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Summary 
United States' policy towards Indonesia (the Netherlands East Indies) during the 
Truman and Eisenhower Presidencies involved many of the major issues of the 
time, including decolonisation, access to economic resources, Cold War strategy 
and Washington's involvement with Asian nationalism. Throughout the period, 
the emphasis of American policy was on the integration of Indonesia into world 
capitalism, an objective which became intertwined with Indonesia's growing 
strategic value to the US, from 1948 onwards, and its subsequent importance as a 
scene of confrontation with the Soviets and Communist China. By 1961, 
Washington's policies had failed in all their major aims and it seemed possible 
that Indonesia would become a communist state. 
The Eurocentric bias of American policy consistently dominated US relations 
with Indonesia. During the independence struggle, between 1945 and 1949, 
Washington's support for The Netherlands ended only when it became a greater 
threat to stability than the nationalists. However, after independence, its pro- 
Dutch inclinations were revived over the West Irian question. The militant anti- 
communism of John Foster Dulles, the Americans' inability to come to terms 
with Asian nationalism, exemplified by its handling of the Bandung Conference, 
in 1955, and the deep personal dislike of Sukarno by senior Administration 
officials combined to cause a deterioration in relations which culminated in a 
CIA-sponsored rebellion, in 1957/58. 
The determination and execution of American policy was influenced by 
Australia, which favoured Indonesian independence, and which, in the 1950's, 
exerted great influence in Washington, especially over West Irian. Along with 
the United Kingdom, whose forces had liberated the Netherlands East Indies in 
1945, Australia had a central role in the CIA-backed rebellion. American policy 
minimised the role of the United Nations in the Indonesian independence struggle 
and over West Irian in order to inhibit the Soviet's ability to intervene. 
V 
1. The United States And Indonesia In Context. 
At the end of World War II, the United States (US) wanted to lead its wartime 
allies, principally the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United 
Kingdom (UK), in a co-operative effort to shape the world for the better. 
However, the US found itself in a novel position. Emerging from the conflict as 
the world's strongest nation it was unused to such pre-eminence and many 
Americans wanted a return to the isolationism of the 1930's. Despite the 
pressure for the restoration of its traditional foreign policy, the scale of the 
destruction wrought by war, especially in Europe, and the necessity to respond to 
the strategic advances made by the USSR mitigated against this. US foreign 
policy took on a global perspective as it became engaged in a titanic struggle for 
dominance - or survival - with the USSR. The collapse of the Grand Alliance 
into Cold War hostility and the subsequent division of the world into two 
antagonistic camps provided the context within which US policies towards 
Indonesia were developed and executed. That the US and the USSR became 
enemies is not in doubt but there is no consensus among historians about the 
reasons for the disintegration of the wartime alliance. This study of US- 
Indonesian relations during the Truman and Eisenhower eras, a time of American 
domination in Asia, will examine the impact of American post-war strategy on 
policy towards Indonesia and, in so doing, will seek to illuminate US priorities in 
the conflict with communism. 
Historians have paid relatively little attention to US relations with the 
Netherlands East Indies (NEI), later Indonesia, in the early post-war period. 
Although Indonesia's policy of "Confrontation" in the early 1960's and the 
military coup of 1965 have attracted much interest, the years leading up to these 
tumultuous events have been studied only fleetingly - surprisingly so given the 
controversy over possible US involvement in the overthrow of President 
Sukarno. ' And yet during this period, American policy swung from non- 
intervention, at the end of the war, to a position where, thirteen years later, 
Washington provided political and material support for a rebellion against the 
Indonesian Government. This transition, from an inactive to a highly aggressive 
posture, reflected the increasingly significant place in American priorities 
accorded to Indonesia by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. This 
status derived initially from its economic importance to the recovery of The 
Netherlands and, more generally, world capitalism. However, as Mao Zedong's 
impending victory in the Chinese civil war switched the emphasis of the Cold 
War from Europe to Asia, Indonesia's strategic location in relation to the chain of 
1 For a study of US policy between 1945 and 1949, see Robert McMahon, Colonialism And Cold 
War : The United States And The Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945 - 49, (Ithaca and 
London, 1981). Specific aspects of US policy during this period can be found in Robert 
McMahon, 'Anglo-American Diplomacy And The Reoccupation Of The Netherlands East 
Indies', (Diplomatic History (DH), 2 (1), 1978), Pierre Van Der Eng, `Marshall Aid As A 
Catalyst In the Decolonisation Of Indonesia, 1947 - 49', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 2 
(1988), pp. 335 - 352, Gerlof Homan, `The Netherlands, The United States And The Indonesian 
Question, 1948', Journal of Contemporary History, 25 (1) (1990), pp. 123 - 41 and Cees Wiebes 
and Bert Zeeman, 'US "Big Stick" Diplomacy : The Netherlands Between Decolonization And 
Alignment, 1945 - 9', International History Review (IHR), 14 (1), (1992), pp. 45 - 70. The most 
comprehensive account yet of the covert US support for anti-Sukarno rebels in 1957 and 1958 is to 
be found in Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy : The Secret 
Eisenhower And Dulles Debacle In Indonesia, (New York, 1995), while Joseph Smith, Portrait Of A 
Cold Warrior, (New York, 1976) provides a CIA insider's view of the same events. For broader 
treatments of the Eisenhower Administration's policies toward Indonesia see John Allison, 
Ambassador From The Prairie Or Allison Wonderland, (Boston, 1973) and Howard Jones, 
Indonesia : The Possible Dream, (New York, 1971). 
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offshore military bases developed to contain communism gave it a higher profile 
in Washington. It was, therefore, essential to American policy that the 
archipelago be re-integrated into the capitalist economy and that it remain under 
the control of a government friendly to the West. 
The task of achieving these objectives was, however, complicated by the 
involvement of other interests beside Washington's. The Netherlands, as the 
colonial power, naturally wished to re-assert its authority and restore its 
economic and financial links to the NEI. However, during the Japanese 
occupation, a determined nationalist movement had emerged in the Indies under 
the leadership of Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta. The NEI, thus, became an 
early practical test of the US attitude towards decolonisation and, after 
independence had been achieved in 1949, of its approach to the developing 
countries of the Third World. Sukarno's prominence in the "neutralist" 
movement, along with its continuing economic and strategic importance, ensured 
that Indonesia endured as a priority for American foreign policy during the 
1950's. 
When hostilities finally ceased, in August 1945, the US faced two critical 
challenges. Soviet forces had penetrated into the heart of Europe and had placed 
the USSR firmly on the world stage. Additionally, US efforts to bring the 
Soviets into the war in Asia had allowed them to make significant territorial 
advances, particularly in China. In parallel with the US, the USSR had left 
isolation behind and could not now be disregarded. American policymakers also 
3 
had to confront the almost complete collapse of the capitalist system. Economic 
chaos presented, arguably, a more direct threat to Americans, who dreaded a 
return to the depression of the 1930's. At the war's end, the US found itself in a 
position of political and economic leadership and became involved as never 
before in realpolitik. For a nation which sought to project itself as a principled 
player in world affairs its new-found status strained its "moral" outlook on the 
world. The US had been the first nation to throw off colonialism and prided 
itself on its support for the emancipation of dependent peoples. Of importance to 
the story of its relations with the NEI, then, is the extent to which Washington's 
principle of support for decolonisation endured in the face of its new priorities. 
Historians, especially Americans, have devoted much time and effort in 
trying to explain the outbreak of the Cold War. 2 Early analyses contend that it 
was Soviet aggression which had forced the US into a response, leading to the 
creation of two hostile camps. This "orthodox" school holds that, over the 
eighteen months which separated the end of the war and the announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine, in March 1947, the US learned not to trust communists to keep 
agreements and that the USSR was intent on maximising its strategic position in 
Europe. The "orthodox" position is, then, that Washington was guilty only of 
naivete and that it was given no alternative to meeting head-on the `distending 
challenge of the Communists'. 3 "Revisionist" historians, however, argue that 
2 For an overview of the debate see Howard Jones and Randall B. Wood, `Origins Of The Cold 
War In Europe And The Near East ; Recent Historiography And The National Security 
Imperative', DH, 17 (2) (1993), pp. 251 - 76. 
3 Herbert Feis, From Trust To Terror : The Onset Of The Cold War, (London, 1970), p. 191. See 
also John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (London, 1971) for another 
"orthodox" analysis. 
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this represents a limited view of Soviet policy at the end of the war and ignores 
American economic concerns. They take a more sympathetic view of Soviet 
intentions, arguing that the USSR was incapable of mounting an invasion of the 
West and only decided to take `close control' of Eastern Europe in response to 
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. 4 Of much greater significance to the 
"revisionists" is the belief that the US approach to the post-war world was 
conditioned by the widespread fear of another depression, a situation which could 
be avoided only by gaining access to raw materials and markets, many of which 
were closed to it. 5 According to the "revisionists", this need to secure access to 
markets brought the US into conflict not just with the Soviets, who controlled 
Eastern Europe, but also with the European imperial powers. Thus, in 1945, the 
US was not concerned so much with a communist threat but was pursuing policies 
whose `ultimate objective ... was both to sustain and to reform world capitalism. '6 
With the debate about the origins of the Cold War beginning to resemble the 
situation it sought to explain, attempts have, more recently, been made to find a 
consensus by taking the best from both camps. 7 "Postrevisionist" historians argue 
that the US approach toward the post-war world was conditioned by anti- 
4 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia And The Cold War 1945 - 1975, (New York and London, 
1976), p. 51. David Horowitz, From Yalta To Vietnam, (Harmondsworth, 1971), 
pp. 11 - 13 and 89. 
5 Stephen Ambrose, Rise To Globalism, (London, 1971), p. 17. 
6 Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits Of Power : The World And US Foreign Policy 1945-54 
(New York and London, 1972), p. 11. It is also argued that the Marshall Plan was a continuation 
of policies which the US had been pursuing since after World War I and which were aimed re- 
ordering world capitalism in the likeness of the US economy - Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan 
: America, Britain And The Reconstruction Of Western Europe 1947 - 1952, (New York and 
Cambridge, 1989). 
7 Jones and Wood, `Origins Of The Cold War', DH, 17 (2) (1993), pp. 251 - 76, citing John 
Gaddis. 
5 
communism and a new doctrine of national security designed to `configure an 
external environment compatible with (the) domestic vision of a good society. ' 
Thus, to the Truman Administration, national security meant more than just 
defending territory - the US also had to maintain a decisive advantage in its `power 
relationship' with the USSR to convince `friends as well as foes' of the benefits of 
a liberal capitalist order. "Postrevisionists" argue that the US simply could not 
afford to take chances with the totalitarian Soviet state which controlled the heart of 
Eurasia and, so, had to prevent the expansion of communism. 8 
Of particular interest in the story of US relations with Indonesia is its post-war 
attitude towards decolonisation, where it is possible to discern a wider degree of 
agreement amongst historians. Traditionally, Americans have seen themselves as 
the champions of "liberty" and have promoted democracy and anti-colonialism as a 
matter of principle. However, by the end of the war, the US no longer promoted 
immediate independence for the colonies but favoured a system of "trusteeship", 
under which imperial powers would set timetables for the liberation of their 
8 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance Of Power : National Security, The Truman Administration 
And The Cold War, (Stanford, 1992), pp. 13,495 - 97 and 515. For another assessment of the 
concept of the national security state, see Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace : The Origins Of The 
Cold War And The National Security State, (Harmondsworth, 1978). Despite the work of the 
"postrevisionists", the controversy over the causes of the Cold War seems not to have arrived at any 
definitive conclusion. Howard Jones and Randall Wood suggest that, while recent work points 
toward there having been a complex mixture of causes with both sides' search for security being the 
`common denominator', much more work still needs to be done before a satisfactory new synthesis is 
reached. (Jones and Wood, `Origins Of The Cold War', DH, 17 (2) (1993), pp. 251 - 76). Others 
believe that "postrevisionism" has not substantially altered the contours of the debate and denounce 
it as "`orthodoxy" for a new generation' in the belief that, essentially, it amounts to an assault upon 
the theories of the "revisionists". (Bruce Cumings, ' "Revising Postrevisionism", Or, The Poverty 
Of Theory In Diplomatic History', DH, 17 (4) (1993), pp. 539 - 69). A more fundamental 
criticism concerns the extent to which the debate has been confined to American academic circles 
and has, consequently, failed to move beyond a US-centred analysis. (For example, see Donald 
Cameron Watt, `Britain And The Historiography Of The Yalta Conference And The Cold War', 
DH, 13 (1) (1989), pp. 67 - 98). 
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colonies. 9 However, even this stance was modified after it drew opposition from 
the colonial powers, especially the UK, and from within the US Administration, 
where "Europeanists" in the State Department argued that Washington should not 
alienate Britain, France and The Netherlands by pressurising them to decolonise. 10 
At the same time, the US War and Navy Departments wanted to acquire numerous 
islands in the Pacific for use as military bases, a policy clearly incompatible with 
anti-colonialism. " The compromise between these conflicting priorities was a 
further watering-down of the commitment to independence and, when, in June 
1945, America signed the UN Charter, its provisions on trusteeship did not compel 
the Europeans to place their colonies into trusteeship and allowed the US to go 
ahead with its plans for island bases. 
This less than heroic policy left the US in a contradictory position because, 
while it reflected the exigencies of the post-war situation, Washington still wanted 
to flaunt its anti-colonial credentials to the world, for example, through its promise 
to grant independence to the Philippines. While this might be explained by 
asserting that the US had only moderated its approach where the sovereignty of 
other nations was involved, another, more powerful, rationale has been proposed - 
that revolutionary nationalism threatened access to the raw materials and markets 
the US craved by raising the possibility of the nationalisation of resources, industry 
and markets. "Revisionist" historians are satisfied to explain US policy towards 
9 Cordell Hull, Memoirs Of Cordell Hull Vol. 2, (London, 1948), p. 1599. 
10 Leffler, Preponderance Of Power, p. 92. 
11 Hull, Memoirs Of Cordell Hull Vol. 2, p. 1599. 
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decolonisation in these terms. 12 However, "postrevisionists" argue that the US 
feared that communists might take advantage of nationalist movements to disrupt 
US plans. In their view, Washington determined to thwart revolutionary 
nationalism because it might act as a stalking horse for communism and, also, to 
ensure that the West had continued access to Third World resources and markets. 13 
Such an outlook is consistent with the granting of Philippine independence, the 
terms of which ensured that the US retained its economic interests. Of concern, 
also, was the potential threat posed by Asian nationalist movements to the Truman 
Administration's plans for American national security in the Pacific. Both the US 
military's perceived need for bases in the region and the more general desire of 
American leaders to lead post-war reform ran counter to local moves towards 
independence. What is not in question is that, by mid-1945, US anti-colonialism 
had been downgraded in importance in the face of more pressing concerns. 
The United States and the NEI 
While Washington's strategic and economic priorities, as well as its attitude to 
decolonisation, were important factors in post-war US relations with the NEI, the 
Truman Administration also had to set its policy in the context of America's pre- 
war connections with the colony, which, in the years before the outbreak of 
hostilities in the Pacific, were strictly limited and based largely on trade. 
14 It was 
12 Ambrose, Rise To Globalism, p. 18. 
13 Leffler, A Preponderance Of Power, pp. 496 - 98. 
14 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 45. 
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only when the prospect of losing access to the NEI's rich natural wealth arose that 
Washington developed an appreciation of its strategic importance. However, when 
the Japanese surrendered, the US had no military presence in the NEI and did not, 
therefore, regard the colony as a post-war priority. Washington's attitude towards 
the NEI also assumed that there would be little, if any, opposition to the restoration 
of Dutch sovereignty from nationalist forces. 
Before the war, the US had significant trade and investment links with the 
NET. In 1940, the colony was the source of more American imports, by value, than 
any other Asian country and was America's fourth largest export market in Asia. 15 
The US was also important to the NEI as a trading partner, accounting for 20 per 
cent of its exports and supplying 23 per cent of its imports - the NEI was the fourth 
largest market for American arms. 16 The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company 
(Stanvac), which was Royal Dutch Shell's (RDS's) only competitor, controlled 27 
per cent of NEI oil refining capacity, amounting to 2 million tons each year and had 
assets valued at $50 million. '7 There were also substantial investments by 
organisations such as General Motors, Caltex, the Goodyear Rubber Company, the 
US Rubber Company and Proctor and Gamble. Altogether, American investment 
in the NEI totalled about $250 million. 18 According to Cordell Hull, the Secretary 
15 Rupert Emerson, The Netherlands Indies And The United States, (Boston, 1942), p. 42. 
16 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 46. Hull to the Consul-General at Batavia (Walter 
Foote), 5 Oct. 1940, Foreign Relations Of The United States (FRUS) 1940 IV, p. 167. 
" Memoranda of Conversation, by Maxwell Hamilton, 25 Jul. 1940 and by Stanley Hornbeck, 
16 Aug. 1940 and Foote to the Secretary of State, 21 Aug. 1940, FRUS 1940 IV, 
pp. 55 - 56,75 - 79 and 83. 
18 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 46. 
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of State, this commercial relationship gave the US `a substantial interest in the 
maintenance of the principle and practice of equality of opportunity in trade and 
enterprise. ' 19 
The US also had a growing strategic interest in the NEI. With a population of 
70 millions, the NEI was a huge potential market for US exports. It also supplied 
40 per cent of the world's natural rubber, including 35 - 40 per cent of American 
imports, and 18 per cent of world tin supplies. 20 US concern at the Japanese threat 
to the NEI was deep enough, in April 1940, for Hull to warn that `any change in the 
status of the Netherlands East Indies would directly affect the interests of many 
countries .... 
' He went on to tell Japan that intervention in the domestic affairs of 
the NEI would prejudice peace and stability in the region. 21 His clear implication 
was that the US would not be able to ignore the loss of the NEI's resources to a 
hostile nation. Washington's increased interest had been noted in London, where 
the Foreign Office had observed that the NEI's oil fields produced 7 million tons 
each year and contained estimated reserves of 1,500 million barrels, which ranked 
the NEI second only in importance to the Middle East. The Foreign Office 
concluded that, after the war, `oil supplies at the Western end of the Pacific will be 
vital [and] America is likely to insist upon a greater measure of control over NEI 
production. ' 22 
19 HuiI to the Ambassador in Japan, 4 Jul. 1940, FRUS 1940 IV, pp. 381 - 87. 
20 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 51. F. S. V. Donnison, History Of The Second World 
War : British Military Administration In The Far East 1943-46, (HMSO, 1956), p. 413. 
21 Cordell Hull, Memoirs Of Cordell Hull Vol. I, p. 889. 
22 Public Record Office, London (PRO); FO 800/303; "Memorandum on the Essential Interests of 
the British Commonwealth in the Persian Gulf and its Coastal States : with Special Reference to 
India. ", Mar. 1945. 
10 
The strategic importance of the NEI's natural wealth was complemented by its 
military value to the US. Before Pearl Harbor, General Douglas MacArthur had 
considered the NEI, along with Malaya and the Philippines, to be `America's single 
hope of effective resistance' to the expected Japanese onslaught. 23 Even after its 
fall, MacArthur saw the NEI as one of the steps on his proposed progress from 
Australia to Japan. However, in March 1945, Allied plans were changed and it was 
decided that the NEI would be bypassed. Instead of re-taking the islands as part of 
the process of pushing back the Japanese, the Allies opted to cut off `the so-called 
Empire lifeline to the East Indies. '24 The decision had a profound impact on future 
US policy because it meant that, when the war ended, there was no concentration of 
American troops in the NEI with the result that the US had no immediate and direct 
interest in the colony. 25 Thus, by 1945, the US had identified a strategic interest in 
the NEI but the colony was not a priority for planners. 
Crucial to the American attitude towards the NEI at the end of the war was the 
closeness of its friendship with The Netherlands. Bound by the traditional links 
between the two countries, something emphasised by President Franklin 
Roosevelt's ancestry, their wartime alliance had further strengthened the bonds 
between them. Despite Roosevelt's death, his enthusiastic belief in Dutch 
liberalism - he had compared British and the French colonialism unfavourably with 
the `admirable Dutch commitment to colonial independence' 
26 
- conditioned US 
23 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964), p. 111. 
24 Ibid., p. 254. 
25 Akira Iriye, The Cold War In Asia :A Historical Introduction, (Englewood Cliffs, 1974). p. 72. 
26 Warren Kimball, The Juggler (Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 151. 
planning for the post-war NEI. However, Dutch imperialism was far more 
conventional than the Americans would have liked to believe. In 1945, the notion 
that the Indonesians might want their independence, let alone be capable of 
governing themselves, seemed far-fetched to most Netherlanders. Believing that 
they had a mission to civilise the "spice islands" and that `(the Dutch had) made the 
Indies', 27 they could not imagine that the natives would be so ungrateful as to reject 
them. 
The Netherlands' domination in the NEI had brought huge wealth to the 
metropole, a benefit which led the Dutch to conclude that `the prosperity of (The 
Netherlands and the East Indies) is indivisible'. 28 During the nineteenth century, 
they extracted enormous profits from the NEI - between 1831 and 1877 the average 
annual profit returned to The Netherlands was 18 million guilders at a time when 
the national budget never exceeded 60 million guilders. 29 Up to the outbreak of 
World War II, they continued to dominate the economy by means of both corporate 
and financial investments which, by 1940, are estimated to have totalled $1.4 
billion, yielding $100 million in profits annually. 30 Between 1925 and 1934 
receipts from the NEI averaged 14.7 per cent of national income. Though, by 1935, 
this had fallen to 13.7 per cent it still probably represented the highest ratio 
anywhere in the world . 
31 Despite this continuing pre-eminence, the Dutch were not 
27 Pieter Gerbrandy, Indonesia, (London and The Hague), p. 28. 
28 Ibid., p. 26. 
29 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 24. 
30 Ibid., p. 39. 
3' Theodore Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against The West In Java And Luzon 1942 - 45, 
(Princeton and Guildford, 1988), pp. 17 - 18. 
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investing in the dynamic sectors of the economy such as rubber production and 
mineral extraction where non-Dutch investors were staking their claims. Between 
1929 and 1939,61 per cent of the investment in enterprises capitalised at over f 10 
million came from the UK, the US or other foreign countries while nearly a quarter 
came from Indonesian sources. As World War II loomed, the Dutch capitalist class 
still dominated in the Indies but only by reason of its stake in a declining estate 
economy. 32 
The economic exploitation of the NEI went hand-in-hand with a rigorous 
system of political control under which the Dutch exercised power through pliant 
local rulers. By encouraging rivalries among its puppets, The Hague was able to 
enjoy virtually unchallenged domination of the colony. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, and up to the Japanese invasion, in March 1942, the Dutch resisted 
significant political reform. In 1918, in response to agitation for more local 
government, the authorities set up the Volksraad (People's Assembly) but this 
institution was never representative, did not have legislative power and was 
subordinate to the Governor-General. It remained the principal concession to an 
admittedly weak nationalist movement. Only after Germany overran Holland, in 
May 1940, did the Netherlands Government-in-exile review the constitutional 
relationship with the NEI, concluding that, while secession was not wanted, there 
was a demand for greater independence in the conduct of local affairs with many 
people wanting an equal relationship between Holland and the Indies. 
Consequently, on 6 December 1942, Queen Wilhelmina promised a new 
32 Richard Robison, Indonesia : The Rise Of Capital, (Canberra, 1986), p. 9. 
13 
constitutional settlement for the colonies and undertook to call a post-war 
conference to decide on the future structure of the Kingdom. 33 Although the 
sovereign's pronouncement was vague, this shift in thinking brought the Dutch 
more into line with the Roosevelt Administration's gradualist approach to 
decolonisation and helped convince the American President of their sincerity. 34 
However, the Queen's statement hid the determination of Dutch politicians to 
restore Holland's prosperity and influence after the war, plans which depended on 
the retention of the NEI. 35 
While Washington believed that it had a good understanding of the Dutch and 
their policies, the same cannot be said about American knowledge of Indonesian 
nationalism. Aware that the Dutch had successfully suppressed all opposition 
before the war, the Americans were hampered by an almost complete lack of 
wartime intelligence from the NEI. 36 During the war, the Allies had been 
unsuccessful in placing agents in the NEI and MacArthur had prevented the Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS) from operating in his South West Pacific Area (SWPA) 
command. 37 Also, the Dutch believed that their return would not be opposed38 and, 
33 Gerbrandy, Indonesia, p. 54. 
34 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 63 - 65. 
35 Gerbrandy, Indonesia, pp. 61 - 62. Wiebes and Zeeman, 'US "Big Stick" Diplomacy', 
IHR, 14 (1) 
(1992), pp. 45 - 70. 
36 Scott Bills, Empire And Cold War : The Roots Of US-Third World Antagonism 1945 - 47 
(London, 1990), p. 129. 
37 Peter Dennis, Troubled Days Of Peace : Mountbatten And South East Asia Command, 1945 - 
46, (Manchester University Press, 1987), p. 77. 
38 PRO; FO 371/63551; "Report To The Combined Chiefs Of Staff By The Supreme Allied 
Commander, South East Asia For The Period 1943 - 46", Post Surrender Tasks, p. 
269. 
Mountbatten cites Dr. H. J. van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the NEI, as believing 
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consequently, the State Department underestimated the impact of the Japanese 
occupation on the nationalist movement and remained convinced that the 
nationalists would not pose a threat to The Netherlands' continued sovereignty. So, 
in June 1945, the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, told Henry Stimson, the 
Secretary of War, that `there will probably be a generally quiescent period in the 
relations between the Dutch and the native population ... (and) the great mass of the 
natives will welcome ... the return of the Dutch to control. '39 Less than two months 
after Grew wrote his memorandum, Sukarno declared Indonesian independence 
and confounded Washington's expectations for the NEI. 
The State Department's complacent analysis was based on its awareness of the 
short and unsuccessful history of Indonesian nationalism, which had only attained 
significance in the early twentieth century, when a cadre of university-trained 
Indonesians had begun to challenge Dutch political control in the NEI. The Dutch 
responded by denying these intellectuals positions in society commensurate with 
their status by excluding them from government and other "white-collar" work. 
40 
Soon, the suppressed energy of this new Indonesian elite found expression in 
nationalism and, in 1912, they formed Sarekat Islam (SI). Characterised by a 
profound hostility to the Chinese who controlled finance and credit 
in the 
economy, 41 by 1920, it had 2.5 million members. 
42 However, SI had soon begun to 
39 Grew to Stimson, 28 Jun. 1945, FRUS 1945 VI, pp. 556 - 80. 
40 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 27 - 28. 
ý1 Robison, Indonesia : The Rise of Capital, p. 23. 
42 Charles McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, (Princeton, 1966), p. 80. 
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display signs of Indonesian nationalism's propensity for factionalism as rivalries 
erupted between nationalists and radicals. In 1919, communists who had sheltered 
in the organisation were expelled and, the following year, they formed the 
Perserikaten Kommunist di Indonesia (PKI). The PKI took the initiative in 
opposing Dutch rule but was crushed when it carried out an abortive uprising in 
1926. The defeat of the communists allowed the initiative to pass back to the 
nationalists. In 1927, Sukarno founded the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) which, 
under his charismatic leadership, quickly became the foremost expression of 
nationalist sentiment. The Dutch response was unequivocal and, in 1929, the PNI 
was banned and Sukarno arrested. After his release in 1931, Sukarno resumed his 
leadership of the nationalist cause, which began to regain its strength. Once again, 
in 1934, the Dutch arrested Sukarno and other nationalist leaders and sent them into 
internal exile where they remained until 1942. By the time war broke out, the 
nationalists had been neutralised and the Dutch enjoyed unchallenged domination 
of the NEI. 
Grew's assessment of Indonesian popular opinion was rooted in Washington's 
knowledge of the pre-war state of the nationalist movement and did not take 
account of the profound impact of the Japanese occupation. Despite being driven 
by a Japanese brand of imperialism and the needs of war, Japanese pan-Asianist 
rhetoric fanned nationalist sentiment by promising `to restore Asia to its natural 
state' and by offering an appealing new economic dispensation in the form of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 43 Although the extent of the advances 
43 Akira Iriye, The Cold War In Asia, pp. 59 - 60. For further reading on Japanese war policy, see 
Iriye, Power And Culture : The Japanese-American War 1941 - 45 (Cambridge and London, 1981), 
16 
made by Indonesians were limited by Japanese interests, the nationalists were able 
to exploit the situation and had built themselves into a powerful movement by the 
time of the Japanese collapse, in August 1945. The occupation proved to 
Indonesians that foreign domination of any kind was abhorrent as the Japanese, 
who had been welcomed as liberators in 1942, became as unpopular as the Dutch 
had been before them. 44 
For the first year or so of the occupation, the Japanese were intent on winning 
Indonesian support for the war effort . 
45 Local leaders like Sukarno and Hatta were 
co-opted to the Japanese enterprise and Indonesians were given an increased, but 
circumscribed, role in the Indies' administration. 46 From the outset, the Japanese 
sought to control the nationalist movement by banning the display of the 
Indonesian flag and discussions about nationalism. They also set up their own 
mass organisation, Tiga A, in an effort to enlist popular support for their cause. 47 
However, as the tide of the war turned, Japan's priorities shifted to the defence of 
its conquered territories and it encouraged the formation of organisations, both 
civilian and paramilitary, to bolster the war effort. As the Japanese position 
Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War : The Great Pacific Conflict, (New York, 1986), John Dower, War 
Without Mercy : Race And Power In The Pacific War, (New York and London, 1986) and Friend, 
The Blue-Eyed Enemy. 
44 Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, p. 7. Ganis Harsono, Recollections OfAn Indonesian Diplomat In 
The Sukarno Era (University of Queensland Press, 1977), p. 34. 
as Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno And The Struggle For Indonesian Independence, (Ithaca, 1969), p. 223. 
46 Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, p. 70. After occupying the NEI, the Japanese sent only three 
hundred administrators to the islands and so needed to employ Indonesians, mainly on lower grade 
duties. 
47 Dahm, Sukarno, p. 221. 
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deteriorated, nationalists were able to take advantage of their increased 
vulnerability and used these new organisations to promote their own cause. Led by 
Sukarno and Hatta, one such group, PUTERA, soon fell foul of the authorities. 
However, another, known as PETA, later became the core of the nationalist army. 
Set up to improve the defence of the NEI against Allied attack, PETA was a 
Japanese-trained, but largely local, fighting force which gave many Indonesians 
their first military training. 48 As their position weakened, the Japanese were forced 
to make further concessions to Indonesian nationalism and, in December 1944, they 
agreed to grant independence to Indonesia, but the final transfer of power was 
frustrated by the Japanese collapse in August 1945. Just as Japanese promises of 
independence proved illusory, so their pledge of a new economic order failed to 
bring progress to the NEI. Aimed at securing access to its resources, such as oil, tin 
and rubber, 49 the Japanese occupation led to economic and humanitarian hardship 
and perpetuated the NEI's economic subservience to foreign powers - Java, in 
particular, experienced widespread starvation and suffered under the romusha 
system of forced labour. 50 
48 The Dutch colonial army, the KoninklUk Nederlands Indisch Leger, recruited mainly from the 
predominantly Christian islands, such as Ambon, rather than the Muslim areas, like Java and 
Sumatra. 
49 S. Woodburn Kirby, History Of The Second World War : The War Against Japan, Vol. V, 
(London, 1969), p. 466. 
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By August 1945, and unknown to American planners, Indonesians had gained 
experience in administration, had a rudimentary military force at their disposal and 
were confident of their ability to mount a serious challenge to Dutch rule. Japan's 
sudden collapse and the Allies' inability to reach the NEI quickly, created a power 
vacuum in the NEI which offered the nationalists the chance of government. 
Sukarno and Hatta at first hesitated to take power but, under pressure from radicals, 
on 17 August 1945, Sukarno proclaimed independence and the creation of the 
Republic of Indonesia in a modest ceremony at the Japanese army commander's 
house. 
However, with the Japanese surrender, Sukarno knew that it was the Allies 
who would determine the fate of the Indonesian Revolution. The first direct 
American contact with the NEI came when, on 15 September 1945, OSS agents 
arrived at Tandjunpriok as part of the Allied Military Mission, which was under the 
command of Rear-Admiral W. R. Patterson. 51 Also aboard Patterson's flagship, 
HMS Cumberland, were British and Dutch Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War 
and Internees (RAPWI) officials and Netherlands Indies Civil Administration 
personnel, including Dr. Charles 0. van der Plas, the Head of Civil Administration 
in the Netherlands Indies Government-in-exile, whose mission was to ensure the 
integrity of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, its future prosperity and its place in 
the world. 
51 The port at Batavia, seat of the colonial government in the NET. 
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2. Washington Hides Behind The British (August 1945 - November 1946) 
As part of its policy of favouring the revival of European imperialism in 
Southeast Asia, the State Department looked forward to the restoration of Dutch 
sovereignty in the NEI and expected that it would lead to the fulfilment of 
Washington's post-war economic, political and strategic objectives. However. 
when the re-occupation of the NEI began, the inadequacy of US policy became 
apparent as Allied forces discovered the strength of Indonesian nationalism. They 
found overwhelming support for independence in the NEI and that radical 
nationalists were willing, and able, to use violence to resist the re-introduction of 
Dutch rule. Through its policy of non-intervention, the Truman Administration 
tried to avoid direct responsibility for the application of an Allied policy so 
obviously unpopular with Indonesians. As time went on, Washington came under 
increasing pressure from the British, the Dutch, the Indonesians and domestic 
opinion to abandon their stance and to help in the search for a solution. By 
November 1946, when the British finally withdrew from the NET, it seemed as if a 
solution had been brokered which would allow Washington to escape direct 
involvement in the crisis. 
In June 1945, the State Department was emphatic that its priority in Southeast 
Asia generally, and the NEI in particular, was stability. It presumed that, in return 
for the American peoples' sacrifices during the war, the US had a right to be 
rewarded with `peace and security ... and economic welfare' 
in the region. It 
accepted, however, that this objective could only be secured if native populations 
20 
were granted `the largest possible measure of political freedom ... consistent with 
their ability to assume the responsibility .... ' 
1 In respect of the NET, Washington 
believed that the twin objectives of stability and greater political freedom for the 
colonised - which might involve independence - would be achieved by the return of 
the Dutch. 
In fact, the US had made the link between the NEI's post-war political 
development and its own desire for stability in Asia as early as the summer of 1943. 
Then, the Roosevelt Administration had concluded that independence for the NEI 
was a luxury which could not be afforded and that the `future security' of the region 
demanded the return of the Dutch colonists. 2 The need for stability was made all 
the more important as the consequences of the Japanese efforts to stir up anti-white 
sentiment and their fostering of nationalist movements became apparent. 
Americans were, therefore, relieved by the expectation that the Dutch would 
maintain `friendly' relations with the US, Britain and France and that they would 
`almost certainly collaborate in international security arrangements for the Pacific 
and will resist other powers gaining footholds' in the NEI. The State Department 
was also confident that the Dutch would take the necessary steps to ensure internal 
stability in the NEI and predicted, as a `foregone conclusion', that they would make 
`substantial concessions to native desires' for greater local participation in 
government. 3 The idea that the Dutch would protect the NEI from communist 
1 Grew to Stimson, 28 Jun. 1945. FRUS 1945 VI, pp. 556 - 80. 
2 Iriye, Power And Culture, p. 133. 
Grew to Stimson, 28 Jun. 1945. FRUS 1945 VI, pp. 556 - 80. 
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subversion while, at the same time, promoting stability in the region was exactly 
what the US wanted in the post-war world. 
The Truman Administration also believed that the return of the Dutch would 
facilitate the NEI's reintegration into the world economy. Under their rule, it was 
predicted that the native economy of the NEI would quickly achieve self- 
sufficiency after the end of the war. It was also noted that export recovery would 
take longer but that the Dutch had laid plans to rehabilitate the rubber and oil 
industries and that they would `revert to the "open door" policy which had existed 
prior to 1935. ' Thus, the State Department did not expect to encounter serious 
difficulties in exploiting the NEI's natural resources and restoring its valuable pre- 
war trade. With the thought that The Netherlands would be firmly in control of the 
post-war situation, the Administration reassured itself that `traditional Dutch policy 
is in agreement with the view of the US which favors equal economic opportunity 
for all nations and their nationals. '4 The State Department was content that 
American economic policy goals could be achieved by the restoration of the Dutch 
Empire. 
The Truman Administration recognised that it would have trouble in 
reconciling its support for self-determination for the colonised with its desire to 
maintain the `unity of the major United Nations. ' However, as regards the NEI, it 
seemed that the return of the Dutch would be all that was required for the 
achievement of American plans. The State Department was able, as a result, to 
' Ibid., pp. 556 - 80. 
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emphasise its benevolent disinterest in the NEI when it concluded that `United 
States policy is one of non-intervention in the Indies but favors, in principle, ... self- 
government as the (eventual) goal. '5 In practice, this meant that the US supported 
the restoration of Dutch rule while, at the same time, expecting that Indonesian 
independence would be granted at some, undefined, future date. Explicitly, 
Washington proposed to do nothing to bring that independence about. 
The Americans' political desire not to be associated with the restoration of the 
Southeast Asian empires also extended to military disengagement from the region. 
In the autumn of 1944, the Roosevelt Administration had decided that American 
troops serving with Lord Mountbatten's South East Asia Command (SEAC) would 
not participate in political warfare activities `to minimize American association in 
the public eye with the restoration of British imperialism... '6 and, by early 1945, 
American military personnel were being withdrawn from Mountbatten's area, the 
final units leaving on 1 June 1945.7 In April, General Patrick Hurley, the US 
Ambassador to China, had reported that the perilous situation facing American 
soldiers in China required the redeployment of US troops from SEAC to bolster a 
potentially disastrous position. His opinion, expressed to Winston Churchill, the 
British Prime Minister, was `that America should use all her resources for the 
defeat of Japan rather than dissipate them in the reconquest of colonial territory in 
the rear. '8 The Ambassador's comments neatly encapsulated Washington's wish to 
5 Ibid., pp. 556 - 80. 
6 Hull to Roosevelt, 8 Sept. 1944, FRUS 1944 : The Conference at Quebec - 1944, pp. 261 - 65. 
7 PRO; FO 371/63551; "Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff', Strategy and Operations, p. 219. 
8 Patrick Hurley to the Secretary of State, 14 Apr. 1945, FRUS 1945 VII, pp. 329 - 32. 
23 
concentrate on the main priority - the defeat of Japan - while avoiding the 
embarrassment of being involved in Southeast Asian colonial politics. In this 
context, the decision to dissolve the SWPA and transfer most of its area of 
operation to SEAC, with effect from 15 August 1945, satisfied both American war 
strategy and Washington's political interests. 9 The agreement to give SEAC 
responsibility for the liberation of the NEI did not, however, amount to a rejection 
by the US of its interests in the colony since the British shared with the Americans 
a commitment to restoring Dutch rule and so could be trusted to protect US 
interests in the Indies. In effect, Washington "sub-contracted" to London the 
conduct of its policy in the NEI. 
Like the Americans, the British had a sizeable economic stake in the NET. By 
1941, British companies had considerable interests in the NET, particularly in 
mineral extraction and plantations. In addition to the many British importers and 
agents trading there, RDS, which was 40 per cent British-owned, controlled 73 per 
cent of refinery capacity in the NEI and dominated oil extraction, 1° while British- 
American Tobacco was one of a number of companies which owned plantations in 
the NEI. Altogether British investments in the NEI by the time war came totalled 
l about £ 100 million. 1 
9 SEAC's zone of responsibility already included Sumatra, while the SWPA covered the 
remainder of the NEI. The Americans retained the Philippines in their area of operations. 
10 History of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, (Public Affairs, Shell International 
Petroleum Company, London), Department of Management Records and Archives, Shell UK, Shell 
Centre, London. Shell's share of oil production is based on 1938 figures and is confirmed by 
Memorandum of Conversation by Hamilton, 25 Jul. 1940, FRUS 1940 IV, pp. 55 - 56. 
11 PRO; FO 371/46348; Letter from Directors of Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java Ltd, British- 
American Tobacco Co. Ltd, Harrison & Crossfield Ltd, Lever Bros. & Unilever Ltd, "Shell 
Transport" & Trading Co. Ltd to Bevin, 10 Oct. 1945. 
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The NEI was also important to the British Empire in the Far East. Through 
the International Rubber Committee, the British and Dutch controlled production 
levels and the price of natural rubber from their Malayan and Indies plantations. 
The UK also obtained crucial supplies of aviation gasoline from Stanvac refineries 
in Sumatra - in 1940, the company's entire output for the next three years was 
contracted to Britain. 12 Perhaps most importantly of all, communications between 
the UK and its Pacific colonies and Dominions depended on the security of the 
Straits of Malacca, the narrow stretch of water between Malaya and Sumatra, thus 
highlighting the interdependence of the European powers in Southeast Asia. In 
November 1945, a British Government report noted that the British, French and 
Dutch were all facing similar problems in their Asian colonies and concluded that 
an orderly transition to self-government in the British colonies would be 
`impossible to pursue' if nationalist movements were allowed to get out of control 
`in any one of the (British, French or Dutch) dependencies. ' 13 Like Washington, 
London wanted stability and believed that it was essential the NEI `be under the 
control of a friendly power.... ' 14 
The development of atomic weapons had given the US and the UK a shared 
strategic interest in the NEI's future as an ally of the West. In August 1943, 
Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that their countries would collaborate fully in 
the development of atomic energy for military and commercial purposes. They set 
12 Memorandum of Conversation by Hamilton, 25 Jul. 1940, FRUS 1940 N, pp. 55 - 56. 
13 PRO; FO 371/46325; "Economic Co-ordination in South East Asia", report sent to the Cabinet 
Office, 30 Nov. 1945. 
14 PRO; FO 371/54052; "British Foreign Policy in the Far East", 31 Dec. 1945. 
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up jointly the Combined Development Trust (CDT) which was assigned the task of 
gaining control of, and developing, the production of uranium and thorium supplies 
situated in areas outside their jurisdiction. 15 The CDT identified the NEI as a 
significant source of thorium and, amid conditions of extreme secrecy, negotiations 
with the Dutch Government began on 12 July 1945. On 4 August, the US and the 
UK reached an agreement with the Dutch which gave them control of thorium 
supplies in the NEI16 and, in so doing, gave themselves a powerful incentive to 
maintain Dutch sovereignty. 
Although the US and the UK had differing emphases in their respective 
policies towards the NEI, they shared a basic interest in the colony. They both 
wanted to see the NEI remaining under Dutch rule, at least for the time being - the 
Americans, on 10 December 1944, and the British, on 24 August 1945, had 
concluded Civil Affairs Agreements (CAAs) with the Dutch which recognised 
Dutch sovereignty over the NEI and committed them, after liberation, to returning 
the colony to Dutch control. '7 Both also believed that the Dutch would not want to 
return to the pre-war colonial system and would promote institutional reform 
Despite not wishing to be directly involved in Southeast Asia after the war, 
Washington took steps to ensure that it was able to monitor events. Accordingly, a 
15 Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom for the Establishment of the 
Combined Development Trust, 13 Jun. 1944, FRUS 1944 II, pp. 1026 - 28. 
16 PRO; PREM 8/110; "Memorandum of Agreement Between The Netherlands Government and the 
Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland", 4 Aug. 1945. 
" The United Kingdom - Netherlands Civil Affairs Agreement originally covered only Sumatra but 
was extended, on 4 September 1945, to cover the whole of the NET. 
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few weeks before the Japanese surrender, Mountbatten agreed to allow the OSS to 
operate in SEAC's area until American diplomatic representation could be 
arranged. Under the agreement, the OSS teams were allowed to carry out RAPWI 
functions, to obtain information about war criminals and to protect American 
property. In fact, Washington used the understanding as cover for the OSS to 
collect political, military and economic intelligence. 18 The OSS party sent to the 
NEI aboard HMS Cumberland was led by Jane Foster and was joined, on 25 
September, by Lieutenant-Colonel K. K. Kennedy, the US Military Observer. '9 
The Americans also received information from the British, who were keen to 
ensure that Washington was well-informed about events in the NEI. Even before 
the SWPA's dissolution, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary 
of State, had noted, perhaps a little ruefully, that it was `probably inevitable' that 
the post-war situation would require Britain to consult the US Administration on all 
matters relating to Southeast Asia. 20 When SEAC took responsibility for Southeast 
Asia, British awareness of American concern about its investments led Esler 
Dening, Mountbatten's Chief Political Adviser, to assure them that his `personal 
attention ... would be given to the re-occupied areas' and that questions about 
18 PRO; WO 203/6449; SACSEA to Saigon Control Mission, 20 Sept. 1945. US War 
Department, The Overseas Targets : War Report Of The OSS Vol. 2 (New York, Washington, 
1976), p. 413 - 14. 
19 National Archives, Washington DC (NA); Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Record 
Group 226 (RG 226); Field Intelligence Reports : Theater Officer Correspondence, Draft 
Histories, Box 25; 276 SSU/IBT/Batavia - Operations; Foster to Lloyd George, 25 Sept. 1945. 
Kennedy was probably a member of Military Intelligence. 
20 PRO; FO 371/46325; Sir Alexander Cadogan to Anthony Eden, 13 Jan 1945. 
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American interests should be directed to him until normal channels could be 
established. 21 
At the end of the war, the US had a treaty commitment to restore Dutch rule in 
the NEI and had also decided that the Dutch would safeguard American and 
Western interests in the archipelago. The decision to transfer responsibility for 
Southeast Asia to the British was taken to allow Washington to pursue its own 
wartime and post-war objectives and also allowed the US to avoid association with 
the restoration of colonial rule in the region. Despite regarding the British as a 
"safe pair of hands", the Administration ensured that it was in a position to keep a 
close watch on developments and also to pursue its own interests through the 
presence of the OSS until its diplomatic presence was reinstated. The Americans - 
like the British and the Dutch - believed that it would not be long before pre-war 
relations were re-established and the NEI was restored to its place in the world 
political and economic order. The Americans expected that their involvement in 
the process would be limited. 
The tasks facing the Allied forces in the NEI were threefold. They were the 
concentration, disarming and repatriation of Japanese armed forces, the liberation 
and evacuation of Allied prisoners and civilian internees and the maintenance of 
law and order in the major cities until the Dutch could take over. 22 From the 
21 Secretary of the American Commission at New Delhi (Max W Bishop) to the Secretary of State, 
17 Aug. 1945, FRUS 1945 VI, p. 673. The US Consul-General did not return to Batavia until the 
third week in October. 
22 Imperial War Museum (IWM); Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, The Life And Times Of 
General Sir Philip Christison, p. 176. Christison's memoir is unpublished. 
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outset, the reoccupation of the NEI was more problematical than the Allies had 
expected. Mountbatten blamed MacArthur's order, that Allied forces should 
neither re-occupy territory nor take local surrenders until after the Japanese had 
formally capitulated, for postponing the Allies' arrival in the NEI. He also blamed 
MacArthur for the lack of resources available to SEAC to carry out its 
responsibilities. He noted that he had neither the troops nor the transport to carry 
out effectively his tasks of rounding-up and repatriating over 750,000 Japanese 
soldiers and civilians and evacuating over 125,000 prisoners of war and internees. 23 
However, Mountbatten only tells part of the story. By chastising MacArthur for the 
failure to reach the NEI quickly after the cessation of hostilities, he avoided the 
issue of British priorities in Southeast Asia, which left the liberation of the NEI as 
SEAC's lowest priority. 24 In military terms, therefore, both the US and the UK saw 
the NEI as relatively unimportant. The British, who had to deal with the 
consequences of Allied complacency, tried to blame the Americans but were just as 
culpable themselves. The British undoubtedly felt that they had been landed with a 
"hot potato" and this sense of injustice infected their actions in the NEI and helped 
shape American policy. 
Soon after the cessation of hostilities, both the British and the Americans 
began to realise that the situation in the NEI might be more difficult than had 
been expected. By mid-September, reports from RAPWI teams and his own wife 
23 PRO; FO 371/63551; "Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff ", Strategy and Operations, 
pp. 226 - 27 and 257. The general surrender occurred on 2 September 1945 while the surrender 
in 
Southeast Asia was taken on 12 September 1945. 
24 Christopher Thorne, Allies Of A Kind : The US, Britain And The War Against Japan 1941-45, 
(London, 1978), p. 614. 
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had alerted Mountbatten to the appalling conditions in the prisoner-of-war and 
internment camps. It was in response to this intelligence that Mountbatten 
decided to send Patterson to Java with relief supplies and to get more 
information. The knowledge that Indonesian independence had been declared, 
together with reports of the arming of Indonesian radicals by the Japanese, added 
to the fears about the situation in the NET. British concerns were also reflected in 
a more cautious assessment of the situation in Washington, where it was being 
acknowledged that the NEI might present the Allies with `a most complicated 
problem .... 
' 25 However, it was only when Patterson reached Java that the Allies 
began to appreciate the scale of the problem which confronted them. 
Patterson's arrival exposed the extent to which law and order had broken 
down. He found armed Indonesians intimidating prisoners in their camps and it 
soon became clear that many Japanese troops had withdrawn from their policing 
duties. While some had simply interned themselves, others had handed over their 
duties to Indonesian police, while yet more had been physically displaced by 
radical nationalists. 26 Some Japanese, including the hated Kempeitai, the 
Military Police, had, nevertheless, complied with the surrender terms and were 
still patrolling Batavia. It is clear that large numbers of Japanese troops had 
failed to comply with Allied directions to maintain law and order - as one 
25 Brown University Library (BUL); OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports 
(Microfilm) (OSS/State IR Reports) : Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia; OSS Research 
and Analysis Branch (OSS RAB) Report 3255; "A "Government of the Republic of Indonesia" 
Confronts Allied Reoccupation Forces in the Netherlands East Indies", 14 Sept. 1945. 
26 Anderson, Java In A Time Of Revolution, pp. 128 - 30; Clifford Squire, Britain And The 
Transfer Of Power In Indonesia, (PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, 1979), p. 59. 
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sympathetic British officer noted, the Japanese had progressively lost control to 
the nationalists `at a time when ever increasing demands were being made on 
(them) from all sides.... '27 However, the promotion of the nationalist cause by 
the Japanese military hierarchy had also encouraged radicals to take control. By 
now, Mountbatten was convinced that the NEI was going to cause real difficulties 
for the Allies and he told Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, who was to 
command Allied forces in the NEI, that he did not want to be directly responsible 
for, what he believed would be, a `tricky' business. 28 
Just as the British were forced to revise their assessment of the likely course 
of events in the NEI so too were the Americans. Foster reported that van der Plas 
had `been temporarily removed to H. M. S. Cumberland in protective custody' in 
view of the situation. She was also able to give the first detailed account of the 
nationalists and their programme. Her source was, she said, convinced that 
nationalists wanted `nothing short of independence' and she went on to cast doubt 
on the Allies' belief that they were merely creatures of the Japanese. Foster's 
report did, however, give credence to the view that the Japanese were playing a 
`double game' by accepting Allied orders while at the same time supporting the 
nationalists. 29 There is some doubt about the use to which Foster's reports were 
put as five days later she asked her superiors what arrangements were being made 
27 PRO; WO 203/5383; "Report on the Progress of Operation Impersonal" by Capt. E. Tyndale 
Cooper, 19 Oct. 1945. 
28 IWM; Christison, The Life and Times of General Sir Philip Christison, p. 176. 
29 NA; RG 226; Field Intelligence Reports, Box 21; 241; "Current Political Situation", report by 
Foster, 20 Sept. 1945. 
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for `our material' to reach Washington, making it clear that much of it was of 
interest only to the State Department. 3° Despite this communication problem, it 
seems that sufficient information reached Washington to raise doubts about the 
original assessment of the Indonesians' attitude towards their colonial masters. 
While noting that it was too early `to evaluate the full significance of the Java 
uprisings', the OSS accepted that the strength of nationalist support in Batavia had 
been underestimated. 31 
The early reports from Java, while they raised concerns about the basis upon 
which US policy had been founded, confirmed the wisdom of the decision not to 
intervene in the NEI as Foster noted that American prestige amongst Indonesians 
was `very high'. 32 Her assessment was confirmed a few weeks later by another 
American agent who said that pro-nationalist slogans on buildings, which quoted 
from the US Declaration of Independence and the speeches of Abraham Lincoln, 
were designed to appeal to the American troops it had been assumed would liberate 
the NET. That this had not happened had, he reported, left untarnished America's 
reputation as a champion of the colonised. 33 The positive light in which the 
Americans were held contrasted with the plight of the British who were forced to 
30 NA; RG 226; Field Intelligence Reports, Box 25; 276 SSU/IBTBatavia - Operational; Foster 
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25 Oct. 1945. 
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speed up the despatch of troops to the NEI as a result of the evidence accumulated 
by Patterson. 
The first contingents of the main Allied liberation force arrived in Batavia on 
29 September and were soon engaged, along with Japanese troops, in carrying out 
SEAC's post-war tasks. Additionally, Christison had been authorised by London to 
use his "good offices" to arrange meetings between the Dutch and the 
Indonesians. 34 As the military build-up continued, the US sought to preserve its 
distance from the situation but the extent to which the Allied forces relied on 
American equipment threatened to implicate the US in events in the NEI. 
Washington discovered that Lend-Lease trucks stencilled "USA" were being used 
to haul British, Indian and Japanese troops around Batavia and that Japanese troops 
in one truck had fired on Indonesians. 35 On 15 October, the Americans asked the 
British to arrange for the removal of the "USA" insignia in an effort to prevent 
Washington being associated with SEAC's activities. 36 
Although, publicly, the US was neutral in the conflict between the Indonesians 
and the Dutch, the real effect of its stance was to support the Dutch. It was still 
committed to Dutch sovereignty through the CAA and had taken practical steps to 
reinforce this position. In early September, the Administration had agreed to 
34 IWM; Christison, The Life and Times of General Sir Philip Christison, p. 176. 
35 NA; RG 226; Research and Analysis Branch Divisions (RABD); Intelligence Reports 
("Regular" Series), 1941 - 45 ("Regular" Series), Box 285; XL 19357 - XL 19385; "General 
Situation (Java)", Report XL 19385,5 Oct. 1945. 
36 PRO; FO 371/46393; John Allison (US Embassy, London) to Sterndale Bennett, 15 Oct. 1945. 
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complete the training of a contingent of Dutch marines in the US so that they could 
be used `as occupation troops'. 37 A further indication of US attitudes came with 
the approval of a $100 million Export-Import Bank credit for the NET, in the same 
month. While the credit was made conditional upon clarification of the political 
situation, it nevertheless signalled American confidence in the Dutch. 
Washington's predisposition to favour the Dutch was made easier by evidence 
that the nationalists were not quite the force that they had appeared to be. On 28 
September, Kennedy and Foster interviewed Indonesian leaders, including 
Sukarno, to find out more about the potential of the movement. The Americans 
made it clear that the meeting did not imply recognition and Kennedy reported that 
he did not believe that the Indonesians had either the training, equipment or the 
organisation to resist a modern army. 38 Ominously, however, Kennedy also argued 
that the Dutch would be unable by themselves to `defeat completely the forces of 
the Indonesian Republic. '39 While the fact that the meeting was held at all exposed 
a difference of approach with the Dutch, who wanted to execute Sukarno as a 
collaborator, 40 it did show that the OSS team had much the same view of Sukarno 
37 NA; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165 (RG 165); 
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as did the British, who regarded him as a `man of straw' being built up into a 
martyr by the Dutch. 41 
By mid-October, the dilemma facing the US was apparent. On the one hand, it 
had commitments to the Dutch, as the sovereign power, and to the British, who 
were acting on behalf of the Allies. This association with the status quo was given 
added meaning as American-owned oilfields and refineries in Sumatra were being 
protected by Japanese troops acting under Allied orders. 42 In political and 
economic terms, therefore, US interests remained with the restoration of the Dutch. 
However, the emergence of a popular nationalist movement had upset American 
calculations by challenging the assumption that the Dutch would be able to control 
constitutional change. The State Department was also becoming worried about 
Dutch intentions. In an analysis, drawn up in early October, it had noted the 
`crucial necessity' of them making a definitive policy statement43 but American 
patience was sorely tested firstly by their refusal to negotiate with Sukarno and then 
by the vagueness of Dutch proposals. 44 The difficulty facing the US was 
exacerbated by the confusion of information about the nationalists themselves. 
While the British and Kennedy doubted their strength, the Dutch were implying 
41 Memorandum of Conversation by Abbott Low Moffat, 18 Oct. 1945, FRUS 1945 VI, 
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that they were to be feared. On 10 October, Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary of 
State, met the Netherlands Ambassador, Alexander Loudon, who, after handing 
Acheson a copy of the Dutch proposals, described Sukarno and Hatta as wartime 
collaborators. Perhaps in an effort to make sure that all angles were covered, he 
also advised Acheson that they had visited Moscow before the war and that he 
believed they were Communist-inspired. 45 
Essentially, the US response was to take no position at all, a stance justified, 
publicly at least, by the contention that the US could not interfere in the internal 
affairs of friendly powers. 46 However, it was an approach which served to 
reconfirm US support for the Dutch behind an appearance of non-involvement in 
the NEI. Within the State Department, there was a growing realisation that this 
position could not be sustained. Pointing to US economic interests in the NEI and 
the commitment to self-determination in the Atlantic Charter, analysts argued that 
it was `unthinkable' that the US could ignore the situation and urged that `some 
policy must soon be adopted. ' Even so, they had difficulty in identifying an 
acceptable course of action, arguing that support for one side or the other would 
involve potentially unpalatable consequences and half-heartedly suggesting that the 
US might try to persuade Sukarno to negotiate with the Allies. 
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offered policymakers no firm advice and was itself a reflection of the reluctance of 
the State Department to take a position on the NEI. 
Despite its difficulties in devising a policy to deal with the situation and its 
unwillingness to commit itself publicly, the Administration was finding it 
increasingly difficult to avoid comment. On 20 October, in a speech to the Foreign 
Policy Association Forum, John Carter Vincent, the State Department's Director of 
Far Eastern Affairs, spelt out US policy on colonialism in Southeast Asia in an 
effort to meet these criticisms. Vincent proclaimed that the US recognised the 
fundamental right of colonial peoples to self-determination within a specified 
practical time limit. He argued that decolonisation was central to the attainment of 
Washington's foreign policy goals and called for territorial sovereigns and 
nationalists to negotiate transfers of sovereignty in the colonies. Vincent pledged 
that the US would not assist in the forceful imposition of control by colonial 
powers and concluded by offering US assistance, if requested, in efforts to reach 
peaceful settlements. 48 
The speech revealed tensions within the State Department - it had apparently 
not been cleared in advance with the Office of European Affairs49 - and brought the 
US into a more exposed relationship with the Dutch and the Indonesians. Two 
days later, Vincent defended his suggestion that the US was prepared to assist in 
seeking peaceful settlements if requested to do so. He argued that he had not 
48 PRO; FO 371/46353; Department of State Press Release, 18 Oct. 1945. 
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breached the policy of non-intervention since American willingness to give help 
was not new. He also said he was not advocating that the US should actively seek 
to become involved in disputes, such as the one in the NEI, and that any request for 
assistance would be entertained only if it came from a territorial sovereign. 50 This 
clarification formed the basis of the State Department's response to Dutch 
expressions of concern at the import of Vincent's speech . 
51 However, in 
conciliating the Dutch, the US rebuffed the nationalists - on 24 October, Sukarno 
had asked for American mediation citing Vincent's speech. 52 Vincent had, 
however, altered Washington's position in respect of the NEI as it publicly aligned 
the US with British efforts to promote a negotiated settlement. This was done at 
the expense of the Administration's attempts to distance itself from the dispute as 
Vincent succeeded in both antagonising the Dutch and giving false hope to the 
nationalists. The need to reassure the Dutch on the sovereignty issue had the 
consequential effect of delivering a public snub to the nationalists. Finally, the 
assurances given to the Dutch about the conditions under which the US would 
consider mediating the dispute gave them a veto over future American involvement 
in the dispute - only if the Dutch asked for mediation would the Administration 
consider accepting. Overall, the speech and its aftermath reinforced Washington's 
dependence on the British and the Dutch for the achievement of US objectives in 
the NEI and made more explicit its support for the restoration of colonial rule. 
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By the end of October, the situation in the NEI had exploded into open warfare 
between the British and armed Indonesians. Having secured Batavia, SEAC forces 
had, in early October, extended the area under their control to other "key locations" 
in Java in order to make greater progress towards evacuating the Japanese and the 
prisoners of war and the internees. Mountbatten's troops moved to occupy the 
main centres near which were located internment camps and concentrations of 
Japanese troops. At Surabaya, a ferocious battle broke out, on 29 October, as 
Indonesian radicals tried to prevent British occupation of the city. In this critical 
situation the British prevailed upon Sukarno to arrange cease-fires and persuaded 
Dr. H. J. van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Indies, to meet him in 
an effort to get negotiations going. However, The Hague recoiled from legitimising 
Sukarno and denounced van Mook for talking to him despite having given 
permission beforehand for the meeting. 53 
With the situation escalating out of control, both the British and the 
Indonesians turned to the Americans for help. The US Ambassador in London, 
John Winant, reported, on 7 November, that the Foreign Office had complained 
that SEAC was ill-equipped to meet the situation and that the Dutch were being 
difficult. Winant reported that the British wanted 'US understanding and 
sympathy' for their predicament and for any military action they took in furtherance 
of what was, they argued, an Allied task. Two days later, the UK's Ambassador in 
Washington, Lord Halifax, met Secretary of State James Byrnes to ask for an 
53 Memorandum of Conversation by Moffat, 8 Nov. 1945, FRUS 1945 VI, pp. 1170 - 72. 
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indication that the US appreciated the British position. 54 Also in early November, 
Sukarno approached both the US and the UK in an effort to persuade them to 
support a UN investigation into the situation in the NEI. 55 
This pressure revived the concerns of officials in the Bureau of Far Eastern 
Affairs who were unhappy at Washington's policy towards the NEI, which they 
believed had not lived up to American anti-colonial traditions. They also argued 
that through its policy of `benevolent neutrality' towards the Dutch, the US had 
ignored its role as world leader and, consequently, risked harming its long-term 
economic interests. Contending that Vincent's speech had committed the 
Administration to `a negative role of abstention', they condemned as inadequate the 
attempt to hide the origins of SEAC's equipment and asserted that the US would 
not be able for much longer to stand aside from the dispute. As alternatives to 
American `neutrality', they suggested that Washington should either `take a lead' in 
promoting a trusteeship arrangement for the NEI or that it should exert pressure on 
the Dutch to make `reforms short of trusteeship'. Although the officials preferred 
the trusteeship option, which they felt would project a `positive and progressive' 
image of the US and satisfy American public opinion, the Administration was not 
ready to take such a step. 56 It was, however, prepared to despatch its ambassador at 
The Hague to impress upon the Dutch the need for talks, but only if the British 
54 PRO; FO 371/46409; L. Ridsdale to I. A. D. Wilson Young, 2 Jan. 1946. 
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approved. 57 Even though the State Department had accepted a higher profile in the 
dispute, it was still not willing to give the British its public support and was 
certainly not about to challenge Dutch sovereignty in the NET. 
While Washington had been considering its response to the British request, the 
situation in the NEI had changed dramatically. On 14 November, Sutan Sjahrir had 
formed a Cabinet having wrested power from Sukarno. While Sukarno remained 
President of the Republic, the rise of Sjahrir, who as a member of the wartime 
resistance had no association with the Japanese occupation, represented an 
opportunity for talks to resume with the Dutch. On 17 November, Christison, van 
Mook and Sjahrir met informally and events seemed to be taking a promising 
turn. 58 However, these discussions soon broke down over Republican demands for 
Dutch recognition and, by 10 December, the British were again asking the US for 
support. They did not now believe that an approach to the Dutch would be 
productive but instead sought a public statement from the US about the collapse of 
negotiations. The British also wanted American recognition that their troops in 
Java were carrying out Allied tasks. 59 
In addition to the doubts about US policy coming from inside the State 
Department, the Administration was also under fire from other quarters over its 
policy, or lack of one, in the NEI. On 5 December, Congresswoman Clare Luce 
57 Secretary of State to John Winant , 20 Nov. 1945, 
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Booth castigated Washington's `bewildered inactivity' in a speech in the House of 
Representatives60 and, a few days later, a Strategic Services Unit (SSU) report 
warned that US `aloofness' was seen by Indonesians as connivance with the 
forcible restoration of Dutch rule and that American prestige was threatened as a 
result. 61 The Dutch were also known to be unhappy with US `neutrality', which 
they believed represented a failure by Washington to live up to its wartime 
commitments 
62 
The US Administration responded to the British request, on 19 December, 
with a public statement which seemed to satisfy everybody. While the Dutch liked 
the statement, Walter Foote, the American Consul-General in Batavia, reported that 
Christison thought it was `a perfect document' and that the Indonesians saw it as a 
sign that the US would hasten the end of their struggle. 63 Although the statement 
has been described as a `diplomatic triumph', 64 it represented an advance in US 
post-war policy on the NEI only in that it explicitly associated the US with British 
actions and policy in the NEI. For the first time, the Administration publicly 
acknowledged that SEAC was carrying out Allied post-war tasks and that it had `to 
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assure such order as is necessary for their execution. ' The statement reflected US 
policy towards colonialism by recognising Dutch sovereignty in the NEI and, in 
that context, expressed the hope that a peaceful settlement could be achieved which 
would `recogniz(e) alike the natural aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the 
legitimate rights and interests of the Netherlands. ' The Administration called, 
finally, for an early resumption of negotiations and a settlement `in harmony with 
the principles and ideals' of the UN Charter. 65 The initiative indicated the limits of 
US support for the Dutch in that it supported the use of force only insofar as it 
related to the completion of Allied objectives, which did not include the forcible 
restoration of the Dutch. 66 
Three months after the re-occupation, the US had abandoned its attempt to 
hide behind the British, whose effort to share the responsibility for events in the 
NEI had been successful. American policy was in tatters for the simple reason that 
the Truman Administration had not been allowed by the protagonists to remain 
detached from events. Despite this shift, the State Department statement still 
showed it believed that the Indonesians' desire for independence and Dutch rights 
in the NEI were essentially compatible and reconcilable. This stance accorded with 
the Administration's view that Western interests could only be preserved in the 
NEI if the Dutch oversaw an amicable transfer of sovereignty which allowed them 
to retain a significant stake in an independent Indonesia. Washington remained 
65 United States Press Statement, 19 Dec. 1945; Department of State Bulletin (DSB), Vol. XIII, 
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convinced that `the primary responsibility for arriving at a settlement' rested with 
the Dutch67 and that any delay on their part would threaten the NEI's re-integration 
into the capitalist economy or increase the risk that the Indonesian revolution would 
be taken over by radicals or the Soviets, or both, to the detriment of Western 
interests. However, in making its public pronouncement, the State Department had 
strengthened the British and the Dutch positions at the expense of the nationalists. 
It had also limited its own options and was now firmly associated with British 
efforts to promote a negotiated settlement. 
The new American policy did not mean, however, that the Truman 
Administration was prepared to allow the British a free hand. Early in February 
1946 John Allison, a US Embassy official in London speaking with Acheson's 
approval, told the Foreign Office that, because the proposed $3.75 billion loan to 
the UK was under fire in Congress, `there should be no public airing of any Anglo- 
American differences in Far Eastern matters. ' Assuring the British that it was not 
the State Department's idea to use the loan as a lever to secure American 
objectives, he asked that the Administration be kept informed of events in the NEI 
so that any criticism did not affect the loan's passage. 68 The linkage between the 
loan and British policy in the Far East must have impressed the Foreign Office 
despite Allison's denials that it was a connection made by the Administration. The 
US Government had associated itself with British actions in the NEI, but was 
67 United States Press Statement, 19 Dec. 1945; DSB, Vol. XIII, Number 339,23 Dec. 1945. 
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making it clear that its support would continue only if the UK's policies met with 
American approval. 
Washington now became actively involved in promoting a negotiated 
settlement in the NEI and supported a British initiative to get talks re-started. Since 
the bloodletting at Surabaya, the British had accepted that a military solution was 
not achievable and, by December 1945, British policy had shifted and was focused 
on holding the major urban and economic centres until the Dutch were ready to 
take over. 69 At a series of meetings over Christmas 1945, Clement Attlee, the 
Prime Minister, and Ernest Bevin, his Foreign Secretary, urged the Dutch to 
acknowledge their responsibility to take the lead in the search for a settlement. 
Their efforts brought immediate support from Washington. Brushing aside Dutch 
complaints about British partiality towards the nationalists, John Nickerson, the 
Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, reminded Loudon of the 
December statement and told him that a failure by the Dutch to present proposals 
would be `disastrous'. 70 Hickerson's support for the British initiative reflected 
Washington's hope that the colonial powers would negotiate the restoration of their 
sovereignty on terms that accorded with the wishes of `responsible elements' of the 
colonised populations. Although not proposing immediate independence, the US 
expected the colonial powers to accept their duty to prepare their subjects for self- 
government. 71 
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The Anglo-American pressure brought immediate results when, after the 
British had appointed Sir Archibald Clark Kerr as their Special Envoy in the NEI, 
formal talks resumed, in early February. Dutch proposals fitted neatly into the 
framework set out by Hickerson and included the creation of a federal 
Commonwealth of Indonesia which would join The Netherlands and its other 
colonies in a Kingdom of the Netherlands. However, the Dutch promised 
independence only within the lifetime of `the present rising generation'. 72 Sjahrir 
rejected the main elements of the Dutch proposals. He wanted republican 
sovereignty over the whole territory of the NEI, no transitional period to 
independence and the early withdrawal of Dutch troops. Despite these differences, 
the Americans were optimistic. They believed that the Indonesians would be 
prepared to compromise on their demand for independence and that the Dutch were 
committed to reaching a conclusion in the talks. 73 
Unfortunately for the British and the Americans, just as their efforts to secure 
a bi-lateral settlement in the NEI seemed to be bearing fruit, the prospect of 
unwelcome international involvement materialised. With the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) already dealing with a complaint from Iran about Soviet interference in its 
internal affairs, the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic submitted that British actions 
in Greece and Indonesia amounted to a threat to world peace. This threat to the 
Allies' ability to manage the situation in the NEI came at a time when evidence was 
72 Alastair Taylor, Indonesian Independence And The United Nations (London, 1960), p. 19. 
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appearing of increased PKI activity and it raised concerns about Soviet intentions 
towards the NEI. 
The UNSC debate opened on 7 February with D. Z. Manuilsky, the Ukrainian 
Delegate, charging that the UK's actions in the NEI contravened the UN Charter in 
that it was abusing its mandate from the Allies by suppressing the nationalists. He 
charged that the use of Japanese troops by the British showed that they were 
exceeding their mandate and proposed that the UN set up a commission to 
investigate the situation in the NEI and report back to the UNSC. The Soviet 
charges drew a furious response from Bevin, who argued that they had not been 
substantiated. 74 
The US Administration had a rather more complicated problem to address in 
dealing with the Soviet argument than did the British. Having been the prime 
mover in the creation of the UN, Washington wanted to establish it as a forum for 
the resolution of international incidents but was unhappy at the prospect of the 
Soviets using the UN as a means of gaining influence in areas of interest to the 
West. It also had to be aware of the sensitivities of its allies. In December 1945, 
the State Department had considered what line to take in the event that the situation 
in the NEI was referred to the UN and had concluded that the US would argue that 
the best hope for a solution to the problem lay in direct talks between the Dutch and 
the Indonesians. The Administration had also decided not to support any Dutch 
claim that the matter was an internal one and, therefore, not proper to the UN, 
74 United Nations Security Council Official Record (SCOR) 1946, Vol. 1, pp. 174 -178 and 215. 
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arguing that any problem which represented a threat to world peace would `clearly 
be within the competence' of the UN. 75 Accordingly, Edward Stettinius, the US 
Delegate to the UN, argued, on 11 February, that the talks in Batavia represented 
the best chance of avoiding further armed strife and he warned of the `serious 
responsibility' which the UNSC would assume if it did anything `which might 
prejudice or retard the outcome of (the) negotiations .... ' For good measure, 
Stettinius accepted British good faith and argued that The Netherlands Government 
was being sincere in its attempts to solve its problems in the NEI on a liberal 
basis. 76 So, without challenging the competence of the UN to deal with matters 
like the situation in the NEI, Stettinius proposed that the UNSC should take no 
direct part in resolving the dispute in the NEI. 
Despite the rejection of the Ukrainian complaint, which coincided with the 
breakdown of the talks in Batavia, the State Department was sufficiently alarmed 
by the Soviets' action to reassess its approach toward the developing world. Noting 
that work associated with the creation of the UN had diverted US attention away 
from relations with `dependent areas', officials argued that `the very existence of 
the United States' would be at stake if the Soviets replaced the European powers in 
their colonies. To counter this threat, they proposed that the US should use its 
`moral prestige and economic power' to strengthen and stabilise the colonies and, 
`(a)t the same time, see to it that the legitimate political aspirations of dependent 
75 State Department Memorandum (USGA/Gen/29), 26 Dec. 1945, FRUS 1946 VIII, pp. 787 - 89. 
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peoples are fulfilled. '77 Whereas, in June 1945, the State Department had 
identified nationalism as a potentially destabilising force, it was now communism 
which posed a threat to the world balance of power. This threat seemed 
particularly acute in respect of the NEI, where the PKI had been re-established in 
January 194678 and whose nationalist movement was, on the basis of Soviet 
rhetoric at the UNSC, considered to be the target of a communist take-over. 79 
Negotiations were resuscitated, in March, after a personal initiative by van 
Mook, who presented to the Indonesians new proposals based on the creation, by 
the French, of the Indochinese Federation and a French Union. Van Mook's ideas, 
which were well-received in the US, 80 elicited significant concessions from the 
nationalists. They now sought only de facto recognition in Java and Sumatra, 
excluding areas under Allied control, and promised co-operation with the Dutch in 
setting up a federation. They also agreed to allow the deployment of Dutch troops 
on Allied tasks in the NEI. In recognition of the progress made, it was agreed to 
move the talks to The Netherlands and they reconvened, on 14 April, at Hoge 
Veluwe. However, with elections due, The Netherlands Government decided not 
to pursue van Mook's initiative. The Dutch refused to concede de facto recognition 
to the Republic in Sumatra and, as a result, the nationalists hardened their position. 
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Western European Imperialism", Bagby to Gerig, 13 Mar. 1946. 
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The unwillingness of the Dutch to negotiate until after their elections delayed any 
chance of progress until July, when the new Cabinet was sworn in. 
Since December 1945, the Truman Administration had adopted an apparently 
even-handed approach to the Indonesian dispute by promoting a negotiated 
settlement. However, in reality, it was continuing to support the Dutch position in 
the NEI. After the breakdown of the Hoge Veluwe talks, American financial 
assistance to the NEI increased when a further $100 million credit, this time for the 
purchase of surplus property, was signed on 11 July 1946 and, on 15 August, the 
US Commercial Credit Corporation gave a $15 million credit line for the purchase 
of incentive goods. 81 
A more problematic issue for the Administration was the use, by the Dutch in 
the NET, of American military supplies. US sensitivities had already been exposed 
by SEAC's reliance on Lend-Lease equipment and had resulted in the request to 
obliterate identifying insignia. However, the arrival of the US-trained Dutch 
marines in January 1946 and the large-scale influx of Dutch troops from March 
onwards raised the stakes considerably. The prospect of conflict between the 
European troops and the native population brought yet another dilemma for the 
Americans as they were forced to choose between their support for their allies and 
their public commitment to self-government. While military Lend-Lease supplies 
to the Dutch had been halted in August 1945, Washington was aware that Dutch 
81 Acting Secretary of State to Foote, 1 Oct. 1946, FRUS 1946 VIII, pp. 845 - 46. 
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troops had been armed by the British with US-supplied weapons. 82 In March 1946, 
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) considered America's 
role in arming the Dutch and confirmed the established policy of not supplying 
arms `in cases which appear to relate directly to (the NEI)'. However, it recognised 
that once military equipment had been shipped to The Netherlands it would be 
`extremely difficult' to prevent it from being transferred to the NET. Despite US 
policy against supporting the forcible re-imposition of Dutch rule, the SWNCC 
concluded that it was in the `interests of the US' that the Dutch be re-armed. 81 
Washington's public policy of opposing the enforced restoration of Dutch rule has, 
therefore, to be viewed in the light of its acquiescence in the arming of the Dutch 
by the British and its own acceptance that military stores supplied for use by the 
Dutch in Europe might reach the NEI. 
During the early part of 1946, Washington had begun to associate US interests 
in the NEI more closely with those of the Dutch and this changing emphasis was 
reflected in its willingness to give economic support and tacitly to accept the 
arming of the Dutch. This revised attitude was conditioned both by events at the 
UNSC and by the advice coming from Foote. The Consul-General, who had first 
arrived in the NEI in 1934, was extremely sympathetic towards the Dutch, 
believing that they would do more to protect US investments than the British and 
82 NA; RG 226; Field Intelligence Reports, Box 21; 238; Beltz to Bluechell, 9 Dec. 1945. 
Evidence of the scale of British support can be found in HSTL; Truman Papers; NAF, Box 15; 
War Department Intelligence Review - February 1946; Intelligence Review, 26 Sept. 1946. See 
also Hansard (Written Answers), 5 Dec. 1945 and 9 Apr. 1946 and PRO; FO 371/53789; 
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83 SWNCC 202/2: "Policy concerning Provision of US Government Supplies for Post-War Armed 
Forces of Foreign Nations", approved 21 Mar. 1946, FRUS 1946 I, pp. 1145 - 60. 
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reporting that Sjahrir's government was `communistic'. 84 While the Truman 
Administration wanted to strengthen The Netherlands so that it could play its full 
part in the defence of Western Europe, it was prepared to accept that its military 
hardware might be diverted for use in the Indies. If Washington's economic aid to 
the NEI was a tangible sign of its desire to use its wealth to stabilise the NEI and 
promote a negotiated settlement, its attitude towards military supplies showed a 
willingness to provide the Dutch with a military option should talks fail. 
Although Washington had gone to great lengths to ensure that it did not 
become associated with British actions in the NEI, it did not succeed in gaining 
immunity from criticism for its attitude towards the nationalists. In mid-April, 
Representative Ellis Patterson criticised the use of Japanese troops by the British, 
urging the Administration to give its support to the nationalists and calling for a 
UNSC investigation of the situation in the NEI. 85 Now, perhaps for the first 
time, the Administration was being required to account for its policy towards the 
NEI and to square it with domestic anti-colonial opinion. 
In response to Patterson's resolution, Byrnes welcomed the `opportunity to set 
the record straight' about a Government policy which, he said, had `frequently been 
misunderstood, if not actually misinterpreted. ' However, while he pointed out that 
the US recognised Dutch sovereignty in the NEI and that the British were acting on 
84 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6449; Foote to the Secretary of State, 
20 Jun. 1946. Foote to the Secretary of State, 8 Feb. 1946, FRUS 1946 VIII, p. 806. 
85 Library of Congress (LoC); 79th Congress House Resolutions (Fiche 19); House Resolution 
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52 
behalf of the Allies, he also minimised the extent of US complicity. Answering 
accusations that not enough was being done to remove the Japanese troops, he said 
that this was a matter for the British and the Dutch and neglected to mention 
MacArthur's overall control of the repatriation programme. Byrnes also repeated 
the assertion that the US had not been supplying weapons for use in the NEI despite 
knowing that US-manufactured weapons were being supplied by the British and 
that the SWNCC thought that arms given to the Dutch might be diverted there. 
Finally, responding to concerns about the use of Japanese troops, Byrnes gave a 
sanitised account of their role. While he said that they were involved in protecting 
prisoners of war and internees, keeping lines of communication open and supplying 
food and medicine to those in need, he avoided drawing attention to the fact that 
armed Japanese troops were protecting American investments in Sumatra. 86 
Byrnes massaged information in order to present US policy in the best possible 
light. Having no option but to acknowledge Dutch sovereignty, he set about 
minimising the extent of US involvement in the NEI by emphasising the role of its 
surrogate, the UK. Unpalatable information was also withheld in order to contain 
domestic opposition. Ultimately, he had to resist any pressure which might weaken 
the Administration's ability to support the Dutch since they were essential to the 
achievement of US objectives in the NEI. By eschewing open involvement in the 
NEI, Byrnes tied the US yet more firmly to British success or failure. While a 
satisfactory settlement would vindicate US tactics of concentrating its efforts 
86 Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs (Sol Bloom), 
24 May 1946, FRUS 1946 VIII, pp. 822 - 25. 
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elsewhere, any outbreak of generalised hostilities, which it was assumed the Allies 
could not win, risked leaving the Administration open to charges that it had not 
done enough to protect US interests in the colony. 
Congressional disquiet was not the only problem facing the Administration's 
efforts to keep its policies out of the public gaze. In early May, Dr Raymond 
Kennedy, a former special consultant to both the State Department and the OSS, 
launched a vitriolic attack on the Truman Administration's policy towards the NEI. 
Arguing that America's `hands off policy was being pursued in `the hope that all 
will turn out well', he said that the US distrusted revolutions and operated a 
double-standard when it came to supporting democracy for coloured peoples at 
home and abroad. 87 His criticism of US inaction was reflected by Captain Joseph 
Smith, a SSU agent who had served in Sumatra. Briefing the State Department in 
mid-May, he urged the Administration to take advantage of the high prestige which 
the US enjoyed to make a decisive commitment to the nationalists or risk Russian 
subversion of the independence movement. 88 
While the Truman Administration downplayed, for domestic consumption, its 
influence over events in the NEI, it was prepared to take action to defend US 
interests when occasion demanded. By May 1946, the British were tiring of their 
involvement in the NEI. In addition to the hiatus in the negotiations, SEAC was 
facing increased opposition from the Government of India to the use of Indian 
87 The New York Times, 5 May 1946. 
88 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6449; Memorandum of Conversation 
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regiments in the NEI. Continuing violence was resulting in casualties and the 
newly-arrived Dutch troops were provoking the Indonesians89 - the British were 
worried that they were spoiling for a fight with the nationalists. Crucially, at a time 
of severe hardship at home, the cost of the occupation was being borne by the 
British taxpayer. 90 On 3 May, Mountbatten cabled London for advice on future 
occupation policy in Sumatra. He informed the Government that SEAC's 
military tasks could be completed with the final evacuation of the Japanese 
troops by the end of June 1946 and that British troops could be withdrawn by the 
end of July. He pointed out that, if it were decided that the oil installations were 
to be guarded, he would require either the retention of the 24,000 Japanese troops 
who had been protecting them since October 1945 or sixteen additional battalions 
to replace them. 91 Mountbatten's recommendation to terminate the occupation of 
Sumatra was supported by the Chiefs of Staff, who believed that the `only 
justification for remaining ... would 
be on political and economic grounds'. 92 
The Foreign Office was, however, against any withdrawal because it feared that 
anarchy would result and that the UK's economic interests would be 
jeopardised. 93 
89 Mountbatten Archive; File MB 1/C213; Christison to Admiral C. E. Helfrich, Commander of the 
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The debate in Whitehall was not, however, conducted in isolation. The 
British had been careful to keep the Americans informed about developments in 
Sumatra. In late February 1946, they had assured Washington's agents that the 
Japanese would remain stationed `at critical points'. 94 The Americans were well 
aware that this meant that US-owned refineries were being guarded by the 
Japanese. 95 However, Mountbatten's proposal to withdraw British, Indian and 
Japanese forces caused consternation in Washington. On 15 May, Smith told 
State Department officials that the Japanese `guards' had a very important role 
and that, if they were withdrawn, extremists would destroy all foreign property, 
including the American refineries. 96 In response to the threat that the oil 
installations would be left unprotected, Foote made strong representations to 
SEAC that they should continue to be guarded. 97 
The American representations reached London at a time when the British 
were considering the ramifications of leaving Sumatra. Bevin was especially 
concerned at the prospect of the British oil refinery and the coalfields at 
Palembang, in southern Sumatra, not being guarded. 98 However, if the American 
94 NA; RG 226; RABD; "Regular" Series, Box 421; XL 41700 - XL 41716; "Military and 
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installations were also to be guarded, the British knew that extra Allied troops 
would be required to replace the Japanese soldiers whose use Bevin could no 
longer justify on political grounds. 99 On 3 June, it was decided that British 
troops would be retained in Sumatra until November 1946, at the latest. It had 
already been agreed that British troops would remain in Java and it was expected 
that enough Dutch troops would arrive by June to allow the Japanese to leave 
without compromising security of the RDS refinery at Palembang. '°° The British 
decision meant, however, that the American oilfields and refineries near 
Palembang and Medan, in the north, would have their SEAC guards withdrawn. 
It was not long, however, before this decision was overtaken by events. On 
12 June, Washington asked Averell Harriman, its Ambassador in London, to 
clarify whether the Dutch or the British would be responsible for protecting US 
oil refineries in Sumatra. '°' The next day Harriman said that while no final 
decision had been taken in London, it was expected that the Dutch would assume 
responsibility for areas handed over to them. 102 Almost simultaneously with the 
arrival of this news, the State Department discovered that the Dutch would not be 
able to put troops into Sumatra and that all US and other foreign interests would 
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not be protected if the British withdrew. 103 Harriman's approach to the Foreign 
Office resulted in a decision to give protection to the Stanvac refinery at 
Palembang. The British also concluded that political necessity required the 
continued garrisoning of Medan, '04 which made it hard to resist pressure to 
protect the nearby Caltex oilfield. The ability of the British to fulfil their 
commitments without additional resources worried the State Department105 and, 
in the absence of Dutch replacements, the Japanese continued to guard the 
American refineries. '06 
With the installation of the new Dutch Cabinet under Prime Minister Louis 
Beel, both the US and the UK made further efforts to re-start negotiations. On 5 
August, Stanley Hornbeck, the US Ambassador to The Hague, advised The 
Netherlands' Government of Washington's concern over the lack of progress made 
towards finding a solution and its worry that the Soviets might refer the matter back 
to the UNSC to embarrass the Allies. 107 Ten days later, Acheson and Hickerson 
reinforced the point when they met Loudon. Explaining that they were both friends 
of The Netherlands, they told the Dutch Ambassador that the Dutch were `on a bad 
wicket' and that they should take `some constructive action' to prevent the return of 
103 Hornbeck to the Secretary of State, 12 Jun. 1946, FRUS 1946 VIII, pp. 827 - 28. 
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the NEI issue to the UNSC. 108 Also, in August, the British appointed Lord Killearn 
to replace Clark Kerr, who had gone to Washington as Ambassador. He 
immediately impressed on the Dutch and the Indonesians the imminence of the 
British withdrawal and urged them to resume talks. 109 The efforts were successful 
and, on 7 October, discussions resumed under Killearn's chairmanship. Quick 
progress was made with the Dutch conceding Republican sovereignty over Sumatra 
and, on 14 October, a truce agreement was reached. The negotiations moved from 
Batavia to Linggadjati where, on 15 November, a draft agreement was signed by 
the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia. 
The Linggadjati Agreement seemed to vindicate the Anglo-American strategy 
for resolving the dispute in Indonesia. It committed The Netherlands and the 
Republic to co-operate in the creation, by 1 January 1949, of an independent, 
federal United States of Indonesia (USI) and a Netherlands-Indonesian Union 
(NIU) to be headed by the Dutch monarch. The Agreement also included a 
provision for arbitration where disputes could not be settled by joint consultation. 
The Dutch recognised the Republic's de facto jurisdiction over Java, Sumatra and 
Madura and it was agreed that the USI would eventually comprise a federation of 
the Republic, Borneo and East Indonesia. It was acknowledged, however, that the 
Agreement needed to be fleshed out. The most crucial area in which the 
Linggadjati Agreement needed clarification concerned the relationship between 
The Netherlands and the Republic during the transitional period before 
108 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6439; Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson 
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independence. The Republic's de facto authority in Java, Sumatra and Madura 
made the exercise of The Netherlands' sovereignty in those areas problematical 
because the Republic considered itself to be an independent state with 
responsibility for its own defence and foreign affairs whereas the Linggadj ati 
Agreement laid these functions to the NIU. The question of how matters such as 
these would be handled in the interim was not covered by the Agreement and 
seemed certain to provoke discord. 
Washington was, however, optimistic about the prospects of a harmonious 
outcome. Hickerson and Vincent viewed the Agreement as a `workable 
compromise' and argued that it was a vindication of the Administration's belief 
that the Dutch could be relied upon to reach a `stable and equitable' settlement, 
which they thought was close. They expected that further negotiations would 
clarify its vague areas and, fearing that any delay would be exploited by the 
communists, hoped that it would quickly be ratified. 110 Only Foote sounded a 
discordant note, predicting that, with the exception of a small group of moderates, 
most Indonesians would not keep to the Agreement. ' 11 The Dutch were not 
enthusiastic about future prospects either. They believed that the Agreement's 
vagueness might lead the Indonesians to make extreme demands which could, 
ultimately, result in the loss of the NEI. 112 Many Dutch saw the Agreement as a 
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capitulation to the Republic which completely omitted to represent The 
Netherlands' interests, particularly, its future economic and financial interests in the 
NEI. 113 On the other hand, Linggadjati had compromised the Republic's demand 
for immediate independence for the whole NEI and left its Government vulnerable 
to radical opinion. Sukarno, however, feared that the Republic might collapse if 
the Dutch were provoked into taking military action in the absence of a 
settlement. 114 
Despite the doubts about the Agreement and the criticisms of the 
Administration's policy, it seemed that Washington's strategy had paid off. The 
British had undertaken the unpleasant military task of re-occupying the NEI and 
had, with discreet help from Washington, brokered a settlement between the Dutch 
and the Indonesians. In the fifteen months since the end of the war, the US had 
pursued policies which favoured the Dutch and had felt more justified in doing so 
by the emergence of the USSR as a perceived threat to Western hegemony in the 
NEI. The Linggadjati Agreement allowed Washington to argue that Dutch 
sovereignty in the NEI had been restored without resort to force and that it had not 
abandoned its wish to see an independent Indonesia. To be sure, the Truman 
Administration's policy of maintaining distance between itself and the dispute had 
aroused hostility in some quarters and it had been forced publicly to be less 
accommodating to the nationalists than it might have liked. Nevertheless, as 1946 
came to a close, Washington felt able to express its `gratification' at the success of 
113 Gerbrandy, Indonesia, p. 142. 
114 Holland, European Decolonization, p. 88. 
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the Dutch-Indonesian talks in what was only its second public statement on the 
dispute. 11s However, as Hickerson and Vincent had pointed out, a final settlement 
had not yet been reached and Washington was now heavily reliant on the Dutch, 
now unrestrained by the British, to oversee the transition to independence in the 
NEI. 
At the end of November, the British finally withdrew from Java and Sumatra 
with a certain amount of satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the draft treaty. 
Their feelings were shared by the US. Aside from the completion of the post- 
surrender tasks, the Dutch had been re-instated and it seemed as if a settlement had 
been reached with the nationalists. Since September 1945, the US had been 
content to hide behind the British, who had acted as the Administration's agent in 
the NET, while quietly supporting The Netherlands' Government against the 
nationalists. It had only reluctantly made public pronouncements about the 
situation in the NEI and its recognition of Dutch sovereignty. While giving 
diplomatic, economic and military aid to the Dutch, the Administration had tried to 
cultivate an image of impartiality by balancing Dutch and nationalist claims. The 
conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement offered the prospect that the Dutch and 
the Indonesians would reach a solution which would obviate the need for direct US 
involvement and, with it, preserve America's credibility as an anti-colonial power. 
115 United States Press Statement, 17 Dec. 1946; DSB Vol. XV, Number 391,29 Dec. 1946. 
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3. The Dutch Agenda Prevails (December 1946 - December 1948) 
If the Truman Administration believed that that the Linggadjati Agreement 
would lead to a swift settlement between The Netherlands and the Republic, thus 
obviating close American involvement in the dispute, its optimism was misplaced. 
As the Dutch implemented their plans for the NEI's future, relations with the 
nationalists worsened and their imposition of a trade embargo on the Republic 
challenged US hopes of the NEI's speedy re-integration into the world economy. 
With the situation deteriorating, the US was forced to take a more active role in the 
search for a solution to the dispute. Washington's friendship with The Hague was 
tested as, twice, it sought to prevent the use of military measures against the 
Republic. The Administration was also confronted by the need to reconcile its pro- 
Dutch stance with the policies of regional powers, like Australia, which supported 
Indonesian independence. As Washington's specific interest in the NEI became 
increasingly subsumed in its general concern about the advance of communism in 
Asia, the State Department continued to encourage bilateral negotiations between 
the Dutch and the Republic as the best way to resolve the issue. However, by 
December 1948, the Americans had failed to restrain the Dutch in their quest to 
eliminate the Republic and the Indonesian dispute had become an international 
embarrassment for the US. 
The closeness of Washington's friendship with The Hague led the 
Administration to ignore signs of Dutch hostility towards the Republic of 
Indonesia. During 1946, The Netherlands Government had begun to develop a 
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parallel strategy for the NEI which relied on organising the areas outside the control 
of the Republic in support of its cause. In July and October, at the Malino and 
Pangkalpinang Conferences, the Dutch and non-Republican Indonesians had laid 
the groundwork for the future federal structure of Indonesia. By this time, The 
Netherlands had reasserted its authority in the areas of the NEI outside the Republic 
and, although these were the least populated and were relatively unimportant 
economically, had set about promoting them as counterweights to the Republic. In 
the State Department, the Dutch initiative was seen as a `constructive step' but not 
necessarily one which would hasten agreement with the Republic. ' Nevertheless, 
the Dutch persisted with their plans, in spite of their agreement to co-operate with 
the Republic, and, in December, unilaterally created the state of East Indonesia, an 
action which provoked the normally docile Consul-Genera; Foote to warn 
Washington of the dangers of Dutch policy. 2 
The Dutch threat to the Linggadjati Agreement extended beyond building up 
its own position. In a foretaste of its attitude towards the Republic, the Dutch 
Government showed that it did not intend to use the accord as a basis for co- 
operation and eventual agreement. On 10 December 1946, the Dutch Cabinet 
approved Linggadjati but did so conditionally. It sought assurances that the 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union would be an effective one and that the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands would have sovereignty over the NEI during the transitional 
NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6449; Moffat to Vincent, 13 Aug. 1946. 
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period, thus denying the Republic its international status. 3 This interpretation of 
Linggadjati was an attempt to reduce the standing of the Republic, which had 
governed Java, Sumatra and Madura since August 1945, and to ensure that the 
Dutch continued to wield political influence in an independent Indonesia. The 
Republic had a government and fledgling bureaucracy, an army, and had dealt with 
foreign powers, not least the UK and the US and it was hardly surprising that, when 
discussions on the implementation of Linggadjati began, the Republic rejected the 
Dutch conditions. 
On 29 January, events took a new twist as The Netherlands Government 
introduced regulations under which all trade with the Republic had to be licensed 
by the Dutch authorities. Although The Hague said that the measures were 
designed to protect Dutch and foreign interests, a State Department analysis viewed 
them as a bid to deny the Republic its economic independence. The regulations 
were also a challenge to American open-door trading policies and threatened US 
plans for the recovery of capitalism by preventing the export of much-needed 
commodities. 4 The Truman Administration had seen the Linggadjati Agreement as 
presenting an opportunity for the rapid rehabilitation of the NEI's economy and the 
normalisation of trading relationships between the colony and the rest of the world 
but the embargo indicated that Dutch had different priorities. As a measure of the 
State Department's displeasure, it urged the Dutch to reconsider the regulations and 
3 Gerbrandy, Indonesia, p. 143. 
4 BUL; OSS/State IR Reports : Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia; Department of State 
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reminded The Hague of the `broader consequences (of its) policies ... in relation to 
early political and economic world stabilization'. 5 Four days after Washington's 
representations, on 7 March, Dutch marines boarded the Martin Behrmann, a US- 
registered freighter, and confiscated its cargo of rubber and sugar in what amounted 
to a snub to the US. The incident led to a public outcry in the US but the Dutch 
brushed off the Administration's complaints about the trade regulations and the 
Martin Behrmann incident. The State Department's failure to get redress exposed 
the weakness of Washington's position, which was based on the Dutch authorities' 
right to take the action that they had. 6 
In the early months of 1947, the State Department concentrated its efforts on 
the economic front and avoided involvement in the political negotiations between 
the Dutch and the Indonesians. 7 Analysts at Foggy Bottom believed that any 
political settlement arising out of the Linggadjati Agreement would not deliver an 
independent Indonesia for at least two years but that the restoration of trade links 
and the economic rehabilitation of the NEI were immediate necessities. The State 
Department was, therefore, keen to disburse funds for reconstruction in the NEI8 
and, in January, had underwritten the construction of two dredges worth $40 
5 Secretary of State to the Embassy in The Netherlands, 3 Mar. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 899 - 900. 
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million to aid the revival of the tin industry and to secure tin supplies for the US. 9 
The Dutch were ready to accept Washington's largesse but were also intent on 
exercising their sovereignty over the NEI. By 25 March, when the Dutch and the 
Indonesians finally signed the Linggadjati Agreement without having resolved their 
differences over its meaning, the Administration faced a situation in which there 
was every possibility that a political settlement would be hard to reach and that, 
until one had been agreed, its plans for the re-integration of the NEI into the world 
economy would be j eopardised. 10 
The signing of the Linggadjati Agreement did, however, give fresh impetus to 
proceedings as talks resumed between the Dutch and the Indonesians and, on 3 
April, the Truman Administration extended de facto recognition to the Republic. 
With the political talks restarted, the priority of American policy was to stabilise 
the Republic's government with economic aid, accepting as it did Dutch 
sovereignty. The Administration was, in fact, confident that there was little 
prospect of the talks being derailed. The State Department saw no appreciable 
communist threat to the Republic and argued that US economic assistance would, 
in any case, eliminate conditions which could be exploited by the communists-' I 
American military intelligence also believed that the Dutch would not resort to 
force to influence the negotiations. 12 However, it soon became clear that progress 
9 The New York Times, 7 Jan. 1947. 
10 HSTL; Truman Papers, NAF, Box 19; War Department Intelligence Review - April 1947; War 
Department Intelligence Review, 3 Apr. 1947. 
'' NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6449; Hugh Cumming and Moffat to Hickerson 
and Vincent, 17 Apr. 1947. 
12 HSTL; Truman Papers, NAF, Box 19; War Department Intelligence Review - April 1947; War 
Department Intelligence Review, 3 Apr. 1947. 
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was not going to be easy and, by early May, the talks had become deadlocked. 
Herman Baruch, the American Ambassador at The Hague, advised Washington 
that the fault lay with the Republic, which he said was stalling for time in the hope 
that The Netherlands would either withdraw from the NET or take military action 
which would be unpopular in the US. Meanwhile, Lewis Douglas, Truman's 
Ambassador in London, reported that the Dutch were making contingency plans for 
the possible failure of the Linggadjati Agreement and were contemplating either 
withdrawal from the NEI, military action or the appointment of a mediator, such as 
the US. 13 
Coming so closely after Truman's declaration, in March 1947, that the whole 
world was a battleground between the forces of communism and the democratic 
world, the possibility of conflict in the NEI caused his Administration to pay more 
attention to the situation there. Secretary of State George Marshall instructed 
Baruch to remind The Hague of Washington's belief that the best way of securing 
the long-term allegiance of Asian nationalists would be by reaching peacefully 
negotiated settlements with them. Marshall emphasised that, in the NEI, the key to 
success would be to bolster the moderate elements of the Republic's government 
and that the `essential first step' in this process was economic stabilisation. 14 
Washington's pre-occupation with economic issues not only reflected its own 
13 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6449; Ambassador in The Netherlands (Herman 
Baruch) to the Secretary of State, 10 May 1947 and Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Lewis 
Douglas) to the Secretary of State, 21 May 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 927 - 29. 
" George Marshall to Baruch, 16 May 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 924 - 26. 
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priorities but also its presumption that an agreement on economic issues would 
stimulate advances in political and military areas. 
The Administration's efforts to secure a peaceful solution seemed to have been 
rewarded when The Netherlands Government made new proposals for the 
implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement, on 27 May. However, the State 
Department's failure to understand The Hague's determination to dictate a 
settlement led it to overestimate the success of its diplomatic efforts to prevent 
hostilities. Under the new plan, The Netherlands would retain sovereignty over the 
NEI until 1 January 1949 and an interim federal government, dominated by the 
Dutch and their Indonesian allies, was to rule the colony until independence. 
Aimed at reducing the status of the Republic within the future USI, the proposals 
made the interim government responsible for foreign relations and law and order, 
having at its disposal a joint police force. The Hague gave the Republic two weeks 
in which to reply. 15 The British Government quickly offered its support to the 
Dutch initiative and the State Department, while worried about the Dutch 
ultimatum, saw an opportunity to make a `decisive' impact in the search for a 
settlement. Noting that the balance of power in the interim government would rest 
with the Dutch, Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, and 
John Carter Vincent, his opposite number in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, 
advised Undersecretary of State Acheson it was unlikely that the Republic would 
accept the plan unless the US exerted pressure on it to do so. They asked that 
15 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 160. 
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pressure be brought to bear on the Republic to negotiate with the Dutch on the basis 
of the 27 May proposals, a recommendation Acheson accepted. 16 
The American intervention increased the problems faced by Sutan Sjahrir, the 
Republic's Prime Minister. Now aware that he could expect little help from 
Washington, he struggled to avoid war while, at the same time, trying to maintain 
his support in the Republic. On 20 June, he finally accepted The Netherlands' de 
jure sovereignty as well as its proposed interim government but the Dutch rejected 
this compromise and it was also disowned by Sjahrir's supporters, prompting his 
resignation, on 27 June. '7 In an effort to prevent a collapse in the talks, the State 
Department put further pressure on the Republic in the form of an aide-memoire 
which supported Dutch sovereignty in the period before independence and urged 
the formation of an interim government. As an inducement to the Republic, 
Washington held out the prospect of financial assistance for Indonesia after the 
interim government had established with their agreement. 18 
The State Department's aide-memoire left the clear impression that the US 
was acting on behalf of the Dutch. The Australian Minister of External Affairs, 
Herbert Evatt, complained that, as a result of Washington's demonstrable 
willingness to put pressure on the Republic, the Dutch could be expected to seek 
16 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6439, Matthews and Vincent to Acheson, 
5 Jun. 1947. Acheson to Foote, 5 Jun. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI pp. 941 - 42. 
17 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 162 - 63. 
18 Marshall to Foote, 26 Jun. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 959 - 60. 
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US support whenever a crisis threatened. 19 The Dutch negotiating position 
certainly seemed to have been strengthened by events as the Republicans, 
weakened by Sjahrir's resignation and led by new Prime Minister, Amir 
Sjarifudden, accepted all the Dutch demands, including the creation of a joint 
gendarmerie. However, the Republican Cabinet rejected the outcome of the 
negotiations and, in a final effort to avoid hostilities, the Truman Administration 
reminded The Hague of the instability which would be caused by their use of 
military force. 20 The US attempt to halt military action did not take account of the 
extent to which the Dutch were committed to their own plans for the NEI. Just as 
the 27 May proposals had not been intended, as Washington had thought, as a basis 
for negotiation, so the Dutch were not willing to step back from the brink. On 21 
July, Dutch troops attacked the Republic in what was termed a "police action", 
signalling the rejection of American diplomacy by the Dutch. 
Despite the Administration's opposition to the use of force, the Dutch military 
operation was not unexpected and had clear attractions for Washington. On 6 June, 
H. F. Van Vredenburch, the Head of the Directorate of Political Affairs in Holland, 
had made clear to Acheson The Hague's intention to use the action to secure 
control over export commodities and immediate evidence of this was available as 
the Dutch captured the Stanvac oil refinery near Palembang. 21 In private briefings 
"' Flinders University Library (FUL); Evatt Collection; Cables - London 1947 - 1948; Department 
of External Affairs (DEA) to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 16 Jul. 1947. 
20 Foote to Secretary of State, 15 Jul. 1947 and Secretary of State to Foote, 17 Jul. 1947. FRUS 1947 
VI, pp. 976 - 78. 
21 Memorandum of Conversation by Alexander Schnee, of a meeting between Acheson, van 
Vredenburch, Hickerson and Loudon, 6 Jun. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 942 - 45. The New York 
Times, 25 Jul. 1947. 
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for Baruch, Baron van Boetzelaer, the Dutch Foreign Minister, stressed that The 
Netherlands' financial position, and the need to restore law and order, had left it no 
alternative but to take military action. 22 The Dutch were also careful to re-assure 
Washington that they remained committed to reaching a settlement based on the 
Linggadjati Agreement. Indeed, they made it clear that they did not intend to 
liquidate the Republic completely so as to give its leaders another chance to 
negotiate. 23 Foote's enthusiasm must also have encouraged the Dutch to think that 
the US response to the "police action" would not be unduly harsh. Before the 
"police action" he had advised Washington that Dutch military action would be 
`necessary to restore law and order whether or not (the) Indo(nesian)s accept Dutch 
terms' 24 and, after the attack had begun he urged the Dutch to capture the 
Republic's capital, Yogjakarta. 25 In fact, Foote's dealings with the Dutch had 
given them the impression that the Administration's policy of opposing a violent 
solution was designed for public consumption only and that it would, in fact, 
support the use of force if that resolved matters quickly. 26 
While the American Consul-General was undoubtedly misrepresenting US 
policy, his government did not rush to condemn the Dutch action. On 24 July, 
Matthews recommended to Marshall that, when he met the new Dutch 
22 Baruch to the Secretary of State, 20 Jul. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 982 - 83. 
23 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6450; Baruch to the Secretary of 
State, 
26 Jul. 1947. 
24 Foote to the Secretary of State, 4 Jul. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 970 - 71. 
25 Interview with members of the Veriniging Oud Militairen Indiegangers, Utrecht, 23 Apr. 1997. 
Yogjakarta became the Republic's capital after the return of the Dutch. 
26 PRO; FO 371/63601; Mitcheson to the Foreign Office, 27 Jun. 1947. 
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Ambassador, Eelco van Kleffens, later that day, he should let van Kleffens know 
that the US retained the `friendliest feelings' for The Netherlands. He also 
proposed that Marshall should indicate US preparedness to help it in `establishing a 
friendly basis' for any discussion of the Indonesian situation at the UNSC, if 
necessary by putting down for debate a resolution of its own. 27 Washington's 
response to the "police action" revealed the shift which had occurred in its 
approach to decolonisation. Since the end of the war, US policy had become 
increasingly oriented towards the defence of Europe and this emphasis had become 
greater since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the European 
Recovery Program (ERP). No longer did the aspirations of nationalists feature so 
prominently in Washington's approach to decolonisation which was, in Indonesia's 
case, `conditioned by (the Administration's) attitudes towards ... Holland. '28 In 
fact, the Truman Administration regarded The Netherlands a `one of the most 
stable factors' in Europe and had pledged itself to maintain and strengthen the 
Dutch Government and crucial to this project was the restoration of the economic 
links between the NEI and the metropolitan power. 29 Washington's stance was 
underlined a few days after the "police action" began, when the SWNCC ranked 
The Netherlands fifth in terms of its importance to US national security. 30 
27 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6439; Matthews to the Secretary of State, 
24 Jul. 1947. Memorandum of Conversation by Morgan of a meeting between Marshall and Eelco 
van Kleffens, 24 Jul. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, p. 992. 
28 NA; RG 59; Lot 54 D 190; Reel 6/39; "Proposed Public Position of the United States with 
respect to Nationalist Movements in Colonial Dependencies", Landon to Davies, 6 Aug. 1947. 
29 BUL; OSS/State IR Reports : Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia; Department of State 
Intelligence Report 4446, "Analysis of the Current Political and Economic Situation in the 
Netherlands", 31 Jul. 1947. 
30 "Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries", JCS 
1769/1 circulated as SWNCC 360/1,12 May 1947. SWNCC 360 as amended by SWNCC 360/1 
was noted on 23 July 1947, FRUS 1947 I, pp. 734 - 50. 
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Complementing the State Department's Eurocentric approach, was Foote's 
antagonism towards the nationalists. Ever since his return to Batavia, Foote had 
submitted hostile reports which depicted moderates being dictated to by extremists 
and emphasised his - and the Dutch - view that the nationalists could not be trusted 
to abide by agreements. 
The Administration's sympathetic attitude towards The Netherlands did not go 
unchallenged and its ability to deflect criticism away from The Hague was 
restricted, especially by the international opposition to military action. Within the 
State Department itself, there was a recognition that American policy had failed the 
people of Indonesia and a belief that Washington had `tacitly encouraged' Dutch 
military action. 31 The Administration also came under fire when it was shown that 
the Dutch had been using American weaponry, including fighter aircraft and 
bombers, against the nationalists. 32 However, the biggest problem for the State 
Department was the international outcry which the "police action" provoked, as 
both Australia and India threatened to refer the matter to the UNSC. 
The Australian Government was particularly concerned about the impact of 
the Dutch military action in the NEI, which was of great strategic interest to 
Canberra. Before World War II, Australia had, along with the NET, been part of 
what had appeared to be a politically stable region dominated by powerful 
31 NA; RG 59; Lot 54 D 190; Reel 6/39; "Proposed Public Position of the United States with 
respect to Nationalist Movements in Colonial Dependencies", Landon to Davies, 6 Aug. 1947. 
32 The New York Times, 22 Jul. 1947. On 26 July 1947, Senator Chavez raised the matter in 
Congress (see LoC; US Congressional Record - 80th Congress, Session 1,1947). 
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European nations. However, the Japanese defeat of the colonial powers had altered 
radically Australian perceptions, which, after the war, saw the NEI as a vital barrier 
against invasion from the north. Australian politicians, like Evatt, doubted the 
ability of the Europeans, and especially the Dutch, to guarantee their country's 
security and also had to consider the potential threat to Australian security posed by 
its highly populous neighbour. 33 As a result, they began to elucidate a distinctively 
Australian foreign policy which identified an Australian national interest in 
securing a stable and friendly Indonesia. Accordingly, Canberra had taken an 
accommodating view of Indonesian nationalism and, by mid-1947, was a keen 
supporter of Indonesian independence. 34 The reasons behind India's championing 
of the Republic were less complex, being based on its own colonial past and the 
wish of Pandit Nehru, its Prime Minister, to carve out a world role for independent 
Asian states. 
The State Department thus found itself in conflict with the Australian and 
Indian Governments over how to respond to the "police action". It did not agree 
with their assessment that events in the NEI constituted a threat to world peace and 
preferred to portray Canberra's interest as a product of Evatt's personal ambition to 
project himself as an international statesman rather than as an expression of 
Australian policy. 35 However, Canberra's potential for diplomatic involvement in 
33 For an account of Australian relations with the NEI and Indonesia, see Margaret George, 
Australia And The Indonesian Revolution. 
34 Interview with Thomas Critchley, Sydney, 12 Sept. 1996. 
35 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6450; Memorandum of Conversation by Robert 
Lovett of a meeting with Norman Makin (Australian Ambassador), 5 Aug. 1947. 
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the issue could not be ignored and Nehru's complaint that US inaction was creating 
a `most unfortunate impression' in Asia and with Moslem countries worried Henry 
Villard, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, so much so 
that he advised the Administration to take the initiative in involving the UN in 
order to mitigate the situation. 36 
The State Department was not, however, keen to involve the UN as it wanted 
to prevent the Soviets from taking advantage of the situation and so it joined with 
the British, who shared its viewpoint, in an effort to forestall a reference to the 
Security Council. In an attempt to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians together, 
and with Washington's agreement, the British Government offered its "good 
offices" to both parties. However, the Dutch rejection of London's offer exposed 
the limits of the Administration's willingness to pressurise The Hague as Marshall 
rejected a British proposal that London and Washington should induce the Dutch to 
accept arbitration. 37 In taking this approach, the Secretary of State acknowledged 
the Administration's unspoken support for the "police action" and effectively 
signalled Washington's abandonment of the Linggadjati process since the 
Agreement had specifically provided for arbitration in the event of disputes being 
unresolved after bilateral negotiation. The Dutch had broken the Agreement in 
mounting their military action and now Washington had accepted that Linggadjati 
was a dead-letter. Washington's rejection of arbitration also left the problem of 
what to do next. 
36 Henry Villard to Charles Bohlen, 29 Jul. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 994 - 96. 
3' British aide-memoire given to Lovett, 24 Jul. 1947, FRUS VI 1947, pp. 987 - 89. NA; RG 59; 
DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6450; Marshall to the US Ambassador in London, 
26 Jul. 1947. 
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The Administration remained determined to find a way of bringing the two 
sides together without involving the Security Council. Charles Bohlen, the State 
Department's Counselor, recommended to Marshall that the US might join with the 
British in a mediation effort, a move which, if successful, would delay debate of 
any resolution submitted to the UNSC. 38 The only difficulty with this was that 
Truman had previously rejected this course of action, probably to avoid increasing 
Washington's involvement in the dispute. Marshall, however, noted that the 
President's decision had been taken before it had become clear that the dispute 
would be referred to the UNSC and he decided to try to change Truman's mind. 
On 30 July, Truman approved Marshall's recommendations that the US should 
offer to mediate either with the British or on its own and that Marshall should 
solicit the Dutch to request US, or US/UK mediation. 39 This attempt by the 
Americans to promote negotiations coincided with the submission of resolutions to 
the UNSC by Australia and India and represented a desperate last-ditch effort to 
circumvent debate in that forum. 
Although Truman had agreed that the US could become involved in a joint 
mediation effort with the UK, Marshall was becoming increasingly convinced that 
the Administration would be unable to avoid being drawn into the dispute. He had 
already warned Truman of the dilemma facing the US, which could neither support 
Dutch military action nor oppose a UN investigation. 40 The Secretary of State also 
38 Charles Bohlen to the Secretary of State, 29 Jul. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, p. 996. 
39 HSTL; Truman Papers; White House Central File (WHCF) : Confidential File, Box 34; United 
Nations; Marshall to Truman, 30 Jul. 1947. 
40 HSTL; Truman Papers; WHCF : Confidential File, Box 34; United Nations; Marshall to 
Truman, 30 Jul. 1947. 
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knew that something had to be done to reduce tension and avoid a UNSC debate 
but his options were limited by his own rejection of arbitration and the Dutch 
refusal to accept London's "good offices". Marshall concluded, from this, that the 
Administration had no alternative but to try to promote a settlement itself and, so, 
his unilateral offer of Washington's "good offices" was aimed at securing The 
Hague's co-operation. In securing the acquiescence of the Dutch, Marshall hoped 
to hold off the imminent UNSC debate. The Administration's initiative seemed to 
be achieving its desired objectives as the UNSC delayed consideration of the 
Australian resolution, which had called the Dutch action a `breach of world 
peace'41 and when, on 1 August, the Dutch accepted US mediation. However, 
Washington's effort collapsed as, first, it proved impossible to transmit the offer of 
"good offices" to the Republic's leaders and, then, on 19 August, the Indonesians 
finally rejected it. 42 
While Washington's offer of "good offices" was designed to prevent any UN 
involvement in the settlement of the Indonesian dispute, it could not stop the 
UNSC debating calls for a cease-fire. On 31 July, the Council had begun 
consideration of the issue and Washington was soon forced to reveal its acceptance 
that the Linggadjati process was over. This it did by withholding its approval for 
an Australian draft resolution, which called for a cessation of hostilities and for 
arbitration as provided for by the Linggadjati Agreement. In its place, Washington 
substituted one of its own which, in addition to demanding an end to hostilities, 
4I The New York Tines, 1 Aug. 1947. 
42 Secretary of State to Foote, 4 Aug. 1947, FRUS VI, p. 1012. NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949. 
856E. 00, Box 6450; Foote to the Secretary of State, 19 Aug. 1947. 
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merely called for the dispute to be settled by `arbitration or by other peaceful 
means'. This resolution, calling for a cease-fire to take effect on 4 August, was 
adopted on 1 August. 43 
With the Administration's initiative to promote bilateral talks floundering, on 
14 August, the UNSC opened a further debate on the Indonesian crisis focusing on 
the policing of the cease-fire and the promotion of a settlement to the dispute. 
Once more, Washington found itself in conflict with the Australian Government, 
which had proposed that the UNSC should send a commission to Indonesia to 
observe the cease-fire and promote a settlement. The US was opposed to linking 
the two issues and the State Department instructed its Delegate to the UNSC, 
Herschel Johnson, that it wanted the UNSC to `draw a sharp distinction' between 
its interest in the cessation of hostilities and the ultimate settlement. The UNSC 
had already adopted a resolution covering the cease-fire and the Truman 
Administration did not want it to become involved in any settlement. 44 The 
American action, together with the implacable opposition of the Dutch, forced the 
Australians to back down. 
Despite this tactical victory, there was still great pressure for the UN to 
become directly involved in resolving the dispute. In addition to the Soviet bloc's 
interest, there was a groundswell of support for UN action from the Non-Permanent 
members of the UNSC and those co-opted for the debate. The Indian and 
43 SCOR 1947, Vol. 2, Resolutions, p. 6. 
" Secretary of State to Herschel Johnson, 12 Aug. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 1024 - 25. 
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Philippines Delegates both spoke in favour of UN action, reminding the Council of 
the strength of Asian nationalism, 45 but the Dutch protested that the UN had no 
jurisdiction in relation to the eventual political settlement, which it considered an 
internal matter. The US, for its part, did not want the UN to take action because 
this would have allowed Soviet involvement. However, given the wide support in 
the UNSC for action, it faced the risk that it might be forced to veto a resolution 
sanctioning Soviet influence in the NEI. On 22 August, Johnson therefore 
introduced a draft resolution which was based on an earlier Dutch suggestion and 
was designed to encourage their agreement to UNSC involvement. The resolution 
provided for the establishment of a Committee of Good Offices (GOC) made up of 
one representative each appointed by The Netherlands and the Republic and a third 
nominated by the two parties' representatives. Johnson argued that there was doubt 
about UN jurisdiction in the NEI and that an offer by the UN of its "good offices" 
would avoid this problem. 46 Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Delegate, accused the US 
of attempting to by-pass the UN, 47 but, despite his objections, the resolution was 
adopted and the GOC established. Also on 25 August, the Council adopted an 
Australian-Chinese resolution which called for the career consuls at Batavia to 
form a commission, later known as the Consular Commission (CC), to report on 
the cease-fire issue. 48 
'5 SCOR 1947,185th and 192nd Meetings, 15 and 22 Aug. 1947, pp. 2017 - 24 and 2153 - 57. 
46 SCOR 1947,193rd Meeting 22 Aug. 1947, pp. 2175 - 79. 
4' SCOR 1947,194th Meeting 25 Aug. 1947, pp. 2204 - 05. 
48 The Consular Commission was composed of Security Council members who had career 
consular officials in Batavia and was a device to preclude Soviet involvement. 
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The passage of the first 25 August resolution revived American diffidence to 
the dispute in the NEI. The Dutch "police action" had provoked the Truman 
Administration into taking a public initiative to broker a settlement and, in making 
its offer of "good offices", Washington had accepted the responsibility for 
facilitating a negotiated solution. Although, in part, this was motivated by a desire 
to avoid UNSC intervention, it also reflected a desire to assist American interests 
by limiting the influence of other interested powers, such as the UK and Australia. 
With the creation of the GOC, however, the US again became equivocal about 
direct involvement. Citing the Indonesian rejection of Washington's "good 
offices", Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett told van Kleffens that, if asked, 
the US would not accept membership of the GOC. 49 In fact, it was the UK which 
emerged as the possible third member of the GOC. With The Netherlands 
nominating Belgium, the Indonesians, and their representative Australia, secretly 
asked the British to be the third member of the GOC, an approach which was 
rebuffed. 50 On 14 September, the Belgians and the Australians made a formal 
request to Marshall that the US take the third seat on the GOC. Although he 
preferred to `avoid this burden', the Secretary of State felt that, given Washington's 
authorship of the enabling resolution, he had no option but to recommend 
acceptance of the invitation to Truman. The President approved the 
recommendation the following day. 5' 
19 Memorandum of Conversation by Lovett of a meeting with van Kleffens, 28 Aug. 1947, FRUS 
1947 VI, pp 1043 - 44. 
50 PRO; FO 37 1 /636 1 7; Sargent to Bevin, 11 Sept. 1947. 
51 HSTL; Truman Papers; WHCF : Confidential File, Box 34; United Nations; Marshall to 
Truman, 14 Sept. 1947. 
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The establishment of the GOC, although it marked the failure of US efforts to 
keep the Indonesian question out of the UNSC, did allow Washington the 
opportunity to direct developments. Having conceded that the UN must become 
involved in the resolution of the crisis, the Truman Administration did not wish to 
allow the Security Council to become the arena in which the details of a settlement 
were hammered out. 52 The UN's offer of "good offices" did not challenge the 
Dutch refusal of arbitration and conformed with Washington's minimalist approach 
to the dispute which was based on the need for a negotiated agreement between the 
two disputants. The GOC also had the distinct advantage of distancing the USSR 
from the settlement talks. That the basic American approach had not changed after 
the Dutch military campaign underlined the pro-Dutch policies being followed by 
the Administration. Indeed, the Dutch were becoming ever more confident of their 
support in Washington, which was regarded as having an `improving appreciation' 
of The Hague's plans in the NEI. 53 
While the CC began its work in September, the GOC did not have its first 
meeting until late October. Meanwhile, the Dutch were able to consolidate their 
military gains at the expense of the Republicans. Washington saw the CC as a 
vehicle to promote US policy and, to this end, Foote's activities as a member of the 
Commission were closely monitored. With the military situation deteriorating, the 
52 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6450; Memorandum of Conversation 
by Dean 
Rusk of a meeting with Sjahrir, 20 Aug. 1947. 
53 The New York Times, 24 Sept. 1947 - reporting comments made by van Mook. Again, Asia 
specialists in the State Department urged that US policy, seen by them as having an `imperialistic 
bias', should be re-directed to involve private pressure on the Dutch to reach a settlement (NA; RG 
59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6439; Raymond Hare to Loy Henderson, 1 Oct. 1947. ) 
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CC produced an interim report, on 22 September, for the UNSC, which found poor 
compliance with the cease-fire order. The report contained proposals for rectifying 
the situation and this infuriated the State Department, which believed that the CC 
had only a restricted mandate for fact-finding. As a consequence, Foote was 
rebuked for failing to clear the report with the State Department before it was sent 
to the UN. 54 The CC's report formed the basis of a UNSC debate, which began on 
3 October, to consider the cease-fire and which, once more, demonstrated the pro- 
Dutch bias of US policy. Discussion centred around how the cease-fire might be 
enforced. The Soviets argued for a return to the pre-21 July lines while the 
Australians wanted a withdrawal to the positions occupied on 4 August. The 
American delegation opposed both of these propositions with the bizarre reasoning 
that any withdrawal would prejudice the positions of the two parties. 55 In reality, 
the US was supporting the acquisition by conquest of territory by the Dutch. 
However, the Dutch position was weakened considerably by the final CC report, 
submitted on 11 October, and, in an effort to avoid having to veto draft resolutions 
which sought to support UN policy, the new US Delegate, Senator Warren Austin, 
proposed a compromise calling upon the GOC to take responsibility for ensuring 
the effectiveness of the cease-fire and for facilitating negotiations between the 
parties. Reversing its earlier position, the US now wanted the cease-fire and the 
political settlement to be linked under the GOC's auspices. The resolution was 
adopted on 1 November, after an amendment calling for the military position to be 
frozen on the basis of territory occupied on 4 August was accepted. 
54 Lovett to Foote, 27 Sept. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, p. 1052. 
55 Memorandum of Conversation by Lacy, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 1058 - 59. SCOR 1947,209th 
Meeting, 9 Oct. 1947, pp. 2526 - 28. 
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Washington was now able to channel all its efforts into promoting a settlement 
through the GOC, to which it had appointed Dr. Frank Graham, the President of the 
University of North Carolina, to serve with Judge Richard Kirby of Australia and 
Paul van Zeeland from Belgium. Under its rules, the GOC could only act by 
consensus, an arrangement which led to conflict and minimised the Committee's 
scope for action. While the Dutch were determined that the GOC should not 
undermine their sovereignty, Kirby and his deputy, Thomas Critchley, decided that 
a quick transition to independence was the only sensible course to follow. In 
contrast to Graham, who was in close contact with the State Department, Kirby was 
given a free hand on the GOC, having been briefed only to be fair in his dealings 
with the disputants. 56 Graham, in fact, became a surrogate Consul-General in 
Batavia and promoted US policy within the GOC, a position which varied from his 
public view that the members of the GOC were representatives of the UNSC. 57 
If Graham's arrival did not signal a change in Washington's policy, it exposed 
the State Department to a different view of the Republic than Foote had previously 
given it. For example, Graham reported that the Republic was not cowed by Dutch 
military superiority, that its political structure was sound, and that the Republic's 
leaders recognised they would have to work with the Dutch. His deputy, Charlton 
Ogburn, also provided a refreshingly different outlook, telling Washington that the 
image of lawlessness in the Republic was a fiction and that there was no 
appreciable communist influence on the Government whose policies were `mildly 
56 Interview with Thomas Critchley, Sydney, 12 Sept. 1996. 
57 Austin to Lovett, 15 Oct. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 1054 - 55. Foote had left Batavia 
in 
October 1947 and had been replaced by Charles Livengood. 
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socialist'. 58 Graham was, however, unable to carry out his work in the GOC 
without first obtaining State Department advice on the policies he should follow. 
The first major problem faced by the GOC concerned the cease-fire. When 
Graham found that his colleagues could not agree about whether the 1 November 
resolution required a Dutch military withdrawal, he sought State Department 
advice. 59 The response he received indicated the extent of the continued US 
support for the Dutch. Although the resolution forbade the use of armed force to 
extend territorial control not enjoyed on 4 August, Lovett wrote that the State 
Department believed, this did not require a Dutch withdrawal. 60 
The cease-fire talks had begun on 14 November and, in early December, the 
GOC was trying bring about the resumption of political talks. The first problem 
was to find a neutral venue. Eventually, it was agreed that the US would supply a 
ship and, after some hesitation, the Administration agreed to donate the USS 
Renville. 61 Washington's shyness did not, however, extend to the talks themselves. 
After the political talks began, it quickly became apparent that little headway was 
being made. With the process stalled, the State Department told Graham that the 
GOC should take a `firm stand' to get things going. 62 This advice coincided with a 
separately developing crisis as the Dutch sought to exploit their military situation to 
58 Graham to the Secretary of State, 29 Oct. 1947 and Ogburn to the Secretary of State, 17 Nov. 
1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 1063 - 64 and 1072 - 74. 
59 Graham to the Secretary of State, 13 Nov. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 1070 - 72. 
60 Lovett to Graham, 18 Nov. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, p. 1074. 
61 PRO; FO 810/4; British Consul-General (Sir Francis Shepherd) to Foreign Office, 27 Nov. 1947. 
62 Lovett to Graham, 19 Dec. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 1084 - 85. 
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the detriment of the Republic. 63 In response to these pressures, on 25 December, 
the GOC delivered to the Dutch and the Republic what became known as its 
"Christmas Message". In it, the GOC proposed a truce line at the Dutch positions 
of 4 August and called for the restoration of Republican civil administration within 
three months of a political agreement being signed. The "Christmas Message" also 
called for the withdrawal of Dutch forces from conquered territory and for elections 
to be held, between six and twelve months after political agreement had been 
reached, to determine the relationship between the Republic and the USI. 
As the GOC sought to defuse the crisis in the NET, the State Department was 
considering what advice to give to Graham, based on his reports of developments, 
and, on 31 December, Lovett cabled Graham with detailed guidance. He made it 
clear that, while the GOC must act as a free agent, the scope of the alternatives 
open to it should be determined by the `major considerations of US policy'. He 
advised Graham that the State Department wanted to ensure the stability of the 
Dutch Government, which he described as a `strong proponent' of US policy in 
Europe. He also emphasised US support for self-government for peoples `qualified 
to accept (the) consequent responsibilities' and the need to restore trade between 
Indonesia and the rest of the world, noting the NEI's `indispensability' to the ERP. 
Lovett offered Graham the `practical suggestion' that the reversal of the Dutch plan 
for the establishment of the USI was `unrealistic and undesirable' and 
63 Critchley to the DEA and Kirby, 22 Dec. 1947, Diplomasi Australia & Indonesia's 
Independence : Documents 1947, pp. 484 - 85. 
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congratulated him that the "Christmas Message" did not appear to conflict with US 
policy. 64 
If the Truman Administration believed that the Dutch would be prepared to 
accept the "Christmas Message" simply because it reflected US thinking on the 
terms of a negotiated settlement, then it was in for a rude awakening. Although the 
Republic reluctantly accepted the GOC's proposals on 30 December, the Dutch 
rejected them, making counter-proposals which eliminated all references to the 
Republic. The Dutch refused to agree to the restoration of Republican civil 
administration in territory they had conquered, the withdrawal of their troops and 
they made no provision for the inclusion of the Republic in an interim federal 
government. On 9 January, The Netherlands' negotiators gave the Republic three 
days in which to agree unconditionally to the Dutch plans. Graham, meanwhile, 
sought to remove the threat to the negotiations by drawing up six additional 
political "principles" which assured the Republic of a role in the USI and of fair 
representation in the interim government. 65 On 6 January, he sought the State 
Department's approval for his plan, which he received the next day. 66 In fact, 
Graham's six "principles" had not been discussed within the GOC67 and amounted 
64 Acting Secretary of State to Graham, 31 Dec. 1947, FRUS 1947 VI, pp. 1099 - 1101. 
65 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 199,201 and 203. 
66 Graham to the Secretary of State, 6 Jan. 1947, and Secretary of State to Graham, 7 Jan. 1947, 
FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 62 - 64 and 68. Critchley `took it for granted' that 
Washington had been 
involved in the drafting of the six additional principals and that, in any case, they would have been 
circumscribed by Washington's policies and would have required Washington's approval. 
(Letter 
from Critchley to the author, 6 Aug. 1998. ) 
67 Interview with Thomas Critchley, Sydney, 12 Sept. 1996. The "principles" were agreed 
by the 
GOC before being submitted to the Dutch and Indonesians. 
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to a unilateral US attempt to bring the talks to a conclusion. After the "principles" 
were presented to the Dutch and the Republic, the State Department made 
strenuous efforts to ensure that they were accepted. The difficulty lay in securing 
Dutch agreement, since the "principles" directly contradicted the Dutch counter- 
proposals, and so Washington took the unprecedented step of warning the Dutch 
that they risked losing their ERP funding unless they accepted the six "principles"68 
- Graham has suggested that pressure was applied to the Dutch by the highest 
ranking officials in the State Department and that `without Marshall there would 
have been no Renville Agreement'. 69 On 11 January, the Dutch accepted the six 
"principles" and, on 17 January, the two sides signed the military and political 
accords which made up the Renville Agreement. 
Coming after the turbulence of the preceding four months, Washington 
welcomed the Renville Agreement as a `just and practical' basis for the political 
and economic development of the NEI. 7° State Department officials believed that 
the Agreement had prevented the elimination of the Republic as a political entity 
and had salvaged the possibility of reaching a negotiated solution to the Indonesian 
question. However, they viewed the Agreement as being decidedly more 
favourable to the Dutch, who had retained their military gains. Additionally, the 
Republic had been forced to accept the new states which had been created by the 
68 Interview with Thomas Critchley, Sydney, 12 Sept. 1996. Marshall to the Embassy in The 
Netherlands, 13 Jan. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, p. 77. 
69 Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 316. 
70 US Press Release, 20 Jan. 1948; DSB, Vol. XVIII, Number 448,1 Feb. 1948. 
88 
Dutch in conquered territory. 71 For its part, the Republic could only look towards 
the promised plebiscites as a way of demonstrating its influence but, even in this, it 
remained dependent on the US and the UN to ensure fairness in the their conduct. 72 
Van Kleffens managed, perhaps unwittingly, both to highlight Washington's role in 
the Renville talks and their beneficial outcome for The Netherlands when he 
thanked Lovett for Graham's work in selling the six "principles" to the Republic 
and for the State Department's fairness, understanding and open-mindedness. 73 
This occurred at a time when the State Department was concerned to preserve the 
fiction of US non-involvement by stressing the part played by the GOC, and 
Graham, in facilitating the negotiations. 74 
Between August 1947 and January 1948, the US came to terms with the 
setbacks to its policy caused by the Dutch "police action". Having failed to stop 
Dutch military action, it had been forced, firstly, to accept UN involvement in the 
dispute and, then, to become a member of the GOC. Through its membership of 
the GOC, the US became more closely identified with the negotiations and, 
consequently, with their success or failure. However, despite its greater degree of 
exposure, Washington remained unwilling to take a strong lead in resolving the 
dispute. As Graham had made clear in seeking Washington's agreement to the six 
71 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6451; Livengood to the Secretary of State, 
20 Feb. 1948 and 856D. 00, Box 6440; Rusk, Hickerson and W. Walton Butterworth to the 
Secretary of State, 10 Feb. 1948. 
72 The New York Times, 19 Jan. 1948. 
73 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6451; van Kleffens to Lovett, 15 Jan. 1948. 
74 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6440; Rusk, Hickerson and Butterworth to the 
Secretary of State, 10 Feb. 1948. 
89 
"principles", they were designed only to facilitate Dutch preparations for the end of 
their sovereignty and not to force Indonesian independence. 75 The Renville 
Agreement was, however, entirely compatible with US policy, which continued to 
emphasise the importance of the political and economic stability of The 
Netherlands and which foresaw Indonesians gaining their independence only when 
they were capable of discharging the responsibilities of self-government. 76 The 
ulterior motive in Washington's approach was evident to Kirby, who reflected the 
Australian belief that the Republic's aspirations were being subordinated to the 
Truman Administration's wider policy objectives. Kirby argued that Washington's 
chief concern was to bring the NEI's resources into the world economy at the 
earliest possible opportunity rather than to smooth the way to independence, 77 a 
charge which was difficult to refute given that the Renville Agreement had left the 
Dutch in control of most of the economically vital areas of Java and Sumatra. The 
Australians sensed that, if the Indonesians were to benefit at all from the Renville 
Agreement, it would be as a result of an early political settlement. 78 Of greater 
consequence for Washington was the knowledge that its prestige and interests were 
now bound up in the search for a final settlement based on Renville, a settlement 
which it expected the GOC to broker. 79 
75 Graham to the Secretary of State, 6 Jan. 1947, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 62 - 64. 
76 NA; RG 59; Lot 54 D 190; Reel 6/39; "Summary Statement : U. S. Policy Towards the 
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77 Australian Archives (AA); CRS A3300/7/686; Kirby to Canberra, 13 Feb. 1948. 
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Washington's increased commitment to the pursuit of a settlement in the NEI 
coincided with a growing sense of the NEI's importance to the US. Whereas it had 
been seen previously as an adjunct of The Netherlands and policy had been 
determined primarily with the interests of the metropole in mind, during 1948, 
State Department officials began to accord Southeast Asia, and the NET, a higher 
priority in policymaking terms. This new trend did not mean that the US reoriented 
its policy towards the region in such a way as to exclude the interests of the 
colonial powers. On the contrary, the continued need to stabilise Europe meant that 
the economic links between metropoles and their colonies had to be preserved. 
Yet, as part of a wider trend, Administration policy now began to reflect the NEI's 
importance to American strategic concerns, such as Cold War competition and the 
revival of Western economies. 
Traditionally, the US viewed China as the focus of its policies in Asia and this 
perception continued after 1945, despite the civil war there. However, as the 
Nationalists' position worsened, the State Department became more certain of the 
need to concentrate on Japan as the basis of its policy in Asia. As Japan became 
more prominent, so the idea of containing communism on the Asian mainland 
receded. Instead, US planners envisaged a network of offshore bases, linking Japan 
and Southeast Asia, as the main barrier to communist expansion. 80 Japan's 
importance as the conduit for US policy in Asia required that it be economically 
strong and ideologically linked to the West and led the State Department to review 
80 Michael Schaller, `Securing the Great Crescent : Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment 
in Southeast Asia', Journal of American History, 69 (1982), pp. 392 - 414. 
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its attitude towards Southeast Asia, which it envisaged would supply the Japanese 
with raw materials and provide markets for its exports. 
US plans to revitalise Japan's economy, and the growing need for raw 
materials generally, made even more important the task of ensuring that Southeast 
Asia remained friendly to the West. State Department officials, like John Paton 
Davis, thought that colonialism in the region was doomed and that the US would 
soon have to deal with independent countries led by the same nationalists who were 
then opposing America's allies, the colonialists. This analysis was complemented 
by the increased perception that the Soviets were also becoming more interested in 
Southeast Asia, which was becoming the scene of Cold War confrontation. 81 
George Kennan, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, also 
accepted the increased importance of Southeast Asia and, in particular, Indonesia to 
US interests noting that Indonesia was `the most crucial issue of the moment in our 
struggle with the Kremlin' and that it was the `anchor in that chain of islands ... we 
should develop as a politico-economic counterforce to communism in the Asian 
land mass. '82 
Washington had long regarded the NEI as a strategically important producer of 
the raw materials, especially oil, upon which the West depended. It was clear to the 
State Department, in early 1948, that the NEI's export trade was being seriously 
81 HSTL; Papers of John F. Melby (Melby Papers), Box 9; SE Asia File - SE Asia Regional 
Conference - Bangkok, Siam (1); Report of the Southeast Asia Conference, 
21 - 26 Jun. 1948. 
82 Wilson D Miscamble, George F Kennan And The Making Of American Foreign Policy, 1947 - 50 
(Princeton, 1992) pp. 273 - 74. 
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retarded by the political situation. 83 The Administration was also becoming 
concerned about a general shortage of oil supplies caused by rising world demand 
and limited supply. 84 In 1938, the NEI had been the fifth largest producer of oil, 
pumping nearly 7.5 million tonnes. However, war damage and the post-war 
`political difficulties' had caused a slump in production with less than 1.5 million 
tonnes extracted in 1945 and only 0.3 million tonnes produced in 1946. $5 From the 
US point of view, the situation had been eased by the Dutch "police action", which 
had led to increased production, but continued political instability remained a threat 
to the rehabilitation of the Indonesian oil industry -a concern which was reinforced 
by the fall of the Sjarifudden Government, on 23 January 1948, as a result of 
disquiet in the Republic over the Renville Agreement. 
However, Washington was becoming more optimistic that a negotiated 
settlement could be reached as Hatta replaced Sjarifudden and while Sukarno, who 
viewed the Renville Agreement as a reasonable basis for talks, remained as the 
President of the Republic. 86 This perception of Republican moderation, combined 
with the Administration's greater investment in the negotiating process, led the 
State Department, once more, to encourage the Dutch to negotiate. However, the 
Administration was still keen to maintain its distance from events and, so, it used 
83 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,811.503156D, Box 4843; Consulate 
General to the Secretary of 
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its new GOC representative, Coert DuBois, to remind the Dutch that it was their 
responsibility to make proposals for the implementation of the Agreement. DuBois 
also told the Dutch that he should be given an opportunity to scrutinise any 
proposals they might want to make before they were submitted to either the GOC 
or the Republic to ensure that they were acceptable to the Republic. 87 
The Dutch, however, were more interested in implementing their own plans. 
Almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Renville Agreement, the Netherlands 
Indies Government created new states in West Java, East Sumatra and Madura out 
of territory conquered in 1947. Then, on 9 March, the Lieutenant Governor- 
General van Mook, announced plans to establish a Federal Interim Government 
(FIG) in which the Republic would be free to participate if it wished. These 
initiatives were taken by the Dutch before political negotiations on the 
implementation of the Renville Agreement had begun and, not surprisingly, the 
Republic complained that The Netherlands had contravened the Agreement, the 
provisions of which obliged the parties to co-operate in the setting up of the USI. 
The Republic also indicated that its own commitment to the Agreement had led to 
the withdrawal of 35,000 Republican troops from behind Dutch lines. 88 
Washington remained uncritical of the Dutch and declined to condemn their 
alleged infractions of the Renville Agreement. The State Department regarded the 
87 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6451; Livengood to the Secretary of State (Nos. 
151 and 152), 20 Feb. 1948. Graham had returned to New York to present the GOC's report on 
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88 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 211 - 12. 
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creation of the new states as tolerable so long as their future status was subject to a 
plebiscite. 89 Also, Marshall wanted the Republic to enter an interim government to 
smooth the path to a settlement and to allow the US to give economic aid to the 
NEI in such a way that The Netherlands would not be embarrassed. 90 The growing 
influence of wider issues on US policy - the Soviet threat and oil supplies - had not 
yet begun to change the Administration's basic approach to the search for a 
settlement. The attempt to filter Dutch plans before they became public had given 
way to the old assumption that the Dutch could be relied upon to negotiate a 
settlement which protected US, and the West's, interests. Indeed, the very 
appointment of DuBois underscored the basic pro-Dutch orientation of US policy. 
Critchley certainly regarded DuBois, who had served in the US consulate in the 
NEI before the war, as a friend of the Dutch. 91 By June, however, DuBois had 
undergone a change of mind and a split had emerged between him and Washington, 
which led to a significant shift in the Administration's policy towards Indonesia. 
When the political talks finally got underway, on 17 March, they quickly 
became bogged down over the same issues which had led to deadlock after 
Linggadjati. The Republic asserted its right to retain an army and to conduct 
foreign relations during the interim period before independence while the Dutch 
rejected these proposals as a denial of its sovereignty. As the talks ground on 
89 Secretary of State to the US Representative at the UN (Senator Warren Austin). 25 Feb. 1948, 
FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 106 - 07. 
90 Marshall to DuBois, 2 Mar. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, p. 133. 
91 Critchley to L. Maclntyre, 18 Mar. 1948, Australia & Indonesia's Independence : The Renville 
Agreement - Documents 1948. See McMahon, Colonialism And 
Cold War, p. 213. 
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inconclusively, DuBois reported as `excellent' relations between himself and the 
Dutch, who were, he said, taking a tolerant approach towards the Republic's 
negotiators. His confidence that the Dutch were intent on implementing Renville 
was undiminished and he urged the Republic to accept this too. 92 The Dutch, 
however, pressed on with their plan to set up a federation with, or without, the 
Republic's participation. On 1 May, they announced that a conference of non- 
Republican states would be held at Bandung to discuss the setting up of the FIG, 
once more indicating their intention not to be deflected from setting up the USI on 
their own terms. 
In contrast to the openly sympathetic approach taken by Washington, the 
Australians were far more critical of the Dutch. The Australian Government 
believed that, without the Republic's assent, peace would not be possible. 
Moreover, one of the primary objectives of the Australian GOC Delegation was to 
persuade the Americans on the importance of the Dutch coming to terms with 
Indonesian nationalism and the unfortunate consequences which would ensue if 
they failed to do So. 93 Whereas Washington assumed that the Dutch would 
eventually offer a generous settlement to the Republic, the Australians believed that 
pressure would have to be exerted on them to achieve this goal. 94 Meanwhile, 
Critchley, who by now was the Australian representative on the GOC, had 
concluded that a political settlement was essential and, frustrated by what he 
92 DuBois to the Secretary of State, 2 and 10 Apr. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 133 and 143 - 44. 
93 Letter from Critchley to the author, 6 Aug. 1998. 
94 "Australian Policy On Indonesia", DEA Memorandum, [15 Apr. 1948], Australia & 
Indonesia's Independence : The Renville Agreement - Documents 1948. 
96 
regarded as stalling tactics by the Dutch, he began, in April, to develop an initiative 
designed to break the impasse. 95 
In early May, the State Department became aware that its assumptions about 
the Dutch and their approach to the search for a settlement were misplaced. At the 
UN, the Republic's representatives had criticised the Dutch for their violations of 
the Renville Agreement and had also expressed concern about the performance of 
the GOC. Infuriated by this, Marshall ordered DuBois to upbraid Hatta's 
Government but, much to his surprise, DuBois replied that the Republic's 
allegations were `anything but baseless'. The Dutch, he warned, were restricting 
the Republic's freedom to communicate with the people by preventing plebiscite 
meetings from being held. DuBois confirmed that the Republic's criticisms of the 
GOC were not unreasonable since, in the post-Renville talks, little favourable to the 
Republic had been achieved. Perhaps most damagingly of all, DuBois advised 
Marshall that the Dutch were relying on the US to cover for their intransigence both 
in the GOC and at the UNSC. 96 The Secretary of State was shocked by DuBois' 
report, which reached him in the middle of the month, and he rejected the 
implication that pro-Dutch bias had influenced American policymaking. Advising 
DuBois that US policy had been based on the supposition that the Dutch complying 
with the Renville Agreement, Marshall said that he had received no indication that 
the Dutch were culpable or that there was Republican dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the GOC. Specifically, Marshall rejected DuBois' suggestion that 
95 Interview with Thomas Critchley, Sydney, 12 Sept. 1996. 
96 Marshall to DuBois, 30 Apr. 1948 and DuBois to the Secretary of State, 10 May 1948, FRUS 
1948 VI, pp. 161 - 62 and 164 - 68. 
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the Dutch might resort to force to settle matters, saying that the Administration had 
been assured by the Dutch that they had no such plans. 97 
Marshall's reluctance to accept DuBois' advice demonstrated the extent to 
which the Administration had become divorced from the situation in the NEI. It 
also emphasised the further reality that the State Department believed that 
American interests lay in having The Netherlands as a stable and co-operative ally 
and not in accommodating the Republic. This outlook now coloured its reaction to 
Critchley's effort to find a way forward. As the political talks faced breakdown, 
Critchley tried to break the deadlock by proposing that, instead of simply 
facilitating the negotiations, the GOC should make its own proposals for a 
settlement. His plan, which he had discussed with Hatta but had not cleared with 
his colleagues, DuBois and Raymond Herremans, was aimed at circumventing 
disagreements about the plebiscites promised by Renville. 98 Critchley's central 
proposition was for the election of a Constituent Assembly, which would be 
charged with drafting a constitution for the USI, negotiating a Union statute and 
which would eventually appoint the provisional federal government to which 
sovereignty would be transferred. In early May, DuBois began working with 
Critchley to refine the plan and, at the end of the month, he presented an outline of 
the plan to the State Department for comment. 99 
97 Secretary of State to DuBois, 14 May 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 172 - 74. 
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Faced with the alternative of deadlocked negotiations, Washington's response 
was positive. Lovett told DuBois that he was impressed by his analysis of the 
situation and by his ideas. 1°° At the beginning of June, DuBois advised 
Washington of some refinements to the plan and, in asking the Administration to 
persuade the Dutch to accept it, argued that it represented the only hope for a 
peaceful settlement. He sought the State Department's approval for the plan saying 
that, if it did not like his plan, he was `at a loss' to know what to do next. '°' On 5 
June, DuBois sent a copy of the full proposals to Washington for comment102 and, 
on 10 June, the Critchley-DuBois Plan was handed to the Dutch and the Republic. 
The plan immediately ran into trouble. Lacking Herremans' agreement, it was 
presented as a personal initiative by Critchley and DuBois and this aroused the 
opposition of the Dutch. Their more substantive objection to the plan concerned its 
stipulation that the provisional federal government should `have every power of 
sovereignty' in the interim period, leaving the Dutch Governor only with a power 
of veto. 103 Although, it claimed at first not to have received a copy of the plan, 104 
the State Department did not now reflect Lovett's earlier views about the plan. Its 
first concern was that the GOC should not become an arbitral body and the State 
10° Lovett to DuBois, 27 May 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 186 - 87. 
"" DuBois to the Secretary of State, 1 Jun. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 203 - 07. 
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Department believed that the Critchley-DuBois Plan implied just such a change in 
its status. Aware that the plan was essentially Critchley's, and since the State 
Department viewed him as the main influence behind the push to give the GOC a 
wider role, the Americans decided not to support the initiative. 105 More 
importantly, however, the State Department shared Dutch concerns on the question 
of sovereignty in the transitional period before independence, an issue which had 
been highly influential during the Renville talks and which remained important for 
Washington. 
While Critchley believed that this attitude could have been influenced by a 
legalistic desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, 106 the 
State Department had other reasons for taking this line. Like Graham before him, 
DuBois was given detailed advice about the parameters within which US policy 
allowed him to work. So, DuBois was told that, despite being a free agent as a 
member of the GOC, he was expected to deliver an agreement which accorded with 
the `larger interests of the United States'. In particular, the State Department 
advised him that the interim period before independence was intended to allow the 
Dutch to regain possession of, and rehabilitate, the NEI economy and to give 
Indonesians time to be trained for government. 107 It is clear that, while Washington 
in theory supported eventual independence, it continued to be concerned primarily 
with the stability of The Netherlands and the re-integration of the 
NEI into the 
105 PRO; FO 371/69765; Franks to the Foreign Office, 11 Jun. 1948. 
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world economy, an approach consistent with the attitude it had adopted after the 
Dutch "police action". Without Washington's support the Critchley-DuBois Plan 
could not succeed but its existence was, nevertheless, an embarrassment for the 
State Department. The last rites for the Critchley-DuBois Plan were acted out at 
the UNSC, which was debating a resolution from the Soviets calling on the 
Security Council to consider the proposals. Having already told DuBois that it was 
`unalterably oppose(d)' to any referral of the proposals to the UNSC, 108 the 
Administration now abstained in a vote on the Soviet resolution, thus denying the 
USSR a majority by one vote. 109 
The failure of the Critchley-DuBois Plan had a serious impact on DuBois' 
health and he left the NEI late in June to be replaced by H. Merle Cochran, a career 
diplomat known to be well-disposed towards the Dutch. "° DuBois' and 
Critchley's work did, however, have an effect on US policy, which was now 
beginning to take account of the possibility that the Dutch might not be acting in 
Washington's best interests. Just before the Critchley-DuBois Plan had been 
published, a CIA report had concluded that a prolonged dispute in the NEI would 
delay the restoration of political stability and economic rehabilitation. Fearful that 
this could lead to a settlement unfavourable to the US, the Agency suggested that 
some compromise would have to be found which `afford(ed) expression to 
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Indonesian nationalism but permitt(ed) the continuation of Dutch assistance and 
guidance in Indonesia. ' This `middle course' would, the Agency warned, require 
the `continuing influence of third powers' in Indonesia. " The CIA's report 
signalled the extent to which, up to that point, US support for Indonesian 
independence had amounted to little more than pious words. DuBois had reached 
much the same conclusion as the CIA during the final weeks of his stay in the NET. 
In early June, he had told Marshall that no substantial economic rehabilitation 
would take place unless there was a settlement which had nationalist support. 
DuBois had also believed that an agreement could be devised which allowed the 
Dutch to retain their economic stake in the colony while, at the same time, 
providing the US with a foothold in the newly independent country. The US 
Delegate reminded Washington that only the US could provide the funds needed 
for reconstruction and pointed out that the nationalists would be only too pleased to 
have the US as a counterweight to the Dutch after independence. "2 Within the 
State Department, the more complicated picture was reflected by Lovett, who 
admitted to van Kleffens that he had formerly viewed the dispute `in terms of black 
and white and had felt that the Netherlands' position was substantially correct' but 
that he now saw a `large element of gray injected into the picture'. 
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That senior State Department officials, like Lovett, were now beginning to 
take account of the possibility that the intractability of the dispute might be the fault 
of both sides and not, as they had previously supposed, just the Indonesian, 
represented a major shift in American thinking. After reflecting at more length on 
the Critchley-DuBois proposals, State Department analysts were also arguing that 
they were more acceptable than they had originally believed. After closer scrutiny, 
the plan was now found to be `in full consonance' with the Renville Agreement. 
Crucially, it was discovered that the proposals not only provided for a constructive 
and speedy transition to independence but also safeguarded as far as possible The 
Netherlands' economic interests. Analysts noted that the main drawback to the 
Plan was the fact that the Dutch had rejected it and were unlikely to accept anything 
similar. 114 Nevertheless, the State Department began work on re-drafting the 
Critchley-DuBois Plan in an effort to find a proposal which had some hope of 
acceptance by the Dutch and the Republic. Officials acknowledged that this step 
represented a further assumption of responsibility for obtaining a settlement by 
Washington but regarded it as the only way of preventing continued deadlock in the 
negotiations. 115 The State Department's action also was a tacit acceptance that the 
Dutch could not be relied upon to secure a settlement in the NEI. 
By mid-July, the State Department had, despite its rejection of the Critchley- 
DuBois Plan, now fully accepted Critchley's conclusion that neither of the parties 
114 BUL; OSS/State IR Reports : Postwar Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia; State Department Office 
of Intelligence Research (OIR) Report 4716, "Appraisal of the DuBois-Critchley Plan as a Pattern 
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to the dispute were capable of breaking the deadlock in the talks. On 13 July, and 
shortly after the re-drafting of the Critchley-DuBois Plan was completed, Lovett 
again met van Kleffens. This time, the Undersecretary of State told the Dutch 
Ambassador that Washington had no confidence in the Dutch being able to make 
proposals which would be acceptable to the Republic and that only the GOC 
seemed to be in position to find a compromise. Washington's hard line seemed 
borne out when van Kleffens refused to deny that The Netherlands Government 
would, if necessary, form the FIG without the Republic, a step which Lovett said 
amounted to a partition of the NEI, which Washington regarded as unacceptable. 
Despite this clash, Lovett came away from the meeting with the clear impression 
that the US draft plan would need further amendment if it was to be made 
acceptable to the Dutch. 1 16 Cochran left for the NEI, in late July, with the draft 
plan, travelling to The Hague for consultations with the Dutch Government. On 9 
August, he arrived in Batavia and began work on finalising the US plan. 
Cochran had little time to settle down before the situation again moved into 
crisis. A new Dutch Government, under Prime Minister Willem Drees, had taken 
office on 7 August and had begun to prepare a revised set of proposals for 
discussion with the Republic. The Dutch proposals were agreed by the Cabinet on 
27 August and immediately caused Cochran problems. Washington expected that 
the Dutch plan would be submitted to the Republic through the GOC and that 
Cochran's proposals would be tabled a week or so later. 117 However, Cochran 
1 16 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6451; Memorandum of Conversation by Lovett of 
a meeting with van Kleffens, 13 Jul. 1948. 
117 Secretary of State to Cochran, I Sept. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 314 - 15. 
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believed that the Republic and the Australians would both reject the Dutch plan and 
that, since his proposals included elements of the Dutch plan, it too would fail if 
presented after the Dutch plan had been rejected. Cochran urged Washington to 
persuade the Dutch not to submit their plan and advised officials that advances 
made by the communists made it imperative that negotiations did not flounder. ' 18 
Meanwhile, the State Department had become concerned that the Hatta 
Government might be overthrown by communists. It had noted that the USSR was 
paying increased attention to Southeast Asia and was `posing' as a friend of 
colonial peoples. 119 In Indonesia, the threat from communism, which had hitherto 
not been considered great, suddenly became more serious when it was discovered 
that Musso, a long-standing leader of the PKI, had returned to Indonesia from 
Moscow. The State Department now believed that the Hatta Government's 
survival was essential both to defeat the communist threat and to allow a settlement 
to be reached. 120 Representing moderate nationalism, Hatta was viewed as the best 
hope Washington had of achieving stability in Indonesia. With the Dutch still 
unwilling to hold back their proposal and the communist threat growing, Cochran, 
on his own initiative, tabled his Plan to the Dutch and the Republic in an attempt to 
save the negotiations and the Hatta Government. The Cochran Plan, presented on 
10 September, was designed to appeal to the Dutch and, while still based on the 
Critchley-DuBois Plan, its provisions strengthened the federal structure of the USI 
118 Cochran to the Secretary of State, 7 Sept. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 322 - 24. 
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and ensured against Republican domination of the government. The Plan also 
enhanced the powers of the Dutch representative during the transition. 12 1 Even 
with these new provisions, the Republic's Cabinet approved the Plan as a basis for 
negotiation, on 20 September. '22 The Netherlands Government, jealously 
protective of its sovereignty in the NEI, felt betrayed by the Administration and its 
new Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, rushed to Washington to make his 
government's feelings clear. In a series of meetings with Marshall and other 
officials, Stikker reminded the Americans of their undertakings not to take action 
without consulting The Hague. He also expressed reservations about the elections 
promised by Cochran, which he believed the communists might well win. For his 
part, Marshall emphasised that, for the first time, the Administration was united 
behind a proposed way forward - the Cochran Plan - and that prompt action was 
required to avert the crisis. ' 23 
The Administration used the meeting between Marshall and Stikker as part of 
a concerted drive to persuade the Dutch to accept the Cochran Plan as a basis for 
negotiation. In part, its new approach reflected the dismay felt at the apparent 
unwillingness of the Dutch to make concessions to nationalist opinion. The day 
before the meetings with Stikker, the State Department had received a 
memorandum from Graham urging the Administration to give the Dutch an 
121 Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 142 - 43. Critchley and Herremans had been kept in the 
dark about the Cochran Plan until it was tabled (PRO; FO 810/11; Shepherd to the Foreign 
Office, 25 Oct. 1948). 
122 Cochran to the Secretary of the State, 21 Sept. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 359 - 60. 
12 .3 Dirk Stikker, Men Of Responsibility -A Memoir, (New York, 1965), pp. 115 - 17. Memoranda of 
Conversation by Marshall and Lovett, of meetings with Stikker, 17 Sept. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, 
pp. 343 - 47. 
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ultimatum to accept the Cochran Plan. ' 24 The American sense of urgency and 
Dutch fears about the communist threat in Indonesia both seemed to be justified 
when, on 19 September, a communist-led uprising broke out at Madiun. However, 
Hatta's Government put down the rebellion and executed many of the ringleaders 
thus undermining The Netherlands' claim that the Republic was in the grip of 
extremists. The suppression of the rebellion greatly impressed the State 
Department, which now saw the Republic as anti-communist and as having 
provided stable government for 50 million people for three years. Officials noted 
that Hatta's was the only government in the Far East to have suppressed a 
communist revolt and that it done so without Western help and despite being 
handicapped by the Dutch. 125 However, the failure of the Madiun uprising also 
reduced the Administration's need for an urgent settlement because Hatta's 
position was no longer under internal threat and Administration officials became 
worried that the Republic might, as a result of its new-found, favoured status, be 
encouraged to `raise (its) price' for a settlement in talks with the Dutch. 126 
The events of September, which included the delayed Dutch response to the 
Cochran Plan, caused much debate in the State Department about the 
Administration's policy options. Officials were particularly concerned that the 
Dutch might reject the Plan completely and thereby place the Administration in an 
1224 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6440; Graham to the Secretary of State, 
16 Sept. 1948. 
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impossible position. The State Department's energy was directed at persuading the 
Dutch to accept the Cochran Plan as a basis for negotiation and, in late September, 
Marshall, addressing the UN General Assembly, tied US prestige to the efforts to 
find a non-violent solution. ' 27 To Critchley, this approach merely served to show 
that the State Department was more interested in the Administration's international 
reputation than it was in finding a solution as, in Batavia, Cochran was struggling 
to preserve the entire process from collapse. The Dutch had remained intransigent 
in the face of US blandishments and, in early October, gave Cochran their proposed 
response to his Plan. Cochran found it so unacceptable that he refused to transmit 
it to the Republic and spent the next ten days seeking a better reply. 128 The Dutch 
response, which was finally delivered on 14 October, was an improvement over the 
original but still did not satisfy Hatta since it did not offer elections to the 
provisional government and proposed a slower timetable for its establishment. 129 
The presentation of the Cochran Plan had effectively sidelined the GOC as the 
main diplomatic activity centred around Cochran in the NEI and in Washington. 
The Dutch Government's decision to hold direct talks with Hatta only served to 
emphasise the GOC's position. This step, together with the sacking of van Mook 
and his replacement by Beel, a conservative, increased Cochran's concerns about 
the likely success of negotiations. However, his worries were not necessarily 
shared in Washington, where William Lacy, the Assistant Chief of the Division of 
127 The New York Times, 24 Sept. 1948. 
-18 AA; CRS A4968/2/25/9/2; T. Critchley (Secret Reports), Critchley to Burton, 30 Oct. 1948. 
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South East Asian Affairs, believed that face-to-face talks `should assist' the search 
for a settlement. 130 Despite Lacy's opinion, Lovett was also worried about the 
chances of the talks reaching a satisfactory conclusion. After meeting the Dutch 
Ambassador, he cabled Cochran and told him that he believed the Dutch 
negotiators would have only limited room to manoeuvre and that he feared a 
resumption of military action, which he had warned the Dutch against. 131 
Although the State Department had invested a great deal in the Cochran Plan, 
the Dutch initiative appealed to the Administration, which had consistently 
supported bilateral talks between the Dutch and the Republic as the best way of 
reaching an acceptable solution. The Dutch delegation, led by Stikker, arrived in 
Batavia on 1 November and soon began talks with Hatta. While Washington was 
hopeful that a deal could be reached, early indications were not good, as Cochran 
accused Beel of trying to engineer a break down in the negotiations. The talks 
adjourned in the middle of the month, after Hatta had made significant concessions, 
and Stikker returned to The Hague to consult about the position reached. To 
Critchley, it seemed as if the Americans had failed to cope with Dutch delaying 
tactics and could not decide how to deal with the situation. He told Canberra that 
Cochran was worried about the delay in starting talks on the basis of his Plan, 
which had been `for urgent consideration', but that he also wanted to give Stikker a 
chance to reach a settlement. Critchley added that, because of this dilemma, the 
State Department had avoided pressurising the Dutch since Stikker's arrival. 132 
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In fact, Washington was preparing for the possible collapse of the talks. On 5 
November, Lovett had sent to Cochran a draft of an aide-memoire which it was 
intended should be delivered to the Dutch if they sabotaged the negotiations. The 
Dutch negotiators' return to the NEI and the resumption of talks, on 27 November, 
appeared to improve prospects but it soon became clear that this hope was 
misplaced and, amid mutual recriminations, the talks broke down, the Dutch 
leaving for Holland on 5 December. While the talks had been in progress, 
Washington had been alerted by both the Republic and the Indian Government that 
the Dutch were planning to resort to the use of force after the UN General 
Assembly adjourned in December. 133 In response to this possibility, Cochran had 
expressed to Stikker his concern at the way the Dutch had weakened Hatta's 
position by forcing him to make further concessions and he had warned that 
Washington `would hit (the) ceiling' if the Dutch resorted to military action to 
settle the matter. 134 The failure of the talks also opened up the probability that the 
whole matter would be referred to the UNSC - Cochran expected Critchley to do 
that. Cochran also believed that the talks had gone as far as they could without 
further pressure being applied to the Dutch. He told Washington that the Republic 
had demonstrated its willingness to compromise while the Dutch had refused to 
negotiate and recommended that the aide-memoire now be sent to the Dutch 
Government before Stikker's report was considered by the Cabinet. 135 
133 AA; CRS A6537/T2/SEATS 2; Australian Embassy in Washington to the DEA, 29 Nov. 1948. 
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The Administration agreed with Cochran's analysis of the situation and, on 7 
December, the aide-memoire was delivered to the Dutch Foreign Ministry. The 
document promoted the Cochran Plan as a basis for a political settlement, regretted 
the breakdown in talks and identified the survival of the Republic's Government as 
a key priority. Crucially, the aide-memoire noted that Dutch military action would 
seriously deplete The Netherlands' resources and tend to nullify the effect of 
European Co-operation Administration (ECA) appropriations to The Netherlands 
and the NEI and might `jeopardize continuance thereof. ' The Administration 
warned that, in the light of The Netherlands Government's actions, it might be 
forced to conclude that the GOC had no future role in solving the Indonesian 
dispute. In such circumstances, the Administration warned, it would resign from 
the GOC to give itself freedom of action in its handling of the dispute. The aide- 
memoire ended with a request that The Netherlands Government do nothing which 
would weaken the newly emerging `Western European structure. ' 136 Stikker later 
recorded that he refused to receive the communication and instructed van Kleffens 
to have it withdrawn. 137 US Embassy officials in The Hague reported that the 
Dutch had reacted with `pained and angry surprise' at the contents of the message, 
warned Washington about the possible repercussions of the aide-memoire and 
asked for concessions to mollify the Dutch. 138 Within hours, the State Department 
revised the document making it less critical of The Netherlands and withdrawing 
136 Acting Secretary of State to Cochran, 6 Dec. 1948, FRUS VI, pp. 527 - 29. 
137 Stikker, Men Of Responsibility, p. 139. 
138 Lloyd Steere (Charge at the Embassy at The Hague) to the Secretary of State, 7 and 8 Dec. 1948, 
FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 530 - 31 and 539 - 41. 
the threat to the aid programme. 139 Officially, the Netherlands Government was 
greatly satisfied with the new wording140 but, on 10 December, it delivered to the 
State Department a note which frostily asserted that the US aide-memoire was 
based `on an insufficient understanding of the circumstances' and went on to imply 
that the Dutch were considering military action. 141 In a last ditch effort to prevent 
hostilities, Cochran prepared a letter for Hatta's signature which sought to meet 
outstanding Dutch concerns. 142 In Washington, the letter proved dramatically the 
Republic's willingness to reach a settlement143 but it drew only an ultimatum from 
the Dutch and, on 19 December, they launched their second "police action". 
In the months between the Renville Agreement and the second Dutch "police 
action", Washington's approach to the question of Indonesian independence 
underwent great change. The Administration had, since the end of the war, seen its 
own interests as indivisible from those of The Netherlands but, as the year 
progressed, Washington became increasingly worried that the economic 
rehabilitation of the NEI was being delayed unacceptably by Dutch intransigence in 
the talks. The friction between Washington and The Hague over economic issues 
grew worse as the Truman Administration recognised that it had an increasing 
interest in the future of Indonesia. As the perception grew that the USSR posed a 
139 Department of State to The Netherlands Embassy, 8 Dec. 1948 FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 531 - 35. 
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threat to Southeast Asia and as Indonesia itself became important to US plans to 
contain Asian communism, Washington developed its own, separate need for a 
settlement in the archipelago. The emergence of considerations which did not 
necessarily point to continued Dutch sovereignty weakened the Administration's 
willingness to give unconditional support to Dutch efforts to recover their colony. 
However, this new approach did not affect the underlying sympathy which the 
Administration had towards the Dutch and which continued to prevent it from 
taking decisive action to force the Dutch to compromise. 144 
At the same time as this reappraisal of US interests was taking place, the State 
Department finally acknowledged that the Dutch were not prepared to countenance 
political change other than on their own terms. Officials also had to revise their 
former views about the Republic, which not only established its anti-communist 
credentials but also proved to be extremely flexible in negotiations. The 
Administration found it difficult to ignore the testimony of Graham, DuBois and 
Cochran that it was the Dutch who were holding up a settlement, an analysis which 
became clear to the State Department after the presentation of the Cochran Plan. 
The Dutch standing in Washington was particularly damaged by the second "police 
action" which was launched after The Hague had given numerous assurances that it 
would not resort to military action while negotiations were still taking place. 145 As 
the reputation of the Dutch fell, so the Republic's stock rose in response to its 
1.44 The New York Times, 23 Dec. 1948. 
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almost abject willingness to co-operate with the GOC and with the Cochran 
Plan. 146 
As Washington's interest in a speedy settlement to the dispute increased and 
its faith in the Dutch declined, the State Department took on a much greater 
responsibility for finding a solution and it was the failure of the Critchley-DuBois 
Plan which proved to be the catalyst for change. In August 1947, Washington had 
seen the GOC as a device which allowed UN involvement in the dispute but which 
also, significantly, precluded Soviet intervention. The State Department had also 
found the GOC to be a useful vehicle for pursuing US policy in Indonesia. 
However, the post-Renville talks had shown the GOC's role as the facilitator of 
talks was inadequate to the needs of the situation with the result that Critchley had 
determined that it could only succeed if it took the initiative. Although his idea was 
rejected by the State Department, it did form the basis of the American approach in 
the second half of 1948. Not only did the Cochran Plan bear more than a passing 
similarity to Critchley's but it was also put forward as a way of pushing 
negotiations forward. The main difference, however, between the two situations 
was that the diplomatic manoeuvres which followed the presentation of the 
Cochran Plan took place outside the structures of the GOC. 147 Essentially, Cochran 
was acting as a representative of the US government and not as a member of the 
GOC, although it provided a useful disguise for his activities. Ultimately, however, 
the State Department's tactics failed when the Dutch rejected the aide-memoire of 
146 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6440; Rusk and Hickerson to the Secretary of 
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7 December. The fact that nine days later the Dutch launched their second military 
action suggests that Washington's revision of the document contributed to the 
Dutch Government's decision to use force against the Republic, a view shared by 
Sir Francis Shepherd, the British Consul-General in Batavia, who believed that the 
aide-memoire `had done more harm than good by putting the Dutch backs up and 
settling them in their obstinacy. ' 148 With Dutch rule in the NET imposed by the 
military, Washington's policy had failed and The Netherlands Government had 
taken advantage of the US policy of subordinating all other policy aims to the 
central goal of stability in Europe. 
148 PRO; FO 810/ 11; Shepherd to the Foreign Office, 28 Dec. 1948. 
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4. American Self-Interest Brings Indonesian Independence (January - 
November 1949) 
Dutch troops made rapid advances into Republican territory taking the 
nationalists' capital, Yogjakarta, where Sukarno, Hatta and other Republican 
leaders had decided to remain to await capture. As the assault continued, all of the 
Republic's main population centres were occupied but the Dutch were unable to 
inflict a decisive defeat on the Indonesian forces, which melted away and prepared 
to launch a guerrilla war. As Cochran had predicted, the Truman Administration 
reacted angrily to the Dutch action, but Washington's immediate response did not 
flow from a principled support for Indonesian nationalism. Rather, it was 
conditioned by the complete collapse of its strategy of using friendly persuasion to 
nudge the Dutch into an accommodation with the Republic and by the domestic 
and international reaction to the Dutch action. Nevertheless, despite its vociferous 
and public hostility to the second "police action", the Truman Administration's 
outrage soon petered out and gave way to diplomatic manoeuvring and deference to 
the Dutch. Crucially different in the months after the second Dutch military action, 
though, was the existence of a UNSC resolution which prescribed the steps to be 
taken by the Dutch to effect a transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia and powerful 
domestic pressure on the Administration to ensure that the Dutch abided by the 
UN's will. 
The second Dutch "police action" shattered US policy in the region and also 
delivered a hammer blow to Washington's hopes for a peaceful transition to 
independence in Indonesia. It had been Washington's fervent hope that it would be 
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able to avoid direct association with the process of decolonisation in the Far East 
but the Dutch had managed, according to the CIA, to bring this `problem sharply 
into focus'. Not only would the Administration's past policy in relation to the NEI 
now be scrutinised publicly but its response to the Dutch use of force would also be 
subjected to close attention. Additionally, the Administration was concerned that 
the Dutch had increased the prospect that nationalist movements in southern Asia 
would turn to the Soviets for support. By attacking the Republic, they had 
suppressed the Republic's anti-communist government, which an intelligence 
report produced for the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan 
described as `the last bridge' between the West and Indonesian nationalism. The 
CIA believed that the attack had placed in doubt both the Dutch and the 
Indonesians' ability to contribute to world `political stability and economic 
recovery'. The Agency expected political dissent to increase in Holland while it 
believed that the `liquidation' of the Republic would have an obviously 
destabilising effect. The cost to the Dutch of the military campaign and the 
economic consequences of prolonged guerrilla warfare were all expected to have a 
significant effect on the capitalist world. As if this were not enough, the Dutch had 
broken the Renville Agreement truce and, in so doing, had `weakened the prestige 
of the United Nations', thus compromising faith in Western concepts of 
international law and democracy and allowing the USSR to deflect charges that 
communists were solely responsible for UN failures. ' 
' HSTL; Truman Papers; PSF, Intelligence File, Box 256; ORE 1949 (28,29,33,39 - 41,43 - 
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The State Department, which had received assurances from the Dutch that 
they were willing to continue negotiations on the basis of Hatta's letter, responded 
to the outbreak of hostilities with shock. Not only had the Dutch jeopardised a 
wide range of US policies but they had defied Washington's diplomatic pressure 
for a peaceful transition to Indonesian independence. Robert Lovett, the Acting 
Secretary of State, was `indignant' at the Dutch action and promised to raise the 
issue at the UN, while W. Walton Butterworth, the Director of the Bureau of Far 
Eastern Affairs, found it `incredible' that The Hague had resorted to force. 2 Their 
sense of betrayal was transmitted to the Foreign Office, in London, by Embassy 
staff who made it clear that Washington felt embarrassed by the Dutch military 
action after having played such a central role in negotiations. 3 The State 
Department's belief that the Dutch action had severely damaged Western interests 
in Asia led Butterworth to observe that The Netherlands had done itself and other 
`Christian nations' a grave disservice. 4 Yet, in many ways, the Administration was 
in a bind of its own making. Having consistently supported Dutch sovereignty in 
Indonesia and having been prepared to amend its original aide-memoire, it had 
signalled to The Hague its reluctance to take strong action to impose its will on the 
negotiations. This impression had been compounded by Washington's reluctance 
to push the Cochran Plan and its failure, in 1947, to condemn the first "police 
action". It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Administration's anger had more 
2 PRO; FO 371/69783; Franks to the Foreign Office, 19 Dec. 1949. NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949, 
856D. 00, Box 6440; Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation by Butterworth, of a 
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Embassy), 18 Dec. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 578 - 79. 
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to do with the fact that Holland, a client state, had decided to pursue its own agenda 
in preference to Washington's. 
It soon became clear, however, that the Dutch military action had aroused 
widespread opposition both within the US and internationally. The Administration 
found that domestic opinion was heavily against the Dutch action and that this 
mood was reflected in Congress, where anti-Dutch sentiment might have 
jeopardised ECA appropriations to The Netherlands as well as the moves to create 
a Western security alliance. The scale of the threat posed to the Administration's 
policies was graphically highlighted by Senator George Malone's assertion that the 
Dutch could not have financed their military operations in Indonesia without US 
funds. 5 This theme was also taken up by Philip Murray, the President of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), who wrote on behalf of his six million 
members to complain that US aid was being used by The Netherlands `for purposes 
inconsistent with the original intent'. Murray urged that the Administration take 
`every feasible step in the realm of diplomacy and economics' to help terminate the 
Dutch aggression and to assure a speedy settlement. 6 The CIO's representations, 
and those of other like-minded organisations, put great pressure on the 
Administration to take strong action in the Security Council. ' 
5 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6440; Butterworth to Bohlen, 7 Jan. 1949. The 
New York Times, 23 Dec. 1948. 
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The weight of domestic opinion in favour of UN action to halt the Dutch was 
complemented by the international concern. The Dutch attack was condemned 
throughout Asia, where the plight of Indonesian nationalists evoked much 
sympathy. The governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon all withdrew airport and 
harbour facilities to the Dutch military while Australian dockworkers boycotted 
Dutch military shipments and students demonstrated in Burma, India and Pakistan. 8 
Once more, Australia and India were outspoken in their criticism. At the UNSC, 
the Australian Delegate, Colonel W. R. Hodgson, likened the Dutch assault to that 
perpetrated by Hitler on Holland in 1940,9 while Nehru let it be known that he 
might break off diplomatic relations with The Netherlands. Like the domestic 
critics of US policy, Nehru told the US Ambassador, Loy Henderson, that he could 
not understand why the US, and the UK, could not bring effective pressure to bear 
on The Netherlands, which received so much financial and other aid from them. 
Although the State Department prevailed upon Nehru not to sever relations with 
The Netherlands, 10 the Indian Government did announce its intention to hold a 
conference for Asian nations, in New Delhi, to condemn the Dutch. To the 
Americans, it seemed as if their fears about an East-West split were being 
realised. 11 
8 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 253. 
9 Letter from Critchley to the author, 6 Aug. 1998. 
10 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,745.56, Box 3997; 12 - 2048; Embassy to the Secretary of State, 
20 Dec. 1948 and Henderson to the Secretary of State, 21 Dec. 1948 and Memorandum of 
Conversation by Joseph Sparks, of a meeting between Joseph Satterthwaite and Sir Benegal Rama 
Rau (Indian Ambassador), 22 Dec. 1948. 
" Cochran to the Secretary of State, 3 Jan. 1949, FRUS 1949 VII pt. 1, pp. 119 - 21. 
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The Administration's public response in the days immediately following the 
Dutch military action reflected the indignation felt at Foggy Bottom. On 20 
December, the ECA suspended allocations to the NEI and, two days later, Philip 
Jessup, the Acting US Delegate to the UN, told the Security Council that the US 
could not `find any justification for the renewal of military operations in Indonesia. ' 
His speech, in which he called for a cease-fire, the release of political prisoners and 
a withdrawal of Dutch troops to the status quo line, amounted to the strongest 
public rebuke delivered up to that time by Washington to The Hague. 12 However, 
the apparent toughness of the State Department's actions did not stand up to close 
scrutiny. For example, the Australians considered the cessation of Marshall Aid to 
the NEI as being `little more than a gesture', 13 while Lovett admitted that the US 
wanted to take `reasonable and moderate measures now' in order to avoid extreme 
ones later. He told the British Ambassador, Oliver Franks, that the ECA's 
suspension of aid for the NEI was an attempt to head off any congressional demand 
for a halt to funding for The Netherlands itself and to `canalise the rising tide of 
popular indignation' at home. 14 The limits of Washington's willingness, or ability, 
to act were also demonstrated in the UNSC debate which Jessup had addressed and 
which was considering a US-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire, the 
withdrawal of Dutch troops to their 18 December lines, the release of political 
prisoners and a report from the GOC on events in Indonesia since 12 December, 
including an assessment of who was responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. 
12 SCOR 1948,389th Meeting, 22 Dec. 1948, pp. 42 - 49. 
13 AA; CRS A5954/l/2278/1; Australian Consul-General, Batavia, to the DEA, 23 Dec. 1948. 
" Memorandum of Conversation by Lovett, of a meeting with Franks, 24 Dec. 1948, FRUS 1948 
VI, pp. 602 - 03. PRO; FO 371/69787; Franks to the Foreign Office, 24 Dec. 1948. 
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When the UNSC voted on the resolution, on 24 December, Washington failed to 
obtain the necessary support to approve its demand for a Dutch withdrawal and an 
apportionment of blame. 
The measures taken by the Administration in the days immediately following 
the second "police action" were public manifestations of the internal debate 
conducted within the State Department over what to do about the Dutch defiance of 
Washington's policies. They also reflected Washington's growing commitment to 
the UN, a policy shift made public in Truman's Inaugural Address, on 20 January 
1949.15 The Administration's room for manoeuvre was, however, limited by its 
wish to work with its allies. On the day that the Dutch launched the "police 
action", the Administration had begun a review of its policy options and Lovett had 
instructed Jessup to request an emergency meeting of the UNSC. He had also 
informed Jessup that the US did not see much point in remaining as a member of 
the GOC and had asked him to `sound out' Security Council members on their 
willingness to apply economic sanctions to The Netherlands under Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter. 16 Australian diplomats reported that US policy was directed, firstly, at 
stopping the fighting and, secondly, towards restoring the Republic's position. 
They were impressed by the State Department's actions, which they felt showed 
that it `really mean(t) business'. 17 However, the State Department had also decided 
that it would not allow itself to become exposed to world opinion in the way it had 
S LaFeber, America, Russia And The Cold War, p. 81. 
16 Lovett to Jessup, 18 Dec. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 577 - 78. 
17 AA; A3300/7/688; Australian Embassy, Washington to the DEA, 18 Dec. 1948. 
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been by the Dutch military action and Lovett, therefore, had made it clear to Jessup 
that he was only to request the UNSC meeting if other members agreed. On 20 
December, Truman instructed Lovett that, while he wanted to `properly label' 
Dutch culpability, he was not prepared for the US to take action which would be 
impossible to maintain because of a lack of international support. 
Since the Administration was not willing to act unilaterally after the second 
"police action", the main emphasis of its efforts to repair the damage done to its 
prestige and to deliver a settlement in Indonesia switched to the UN. While, 
theoretically, it was within Washington's power to halt Marshall Aid to The 
Netherlands, the State Department consciously decided not to take any action 
beyond that which its allies would support and which could be agreed by the 
UNSC. So, when the UK Government rejected sanctions as an option, Washington 
saw that as the end of the matter and limited its action to the cessation of ECA aid 
to Indonesia. In the UN, it persuaded the Security Council to call for a cease-fire 
and the release of political prisoners captured in the second "police action"' 8 but 
these steps hardly amounted to a radically different approach to the crisis. In fact, 
the Administration's cautious approach was dictated by the conflicting pressures 
which it faced and which prevented it from making an unambiguous commitment 
to Indonesian nationalism. 
During the UNSC debate, Dean Rusk, the Director of the Office of United 
Nations Affairs, provided Jessup with a comprehensive briefing on the background 
18 SCOR 1948, Resolutions and Decisions, 24 Dec. 1948, p. 12. 
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to the State Department's approach. Rusk's statement revealed the extent to which 
Washington's policy remained inherently conservative and reactive despite its 
professed support for decolonisation. He told Jessup that the Dutch action had 
brought `into sharp conflict a number of important ... national interests', which 
Rusk described as including Washington's deep interest in the political and 
economic stability of Western Europe. He also emphasised Washington's support 
for the rapid development of self-government and independence for colonial 
peoples. In a further demonstration of the tightrope Washington was walking, 
Rusk said that the "police action" appeared to be a direct encouragement to 
communism in Southeast Asia and could not be condoned `or wink(ed) at' and yet 
the Administration, he went on, had no intention of breaking totally with the Dutch 
over Indonesia because such a move would lead to `splendid isolation' for the US. 
As to the Administration's future action, Rusk's priority was to secure a cessation 
of hostilities and he restated Washington's faith in a `bona fide effort' by the Dutch 
and the Indonesians to reach a political settlement. In supporting further 
negotiations Rusk showed how limited were the options available to the US, 
especially since the Administration felt that it did not have the strong support of 
either the British or the French. Indeed, Rusk made it clear to Jessup that the State 
Department's activity in the UN would, in part, be directed at mobilising public and 
international opinion to persuade the UK and France to take a tougher line. 
Rusk's cable to Jessup was a frank admission of the thinking behind, and the 
limitations of, US policy in the aftermath of the second "police action". In policy 
terms, it revealed that little had changed beyond the increased sense of urgency 
124 
which was felt in Washington about the need for a negotiated agreement on 
decolonisation. Rusk's advice did not mean that The Administration had 
undergone a selfless conversion to freedom for the colonised but, rather, that it was 
worried about the communist threat to the West's interests in Asia. Not least 
amongst his considerations was concern that US prestige in Asia had been severely 
undermined by its association with colonial rule. Rusk stressed that one of 
Washington's prime objectives in dealing with the Indonesian question would, 
henceforth, be to demonstrate to Asians US interest in self-government. He 
explained the Administration's caution in terms of its desire not to `become 
involved in a series of armed actions on cases arising before (the) UN' when he 
might have added that inaction by its allies and the consequences of its own failed 
policies had boxed Washington into a corner. Nevertheless, Rusk's cable showed 
that the Administration believed that it had gained a tactical advantage as a result of 
the Dutch action which would strengthen its chances of contriving a political 
settlement because, at the end of the day, Washington was `... pursuing (its) own 
interests and policies .... 
Today pursuit of our policy may make us critical of the 
Dutch; tomorrow pursuit of the same policy in different circumstances may make 
us equally critical of Indonesians. "9 
By the end of the year, the sense of outrage which had affected the senior 
officials in the State Department and which had promised, in Australian eyes at 
least, a more determined effort by Washington to broker a political settlement, had 
evaporated. On 27 December, Jessup reported that The Hague had defied the 
19 Rusk to Jessup, 23 Dec. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 597 - 600. 
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UNSC by not complying with the cease-fire call or releasing its political 
prisoners. 20 Despite this, Hodgson reported to Canberra that the US appeared to 
have lost much of its enthusiasm for firm action and was more concerned with 
blocking the USSR than in securing a satisfactory decision in the Security 
Council 
. 
21 A similar picture emerged from Washington, where William Lacy, the 
Assistant Chief of the Division of South East Asian Affairs, believed that the 
Administration's `initiative was at least temporarily exhausted'. 22 Within a 
fortnight of the "police action" Washington was powerless to make any significant 
impact on the situation so long as it was unwilling to take action to impel the Dutch 
to reach a settlement. 
The New Year, however, saw renewed pressure on the Administration to 
adopt a tougher stance. The Dutch, once more, demonstrated their determination to 
press ahead with their own policies, this time in defiance of the UN, and diplomatic 
developments encouraged Washington into a more active posture. Furthermore, 
Cochran underlined to the State Department the extent to which the US had been 
humiliated by the Dutch. The Administration's response to these developments 
amounted to yet another change in approach as it sponsored a Security Council 
resolution which, for the first time, was prescriptive in delineating the process 
which the Dutch would be expected to follow in transferring sovereignty in 
Indonesia. 
20 Jessup to the Secretary of State, 27 Dec. 1948, FRUS 1948 VI, pp. 607 - 08. 
21 AA; A5954/1/2278/1; Lt. Col. W. R. Hodgson to the DEA, 27 Dec. 1948. 
22 AA; A3300/7/688; Australian Embassy, Washington to the DEA, 27 Dec. 1948. 
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In the first week of January, the UNSC returned to the Indonesian issue and 
examined the progress made by the Dutch in meeting the terms of the 24 December 
resolution and two additional resolutions adopted on 28 December. These later 
resolutions reiterated the call for a cease-fire and the release of political prisoners. 
In an attempt to mollify the UN, the Dutch had announced that cease-fires would be 
introduced in Java and Sumatra but that Dutch forces would retain the right to 
maintain law and order. The Dutch failure to comply fully with the UN cease-fire 
resolutions, and the continued captivity of the Republic's leadership, provoked a 
second outspoken attack by Jessup at the Security Council. Repeating the 
Administration's view that the "police action" lacked justification and explicitly 
condemning the Dutch for failing to comply with UNSC resolutions, he charged 
that the Dutch had violated the UN Charter. In dissociating the Administration 
from the Dutch military action he praised the Republic as the `heart of Indonesian 
nationalism' and called for a resumption of talks, under the auspices of the UN, 
based on the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements and the Cochran Plan. 23 Even 
after Jessup's unprecedented public attack on the Dutch, the pressure on 
Washington to act increased when the GOC revealed that the Republican prisoners 
did not have the freedoms which the Dutch had assured the Security Council they 
enjoyed. 24 
23 SCOR 1949,398th Meeting, 11 Jan. 1949, pp. 2- 10. 
24 Raymond Lisle (Deputy US Representative to the GOC) to the Secretary of State, 16 Jan. 1949, 
FRUS 1949 VII, pp. 154 - 56. On 7 January, J. H. van Roijen, the new Netherlands Delegate to the 
UN, had asserted that some political prisoners had been released and that the remainder, held on the 
island of Bangka, were permitted to move about freely. 
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Washington was also finding it increasingly difficult to justify its policy 
internationally. Suspicions about Nehru's reasons for calling the New Delhi 
Conference led to a dialogue with the Indian Prime Minister to ascertain his 
thinking. In these discussions, Henderson explained Washington's position and 
secured from Nehru a public statement that the Conference was intended to 
supplement, not supplant, the work of the UN and that it was not the precursor to 
the creation of an Asian bloc. Despite this overt friendliness, the Indians made it 
clear that the UNSC's unwillingness to take enforcement action had angered Asian 
peoples and that the Conference should be seen as a `regional demonstration' 
against the `ineffectiveness' of the Security Council. 25 The British, too, were 
impressing on Washington the need for a solution in Indonesia, albeit from a 
different standpoint. Like the Americans, they were concerned about the possibility 
of Asia being lost to the West and had devoted much effort in trying to create an 
anti-communist front in Southeast Asia. With the collapse of the Kuomintang in 
China imminent, London was horrified at the impact of the Dutch "police action" 
on Asian opinion and the dangers it posed for the defence of British interests in the 
region. 26 The British fears about the growth in communist support were shared by 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, which told Truman that the repression of the 
Republic would strengthen the communists' position in Indonesia and that the 
25 NA; RG 59; Records of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, 
1941 - 1953, Subject Files 1941 - 53, (Lot 54 D 
224); Box 5; Australia - Summary Letters to and 
from Embassy; J. Harold Shullaw to Myron Cowan (Ambassador in Australia), 24 Jan. 1949. 
26 PRO; FO 371/76141; Dening to Frank Roberts (Principal Private Secretary to Bevin), 
12 Jan. 1949. 
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USSR would use the Dutch action to stimulate anti-Western feeling and to gain 
converts in Southeast Asia. 27 
The Dutch action had also angered Cochran, who felt personally affronted. In 
the days leading up to the military assault he had been trying to persuade Hatta and 
Sukarno that negotiations were possible and had been pressuring them to make 
concessions to the Dutch. Having had his integrity compromised by the "police 
action", he angrily told Washington that he would be unwilling to mediate the 
dispute unless the US dissociated itself from the Dutch action and suspended ECA 
appropriations to The Netherlands. He also demanded that all military action be 
ended, prisoners released and that Beel, The Netherlands' High Representative in 
Indonesia, and the Dutch military commander, General Simon Spoor, be removed. 
Furthermore, he recommended the dissolution of the GOC, which he believed had 
outlived its purpose. Cochran also warned the State Department that, after the 
Dutch defiance of the UN, ECA aid was almost certain to be cut off by Congress 
and that it would be sensible to use it beforehand as a bargaining counter. 28 
Although, Cochran was called back to Washington, on 7 January, for 
consultations and to contribute to the debate about future policy, the main contours 
within which the Administration would act had already been settled. Washington 
remained unwilling to take any steps which would not command majority support 
in the UNSC, where US efforts to find a settlement were to be focused. 
27 HSTL; Truman Papers; PSF; Intelligence File, Box 256; File : ORE 1949 (28,29,33,39 - 41, 
43 - 45); "Consequences of Dutch "Police Action" In Indonesia", ORE 40 - 49,27 
Jan. 1949. 
28 Cochran to the Secretary of State, 3 Jan. 1949, FRUS 1949 VII, pp. 119 - 21. 
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Immediately following Jessup's 11 January speech, the US Delegation circulated a 
draft resolution which embodied the gist of his condemnatory remarks and outlined 
a series of measures for resolving the dispute. Unusually, the draft resolution was 
published as a working paper in an effort to ensure that it secured substantial 
support before it was put formally to the UNSC. The US working paper was 
discussed extensively with other Security Council members and the Dutch, who 
found the document completely unacceptable. By 21 January, the draft resolution 
had been reworked to meet the concerns of Washington's allies and to incorporate 
elements of a Dutch Government proposal which was being developed - the final 
draft of the resolution included a timetable for the transition to independence which 
called for the creation of the FIG by 15 March 1949, for elections to be held no 
later than 1 October 1949 and for a transfer of sovereignty to take place no later 
than 1 July 1950. In line with State Department policy, the US was only one of 
four co-sponsors of the resolution - Cuba, Norway and China were the others - and 
it was adopted, on 28 January. 
The passage of the resolution marked a sharp departure from earlier US policy 
in two significant ways. First, it represented a practical demonstration of 
Washington's decision to give up its unilateral attempts to secure a settlement in 
Indonesia. The resolution had been carefully crafted to ensure that it did not attract 
opposition, particularly from France. It was also praised by the Australians, who 
considered it to be `the most vigorous and comprehensive attempt' yet by the 
UNSC to achieve a settlement. 29 The resolution also marked the first occasion on 
29 FUL; Evatt Collection; External Affairs : Reports and Intelligence Summaries - 1949; Political 
Intelligence Summary 3/49,3 Feb. 1949. 
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which the US had prescribed the framework of a settlement having previously been 
prepared to accept the outcome of bilateral negotiations between the Dutch and the 
Republic. 
Within days of the adoption of the 28 January resolution, and despite its 
success in building an international coalition behind a UN-brokered peace process, 
the Administration's determination once again wavered. While consulting with the 
Dutch about the UNSC resolution, the State Department had been told that The 
Netherlands Government was preparing a fresh set of proposals for discussion with 
the Republicans. Now, in the full knowledge that The Hague was unalterably 
opposed to restoring the Republican Government, 30 and conscious that the UN 
decision had provoked a crisis in the Dutch Cabinet, Washington decided to allow 
the Dutch time to finalise their ideas in the hope that they would comply with the 
UN resolutions. The Administration also hoped that they would make the 
necessary `psychological and political adjustment' to the new situation31 and 
Cochran, who was appointed as the US representative on the new UN Commission 
for Indonesia (UNCI), was instructed not to press the Dutch too hard and to allow 
them a chance to bring forward their own plans. 32 This they did and, on 26 
February, the Dutch published their latest proposals for a settlement. 
30 Van Roijen, SCOR 1949,406th Meeting, 28 Jan. 1948, pp. 6- 19. 
31 Secretary of State to Baruch, 3 Feb. 1949, FRUS 1949 VII, pp. 203 - 04. 
32 PRO; FO 371/76108; Minute by Robert Scott, 9 Feb. 1949. Scott's minute recorded a 
conversation with Dickover of the US Embassy. The UNCI had been created under the terms of 
the 28 January resolution and could reach decisions by a majority vote. Its membership was 
unchanged from that of the GOC. 
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The Beel Plan, as the proposals were known, conceded a speedier transition to 
sovereignty than that contained in the 28 January resolution. The Dutch suggested 
that the interim government could be set up by 1 May 1949 with the transfer of 
sovereignty taking place two months later. The Beel Plan also announced the 
convening of a Round Table Conference (RTC) in The Hague, beginning on 12 
March, to discuss the detailed arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty. While 
the Dutch said that republicans would be able to attend the RTC, it was made clear 
that the Republic's Government would not be restored before the talks began. 33 
Perhaps as a mark of their displeasure with the Americans, the Dutch did not let the 
State Department have advance information about the contents of the Beel Plan. 
The Administration, embarrassingly, was forced to rely on the British to provide 
details of the Dutch proposals before they were formally published. 
Nevertheless, by 23 February, J. Harold Shullaw, the Acting Chief of the 
Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs, was certain that the 
Plan would not work. He noted that the interim government would be created `by 
imposition rather than negotiation', and that no other construction could be placed 
on the Dutch proposal so long as they refused to allow the restoration of the 
Republic's Government. Shullaw also pointed out that, despite the proposal to 
transfer sovereignty by 1 July, the Dutch did not actually intend to allow 
independence until the RTC had concluded. Perhaps with an eye to The Hague's 
past record, he thought that the discussions might be `prolonged interminably', 
34 
33 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 281 - 82. 
34 NA; RG 59; Lot 54 D 224, Box 5; Australia - Summary Letters to and from Embassy; Shullaw 
to Cowan, 23 Feb. 1949. 
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By early March, the extent to which the State Department had accepted that no 
satisfactory settlement could be achieved without the restoration of the Republic 
was clear. In a note to the British, officials reported republican fears that the Dutch 
would use the RTC to install a pliant government in Indonesia which would then 
act as a front for the final destruction of the Republic. They also noted that a 
restored Republican government was the only body which would be able to call off 
the guerrilla war which had followed the "police action". 35 The Administration's 
rejection of the Beel Plan was formalised by Austin at the UNSC, on 10 March, 
when he denounced the Dutch for their continued failure to agree to the restoration 
of the Republic's government in advance of negotiations commencing. 36 
Washington was undoubtedly disappointed by the Dutch failure to bring 
forward proposals in accordance with the terms of the UN resolutions. However, 
its re-conversion to a more forthright posture did not result solely from the Beel 
Plan's inadequacies. It was also influenced by the situation in Indonesia, where 
The Netherlands' position had been hurt by the resignations of Dutch-supported 
federal governments in West Java and East Indonesia after the second "police 
action". Now, the Beel Plan provoked the Federalist Indonesians to come out in 
favour of the restoration of the Republic's government, 
37 thus uniting all shades of 
Indonesian opinion behind the UN resolutions and making it easier for the Truman 
35 Department of State to the British Embassy, 4 Mar. 1949, FRUS 1949 VII, pp. 297 - 99. The 
Administration was becoming increasingly aware of the effectiveness of the Indonesian resistance 
to Dutch occupation ( George Kahin, Nationalism And Revolution, p. 417) and believed that only 
the Republican government could halt it. 
36 SCOR 1949,416th Meeting, 10 Mar. 1949. 
37 PRO; FO 371/76121; Bevin to Franks, 10 Mar. 1949. Bevin's information was from Douglas. 
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Administration to insist on Dutch compliance. The military situation was also 
worsening as the Indonesians mounted an increasingly effective guerrilla campaign. 
On 6 February, Stikker had told Cochran that guerrilla activity was 'serious' 38 and 
it seemed as if the CIA's predictions about the detrimental effects of the "police 
action" were being realised. To make matters worse, the Dutch assault had led to 
the escape of about 40,000 communists taken prisoner by the Republic after the 
Madiun uprising, 39 a development which threatened not only increased resistance 
to the Dutch but the stability of an independent Indonesia. The crisis in Indonesia, 
therefore, demanded an early solution, which was acceptable to nationalists, to 
prevent escalating disorder. 
The Administration was also confronted by growing political pressure in 
Congress to take a tougher line with the Dutch. Lovett's hope that the halting of 
ECA aid to Indonesia might satisfy critics appeared misplaced as the Senate began 
to debate an amendment to the Economic Cooperation Administration Bill, tabled 
by Senator Owen Brewster, which called for the ending of all aid to The 
Netherlands until it complied with UN resolutions. Brewster's opposition to 
Administration policy linked the cost of the Dutch military presence in Indonesia, 
about $1 million each day, with Marshall Aid, which he argued was being used to 
finance the Dutch military presence in Indonesia. For good measure, Brewster 
highlighted the Dutch use of US military hardware in Indonesia. The gravity of the 
38 Cochran to the Secretary of State, 9 Feb. 1949, FRUS 1949 VII, pp. 212 - 23. 
39 NA; Records of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218 (RG 218); Geographic File 
1948 - 50, Box 50; CCS 400 Indonesia (12-20-49); John 
Ohly to Edward Dickinson and Maj. 
Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, 8 Dec. 1949. Butterworth to Webb, 24 Oct. 1949, FRUS 1949 IX, 
pp. 570 - 76. 
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threat posed to US policies in Western Europe by domestic political opposition 
grew as the deadline for the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty neared. In late 
March, Brewster questioned the Administration's willingness to accept Dutch 
membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) when signatories to 
the Treaty were required to resolve international disputes peacefully and in 
accordance with the UN Charter, a condition which The Netherlands clearly was 
not meeting. 40 
It was apparent that the Administration would not be allowed to sit back while 
a solution to the Indonesian question was found. Dutch intransigence over the 
restoration of the Republic's government and the opposition in Congress limited 
the Administration's options drastically - at stake was not just the future of 
Indonesia but also the recovery of Western Europe, if the Marshall Plan and the 
North Atlantic Treaty unravelled. Washington was also faced with the prospect of 
the imminent victory of the Chinese communists and an altered balance of power in 
Asia. At the beginning of the year, Henderson had told the Secretary of the 
Australian Department of External Affairs, John Burton, that US inaction was only 
temporary and that a stronger approach would be evident in two or three months 
time if the Dutch did not respond to pressure to reach a settlement in Indonesia. 41 
According to Henderson, the failure of the Beel Plan alone should have been 
enough to trigger a new US attempt to obtain a settlement. However, the need to 
40 LoC; Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 7 Feb. and 29 Mar. 1949. 
41 AA; CRS A1838/2/383/1/2/5; Burton to the DEA, 20 Jan. 1949. 
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end the turmoil in Indonesia was only one of a complex array of problems which 
confronted Washington in Southeast Asia. 
The State Department responded to these challenges by reviewing its policy 
towards Southeast Asia and, at the end of March, produced a revised analysis of the 
situation in the region. The document, which as NSC 51 was approved as policy by 
Truman on 1 July 1949, also signalled a new determination to resolve the impasse 
in Indonesia. The paper noted that political turmoil affecting `fully half of 
Southeast Asia was threatening the achievement of Washington's long-term 
objectives for the region, which it defined as `the eventual improvement of welfare 
and the calming of extreme nationalist passions' through economic development. 
Washington's strategy, the paper said, should be to promote gradual change in the 
economic relationship between Southeast Asia and the West by supporting political 
independence, which, in turn, would give Southeast Asian countries the `impetus to 
diversify their economies'. In seeking this new dispensation, the State Department 
identified the `futile' efforts of the Dutch to restore their pre-war relationship with 
the NEI as a major obstacle to change. Naturally, it was intended that the US 
should play a significant part in the evolution of Southeast Asian economies 
through private investment capital and Truman's recently announced "Point IV" aid 
programme. The paper did not, however, envisage swift change since Southeast 
Asia's traditional products - foodstuffs and raw materials - were needed in the 
short-term to promote West European, Japanese and Indian `self-support'. Clearly, 
the State Department wanted to ensure America had a significant economic and 
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diplomatic role in Southeast Asia so as to secure its policy priorities of political 
stability and economic order. 
The policy review also acknowledged the importance of the region in Cold 
War politics and the damage which the Dutch were doing to the West's cause. 
With not a little irony given Washington's desire to dominate economic 
development, the document asserted that `the Kremlin seeks ultimate control over 
Southeast Asia as a pawn in the struggle between the Soviet World and the Free 
World'. Noting that Southeast Asia had `no power potential' and was of only 
secondary importance, the document argued that the region's value lay not just in 
its role as a supplier of raw materials but as a cross-roads in North-South and East- 
West communications which, if lost to the Soviets, would endanger the base areas 
of Japan, India and Australia. It went on to say that the main danger to the West's 
position in the region came from the actions of the Dutch, in Indonesia, and the 
French, in Indochina, who both were undoing the `salubrious effect created by 
enlightened American and British policy in Southeast Asia. ', concluding that what 
was needed was an immediate settlement of both disputes on terms which were 
satisfactory to nationalists. The review stressed the deleterious effects of the Dutch 
presence in Indonesia, which was tying down 80,000 men who could be better used 
in the defence of Europe or working in Dutch factories. Finally, the State 
Department feared that, if the Dutch stayed in Indonesia much longer, the cost of 
`this piece of adventurism' would be transferred to the US either through Marshall 
Aid or military assistance. 
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Having identified the Dutch as being `now and in the long run the disruptive 
element in ... Indonesia', the policy review noted that the chaos and the rapid 
growth of communism could only be prevented by an early transfer of sovereignty. 
It also reflected a renewed determination that The Netherlands would not be 
allowed to deflect the Administration from its chosen course of action by 
threatening to withdraw from the North Atlantic Pact. However, to secure Dutch 
co-operation, the paper proposed that they should be given assistance, through the 
ECA programme, to help them adjust to the loss of Indonesia. 42 Although the 
policy review was not presented until the end of March, the thinking behind it had 
already begun to influence Administration policy towards Indonesia, particularly in 
respect of the impending creation of NATO and the military assistance programme 
aimed at bolstering European security. 
The Administration's more aggressive approach had begun on 5 March, when 
Averell Harriman, now Washington's Special Representative in Europe, met 
Foreign Minister Stikker to discuss US plans for military assistance to Europe. 
Designed to complement the creation of NATO, the Military Assistance Program 
(MAP) was a central feature of the Administration's strategy for the defence of 
Europe. Harriman told Stikker that the Administration might be required by 
Congress to withhold military aid unless there was a settlement in Indonesia. 
Harriman implied that the State Department had only reluctantly come to this 
conclusion, having been forced to accept that Congress would not authorise the 
42 NA; RG 218; Geographic File 1948 - 50 : 092 Asia (6-25-48) Sec. 1-4, Box 7; CCS 092 Asia 
Sec. 1.; PPS 51, "U. S. Policy Towards Southeast Asia", 29 Mar. 1949. 
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necessary appropriations in the absence of an agreement which conformed with 
Security Council resolutions. 43 However, Stikker clearly understood that the threat 
came directly from the Administration. ' A week later, the Dutch position was 
apparently bolstered when the Western Union (WU) countries agreed that there 
should be "equality of treatment" under the MAP and that no WU member country 
should be discriminated against by Washington. In taking this stand, the WU 
escalated the problem into a trial of strength with the US and offered the Dutch a 
way of escaping the consequences of the Security Council resolutions should 
Washington's nerve fail. 45 
While the confrontation between the US and the WU continued, the UNSC 
met to consider developments since 28 January. Austin, in addition to denouncing 
the Beel Plan, again called for the restoration of the Republic's Government so that 
negotiations could begin. 46 His comments reflected Washington's conviction that 
the return of the Government to Yogjakarta was an essential precondition to the 
convening of a conference to discuss the transfer of sovereignty. State Department 
officials were, however, concerned that progress was being hindered by the 
antagonism, which had developed since 5 March, between Washington and The 
43 Special Representative in Europe (Averill Harriman) to the Secretary of State, 5 Mar 1949. FRUS 
1949 IV, p. 165. 
4' Stikker, Men Of Responsibility, pp. 145 - 46. 
45 The Western Union had been formed in March 1948, when the UK, France and the Benelux 
countries formed a military pact under the terms of the Brussels Treaty. 
46 SCOR 1949,416th Meeting, 10 Mar. 1949, pp. 30 - 35. 
139 
Hague. The Americans turned to the British and Canadians for assistance47 and, 
gradually, a formula to break the deadlock was devised. On 23 March, the UNSC 
adopted a Canadian resolution which proposed that a preliminary conference be 
held in Batavia to discuss the arrangements for the RTC and the return of the 
Republic's Government to Yogjakarta. On 29 March, the Dutch Government 
informed the UNCI that it would be willing to attend the Batavia conference but 
did so in such a way as to cause the State Department to believe that it still 
harboured reservations about restoring the Republic's Government and promptly 
complying with the Security Council resolutions. 48 
With the North Atlantic Treaty scheduled for signature on 4 April, Stikker 
went to Washington with the future of The Netherlands' participation in NATO 
and the MAP still in doubt. He met Acheson, now the Secretary of State, on 31 
March and found that the Administration remained firm in its intention to exclude 
The Netherlands from the MAP unless it complied with the UN resolutions. 
Acheson told the Foreign Minister that the Dutch were in the wrong and were 
guilty of aggression against the Republic. He informed Stikker that, in his opinion, 
there was `no chance whatever' of Congress authorising funds for military 
assistance to The Netherlands in the absence of a settlement in Indonesia and that 
ECA funding was `gravely jeopardize(d)' by continued Dutch intransigence. 
Stikker responded to this frank assessment of the situation by telling Acheson that 
'" BUL; Foreign Relations, Secretary's Memoranda : Visits of Foreign Dignitaries, 1944 - 52 
(Microfiche Supplement) (Foreign Relations, Secretary's Memoranda); I. S. Humelsine to 
Acheson, 21 Mar. 1949. 
48 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6441; Rusk to Acheson, 30 Mar. 1949. 
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The Hague was prepared, conditionally, to restore the Republican Government but 
that, if excluded from the MAP, the Dutch might not sign the North Atlantic 
Treaty. 49 During the next few days Washington succeeded in forcing the WU to 
recant its claim to "equality of treatment", leaving the Dutch exposed to the 
possibility of an arms boycott. In this situation, Stikker had no option but to agree 
to abide by the 23 March resolution. The Netherlands signed the Treaty and, on 5 
April, the WU submitted a request for arms which omitted mention of "equality of 
treatment' 9.50 The next day, Congress formalised the Administration's stance by 
adopting an amendment to the European Cooperation Administration Bill, 
submitted by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, which replaced the Brewster 
Amendment and committed the Administration to withholding assistance from any 
government against which the UN was taking enforcement action. 
The Batavia Conference opened on 14 April with The Netherlands' delegation 
led by J. H. van Roijen, the Dutch UN Delegate, the Republic's by Mohammed 
Rum and with the UNCI in attendance. From the outset the Conference was 
dominated by the question of the restoration of the Republic's Government and, 
within a week, an impasse had been reached. Disagreement centred on The 
Netherlands' demand for an end to guerrilla activity before it restored the 
Republican Government and its insistence that the Government's jurisdiction 
should extend no further than the city of Yogjakarta. The Republicans argued that 
it was unreasonable to expect them to call a cease-fire before their Government had 
19 HSTL; Papers of Dean Acheson (Acheson Papers), Box 73; March 1949; Memorandum of 
Conversation by Acheson, of a meeting with Stikker, 31 Mar. 1949. 
50 Wiebes and Zeeman, 'US "Big Stick" Diplomacy', IHR, 14 (1) (1992), pp. 45 - 70. 
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met and they proposed that the Republic should take control of the entire Residency 
of Yogjakarta. As had happened in mid-1948, American diplomacy - particularly 
Cochran's - became crucial to the progress of the talks. Once more, Cochran 
operated independently of the UNCI and gave some Republican negotiators the 
impression that he was the agent of the State Department, with full power to make 
policy. According to these Republicans, Cochran exerted far more pressure on 
Rum to make concessions than he did on the Dutch. As an inducement to accept 
the Dutch demands, they reported that Cochran offered assurances that the US 
would `stand behind' a transfer of sovereignty and would give substantial economic 
support to an independent Indonesia. 51 Despite the sense of injustice felt by the 
Indonesians, Washington did push the Dutch to accommodate the Republic. 
Although he initially supported the Dutch definition of the area to be restored to the 
Republic, Cochran changed his mind because he believed that the Republic had 
been pushed as far as it could go. When the Dutch refused to agree with him, 
Acheson intervened with Stikker to ensure a successful outcome to the talks. 52 
On 7 May, the Conference ended with the announcement of what became 
known as the Rum-van Roijen Agreement. The Agreement prevented further 
embarrassment for the US at the UN, where the General Assembly had decided to 
debate the situation, but it left the Indonesians and the Dutch unhappy at the 
compromises they had made. While Republicans succeeded, with Cochran's help, 
51 AA; A 1838/278/403/2/2/2; Critchley to the DEA, 4 May 1949. Kahin, Nationalism And 
Revolution, pp. 421 - 22. 
52 AA; A1838/278/403/2/2/2; Critchley to the DEA; 2,4,6 and 8 May 1949. NA; RG 59; DF 
1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6441; Butterworth to Acheson, 12 May 1949. 
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in having their Government restored to the Residency of Yogjakarta, they achieved 
this at the expense of agreeing to an interim government including Dutch-backed 
states, their status not confirmed by plebiscites, controlling two-thirds of its seats. 53 
Like the Republicans, the Dutch Government thought that it had made more 
concessions than were required by the 23 March resolution. 54 However, the 
Agreement demonstrated that the State Department's tough line with the Dutch had 
generated momentum towards a final settlement and, in an effort to maintain 
progress, Acheson accepted Cochran's advice and decided not to restart ECA aid to 
the NEI until after a political settlement had been reached. 55 
The impression that the showdown between Washington and The Hague over 
military assistance marked a turning point in the Indonesian independence struggle 
was confirmed by the Rum-van Roijen Agreement and by the relatively smooth 
passage of events before the opening of the RTC. The Dutch, for so long resistant 
to any deal not on their terms, now concluded that the RTC would see a final 
settlement involving an early transfer of sovereignty and a `light' union. 56 The 
Netherlands was, however, concerned that the Administration's decision not to 
resume ECA aid would increase the Indonesians' bargaining power. Acheson 
personally reassured Eelco van Kleffens, the Dutch Ambassador in Washington, 
53 Kahin, Nationalism And Revolution, pp. 423 - 27. 
54 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6441; Baruch to the Secretary of State, 
19 May 1949. 
55 Secretary of State to Cochran, 24 Jun. 1949, FRUS 1949 VII, p. 454. 
56 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6441; Memorandum of Conversation by Frederick 
Nolting, of a meeting with Mr Helb (Counselor, Dutch Embassy), 15 Jun. 1949. 
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that this would not be allowed to happen. He told van Kleffens that, following 
Dutch concessions, it would be up to the Indonesians to vindicate their position by 
coming to `a reasonable and prompt settlement'. 57 The Secretary of State's 
comments reflected his desire for an agreement which promoted stability in 
Southeast Asia and did not `vitiate' The Netherlands' position as a `leading 
democratic nation'. While the Administration wanted the `primary result' of the 
RTC to be independence for Indonesia, this was considered to be only a step, albeit 
an important one, towards the realisation of its broader policy objectives. 58 With 
the Dutch and the Americans committed to a solution, the Agreement reached at 
Batavia was implemented and, on 6 July, the Republic's leadership was released, 
its Government was re-formed and a cease-fire announced. 
The RTC opened in The Hague, on 23 August, with delegations representing 
The Netherlands, the Republic and the non-republican Indonesians - the Federal 
Consultative Assembly (BFO) - present. Also in attendance, under the terms of the 
28 January UNSC resolution, was the UNCI. It quickly became apparent that three 
issues would dominate and divide the Conference. The Republic was concerned 
that the NIU would not abridge the sovereignty of an independent Indonesia. The 
most significant areas of disagreement, however, concerned the amount of debt 
which Indonesia would assume from the NEI and the future of West Irian, which 
the Dutch wanted to retain. 
57 HSTL; Acheson Papers; Memoranda of Conversation, Box 73; August - September 1949; 
Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson, of a meeting with van Kleffens, 12 Aug. 1949. 
58 Secretary of State to Cochran, 23 Aug. 1949, FRUS 1949 VII, pp. 474 - 78. 
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Notwithstanding the differences between the parties, Washington had no 
intention of allowing the RTC to fail. The State Department believed that the 
breakdown of the Conference would provoke either a communist uprising or 
another Dutch military action, either of which would have catastrophic 
consequences for its `entire policy in the Far East'. The key to finding a solution 
lay, in officials' minds, in securing concessions from the Dutch which would meet 
the nationalists' `legitimate aspirations' and which would smooth the way for a 
moderate nationalist leadership to take over the governance of Indonesia. CIA 
analysts argued that the best way to isolate the communist threat in Indonesia 
would be to accept the programme of `limited nationalization' offered by the 
Republic and for Washington to provide economic and technical assistance to raise 
living standards. While hoping that the Dutch and the Indonesians would be able 
to reach an agreement, Washington stood ready, in the person of Cochran, to ensure 
that a settlement was reached. 59 
Despite the views expressed by Dutch officials in Washington that The 
Netherlands Government had decided on a `light' union with Indonesia, the 
Republic found Dutch proposals unacceptable. Worried at the implications of the 
Dutch sovereign heading the NIU, Republican negotiators rejected proposals to 
establish a `supreme judiciary' and a Council of Ministers with executive powers 
59 HSTL; Truman Papers; PSF; Foreign Policy File, Box 177; Far East; "Report of Charles 
Deane", undated; Records of the National Security Council; CIA File (Special Evaluations - 
ORE), Box 2; NSC/CIA (5 - 11) - Intelligence Memoranda Dec. 1948 - Dec. 1949; CIA 
Intelligence Memoranda No. 209,20 Sept. 1949; Department of State Weekly Review (DSWR), 
5 Oct. 1949. 
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both of which would have jurisdiction over an independent Indonesia. 60 After a 
lengthy dispute over the form which the NIU should take, Cochran was asked to 
mediate and his compromise, under which the Dutch monarch assumed a symbolic 
role as head of the NIU, brought agreement. Cochran's solution effectively left 
Indonesian sovereignty untrammelled by Dutch interference and the NIU as an 
insubstantial institution. 61 
If the Republic was able to claim a success in the negotiations on the NIU, its 
positions on the debt question and the future status of West Irian were not 
sustained. The Dutch initially argued that the Indonesians should assume G6.1 
billion of debts from the NEI while the Republic's counter-proposal was that the 
Dutch owed Indonesia G540 million. 62 The Dutch also demanded that the 
Indonesians allocate a portion of their foreign exchange earnings and all the 
revenue from tin production to service the debt repayments. Cochran's 
involvement in the resolution of this seemingly intractable problem illustrated the 
importance both he and the State Department placed on securing a settlement on 
terms which Washington considered to be fair. Cochran was determined to play a 
pivotal role in solving the debt issue and, when the Indonesian delegates suggested 
that the UNCI mediate the dispute, he ensured that only he represented the 
60 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6442; Memorandum of Conversation by Lacy, of a 
meeting with Sudjamoko (Representative of the Republic), 14 Sept. 1949. 
61 McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, p. 299. Kahin, Nationalism And Revolution, p. 434. 
62 For detailed accounts of the Dutch and Indonesian negotiating positions see McMahon, 
Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 300 - 01 and Kahin, Nationalism And Revolution, pp. 438 - 44. 
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Commission. 63 Eventually, it was a compromise put forward by Cochran which 
resolved the matter. He persuaded the Indonesians to accept G4.3 billion of debt, 
G900 million more than their final offer, while the Dutch wrote-off about G2 
billion of their claim and dropped their claims to Indonesian foreign exchange 
earnings and tin revenues. Neither side was happy with the final debt settlement, 
which was sold to the Indonesians partly on the basis of promises of American aid 
by Cochran, 64 but it did result from a genuine acceptance by Cochran that both 
sides would have to give ground if the Conference was to be saved from collapse. 
The final contentious issue at the RTC concerned the status of West Irian. 
Both Indonesian delegations, particularly the BFO, believed that the territory was 
indivisible from the rest of the NEI and that it should be included in the transfer of 
sovereignty. In support of their case, they cited the Linggadjati Agreement which 
had defined the putative USI as comprising the whole of the NEI. 65 To the Dutch, 
West Irian had assumed an enormous psychological importance which outweighed 
its economic value. The Dutch Government believed that its retention would allow 
it to save face with domestic opinion and was the only way of securing the two- 
thirds majority in parliament needed to ratify the constitutional changes which 
63 NA; RG 59; Lot 54 D 224, Box 5; Australia - Summary letters to and from Embassy; Shullaw 
to Peter Jarman (US Ambassador), 17 Oct. 1949. Critchley had argued that the UNCI should 
make proposals but Cochran and Herremans had objected. Critchley's aim had been to prevent 
Cochran acting alone. (AA; CRS A 1838/278/403/2/2/2; Critchley to the DEA, 16 Oct. 1949. ) 
64 Interview with Thomas Critchley, Sydney, 12 Sept. 1996. 
65 United Nations Archive (UNA); Missions and Commissions, Good Offices Committee and 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia, 1947 - 1951; Non-Registry Files, DAG13/2.0.0, Box 
18; R. T. C. Weekly Reports; Committee for Political and Constitutional Affairs Weekly Report 
No. 7 (1 -7 Oct. 1949), 8 Oct. 1949. 
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would implement a transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia. 66 The Indonesian case 
found no support in Washington, where the State Department's preferred option 
was that the Indonesians be persuaded to give up their claim to West Irian in the 
belief that the Dutch economy, and Dutch prestige, required the continued 
possession of the colony. 67 In the interests of reaching a settlement at the RTC, 
Washington supported continued Dutch control but was prepared to see a Dutch 
trusteeship in West Irian, if opposition to continued Dutch control proved to be too 
great. 68 The Indonesians were not willing to accept a Dutch trusteeship and were 
unable to rely on support from the Australians, who also opposed Indonesian 
sovereignty over West Irian, and the issue became the last one to divide the 
Conference. Cochran was unwilling to see the RTC breakdown over the question 
of West Irian and eventually supported a compromise put forward by Critchley that 
the matter be deferred for one year, when it would be resolved by negotiation 
between Indonesia and The Netherlands. 69 The settlement of the West Irian 
question, like that of the debt issue, reflected the sympathy which the Americans 
still felt towards the Dutch. On the debt issue, the Republic accepted Cochran's 
assurances of US aid to mitigate the economic impact of the deal while the Dutch 
case for the retention of West Irian took precedence over the Indonesian contention, 
66 Kahin, Nationalism And Revolution, p. 444. 
67 AA; CRS A 1838/264/250/10/7/6; Australian Embassy, Washington to the DEA, 10 Nov. 1949. 
68 PRO; FO 371/76144; Franks to the Foreign Office, 25 Oct. 1949. 
69 UNA; Records of the UN Executive Assistant to the Secretary General (1946 - 1961) 
Cordier); Records Relating to the UN Commission for Indonesia [UNCI], 1948 - 1951, Box 1; 
Indonesia I; J. A. Romanos (Principal Secretary to the UNCI) to Dr. D Protitch (Principal 
Director Department of Security Council Affairs, UN), 20 Oct. 1949. NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 
1949,856D. 00, Box 6442; Nolting to the Secretary of State, 20 Oct. 1949. 
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which had not been questioned until then, that the transfer of sovereignty should 
cover the whole of the NEI. 
By comparison, the question of the transfer of sovereignty was relatively 
uncontroversial. Agreement was reached that sovereignty over the NEI would be 
transferred unconditionally to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
(RUST) no later than 30 December 1949. The Conference closed on 2 November 
and the RUSI formally came into being on 27 December at a ceremony in The 
Hague. 
The nationalists' assumption of power in Indonesia marked the end of over 
three hundred years of colonial rule while, for the Truman Administration, the 
ceremony at The Hague represented the final act of a four-year drama in which it 
had played only a reluctant part. American officials basked in the afterglow of 
the RTC convinced that they had scored a major victory and confident that 
Indonesia could now be saved for the West. To the State Department, the 
emergence of an independent Indonesia was an unalloyed success and America's 
role in its birth a diplomatic triumph. It believed that the RTC had delivered, by 
negotiation, a settlement which conformed with Washington's policy objectives. 
Nor was the Administration shy in associating itself with the victory of Asian 
nationalism over European colonialism. In March 1950, Henderson reminded his 
Indian hosts of the effort Washington had devoted to the creation of the 
independent Indonesia. He argued that Washington's policies had brought 
independence to Indonesia with as little human suffering as possible and without 
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the creation of `deep-seated hatreds or lasting vindictiveness. '70 Lacy, too, 
emphasised Washington's role in the RTC, which for him had been an `amazing 
success' due to the `miracles' performed by Cochran. Glossing over the debris of 
the preceding four years, Lacy asserted that the differences between the Dutch 
and the Indonesians had been resolved with `remarkable ease', while Acheson 
thought that Indonesian-Dutch relations would `be very good' and that the new 
Indonesian state would benefit from Dutch help and advice. 71 
The Administration also took full advantage of Indonesia's statehood in its 
Cold War battle with the Soviet Union. With the RTC successfully concluded, 
Senator Austin lambasted the USSR for `sabotaging' earlier efforts for peace in 
the UN and cited Soviet denunciations of Sukarno and Hatta following their 
crushing of the Madiun uprising as evidence of its hostility to nationalist 
emancipation. 72 Washington complemented its attack on the USSR by using the 
resumption of aid to Indonesia to demonstrate its support for the new country. 
Immediately after the end of the RTC, the Administration restored the suspended 
ECA aid programme and, since Indonesia would not be eligible to receive it after 
the transfer of sovereignty, delivered the remaining $37.5 million worth of 
assistance in the form of rice, textiles and other goods in the seven-week period 
70 Address by Henderson to the Indian Council of World Affairs at New Delhi, 27 Mar. 1950; 
DSB Vol. XXII, Number 562,10 Apr. 1950. 
" HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 9; Southeast Asia. General 1950 - 52; Speech by Lacy at the 
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 11 Jul. 1950. "Crisis in Asia - An Examination 
of US Policy", Speech by Acheson at the National Press Club, 12 Jan. 1950; DSB Vol. XXII, 
Number 551,23 Jan. 1950. 
72 Speech by Austin at the Rochester Institute on International Affairs, 7 Dec. 1949; DSB 
Vol. XXI, Number 547,26 Dec. 1949. 
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between the end of The Hague Conference and independence. 73 Acheson 
ensured that Washington milked the event for its full propaganda value by having 
all the shipments marked with the Stars and Stripes. 74 Despite the uncomfortable 
reality that, officially at least, the agreement at The Hague had been mediated by 
the UN, the Truman Administration spared no effort in portraying the outcome as 
a success for itself. 
Despite Washington's appropriation of Indonesian independence as a Cold 
War propaganda weapon, the possibility that Indonesia itself would become a 
battleground with the communists had not been a dominant theme in Washington's 
thinking about policy in the NEI. Of course, the Administration considered its 
policy towards the NEI in terms of its confrontation with the USSR, and later, the 
People's Republic of China (PRC). It was also encouraged to regard the Republic 
as radical and subject to internal subversion by Walter Foote, the Consul-General 
until October 1947, and by the Dutch. However, while helping to ensure that the 
Administration maintained its support for the Dutch, their reports did not provoke 
Washington to consider communism as a present danger in the NEI. More 
impressive, in the Administration's view, was the imminent success of the Chinese 
Revolution, which forced it to accept that it could no longer remain aloof from `the 
colonial issue' if it wanted to secure the allegiance of newly independent states. 
The CIA argued that the affiliations of these new nations would be `largely 
conditioned' by the attitudes of the Western and Soviet blocs to colonialism and 
73 The New York Times, 25 Dec. 1949. 
74 NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856D. 00, Box 6442; Acheson to Jacob Beam (Acting Consul- 
General, Batavia), 15 Dec. 1949. 
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their economic demands, matters the Agency considered too important to be left to 
75 the imperialist powers. In Indonesia, the Administration's closer involvement in 
the process of decolonisation took the form of the Cochran Plan, which was 
motivated partly by Washington's desire to head off a growing communist threat to 
Hatta's Government. However, Washington soon found that the nationalists were 
more than capable of dealing with the communists, as the suppression of the 
Madiun revolt showed. Indeed, the threat posed by communism soon came to be 
seen, by the Administration, as one which would be solved by Indonesian 
independence under the leadership of Sukarno and Hatta. 
The Administration's realisation that the Republican leadership was anti- 
communist quickly transformed its appreciation of the nationalists, who it now 
saw as a moderate alternative to the Dutch. Having supported The Netherlands 
as guarantor of US interests in the NEI, the Administration's new-found 
admiration for the Republic led it to adopt a more positive, yet still often hesitant, 
approach which favoured a quick transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia. This 
revised attitude did not, however, arise from a sudden rediscovery of traditional, 
supposedly principled, American support for decolonisation. Nor did it reflect 
Washington's promotion of trusteeship with its emphasis on the need to train 
dependent peoples to govern themselves, something which was clearly not 
provided for in the 28 January 1949 Security Council resolution. Instead, it was 
an entirely pragmatic response to the increasingly clear evidence that the Dutch 
75 NA; Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Record Group 263 (RG 263); Estimates of the 
Office of Research Evaluation 1946 - 1950, Intelligence Publication File, Box 2; ORE 25 - 48; 
"The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and its Implications for US Security", ORE 25 - 48, 
3 Sept. 1948. 
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would not be able to restore peace and prosperity to the colony. The second 
"police action" confirmed that, rather than bringing stability, The Netherlands' 
continued presence was provoking chaos and threatened to undermine the 
achievements of the Republican leadership as well as US interests. The Truman 
Administration concluded, therefore, that only a properly managed transition to 
independence offered the prospect of peace and economic rehabilitation in 
Indonesia. Furthermore, Washington judged that a pro-Western nationalist 
government could ensure The Netherlands' economic well-being and the re- 
integration of Indonesia into the capitalist economy. 
If the objectives of US policy remained constant throughout the period of the 
Indonesian independence struggle, then so too did the outlook of the 
policymakers themselves. Given the State Department's historically Eurocentric 
attitude, it was unsurprising that officials, who felt most comfortable dealing with, 
and had more knowledge about, Europe should view the post-war world through 
this perspective. As a result, American policymakers were predisposed to support 
The Netherlands - for example, William Lacy, who as a senior official in the 
Division of Southeast Asian Affairs was central to the determination of policy 
towards Indonesia, was regarded as `strongly pro-Dutch' . 
76 Although The Hague 
rarely acknowledged this, the prejudices of the State Department officers dictated 
constant, though not necessarily uncritical, assistance to its European ally 
throughout the four-year independence struggle. Thus, the State Department's 
support for the Dutch led it to assume that they were willing to search for a solution 
76 Letter from Critchley to the author, 6 Aug. 1998. 
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which would satisfy American, Indonesian and their own interests, an attitude 
which was only rejected in March 1949 when Acheson threatened to exclude The 
Netherlands from the MAP. Nevertheless, Washington's basic sympathy for the 
Dutch persisted through to the RTC, where Cochran ensured that Holland's 
economic and financial position was protected and its honour preserved with the 
retention of West Irian. 
The pro-Dutch bias in US policy also conditioned the Truman 
Administration's view of Indonesian nationalism. Although born out of the first 
anti-colonial revolution, America revealed itself, in its policy towards Indonesia, as 
a nation profoundly worried by change and unable to understand nationalism. The 
inherent conservatism of Washington's position was clearly visible in its 
acceptance of Dutch sovereignty before the end of World War II and its subsequent 
deference to that sovereignty in the four years that followed. The Administration's 
acceptance of the trade embargo on the Republic and its toleration of the first 
"police action" thus signalled its preference for loyalty to its traditional allies. At 
the same time, Americans distrusted Indonesian nationalism as a disruptive force 
bent on undermining the status quo and possibly subverted by communists, a 
stance which did not alter until September 1948. The essentially defensive 
character of US policy was not, therefore, directed against communist aggression 
but in support of American and Western interests which, in the NEI, were bound up 
in maintaining Dutch rule. One consequence of this posture was that Washington 
could only react to events and the pressures exerted on it. So, Washington was 
forced to abandon its original intention to avoid association with the restoration of 
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Dutch rule at the insistence of the UK, The Netherlands and the Indonesian 
nationalists. Also, the Administration's unwillingness to exert its influence over 
The Hague ensured the futility of its efforts to prevent military action, while the 
State Department's determination of policy owed as much to domestic political, 
and international diplomatic, pressure as it did to the pursuit of a coherent plan to 
secure US interests. Even the Cochran Plan, the major US initiative to settle the 
dispute, owed more to Thomas Critchley than the Administration was prepared to 
admit. 
The Truman Administration's all too overt celebration of its role in the 
attainment of Indonesian independence demonstrated how far policy had changed 
since the State Department's determination, in June 1945, that it would not 
become involved in the NEI. Its acknowledgement of responsibility for the 
diplomacy which led to Indonesian nationhood represented a reversal of the 
original decision to avoid entanglement in political turmoil in the colony. 
Notwithstanding the best efforts of those like Lovett, who believed that the 
Administration should not `spread (itself) too thinly and ... 
(should) keep (its) 
commitments down'77, Washington was forced to accept that its `predominant 
power and influence' made it impossible to avoid involvement in Southeast Asia's 
independence struggles and that it must take responsibility for promoting its own, 
now global, interests. 78 It is hard to avoid the conclusion, however, that the 
Indonesian struggle for independence was prolonged by Washington's 
77 Memorandum of Conversation by Lovett of a meeting with Jerome K Huddle (US Representative 
on the UN Commission for India and Pakistan), 4 Jan 1949, FRUS 1949 VI, pp. 1687 - 89. 
78 NA; RG 218; Geographic File 1948 - 50 : 092 Asia (6 - 25 - 48) Sec. I-4, Box 7; CCS 092 
Asia Sec. 1; "US Policy Towards Southeast Asia", NSC 51,29 Mar. 1949. 
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unwillingness to accept the realities of the post-war world in which its own 
influence was dominant and where Europe was not the only place that mattered. 
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5. Indonesia : `A Two-Day Wonder' (December 1949 - January 1953) 
The day after the formal transfer of sovereignty, President Truman issued a 
fulsome statement welcoming Indonesia to the `community of free nations'. 
Praising Sukarno as a `great leader', Truman set the scene for future bilateral 
relations by promising Indonesia `the sympathy and support of all who believe in 
democracy and the right of self-government' and he announced that Cochran 
would be the first American Ambassador to Indonesia. ' The Australian 
Ambassador to Washington, Norman Makin, was not impressed by the American 
celebrations, as he informed his government. Questioning the depth of US 
commitment to Indonesia, he archly reported that the occasion of the transfer of 
sovereignty had been `a two-day wonder' in the US and might have been even 
less conspicuous but for the `unintended delay' in the granting of recognition to 
the new regime. Makin noted that Washington's attitude towards Jakarta2 was 
conditioned by its expectation that Indonesia would assist in the containment of 
communism in Southeast Asia and that the end of hostilities would allow the 
reintegration of Indonesia into the world economy. 3 
Beyond the diplomatic niceties, Administration officials knew that much 
still needed to be done to cement relations with the new nation and that Indonesia 
faced many problems after its ruinous occupation by the Japanese and the post- 
Statement by President Truman, 28 Dec. 1949; DSB, Vol. XXII, Number 549,9 Jan. 1950. 
2 The capital of the independent Indonesia, formerly Batavia. 
3 AA; CRS A 1838/278/406/9/3/2; Makin to the DEA, 11 Jan. 1950. 
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war movement for independence. However, Washington was confident that it 
could assist the new Indonesian government to complete successfully its 
transition to nationhood. US policy towards Indonesia remained largely 
unchanged from that which had obtained before independence. Washington 
wanted to maintain and strengthen `a politically stable, economically viable, non- 
Communist state under a representative, progressively democratic government 
friendly to the United States and the other free nations'. Adjusting to Indonesia's 
new status, the Administration identified the preservation of the largely non- 
communist orientation of the Government and its people as a major task. 
Washington was also concerned to assist the Indonesian leadership maintain 
internal security and rehabilitate its economy. The Administration's belief that it 
could achieve its policy goals in Indonesia was influenced by its own optimistic 
assessment of the post-independence situation. The State Department contented 
itself that the US had won the confidence of the leaders of the new Indonesian 
Government and that none of its objectives had been `voided or seriously 
threatened' since the transfer of sovereignty. 
The State Department did, however, sense that it would need to modify its 
policies towards Indonesia if it was to counter successfully the appeal of Soviet 
propaganda. Identifying an Indonesian cultural bias towards the spiritual and the 
intellectual, the Administration noted that Soviet propaganda might be attractive 
to Indonesians because it operated on an ideological level. The State 
Department, which considered US strength to be materialistic in nature, resolved 
to be careful to show that it was sympathetic toward Indonesia's problems and 
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aspirations. It concluded that a more `psychological' approach would be required 
if the continuing struggle for the hearts and minds of the Indonesians was to be 
successful. 4 No such subtle analysis affected Washington's outlook on economic 
matters in which Indonesia was seen as a `vast reservoir' of raw materials waiting 
to be developed and exported to the free worlds The Administration's view of 
Indonesia's place in the economic world after its independence thus remained in 
harmony with its policy in the years preceding the Round Table Conference 
(RTC). 
Also unchanged was the extent to which Washington was willing, and able, 
to concentrate its attention on relations with Indonesia. Before independence, the 
Administration had only become seriously interested in Indonesia when events 
there had forced its hand. The conclusion of the RTC ended one such period of 
involvement and, in the minds of Administration officials, presaged a less active 
phase in relations, a situation which was compounded by the outbreak of the 
Korean War, on 25 June 1950. Yet, the fighting also stressed the new nation's 
strategic and economic importance to America and exposed differences between 
the Americans and Indonesians over their respective attitudes towards 
communism and Cold War politics which were to bedevil US-Indonesian 
relations over the next decade. American over-optimism about Indonesia's 
' NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,611.56D, Box 2821; Department of State Policy Statement : 
Indonesia, 27 Jul. 1950. The Policy Statement was substantially the same as an earlier draft, 
dated 11 April 1950. (NA; RG 59; Records of the Division of Research for the Far East : Reports 
1946 - 52, (Lot 58 D 248), Box 2; DRF - DR-184 : Unedited Draft, Policy Paper : Indonesia; 
Policy Paper : Indonesia, 11 Apr. 1950). 
5 BUL; 28th Report of the Economic Cooperation Administration for the Public Advisory Board. 
31 Oct. 1950. "Crisis in Asia - An Examination of US Policy", Speech by Acheson at the 
National Press Club, 12 Jan. 1950; DSB Vol. XXII, Number 551,23 Jan. 1950. 
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future, combined with a mutual failure to understand the other party, caused the 
Administration to miss an opportunity to develop closer ties with the new nation. 
The settlement of the Indonesian question at The Hague reduced the 
immediate importance of the newly independent state in Washington's eyes. No 
longer was Indonesia a major issue in world affairs but it did remain a country of 
great, though not critical, importance to Washington. The hostilities on the 
Korean peninsula pushed Asia to the forefront of Washington's Cold War 
priorities, emphasising Indonesia's strategic importance in relation to lines of 
communication and the network of offshore island bases. Additionally, its 
position as a producer of commodities vital to Western economies and US 
strategic stockpiles - such as rubber, tin, palm oil, and the cinchona bark used in 
the production of quinine - was highlighted. With the Administration fearing that 
it might soon be at war with the USSR, and calculating that it would lose access 
to Middle Eastern supplies in such a conflict, it took comfort that Indonesia's oil 
supplies, the `only important source ... outside the 
Western Hemisphere', would 
remain available to the West. 6 In a more general sense, Indonesia retained 
political importance for Washington because of the example it represented to 
other developing nations. As the world's second largest Moslem country, with a 
population of about 75 millions, and as a nation which had recently emerged 
from colonialism, the Truman Administration believed that whatever fate befell 
Indonesia would have a profound effect upon the rest of Asia. Primarily, 
Washington wanted to demonstrate in Indonesia that co-operation with the West 
6 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,611.56D, Box 2821; Rusk to the Secretary of State, 1 Aug. 1950. 
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would bring prosperity without overthrowing existing social and political 
systems. 
The belief in Washington that, despite the serious problems it faced, 
Indonesia would successfully develop into a stable and prosperous nation was 
supported by early assessments of the situation. Of particular concern to the 
Administration was the threat that the PRC would encourage the spread of 
communism throughout the continent, a fear which was re-inforced by 
Communist Chinese involvement in the Korean conflict. Secretary of State 
Acheson was especially worried that the newly independent states, with their 
inexperienced governments, would be susceptible to communist subversion. ' 
However, the Administration did not believe that Indonesia was significantly at 
risk from a communist take-over. American policy was based on a State 
Department assessment that communist activity was `more subdued' in Indonesia 
than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 8 Noting that communist organisation had been 
`intermittent and inefficient', one report identified only a limited danger existing 
in the chaotic labour unions and the press. Of more pressing concern were the 
communists who had escaped captivity during the second Dutch "police action" 
but even this threat was offset by the faith Washington had in the nationalist 
leadership's anti-communism. The Administration's confidence that Indonesian 
leaders were aware of the threat posed by the communists was increased by the 
7 "Crisis in Asia - An Examination of US Policy", Speech by Acheson at the National Press Club, 
12 Jan. 1950; DSB Vol. XXII, Number 551,23 Jan. 1950. 
8 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,611.56D, Box 2821; Department of State Policy Statement : 
Indonesia, 27 Jul. 1950. 
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emergence of the Masjumi party, an Islamic party which was considered to be 
`impervious to Communist doctrine. '9 
On the economic front, too, the prospects for the new country seemed bright. 
As early as March, State Department officials expressed the belief that Indonesia 
could `pay its way' and that balance of payments estimates indicated that a viable 
economy could be maintained without dollar loans, albeit at an austere level. In 
an effort to improve Indonesia's economic situation, they were preparing to 
establish a credit line to facilitate an increase in trade between Indonesia and 
Japan and, given reasonable political stability, expected an increase in investment 
in Indonesia to improve the overall situation. 1° The position got better when the 
Korean War provided a boost to Indonesia's economy. As demand for its 
strategically important commodities increased, and amid fears that a third world 
war was imminent, so the prices Indonesia received for its exports rose with a 
consequently beneficial impact on its trade balance. The improvement was so 
dramatic that Cochran was able to report that Indonesia had moved from near 
bankruptcy to a position where it was in good financial shape. ' l 
The growing perception in Washington that Indonesia was not in need of 
urgent attention was also bolstered by the confidence the Administration had in 
9 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 9; Southeast Asia. General, 1950 - 52; Report No. 5 of the United 
States Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, May 1950, and Box 12; 1950 (Chronological 
File); September 16 - 30; Cochran to Melby, 28 Sept. 1950; Truman Papers; WHCF, Confidential 
Files, Box 41; State Dept. Correspondence 1950; Acheson to Truman, 3 Jan. 1950. 
NA; RG 59; Lot 54 D 190; Reel 1/39; Charles Shohan to Livingston Merchant, 16 Mar. 1950. 
11 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 12; 1950 (Chronological File); Undated Documents; Statement by 
Ambassador Cochran, probably to the MDAP Survey Team and made on 3 or 4 Oct. 1950. 
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the new leadership. After the war, Washington had been greatly concerned about 
the extent of Japanese influence over the nationalist movement and its 
leadership's collaboration with the occupation forces. However, these doubts 
had been dispelled as Sukarno and, especially, Hatta had shown an almost slavish 
willingness to support American and UN initiatives to find a solution to the 
independence struggle. Now the President and Prime Minister of the RUSI 
respectively, Sukarno and Hatta were feted as independence leaders of long 
standing and the people most capable of commanding support both in 
government and amongst the populace. 12 In particular, Sukarno's enormous 
popular appeal was seen as an important barrier to the spread of communism in 
Indonesia. There were, however, doubts about Sukarno's willingness to accept 
unconditionally American policies towards his country. Philip Jessup, now US 
Ambassador at Large, found him to be critical of the administration of the US aid 
programme in Asia and, perhaps more importantly, thought him to be under 
Nehru's influence. 13 Meanwhile, Hatta, though lacking Sukarno's charisma, was 
considered to be a friend of the US. It had been Hatta who persuaded the 
Indonesian delegations to the RTC to accept the deferral of the West Irian issue 
and, after becoming the RUSI's Prime Minister, he gave private and personal 
assurances to Washington that Indonesia would abide by the UN embargo of 
communist China. 14 
12 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 9; File : Southeast Asia. General, 1950 - 52; Report No. 5 of the 
United States Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, May 1950. 
13 NA; DF 1950 - 1954, Box 2821; "Jessup File"; Memorandum of Conversation by Jessup, of a 
meeting with Sukarno, 3 Feb. 1950. 
14 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3749; Rusk to Acheson, 15 Nov. 1950. AA; CRS 
A] 838/278/403/2/2/2; Critchley to the DEA, 1 Nov. 1949. NA; RG 59; Records Relating to the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Far East), 1949 - 54 (MDAP Records); Far East : Country 
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Despite the positive outlook which officials chose to adopt, there was much 
evidence that Indonesia's situation was worse than it appeared and that relations 
with the US would be more complex than was expected. Department of State 
analysts, reviewing the Indonesian situation for the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program (MDAP), concluded that the legacy of World War II and the 
independence struggle had left the country with `formidable economic, financial, 
administrative and political problems', 15 while Washington seemed to have 
misjudged the degree to which Indonesia would live up to the expectations 
placed upon it. 
Notwithstanding the improvement in Indonesia's balance of trade during 
1950, the country's economic and financial position was far worse than had been 
imagined. On taking office the new Government found that the Dutch had left 
the Treasury bare and, when Jessup travelled to Indonesia only a month after 
independence, he found that the Government had only $36 million of Marshall 
Aid to meet its commitments. 16 The effects of war had reduced Indonesia's 
exports to about one-half of the pre-war volume which meant that imports could 
not be paid for and the consequent shortage of imported consumer goods 
threatened to trigger an inflationary spiral. These difficulties were exacerbated 
Files I-P 1949 - 52; Indonesia 1949 - 1950; Silver to Vigderman, 22 Nov. 1950. Michael Leifer, 
Indonesia's Foreign Policy, (London, Boston and Sydney, 1983), pp. 27 - 28. 
15 BUL; OSS/State IR Reports Part VIII : Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Far East 
Generally : 1950 - 61 - Supplement (Microfilm); "Estimate of the Political, Economic, and 
Military Position of MDAP Countries. Part II - The Far East", Department of State Office of 
Intelligence and Research Report 5178 (2), 8 Mar. 1950. 
16 NA; DF 1950 - 1954, Box 2821; "Jessup File"; Memorandum of Conversation by Jessup of a 
meeting with Dr. Sjafraddin Prawiranegara, 3 Feb. 1950. 
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by the huge debt assumed at the RTC, the servicing of which placed great strains 
on already inadequate government revenues. Washington's immediate response, 
in February, to Indonesian requests for assistance was to grant a $100 million 
credit from the Export-Import Bank to improve food production and to 
rehabilitate transport infrastructure. '7 To many Indonesians, this new credit line 
seemed small recompense for the debt burden they had been persuaded to take on 
at Washington's bidding, especially since it had to be repaid with interest. '8 
As if its economic plight was not bad enough, Indonesia had few deployable 
resources of its own to use to improve its situation. The failure of the Dutch to 
educate and train Indonesians had left the country in a parlous state. Not only did 
the government lack trained administrators but farmers were largely ignorant of 
modern methods and the education and health services were short of competent 
staff. For a nation with its size of population, and comprising some three 
thousand islands, it is estimated that, at independence, the illiteracy rate was 
about 90 to 95 per cent and that there were only 1200 doctors and 120 engineers19 
which, in the highly-charged nationalistic atmosphere of 1950, left the country 
dependent on foreigners, particularly the Dutch, to carry out many of the tasks of 
government. To the new regime this was especially galling and this sense of 
injustice fed through into the conduct of Indonesia's external relations. 
17 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 9; Southeast Asia. General, 1950 - 52; Report No. 5 of the United 
States Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, May 1950. 
18 Kahin, Nationalism And Revolution, pp. 443 - 44. 
19 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 9; File : Southeast Asia. General, 1950 - 52; Report No. 5 of the 
United States Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, May 1950. Jones, Indonesia : The 
Possible Dream, p. 42. 
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The complacency within the Administration which led to its superficially 
optimistic assessment of Indonesia's prospects also extended to its understanding 
of the domestic political scene. While the State Department concentrated its 
attentions on personalities, primarily Sukarno and Hatta, it ignored the much 
more complex inter-relationships within the Indonesian political scene. In what 
amounted to a primer for the State Department, Francis Galbraith, an Attache in 
Jakarta, provided a detailed evaluation of Indonesian republicanism and its likely 
impact on Indonesian political life. Although Galbraith identified a multiplicity 
of political organisations, he also showed the extent to which they had similar 
aims and how the leading personalities were linked to each other. He pointed out 
that the `republican front' included both collaborators and non-collaborators from 
the time of the Japanese occupation, those who had co-operated with the Dutch 
and those who had not, as well as communists and radical Moslems. Galbraith 
also advised Washington that Indonesian politicians, while they might belong to 
different parties or have incompatible ambitions, would invariably present a 
united front to the outside world. More important still, he added, were the 
personal ties between politicians related by blood or marriage. As if to 
emphasise the existence of an almost monolithic political structure, Galbraith 
warned Washington that Indonesian politicians had shared goals which 
transcended party lines. He pointed out that the inclusion of West Irian in the 
new state was one such aim along with the sometimes `chauvinistic' desire to be 
free of colonialism and foreign, especially Dutch, domination. 20 Nevertheless, 
20 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3748; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 
22 Mar. 1950. 
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the Administration, including Cochran, persisted in characterising Indonesian 
political life in Cold War terms. More important to Washington were the relative 
strengths of the competing pro- and anti-communist 'bloc(s)' in Indonesia and it 
was to combat communist subversion that Truman authorised the first grant of 
aid to Indonesia, on 9 January 1950. The $5 million aid, provided under the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 1949, was designed to strengthen the Indonesian 
constabulary in its fight against what Acheson told Truman was a `serious 
internal Communist threat'. 21 While the money granted to Indonesia was only 
available to counter communism, Indonesia's more pressing internal security 
problems involved a revolt by renegade Dutch troops in West Java and an 
insurgency by an extreme Moslem grouping known as Darul Islam. 
Washington also overestimated the new Indonesian regime's gratitude for its 
role in securing independence and thereby misunderstood the thinking behind 
Indonesia's neutralist foreign policy. Although Indonesian leaders were only too 
well aware of the central role the US had played in the struggle with the Dutch, 
they did not believe that Washington's involvement had been anything other than 
self-interested. In particular, they felt that the US had repeatedly urged the 
Republic to make concessions in return for promised long-term political gains 
which had not been forthcoming. The US was also blamed for the unfavourable 
terms on which the debt issue and the status of West Irian had been settled at The 
Hague Conference. While other major powers were also seen in the same light, 
21 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3749; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 
1 Aug. 1950. HSTL; Truman Papers; WHCF, Confidential Files, Box 41; State Dept. 
Correspondence 1950; Acheson to Truman, 3 Jan. 1950. 
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Indonesian dissatisfaction was directed mainly at Washington. Indonesians' 
disenchantment with the US combined with their own sense of importance in the 
world and revolutionary pride, to produce a foreign policy which Hatta called 
`independent and active'. The policy was designed both to define Indonesia's 
role in a bipolar world and to appeal to a domestic constituency which had to be 
convinced that Indonesia would not be taken for granted nor would allow outside 
powers to compromise its interests. 22 
Cochran, for one, viewed the policy simply as a device to avoid worsening 
domestic division by not taking sides in the Cold War and dismissed the 
possibility that it might reflect Indonesian antipathy towards the world's 
powerbrokers. Describing Indonesian neutralism as `illusory', he held out the 
prospect that UN membership would make the new regime `more sensitive' to 
US policies. 23 Despite Washington's knowledge of Indonesian policy, it 
nevertheless came as something of a surprise when Jakarta refused to co-operate 
with the MDAP Survey Team which arrived in October. Cochran had initially 
advised Washington that the team would be welcome but it soon became 
apparent that the Indonesian Government was determined to resist a military pact 
with the US. Rather than accept US military aid in return for eventually allowing 
the West to develop bases on its territory, Jakarta told the team that it would only 
take arms from the US if they could be bought outright. The Indonesian 
Government advised John Melby, the Survey Team's leader, that, while it desired 
22 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp. xiii - xvii and 16 - 25. 
23 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 12; 1950 (Chronological File); September 16 - 30; Cochran to 
Melby, 28 Sept. 1950. Indonesia became the UN's 60th member on 1 September 1950. 
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alignment with the US, it could not risk provoking the communists, who might 
cause its downfall. Although Melby acknowledged these fears, he argued that 
Indonesia should not `be permitted' to continue its `vacillation' and still keep 
Washington's `sympathetic support'. 24 Melby's reaction to the Indonesian rebuff 
indicated that resistance to Washington's security plans for Southeast Asia would 
not be tolerated for long. However, if evidence was needed of Indonesia's 
determination to maintain its own stand on world issues, it had come when Hatta 
publicly announced that the war in Korea would have no impact on Indonesia's 
foreign policy. 25 
The Administration's problem with Indonesia over regional security was not 
the only area in which friction was evident in its relations with Jakarta. It soon 
became apparent that the Indonesian Government would not be prepared to allow 
any perceived interference in the internal affairs of the new country and, 
immediately after the transfer of sovereignty had been completed, directed its 
attention towards removing the Dutch-inspired federal system which had been 
imposed at The Hague. 26 The drive to create a unitary state caused concern in 
Washington, where there were fears that it would set back the stabilisation of 
24 NA; RG 59; MDAP Records; Far East : Country Files I-P 1949 - 52; Indonesia 1949 - 1950; 
John Ohly to Lemnitzer, 21 Apr. 1950. HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 12; 1950 (Chronological 
File), May -- December; Melby to the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating 
Committee, 
23 Oct. 1950, covering Report No. 5 of the Joint MDAP Survey Mission to Southeast Asia. 
25 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3749; Cochran to the Secretary of 
State, 
28 Jun. 1950. 
)`' At The Hague, sovereignty had been transferred to the Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia (RUSI), which comprised sixteen federal states of which the Republic of Indonesia was 
the most important. Aware that the federal system had been part of the Dutch plan to destroy 
Indonesian nationalism and, after independence, concerned that the federal structure would not 
work, nationalist leaders resolved to create a unitary state. 
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Indonesia. 27 However, the speed with which the Republic of Indonesia 
peacefully re-absorbed the Dutch-created federal states left Washington with 
little to argue about beyond the Indonesians' disregard for The Hague Agreement 
and the methods used to eliminate the RUSI and its replacement by the Republic 
of Indonesia, on 17 August 1950.28 Of greater long-term consequence was 
Washington's heightened concern about the perceived communist threat to 
Indonesia after the outbreak of the Korean War. Despite its anxiety, the 
Administration found that the Indonesian Government did not want outsiders 
telling it how to deal with its own people. Having already dealt with a serious 
communist insurgency in 1948, the Indonesians felt that they could handle the 
problem and `save themselves'. 29 
Broadly similar tensions surfaced in discussions between US and Indonesian 
officials about the American aid programme. During his visit in February 1950, 
Jessup was strongly urged by both Sukarno and Prawiranegara Sjafraddin, the 
Minister of Finance, of Indonesia's desire that aid should be given without strings 
attached and that the US should not `administer' the aid. In the face of Jessup's 
protestations that the US system required control of the aid programme, Sukarno 
argued that the situation for Indonesia was different and that the US had to take 
account of the psychological nature of the issue and not dwell on technical 
27 HSTL; Acheson Papers; Memoranda of Conversation, Box 73; March 1950; Memorandum of 
Conversation by Acheson, of a meeting with van Kleffens, 21 Mar. 1950. 
28 HSTL; DSWR, 24 May 1950. 
29 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 12; 1950 (Chronological File); Undated Documents; Statement by 
Ambassador Cochran, probably to the MDAP Survey Team and made on 3 or 4 Oct. 1950. 
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issues. 30 It also became clear that American aid would not be provided to relieve 
the inflationary pressures in the economy by supporting the importation of 
incentive goods. Instead, the Griffin Mission, sent to Southeast Asia to examine 
possible aid projects, recommended a programme amounting to $14.445 million 
covering mainly agricultural, health and educational assistance, the relative 
smallness of the proposed aid being determined by the Survey Team's belief that 
Indonesia was unable usefully to absorb large amounts of aid. 31 While the 
Griffin Mission's assessment of the Indonesians' capacity to make use of US aid 
may have been accurate, its recommendations came as a disappointment to a 
country which was relying on Washington's largesse, especially when the final 
aid provision was fixed at $8 million. 32 
If Washington judged the Indonesian Government by its attitude towards the 
communist threat, then Jakarta's litmus test for relations with Washington was 
the status of West Irian. At the RTC, Washington had supported the Dutch case 
to retain West Irian because it accepted that, without a Pacific colony the Dutch 
Government would not secure the necessary majority in Parliament for the 
transfer of sovereignty. Australia had also supported the Dutch, but for reasons 
of national security - Canberra did not want to see Indonesian sovereignty 
in 
30 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954, Box 2821; "Jessup File"; Memoranda of Conversation 
by Jessup, 
of meetings with Sukarno and Sjafraddin, 3 Feb. 1950. 
;' HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 9; Southeast Asia. General, 1950 - 52; Report No. 5 of the United 
States Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, May 1950. The Report notes that the 
Indonesians had not asked the US to support their balance of payments to allow the purchase of 
incentive goods. The Survey was headed by R. Allen Griffin. 
32 MA; Record Group 9, Radiograms; Blue Binder Series, Box 84; State Dept. - In, 
I- 14 February 1950; State Dept. to Supreme Commander Allied Powers, 4 Feb. 1950. 
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West Irian because it saw the whole island of New Guinea as vital to Australia's 
defence. The new conservative government led by Robert Menzies, which had 
come to power on 29 December 1949, agreed with its predecessor's policy of 
opposing any change in the status quo in West Irian, fearing that Indonesia would 
not be strong enough to prevent instability there. Canberra also worried that the 
Indonesian Government had the longer term aim of taking control of Australian 
New Guinea in the eastern part of the island. 33 For the Dutch, the Indonesians, 
the Americans and the Australians the issue of West Irian had been deferred at 
the RTC and was to be settled before the end of 1950. 
It soon became clear that a settlement would not easily be found. The Dutch 
and the Indonesians established a commission, in May, to prepare for the 
substantive talks required by the RTC. However, the Dutch Cabinet decided that 
it would not give up its sovereignty in West Irian. It argued that West Irian was 
neither ethnologically nor geographically part of Indonesia, that its people were 
too primitive to exercise autonomy, that the RUSI had to devote all of its energy 
into putting its own house in order and that The Netherlands, as a modern state, 
was best placed to administer and develop West Irian. 34 Jakarta rejected the 
Dutch case completely, arguing that the intention had always been that the whole 
of the NEI would be included in the transfer of sovereignty. Indonesians also 
pointed out that the people of West Irian could hardly be said to be closer 
j; AA; CRS A4357/2/259/3; Statement by Percy Spender (Minister for External Affairs) in the 
House of Representatives, Canberra, 9 Mar. 1950. 
;4 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3749; The Netherlands Ambassador to Acheson, 
4 May. 1950. 
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ethnically to the Dutch than to Indonesians and that, if the Dutch were so 
concerned about the development of the colony, after 122 years of Dutch rule, its 
state of underdevelopment did not demonstrate a keen Dutch interest in the 
territory. 35 For Indonesians continued Dutch sovereignty over West Irian left 
their revolution unfinished and Sukarno, who was the embodiment of the 
Indonesian revolution, staked his reputation on incorporating West Irian into 
Indonesia by the end of 1950.36 
While the protagonists both had great emotional involvement in the fate of 
West Irian, Washington could find little to get excited about. The State 
Department identified no strategic or security interest for the US in the colony 
and Cochran agreed with this assessment, saying that US interests were `mineral, 
missionary and military (in) character'. The Administration's immediate instinct 
was not to become involved in an issue which meant that it would have to choose 
between two governments with which it wished to maintain good relations. 
Publicly, Washington professed to be neutral on the substantive issue of the 
sovereignty of West Irian and supported the resolution of the problem through 
bilateral talks. Privately, however, the State Department maintained the same 
policy that it had held during the RTC - that it would prefer a long-term Dutch 
trusteeship under UN auspices - and, as it had done then, advised the Dutch of 
this. In fact, Washington's level of disinterest in the matter led the State 
35 LoC; Papers of Jeanne S. Mintz (Mintz Papers), Box 52; UN Delegation ... 
West Irian 
Controversy - Memo by Mintz; "Irian" by Jeanne S. Mintz, Aug. 1951. Mintz was the Press 
Officer for the Indonesian Delegation to the UN. 
36 FUL; Evatt Collection; External Affairs : Reports and Intelligence Summaries 1950 - 1954: 
Political Intelligence Summary, 6 Jan. 1950. 
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Department to conclude that it would be able to accept any solution so long as it 
had been agreed between the Dutch and the Indonesians. 37 
Talks, under the aegis of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union (NIU), began in 
The Hague in December but quickly became deadlocked. Sukarno, recognising 
that US influence could be crucial to the outcome, had appealed to Washington to 
support the Indonesian case and promised the `lasting friendship and gratitude' of 
his nation if it did. His entreaty fell on deaf ears as the State Department was 
more impressed by the attitudes of The Netherlands and Australia who were, 
after all, fighting alongside the US in Korea. 38 The talks collapsed at the end of 
December amid mutual recrimination and with the Indonesians issuing warnings 
about the future of the NIU if sovereignty was not transferred. 39 The State 
Department, despite its worries about Indonesia's stability, accepted that the 
outcome undermined Mohammed Natsir's Government but preferred to side with 
The Netherlands and Australia. 40 
37 NA; RG 218; Geographic File 1948 - 50 : 092 Asia (6-25-48) Sec 1-4, Box 7; CCS 092 Asia 
(6-25-48 Sec 4); Rusk to Major James Burns (Office of the Secretary, Department of Defense), 
22 Mar. 1950 and Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84 (RG 84); 
Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1950 - 52 : 320.1 - 350, Box 26; 350 New 
Guinea Jan. 1950 - Dec. 1952; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 28 Aug. 1950 and 
James Webb 
(Acting Secretary of State) to Cochran, 11 May 1950. 
38 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3749; Cochran to the Secretary of 
State, 
25 Sept. 1950. 
39 NA; RG 84; Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1950 - 52 : 320.1 - 350, Box 
26; 350 New Guinea Jan. 1950 - Dec. 1952; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 15 
Dec. 1950. 
40 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3749; Cochran to the Secretary of 
State. 
14 Dec. 1950. After the inauguration of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1950, Sukarno 
had become President, Hatta was his Vice-President and Natsir became Prime Minister. 
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Despite the conflict between Washington and Jakarta over the future of West 
Irian, the Administration believed that it had interests in common with Indonesia. 
The MDAP Survey Team had noted that the Indonesian Government's principal 
objectives were to establish internal security and develop a `stable, democratic 
government along western-oriented lines', aims which Washington shared. Only 
Indonesia's neutrality in international affairs presented a difficulty for the 
Administration. 41 In normal times, the State Department believed, new nations 
could be allowed to learn from the failure of such 'mistake(n)' policies in the 
knowledge that they would develop `inner equilibrium and stability'. However, 
times were not normal because, as officials argued, a single false step might 
deliver the `novitiate' in to the arms of `an armed thug' - the USSR - and this 
threat presented Washington with a policy dilemma, which was particularly acute 
as far as Indonesia was concerned. The State Department felt that if it did not 
help recently independent states to rectify their technical and material 
shortcomings then they were likely to collapse and fall to communism. However, 
officials also worried that the US would be damned as imperialist by `the more 
edgy' nationalists if it did try to help. Washington's anxiety was also conditioned 
by its experiences in China and the Philippines, where governments had received 
US aid and had come to presume that they could rely on the US would meet their 
every demand for assistance. 42 
41 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 12; 1950 (Chronological File), May -- December; "Summary Report 
No. 5 by Maj. Gen. G. B. Erskine, 24 Oct. 1950 attached to FMACC 33/10,1 Nov. 1950. 
42 HSTL; "The United States and the Far East", DSWR, 30 Aug. 1950. 
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As far as Indonesia was concerned, Washington's assessment of the possible 
consequences of involvement, or non-involvement, resulted in the kind of 
indecision which characterised its policy on West Irian. By early 1951, pressure 
was mounting on the Administration to end its `hands-off policy and to deploy 
its `strength and proven techniques of technical and economic aid' so that 
governments like those in Indonesia would be better able to overcome domestic 
criticism. 43 Within the Administration, too, there was growing concern about the 
direction of US policy, albeit from an altogether different perspective. Officials 
in the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs made no secret of their 
frustration at, what they saw as, the Indonesian Government's ingratitude at US 
assistance. William Lacy, the Office's Director, was particularly upset at the 
half-hearted approval by the Indonesian Parliament of the $100 million credit line 
and at its tardiness in ratifying a bilateral economic agreement with the US. 
Arguing that Washington's policy had been to show `patience and perseverance', 
he said that it had been decided to apply more pressure to make the Indonesians 
realise that `friendship between nations must be a two-way relationship. '44 
Lacy's views were echoed by Jacob Beam, Counselor of the Jakarta Embassy, 
who castigated an Indonesian foreign policy which bracketed the US with the 
USSR for forcing reluctant nations to join one side or the other in the Cold War. 
Beam contended that Indonesians seemed to have forgotten the role played by the 
43 LoC; Papers of Philip C. Jessup (Jessup Papers), Box 1170; Philip Jessup - UN General 
Correspondence 1944 - 52; "Memorandum on Issues of International Security Policy Affecting 
ECA Operations" by Harlan Cleveland and H. van B. Cleveland, Jan. 1951. 
44 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3750; Lacy to Willard Thorp (Assistant Secretary 
for Economic Affairs), 15 Feb. 1951. 
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US in its attainment of independence as well as the economic aid which had 
come from Washington. 45 
Not surprisingly, officials like Lacy and Beam viewed Indonesian reactions 
to US policy from the position of being the instigators and exponents of that 
policy. At a time when the US was involved in the first armed confrontation with 
communism, in Korea, the urgency of their desire to shore up the West's position 
in Asia is obvious. Less understandable is the way that the State Department 
defined Western interests, particularly when it came to issues of importance to 
Indonesia, such as the status of West Irian. While the future of the Dutch colony 
was deemed by Washington to be relatively unimportant, the internal security of 
the Indonesian state and its continued ability to export crucial commodities to the 
West were of vital concern in Washington. Of course, the Administration had 
every right to determine for itself what its objectives were in Indonesia. 
However, this process occurred in such a way that, once decided, the State 
Department became unwilling to countenance any suggestion that either the 
objectives were wrong or that the tactics deployed to secure them were 
misplaced. In part, the Administration's readiness to view the Indonesian 
Government and its people in negative terms contributed to its sometimes 
patronising attitude towards their concerns and the subsequent dismissal of them. 
15 HSTL; Papers of George McGhee (McGhee Papers); Regional Conferences of US Diplomatic 
and Consular Officers 1950 - 1951, Box 2; Department of State, South Asia Conference, Nuwara 
Eliya, Ceylon, 1951, Feb. 26. - Mar. 3; Report of the South Asia Regional Conference of United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Officers. 
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To the exclusion of all else, Cold War priorities formed the basis of US 
policies towards Indonesia. The Administration's first priority was to `firmly 
align' Indonesia with the West by means of `friendly assistance' or, at a 
minimum, to preserve its non-Communist orientation. To this end, Washington's 
policies were aimed at protecting the state against internal subversion and at 
promoting democracy, objectives which, it was thought, were shared with 
Jakarta. To the Administration, Indonesia's role as a supplier of strategically 
vital raw materials gave it an importance beyond the purely political and formed 
the basis of a mutually beneficial relationship. In 1950, Indonesia had supplied 
35 per cent of US tin imports and 30 per cent of its natural rubber and was, as a 
result, critical to US efforts to stockpile these strategic raw materials. The State 
Department believed that its purchases of Indonesian commodities, and the high 
world prices occasioned by the Korean War, were of incalculable benefit to the 
Indonesian economy both as a source of revenue and because of the favourable 
terms of trade, which allowed Indonesia to finance imports from the US. 46 
The sense that the US-Indonesian relationship consisted almost exclusively 
of benefits flowing from Washington to Jakarta was compounded by the view 
held by some Administration officials that Indonesians were unworthy of 
Washington's largesse. Cochran regarded Natsir's Government as weak and 
responsible for the `misuse and non-use' of US aid for the constabulary while 
Beam found Indonesians to be `thriftless and not very industrious'. These 
46 NA; RG 59; Lot 58 D 248, Box 2; DRF-DR-227, Review of US Policy towards Indonesia. 
27 Apr. 1951 and DRF-DR-222, Indonesia : Terms of Trade for 1938,1949, Nine Months of 
1950. 
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unflattering views were reflective of an attitude of mind which pervaded US 
relations with Indonesia, especially after independence. They were the external 
expressions of a pattern of behaviour based on the perceived strength of the US 
and Indonesia's innate weakness. Cochran, for one, believed that Asians were 
`susceptible to successful demonstrations of power' of the kind then being 
deployed by the US in Korea and that this was the way to secure Washington's 
objectives in Indonesia. 47 
In March 1951, Washington's hopes for a stable political environment in 
Indonesia were dealt a blow when Mohammed Natsir's Government collapsed 
after only seven months in office. Having seen the drive for a unitary state 
dominate Indonesian political life during 1950, the failure of the Republic's first 
government was a setback to prospects for sound government. Natsir's period in 
office had coincided with the Administration's growing impatience at the lack of 
progress in Indonesia and, to that extent, his fall reflected the inability of the 
leadership to solve the multiplicity of problems it faced. 48 However, his 
government's failure also resulted from the internal political tensions created by 
the breakdown of the talks to recover West Irian. With Sukarno wishing to 
challenge the Dutch through their economic interests in Indonesia and by ending 
4' NA; RG 59; Records of the Office of Western European Affairs 1941 - 1954, Subject Files 
1941 - 54 (Lot 56 D 37), Records Relating to Indonesia, Netherlands East Indies and Netherlands 
New Guinea, 1948 - 1951, Box 1; Indonesia 1951; Lacy to Rusk, 19 Mar 1951. HSTL; McGhee 
Papers; Regional Conferences of US Diplomatic and Consular Officers 1950 - 1951, Box 2; 
Department of State, South Asia Conference, Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, 1951, Feb. 26. - Mar. 3; 
Report of the South Asia Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers 
and Melby Papers, Box 12; 1950 (Chronological File); September 16 - 30; Cochran to Melby, 
28 Sept. 1950. 
48 See, for example, The New York Times, 3 Jan. 1951. 
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the NIU, Natsir found himself being forced to take a tougher line on relations 
with the Dutch and this re-positioning placed stress on his Administration and 
contributed to its demise. Washington's sanguine analysis of the importance 
attached to the recovery of West Irian by Indonesians had been almost totally 
misjudged and the end of Natsir's ministry represented the point at which West 
Irian became a `test of national rectitude' in Indonesia. 49 
Natsir's Government was also perceived, in Washington, as being weak in 
the face of the growth of the PKI, which had been making a slow, but steady, 
recovery from its near-destruction after the abortive Madiun uprising. Galbraith 
was particularly concerned that the communists had been allowed, by 
Government inaction, to reorganise and to attain a position of strength from 
which they threatened, in his view, to strike a crippling blow against the new 
state. Galbraith did not, however, solely blame Natsir for the failure to rein in the 
PKI. He also noted that Sukarno's approach to government had contributed to 
the situation. Although Sukarno was anti-communist, Galbraith argued, his main 
objective was to unite all shades of political opinion in order to achieve `real self- 
government' in Indonesia, an outlook which led him to eschew attacking `his 
constituents - the whole Indonesian people', including communists. 
50 The 
Administration was much more impressed with the anti-communist credentials of 
49 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp. 31 - 32. 
50 HSTL; McGhee Papers; Regional Conferences of US Diplomatic and Consular Officers 1950 - 
1951, Box 2; Department of State, South Asia Conference, Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, 1951, Feb. 26. 
- Mar. 3; Report of the Southeast Asia Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Officers. NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3750; Memorandum by Francis 
Galbraith, undated, attached to Cochran to the Secretary of State, 20 Aug. 1951. 
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the new Indonesian Government, which took office in May 1951. Led by Dr. 
Wirjosandjojo Sukiman, it demonstrated the willingness to deal with the PKI 
which the State Department felt had been lacking before. Washington was 
favourably impressed by Sukiman's ability to stand up to pressure from 
Communist China and when, in August, the Government ordered the arrest of 
prominent communists, including fourteen members of parliament, the 
Administration began to believe that Indonesian leaders were, at last, taking the 
domestic communist threat seriously. 51 
Washington's new-found confidence in the Sukiman Government was also 
based on evidence that it was prepared to pursue more openly pro-Western 
policies internationally. Although it remained committed to the "independent 
and active" foreign policy, the Government showed evidence that it would be 
willing to side with the US on issues of concern to it. Within days of taking 
office, the Government re-affirmed its support for the UN embargo on rubber 
supplies to China52 and, on 8 September, it signed the Japanese Peace Treaty thus 
boosting greatly Washington's chances of establishing Japan as a regional 
economic power and anti-communist bulwark. The Administration was 
particularly pleased at this development, which Lacy regarded as `the most 
significant step which Indonesia ... has taken toward alignment with the 
Free 
World'. Lacy was especially impressed since the Indonesian decision seemed to 
s1 HSTL; PSF, National Security Council Files, Box 214; 103rd Meeting of the NSC, 
26 Sept. 1951. The New York Times, 15 Oct. 1951. 
52 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. 32. 
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indicate a rupture in the Asian neutralist alliance - India and Burma both having 
abstained from the San Francisco Conference at which the Treaty was signed. 53 
Although continued Indonesian participation in the UN embargo and its 
support for the Japanese Peace Treaty were welcome, Washington was 
principally concerned to involve Indonesia in its security arrangements for 
Southeast Asia. Just as the Sukiman Government took office, the National 
Security Council (NSC) had concluded a review of US policy in Asia, which had 
highlighted Indonesia's strategic position, its economic wealth and its political 
importance as an independent, non-communist nation as `assets to the security of 
the United States in the Pacific. ' In the light of this analysis, the NSC decided 
that a prime objective of US policy `must be' to wean Indonesia away from its 
neutralism and towards greater participation in regional security measures. 54 
Washington's renewed desire to see Indonesia more closely involved with its 
anti-communist activity in Southeast Asia came at a time when the Indonesian 
leadership did not reject such a possibility out of hand. On a visit to Jakarta, in 
July, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, gained the 
impression that only the timing, and not the principle, of such involvement was 
in doubt. Encouraged by this, the Administration used the San Francisco 
Conference to make indirect approaches to the Indonesian delegation in an 
attempt to assess the likely response to any formal offer of talks about joining a 
53 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3750; Lacy to Acheson, 10 Sept. 1950. The 
Indonesian Parliament did not, however, ratify the Treaty. 
54 HSTL; Truman Papers; PSF, National Security Council Files, Box 212; 91st Meeting of the 
NSC, 16 May 1951; "United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia", NSC 
48/5,17 May 1951. 
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Pacific pact. 55 A few days after the Conference ended, the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister, Achmed Subardjo, visited Washington for a meeting with Acheson 
which officials expected would cover possible overt or covert US support for 
Indonesia. 56 While the Australians remained unconvinced of the Indonesians' 
willingness to enter into a security pact with the Americans, Cochran began 
discussions with Subardjo in an effort to tie Indonesia into a closer military 
relationship with the US in return for arms supplies. 57 
If the Sukiman Government's domestic and foreign policies gave 
Washington cause to believe that relations with Indonesia were improving, then 
the unresolved problem of the future of West Irian continued to dampen US 
optimism. The failure of the December 1950 talks had convinced Washington 
that the issue was giving Indonesia an excuse `to radically modify' the RTC 
agreements, particularly co-operation with the Dutch through the NIU. On 8 
January, the State Department urged both sides, in identical letters, to settle their 
differences in a spirit of co-operation but, fearing a unilateral abrogation of the 
NIU by Jakarta, it rejected a suggestion by Casey that pressure be put on the 
Indonesians not to raise the issue at all. 58 If Washington hoped that, by 
ss AA; CRS Al 838/2/TS383/6/1; "Suggested Indonesian Participation in Pacific Security And Its 
Possible Bearing On The West New Guinea Issue", attached to Casey to McIntyre, 3 Oct. 1951. 
56 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3750; Lacy to Acheson, 10 Sept. 1950. 
57 AA; CRS A1838/2/TS383/6/1; "Suggested Indonesian Participation in Pacific Security And Its 
Possible Bearing On The West New Guinea Issue", attached to Casey to McIntyre, 3 Oct. 1951. 
Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. 33. 
58 NA; RG 59; Lot 58 D 248, Box 2; DRF-DR-227, Review of US Policy towards Indonesia, 
27 Apr. 1951. NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; Department of State Instruction 
CA-5731,10 Apr. 1954 and Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Southwest Pacific Desk Files (Lot 58 
D 614), Australia and New Zealand Desk Files, Subject Files 1949 - 58; Fourth ANZUS Council 
Meeting, June 1954; Speaking Paper (D5/4) : Western New Guinea. 
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distancing itself from the dispute, it would retain the trust of the disputants then it 
was badly wrong. Beam reported that many influential Indonesians simply did 
not believe Washington's protestations of impartiality while the Dutch 
encouraged the Australians to use their influence with the Administration to 
secure a more obvious commitment to the status quo in West Irian. 59 
In fact, the Australians needed no encouragement to try to persuade the State 
Department to take a tougher line with Indonesia. Canberra had, since 
Indonesian independence, harboured misgivings about Washington's willingness 
to commit itself to the defence of Southeast Asia, which, for the Australians, 
included supporting Dutch sovereignty over West Irian. 60 To the Menzies 
Government, Washington's hope that the matter could be solved in bilateral talks 
opened up the possibility, however remote, that the Dutch might concede 
sovereignty over West Irian `with grave consequences for Australian security'. 
Canberra had already told the Dutch that, if they left West Irian, then Australia 
would move into the colony and so, to avoid the unpalatable repercussions that 
such action would provoke, its preferred option was that the matter was left in 
"cold storage" and not discussed at all. 61 Undoubtedly, Menzies' election, which 
had removed the troublesome Evatt from the scene, had improved Australia's 
59 HSTL; McGhee Papers; Regional Conferences of US Diplomatic and Consular Officers 1950 - 
1951, Box 2; Department of State, South Asia Conference, Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, 1951, Feb. 26. 
- Mar. 3; Report of the South Asia Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Officers. AA; CRS A1838/272/250/10/7/6; Casey to Menzies, 19 Nov. 1951. 
60 AA; CRS A1838/272/250/10/7/6; Unsigned and undated memorandum to Alfred Stirling 
(Australian Ambassador in The Hague). 
61 LoC; Mintz Papers, Box 52; File: UN Delegation ... West 
Irian Controversy - Miscellaneous 
Undated; Notecard "Chronology 1950". AA; CRS A 1838/272/250/10/7/6; Menzies to Spender, 
30 Nov. 1951. 
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ability to be heard in Washington but its position was immeasurably improved 
when, in September, it signed the ANZUS Treaty with New Zealand and the US 
and by the election, in October, of a Conservative Government in the UK, led by 
the "cold warrior", Winston Churchill. 
Australian fears about the direction US policy on West Irian was taking were 
further aroused as the Indonesian Government made renewed efforts to gain 
sovereignty over the colony. In mid-October, Subardjo gave Cochran details of a 
proposed settlement which involved the transfer of sovereignty over West Irian to 
Indonesia and the granting, by Indonesia, of national treatment to Dutch, 
American and Australian citizens in West Irian. Subardjo's offer also included 
guarantees for these countries' enterprises involved in developing the territory's 
natural resources. Although the proposal was unacceptable to the Dutch, the State 
Department believed that the Indonesian initiative might offer the chance of a 
compromise being achieved. With this in mind, Frederick Nolting, the Assistant 
to the Deputy Undersecretary of State, and Cochran advised Acheson, who was 
due to meet Casey in Paris, to see whether the Australians were interested. They 
hoped that Casey might agree to modify Canberra's opposition to a change in 
sovereignty in order to extract from the Indonesians agreement to a trusteeship 
arrangement involving Indonesia, The Netherlands and, possibly, Australia. 62 
However, Casey adamantly refused to countenance a change in Australian policy 
and told Menzies that he would make this clear to the Dutch. 63 
62 NA; RG 84; Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1950 - 52 : 350 - 360.2, Box 
27; Nolting and Cochran to Acheson, 16 Nov. 1951. 
63 AA; CRS A 1838/272/250/10/7/6; Casey to Menzies, 17 Nov. 1951. 
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Canberra's belief that Washington was trying to find a solution to the West 
Irian problem which satisfied Indonesia's main aim was heightened when, on 23 
November, Wyberley Coerr, the Indonesia Desk Officer at the State Department, 
met Australian Embassy officials to discuss West Irian. He suggested that it was 
in nobody's interest that the Sukiman Government fall and asked the Australians 
to comment on the `hypothetical' possibility that a transfer of sovereignty over 
West Irian might be linked to an Australian-Indonesian defence agreement which 
gave Canberra air bases and port facilities in the disputed territory. The Embassy 
officials reiterated Canberra's position on the sovereignty issue and reminded 
Coerr that Australia thought it best that the issue be `bedded down'. With the 
UK supporting Canberra, Percy Spender, the Australian Ambassador in 
Washington, remained convinced that Cochran was discussing a compromise 
with Subardjo despite receiving a denial when he discussed the matter with 
James Webb, the Acting Secretary of State. 64 Although the Dutch had 
announced their intention to incorporate West Irian into the Kingdom of The 
Netherlands by amending their Constitution, the apparent American efforts to 
find a solution to the problem coincided with the opening of another round of 
talks in The Hague between The Netherlands and Indonesia. 
In the same way as Washington viewed Indonesia as the problem, when it 
came to the future status of West Irian and regional security, so it did when it 
came to aid. The perception that Indonesians were ungrateful recipients of US 
64 AA; CRS A1838/272/250/10/7/6; Australian Embassy in Washington to Casey, 23 Nov. 1951 
and Spender to Menzies, 30 Nov. 1951. 
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aid, and not a proud people whose sense of independence was affronted by their 
need for assistance, dominated in the State Department. This attitude was 
compounded, despite Lacy's assertion that Washington had shown "patience 
and perseverance", by an unwillingness to give the new Indonesian leadership 
time to tackle the huge problems they faced. So it was that, in June, Cochran 
advised Hatta that `repeated changes' in the Indonesian Government and the 
consequent uncertainties about policy direction restricted both the extension and 
assimilation of aid. The Indonesian Vice-President was left with little else to say 
but that he hoped Sukiman's Government would continue in office and develop 
sound policies. 65 In reality, there was not much Hatta could have done to affect 
the situation since, in Washington, the aid programme for Indonesia was already 
under attack both by the State Department and by Cochran. Worried that 
Indonesia might not be able to absorb large amounts of aid, the State Department 
also believed that it was more `fortunately situated' than many of its neighbours. 
Bolstered by Cochran's assertion that Indonesia would not feel discriminated 
against if it received less aid than others, the State Department pared down aid 
allocations for Fiscal 1952 - the final total being $8 million, the same as in 
1951.66 
65 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3750; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 
21 Jun. 1951. 
66 NA; RG 59; Lot 56 D 37, Records Relating to Indonesia, Netherlands East Indies and 
Netherlands New Guinea, 1948 - 1951, Box 1; Indonesia 1951; Lacy to Rusk, 19 Mar 1951. 
BUL; Foreign Relations, Secretary's Memoranda; Briefing Paper for Acheson's Talks with the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mukarto Notowidigdo, 28 Oct. 1952. The original proposals had 
been for $10 million aid with $10 - 15 million in reserve. 
187 
Indonesia's political and economic circumstances were not, however, the 
only factors affecting the aid programme and for the Administration to assign 
blame for its failings solely to the Indonesians was unfair. A prime impediment 
to the aid programme was the antagonism over policy in Indonesia between the 
State Department and the ECA, which was exposed by the assault on the ECA 
programme for Fiscal 1952. During an acrimonious lunchtime meeting with 
Lacy at the Metropolitan Club, in Washington, Allan Griffin accused Cochran of 
helping Senator Joseph McCarthy in his attacks on the Administration, accusing 
him of wanting to pursue policies whose result would be to turn Indonesia over to 
communism. Griffin also charged Cochran with humiliating ECA staff and of 
making `an abysmal mess of American relations with Indonesia'. While Lacy's 
defence of the Ambassador centred on his assumption that the assault on the 
ECA programme by the State Department had piqued Griffin, it ignored what 
was evidently a poor working relationship between the two organisations in 
Indonesia. 67 Perhaps more important, though, was the Indonesian Government's 
reaction to the way the ECA approached its task. As if to exacerbate the prickly 
relationship which already existed between Washington and Jakarta, the ECA 
required Indonesian officials to provide `endless data' to support applications for 
aid and appeared, to the Indonesians, to be insisting on minute control of the 
funds allocated. 68 Given the scale of the problems facing staff at the Ministry of 
67 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3750; Memorandum of Conversation by Lacy of a 
meeting with Griffin on 14 February 1951,15 Feb. 1951. HSTL; Truman Papers, WHCF, 
Economic Cooperation Administration 1947 - 49, Box 17; Economic Cooperation 
Administration, 1951; Report on ECA in Southeast Asia by Orin Lehman, undated. Lehman's 
tour began on 1 March 1951 and lasted for ten weeks. 
68 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,611.56D, Box 2821; Memorandum of Conversation by Cochran 
of a meeting with the Indonesian Ambassador to Washington, Ali Sastroamidjojo, 24 Oct. 1951. 
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Economy, and Indonesian fears of American control over their economy, the 
ECA's paperwork and overbearing attitude only increased the antipathy 
Indonesians felt towards Washington's small aid package. 
Cochran's efforts to incorporate Indonesia into a security system for 
Southeast Asia continued amid signs that Washington still did not know how to 
deal with the Indonesian revolution. In a speech at The National War College, 
Melby, by now Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, praised the progress made in Indonesia since independence but also 
managed to demean the revolution at the same time. Recalling the crucial role 
played by the US at the RTC, he told his audience that, if forced to nominate the 
one person most responsible for the creation of Indonesia, it would be Cochran. 69 
Melby's arrogance provided further evidence of the low opinion of Indonesia and 
its leadership held by some officials, which was reflected in dealings with the 
newly independent state. As with the ECA, friendly Indonesians were also 
concerned about the way the United States Information Service did its work, 
thinking its propaganda too tendentious and negative. In October, the Indonesian 
Ambassador in Washington, Ali Sastroamidjojo, advised Cochran that the agency 
should propound a positive image of America if it wanted to win friends and 
influence people in Indonesia rather than `hammering constantly on an anti- 
communist note. '70 If Washington could argue that Indonesians had little 
69 HSTL; Melby Papers, Box 10; MDAP - Philippines and Southeast Asia Affairs - Office of (2); 
Lecture at The National War College, 10 Dec. 1951 
70 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,611.56D, Box 2821; Memorandum of Conversation by Cochran 
of a meeting with the Indonesian Ambassador to Washington, Ali Sastroamidjojo, 24 Oct. 1951. 
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comprehension of the needs of Cold War politics and the pressures under which 
democracies operated, then Jakarta could equally claim that its needs were not 
understood either. 
Both sides' perceptions of each other were confirmed when, in February 
1952, the results of Cochran's negotiations with Subardjo became known. Under 
the pressure of a furious assault by opponents of the Sukiman Government in the 
PNI and Masjumi, first Subardjo and then the Cabinet resigned amid accusations 
that they had compromised Indonesian neutrality and taken Indonesia into the 
West's camp. Reaction to the deal plunged US-Indonesian relations into crisis 
and led the Administration to wonder whether Indonesia would ever accept the 
sort of security arrangements which Washington regarded as essential. The 
purpose of the negotiations, from Washington's point of view, had been to reach 
an agreement, under the terms of the Mutual Security Act, which formalised the 
provision of US military, economic and technical aid to Indonesia. There was 
some doubt, in Cochran's mind at least, about the legality of the aid which had 
been delivered after independence since it had been based on understandings 
reached between the two governments rather than legal arrangements. The talks 
concluded, on 5 January, with an exchange of notes in which Subardjo gave 
assurances, under Section 511 (a) of the Act, that Indonesia would fight 
communism and assist the US in the fulfilment of its military obligations. 71 In 
addition to regularising the basis upon which economic and technical aid was 
71 NA; RG 84; Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1950 - 52 : 320.1 - 350, Box 
26; 350 Indonesia Jan. 1952 - June 1952; Memorandum by Cochran of a conversation with Hatta, 
3 Apr. 1952. The New York Times, 26 Feb. 1952. 
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granted, the agreement also allowed $2 million of undelivered military aid to be 
released. 72 As far as Cochran was concerned, the agreement was not about the 
`trifling sum ... of economic aid' which Indonesia received, but was aimed at 
meeting the country's security needs. The intention, he told Hatta, was to 
overcome the debacle of the Melby Mission, when Indonesia had refused military 
aid, by providing a basis upon which Indonesia could receive military assistance 
without calling attention to the fact. Cochran also confirmed that the agreement 
had been implicitly linked to the Administration's efforts to solve that West Irian 
dispute when he informed the Vice-President that the collapse of the agreement 
had ended his hopes of persuading Washington to support Indonesia's claim to 
the colony. 73 
/ 
Details of the agreement became known in February, when it was presented 
to the Indonesian Cabinet, and the fact that it had been negotiated in secret by 
Subardjo was made clear. The Foreign Minister, under attack from the PNI and 
Masjumi parties, resigned on 21 February and, two days later, the Cabinet itself 
was forced out of office. Although the outgoing Cabinet pledged that Indonesia 
would abide by the agreement, there was no chance that future governments 
would adhere to the security undertakings which had been given. Given the 
furore in Indonesia, it was not until September that the new Government, led by 
72 NA; RG 59; Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 1953, Miscellaneous Subject File for the Year 1953 
(Lot 55 D 388), Box 7 of 8; Mr Nixon's Visit (3); Briefing Papers for Vice-President Nixon On 
His Trip to the Far East, 15 Sept. 1953. 
73 NA; RG 84; Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1950 - 52 : 320.1 - 350, Box 
26; 350 Indonesia Jan. 1952 - June 1952; Memorandum by Cochran of a conversation with Hatta, 
3 Apr. 1952. The British were also aware that Cochran had discussed such a deal with Subardjo. 
(PRO; FO 371/106824; Memorandum by J. E. Cable, 25 Nov. 1953. ) 
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Wilopo of the PNI, felt confident enough to re-open the issue. On 9 September, 
it indicated that it wished to negotiate an agreement covering only economic and 
technical aid and asked if it could receive military assistance from the US on a re- 
imbursement, rather than grant, basis. Although Cochran had lobbied 
Washington to take drastic steps, including the ending of the aid programme, to 
force Indonesian compliance with the 5 January agreement, 74 the Administration 
took a rather more resigned view of the situation. Both governments soon agreed 
to allow the pact to lapse and negotiations began on a new agreement which 
would place aid to Indonesia on the same footing as that for other "neutralist" 
countries, like Burma and India. A replacement agreement was reached, on 13 
January 1953, which satisfied Indonesian requirements on military assistance 
while the Indonesian aid programme was transferred to the less sensitive 
Technical Co-operation Administration. 75 
The failure of the Cochran-Subardjo pact coincided with the defeat of 
Washington's efforts to broker a deal over West Irian. In the face of strenuous 
Dutch attempts, before the meeting at The Hague, to prevent the issue being 
discussed at all, Washington had made clear to The Netherlands' Government its 
desire that the issue be placed on the agenda. 76 The talks, however, made no 
74 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3751; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 
21 Feb. 1952. 
75 BUL; Foreign Relations, Secretary's Memoranda; Briefing Paper for Acheson for talks with the 
Indonesian Ambassador, 28 Oct. 1952 (Doc. 2299). The New York Times, 19 Sept. 1952. NA; 
RG 59; Lot 55 D 388, Box 7 of 8; Mr Nixon's Visit (3); Briefing Papers for Vice-President Nixon 
On His Trip to the Far East, 15 Sept. 1953. 
76 HSTL; Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 73; March 1952; Memorandum of 
Conversation by Acheson of a meeting with Willem Drees (Dutch Prime Minister) and van Roijen 
(Dutch Ambassador in Washington), 21 Jan. 1952. 
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progress and the focus of the negotiations switched to Washington, where 
Acheson raised the issue with the Dutch Prime Minister, Willem Drees. With the 
Cochran-Subardjo pact signed but not yet denounced, Acheson suggested to 
Drees that a possible settlement to the West Irian question might be found in the 
establishment of a condominium or a UN trusteeship involving several nations. 
Drees' flat rejection of the idea forced Acheson to accept that no immediate 
solution would be found and he decided that Washington would henceforth 
`make every effort to dissuade the disputants in pressing the ... issue to the point 
of crisis. '77 The Dutch Parliament's approval of the incorporation of West Irian 
into the Kingdom, on 15 February, effectively killed off any hope of compromise 
and the repudiation of the Cochran-Subardjo pact only confirmed the end of any 
US-sponsored solution being found to the problem. 
Despite Acheson's acceptance that no solution to the West Irian problem 
was in sight, basic US policy did not change. Washington's preferred option 
remained a negotiated settlement to the sovereignty issue, except that, after the 
failure of Acheson's initiative, the State Department believed that it was no 
longer able to contribute towards the solution and might do harm, if it did 
intervene, by offending one or other of its friends. The Administration's formal 
neutrality on the matter meant it was prepared to accept any settlement which 
might be reached by the disputants and Acheson advised the Indonesian Foreign 
77 AA; CRS A 1838/272/250/10/7/6; Australian Embassy in The Netherlands to the DEA, 
29 Jan. 1952 and Spender to Casey, 4 Feb. 1952. The information about Acheson's suggestion 
came from the Charge at the US Embassy in The Hague. HSTL; Acheson Papers, Memoranda of 
Conversation, Box 73; March 1952; Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson of a meeting with 
Drees and van Roijen, 21 Jan. 1952. 
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Minister accordingly. 78 While the Administration professed to be neutral on the 
West Irian question, it was effectively endorsing the status quo which, at the end 
of 1952, was that the territory was an integral part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. Although Sukarno had made it clear that the US viewpoint was 
crucial to any resolution of the problem and that, if the Administration supported 
the Indonesian case, he would be able to deliver stability and an Indonesia 
oriented to the US, 79 the Truman Administration was unwilling, as its period in 
office drew to a close, to go against its Anglo-Saxon allies. Despite this, 
Canberra remained wary of the American position. Spender believed that the 
State Department was still dangerously split on the issue with some officials 
favouring an early settlement as a means of winning Indonesia over to the West 
and he was doubtful of its willingness actively to support the Dutch and 
Australian case if the matter was referred to the UN. Accordingly, he 
recommended to his Government that it embark, with the Dutch, on a 
`considerable "educative" process' to ensure that the incoming Eisenhower 
Administration took a line more closely attuned to its own. 80 Canberra's 
uncertainties about US policy and the rebuff delivered to Sukarno showed that, 
far from promoting amicable relationships with the concerned parties, 
Washington's approach had satisfied nobody. 
78 HSTL; Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 80; October 1952; Memorandum of 
Conversation by Acheson of a meeting with Mukarto Notowidigdo, 31 Oct. 1952. 
79 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3751; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 
16 Oct. 1952. 
80 AA; CRS A5461/3/2/14; C. T. Moodie to Spender, 5 Dec. 1952. Moodie's memorandum was a 
proposed contribution to a DEA policy paper on West Irian, which Spender approved on 
6 December 1952. 
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The crisis in relations between Washington and Jakarta which developed 
after the collapse of the Cochran-Subardjo pact reinforced the Administration's 
negative perceptions of Indonesian leaders. Apart from Subardjo's failure to 
ensure that he had his colleagues' support, which smacked of political naivete, 
the rejection of the deal revived memories of Dutch propaganda, during the 
independence struggle, that the Republic could not be relied upon to keep 
agreements. Washington's easy acceptance that Indonesia could not be tied into 
a military pact, either formally or informally, also intensified the 
Administration's frustration with the mercurial nature of Indonesian politics. 
However, Washington had lacked sensitivity in its handling of the negotiations in 
thinking, unlike the Australians, that a deal could be struck despite Indonesia's 
foreign policy and, to that extent, was partly responsible for the ensuing 
instability. Confirming Washington's views about Indonesian politics, Wilopo's 
Government, which took office on 1 April and was a coalition of the PNI, 
Masjumi and Partai Socialis Indonesia (PSI), immediately showed its weakness. 
Having failed to obtain a vote of confidence in Parliament - it was only granted 
an "opportunity to work" - the Cabinet displayed a marked reluctance to take any 
action at all to deal with the serious problems it faced for fear of being ousted. 
The State Department at first believed Wilopo to be a `leftist', although it had 
changed its mind by September, 8' but was worried by the decision of the PKI to 
support the Government. Washington saw the PKI's move as being designed to 
heighten the pressure on the Government to resist American aid and, generally, to 
8' NA; RG 59; Records Relating to the Mutual Security Assistance Program (Far East) 1949 - 
1954 (Lot 57 D 472), Far East Country Files, I-P, 1949 - 1952, Box 3; Indonesia 1951 - 1952; 
"Political Developments in Indonesia During Year Ended June 30,1952". The New York Times, 
2 Apr. and 12 Sept. 1952. 
195 
take advantage of the prevailing anti-Western sentiment. However, Cochran 
warned that the PKI had taken a calculated decision to support Wilopo because it 
saw a tactical advantage in doing so. 82 Although its parliamentary support was 
not crucial to the Government's survival, the PKI was signalling its readiness to 
work with the PNI, which for the first time led a Cabinet, and for Sukarno, who 
was associated with the PNI and had taken a radical line on West Irian. The new 
policy represented a further stage in the PKI's rehabilitation after Madiun and the 
August 1951 purge but did not, in the CIA's view, mean that it had reached a 
stage where it could seize power, the PKI's strength lying in its industrial power 
and its guerrilla activities - areas in which it could only harass the Government. 
83 
However, as if to demonstrate the unpredictability of Indonesian politics, the 
most serious threat to Wilopo's ministry came not from the communists but from 
the army and resulted from manoeuvrings within the Government. While the 
events of 17 October marked the entry of the army into post-independence 
political life, they also re-inforced Sukarno's pre-eminent position. To officials 
in Washington, it appeared that the President had shown himself to be a 
champion of democracy and that Indonesia had survived a test of its democratic 
credentials. The crisis was sparked by a PNI-sponsored motion in Parliament 
criticising the Sultan of Yogjakarta, the Defence Minister, who was thought to be 
82 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3751; Coerr to Philip Bonsai, 11 Jul. 1952 and 
Cochran to the Secretary of State, 17 Jul. 1952. NA; RG 59; Lot 57 D 472, Far East Country 
Files, I-P, 1949 - 1952, , Box 3; Indonesia 1951 - 1952; "Political Developments in Indonesia 
During Year Ended June 30,1952". 
83 NA; RG 263; National Intelligence Estimates Concerning the Soviet Union 1950 - 1961, 
Intelligence Publication File, Box 1; NIE-47; "Communist Capabilities and Intentions In Asia 
Through Mid-1953", National Intelligence Estimate NIE-47,31 Oct. 1952. 
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overly influenced by the PSI and was viewed as a possible rival of Sukarno's. 
Offended by the PNI's action, the army General Staff organised a mob to 
demonstrate outside Parliament and asked Sukarno to dissolve the assembly and 
take personal control of the country. Sukarno refused to go along with what 
amounted to a coup attempt, announcing his faith in democracy. Having beaten 
off the coup, which had been backed by the PSI, the Cabinet removed from post 
twenty-one army officers, including Colonel Abdul Nasution the army Chief of 
the Staff, and the PNI continued its campaign against the Sultan. 84 The crisis left 
Sukarno in an unassailable position domestically and enhanced his standing in 
Washington but it also confirmed American perceptions of instability in 
Indonesia. 
Uncertainties about the Indonesian political climate, the disappointment felt 
in Washington at the failure of its attempt to persuade Jakarta to enter into a 
security pact and the collapse of Acheson's West Irian initiative were all signs of 
the difficulties being experienced by the Administration in its relationship with 
Indonesian nationalism. There was also little sign of positive economic news as 
bureaucratic inefficiency and incompetence continued to plague Government 
efforts to improve the situation - Wilopo had found upon assuming office that no 
budgets had been set for 1951 and 1952 and that there was no record of 
Indonesia's external commitments - added to which, a downturn loomed. Having 
benefited from a boom in raw material prices and demand, especially for rubber, 
84 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3751; Bonsai to Allison, 12 Dec. 1952 and RG 84; 
Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1953 - 55 : 350, Box 41; John Andu to E. 
Hagberg, 3 Nov. 1952. 
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caused by Western rearmament and US stockpiling after the start of the Korean 
War, Indonesia now faced a collapse in both price and demand as the War wound 
down and stockpiling programmes ended. As the prices of imports from Western 
countries spiralled, Indonesians ascribed much of the blame for the impending 
economic distress to Washington. 85 
Reflective of the wider relationship between the two countries was 
Washington's increasing unwillingness to give aid to Indonesia and Jakarta's 
growing dissatisfaction at the way it was being treated. The Administration had 
maintained its belief that Indonesians were ungrateful for the assistance they had 
been given both before and after independence and the feeling persisted that it 
had done as much as it needed to in order to discharge its responsibilities towards 
Indonesia. It had, since the RTC, expected that The Netherlands would be the 
prime aid donor to its former colony, but this assumption had been predicated 
upon a harmonious relationship between the two and it was only with great 
reluctance, therefore, that Washington was prepared to consider a larger role for 
itself. The creation of the Colombo Plan, in early 1950, had offered an 
alternative source of development aid, but Indonesia did not join it until January 
1953. Having already given Indonesia a $100 million credit lifie, of which only 
$75 million had been used, and facing pressure on available funding, the 
Administration dramatically cut the aid programme for Fiscal 1953 to $3.5 
million from the already parsimonious $8 million which had been granted for 
85 The New York Times, 6 Jan. 1953. 
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1951 and 1952. Not surprisingly, the Indonesians were `sharply critical' of the 
decision but were powerless to do anything about it. 86 
As the Truman Administration gave way to that of Dwight Eisenhower, 
America's relationship with Indonesia had reached its lowest point since 
independence. The optimism which had characterised Washington's hopes for 
the new country had been replaced by a sense of frustration that Indonesians 
seemed incapable, or unwilling, to help themselves and were ungrateful to those 
who were prepared to assist. Too few officials in Washington, it seems, shared 
the opinion of John Allison, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs, that countries like Indonesia had not had enough time since their 
independence to overcome the problems which they had inherited. Nor did they 
realise that Asians bracketed the US with the European powers which they had 
fought, and in some cases were still fighting, for their freedom. Allison argued 
that central to the successful conduct of relations with Asia was the 
understanding that other countries had `interests and prejudices as strong as our 
own' and that these had to be addressed. 87 And yet it was in this very area that 
Washington's policy had failed most spectacularly. Indonesian commentators 
believed that America's inexperience in dealing with Asians had led it to be 
`rough and even insulting' towards Asia. They expressed dismay at the extent to 
which Americans misunderstood the Asian psyche when they failed to grasp the 
86 DSB, Vol. XXVI, Number 666,31 Mar. 1952, pp. 494 - 95. BUL; Foreign Relations, 
Secretary's Memoranda; Briefing Paper for Acheson for talks with the Indonesian Ambassador, 
28 Oct. 1952 (Doc. 2299). 
87 "Our Far Eastern Policy", speech by Allison at the Public Affairs Conference, 17 April 1952; 
DSB, Vol. XXVI, Number 670,28 Apr. 1952. 
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significance of the "gesture" and the importance of not "losing face" in 
relationships, while believing that `money and power' would be enough to win 
over Asians. The sense that American policy towards Indonesia was not driven 
by a `love' of the country but by a belief that a strong and nationalistic Indonesia 
was better than a communist one only confirmed in peoples' minds the feeling 
that America's policy was determined more by its allies' interests than by 
Indonesia's. 88 By contrast, and as if to confirm the points being made by the 
Indonesians, an Australian assessment of US policy highlighted Washington's 
raw materials procurement policy and its pressure on Indonesia to join an anti- 
communist alliance as the factors which had most turned public opinion against 
it. 89 The challenge facing the Eisenhower Administration, therefore, was to show 
a more sympathetic attitude towards Indonesia and to heal the divisions which 
existed between Washington and Jakarta. 
88 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,611.56D, Box 2821; Jack Lydman to George Harris, 
14 Apr. 1952. Lydman's memorandum quoted extensively from the Jakarta weekly, Mimbar 
Indonesia, 15 March 1952. 
89 AA: CRS A5954/1/227911; "Indonesia : Synopsis of Current Trends", 21 Jul. 1952. 
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6. Relations Balanced On A Knife Edge (January 1953 - December 1955) 
During the Presidential election campaign, the incoming Administration had 
been especially critical of Truman's record in Asia. Although the Republicans 
had concentrated their fire on Truman's failure to end the Korean War, their 
attacks on Far East policy after World War II had capitalised on the arguments of 
Senator Joseph McCarthy, and others, that the region had been neglected by 
policymakers. Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had 
illustrated the indictment of his predecessors' record by pointing out that, since 
1945, no Secretary of State had visited Asia while they had been to Europe 
`eighteen or nineteen' times. ' Dulles could not have been better placed to make 
the accusation and hold out the promise of a more activist involvement in the Far 
East having negotiated the Japanese Peace Treaty for Truman. Indeed, he had 
experienced at first-hand the difficulties which dogged American relations with 
Indonesia when, in 1951, he had secretly sounded out Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan and Indonesia on the establishment of a Pacific pact similar to NATO. 
Insofar as Indonesia was concerned, the idea had soon been discarded as it 
became clear that Jakarta would not be responsive to such an invitation. 2 While 
the new Administration had set for itself the task of repairing the damage done to 
Washington's Cold War objectives in Asia, it also seemed to be well-placed to 
understand the principles which motivated Jakarta in its relationship with the US. 
The prospect that the Administration's relations with Indonesia might enjoy a 
1 The New York Times, 25 Sept. 1952. 
2 Sir Percy Spender, Exercises In Diplomacy - The ANZUS Treaty, And The Colombo Plan, 
(Sydney University Press, 1969), pp. 82 and 86. 
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fresh start were enhanced by Cochran's departure, on 15 March, to join the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Before leaving, Cochran gave Dulles a comprehensive briefing on the 
situation his successor would face and offered his advice about how relations 
should be conducted in future. Evoking the image of a spurned suitor, he warned 
that internal instability or the growing conflict between `Democratic and Commie 
forces' might upset any forecast he made and urged Dulles `to practice 
understanding patience and to exercise unswerving firmness' if he wanted to be 
helpful to Indonesia and, at the same time, win for the US the `respect due us as a 
great power. ' Cochran argued that Washington should remain `friendly (and) 
interested' in its dealings with Jakarta but not so friendly and interested that the 
Indonesians might think that they were `vital to United States interests'. The 
Indonesians, he continued, had to be convinced that it was up to them to show 
Washington what they wanted `and what they deserve'. Having discovered for 
himself that Indonesia would not make an open declaration of support for the 
West's struggle against communism, Cochran counselled Dulles that, in the 
interests of persuading Jakarta of the error of its ways and of securing from it a 
voluntary association with the West, he should `underplay rather than overplay' 
his hand. On no account, he wrote, should overt attempts be made to push 
Indonesia into a decision about forming an alliance with the West. Turning to the 
positive steps which could be taken to improve relations with Indonesia, Cochran 
reminded Dulles that Sukarno had long wanted to visit America and he made 
plain to the Secretary that Sukarno believed American support for Indonesia's 
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claim to West Irian would be the `greatest possible contribution' Washington 
could make to stability and towards keeping Indonesia free of communism. 3 
The departing Ambassador's advice to Dulles was a frank acknowledgement 
of the lack of options available to the Administration in its courtship of 
Indonesia. Since there was no possibility of a military alliance with Jakarta, the 
only measure with a significant chance of attracting Indonesia to the West's side 
was, as Cochran had indicated, for Washington to align itself with Jakarta on the 
West Irian question. However, despite Cochran's personal belief that the 
Indonesian claim should be upheld, he could do no more than recommend that 
the new Administration publicly push for a negotiated settlement. Cochran's 
advice emphasised the extent to which the relationship between the two countries 
had been affected by the rejection of the Cochran-Subardjo pact and was now in 
the doldrums. The sense of drift, which had infected US-Indonesian relations for 
much of the previous year, persisted well into 1953 as the Administration found 
itself unable to replace Cochran until 12 October, when Hugh S. Cumming Jr. 
arrived in Jakarta. 4 
When he arrived, Cumming found the Embassy in an administrative mess 
and spent most of his first six months in post putting things straight. His 
immediate political objective was to repair the damage done to US-Indonesian 
3 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3751; Cochran to the Secretary of State, 
10 Feb. 1953. 
4 Cumming's appointment had been delayed in the Senate by a bureaucratic problem. 
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relations by the Cochran-Subardjo `snafu'. 5 However, his main interest was to 
frustrate the advance of communism in Indonesia, a subject on which both Dulles 
and Eisenhower briefed him before his departure. The Secretary of State advised 
Cumming not to tie himself to Indonesian territorial integrity if that meant losing 
the whole country to communism. Dulles, saying that nothing could be put in 
writing, stressed his belief that Washington's unwillingness to countenance the 
division of China had delivered the whole country to the communists and he told 
Cumming that he would prefer to see Indonesia break up into `racial and 
geographic units' which would `furnish (the US with) a fulcrum' to eliminate 
communism where it had taken hold. Eisenhower re-inforced the point, which 
the new Ambassador took to be `the essential ... of the policy I was supposed to 
follow' and the product of Dulles' thinking, rather than State Department policy. 6 
By the time Cumming arrived in Jakarta, Dulles' advice must have seemed 
particularly apposite with the collapse of the Wilopo Administration and its 
replacement by a new government which Washington believed included 
communist sympathisers. 
The Wilopo Government had survived a little over one year when it fell, in 
June 1953. Although perceived to have staggered from one crisis to another, 
Wilopo's Ministry had seen advances towards a more regularised form of 
5 University of Virginia Library (UVaL); Special Collections Department; Hugh S. Cumming Jr. 
Papers (Cumming Papers), Box 2; HSC - Correspondence A-C (1952 - 1958); Cumming to 
Allison, 10 Jan. 1957 and HSC - Correspondence P-R (1952 - 1958); Cumming to Lowell 
Pinkerton (Acting Chief Inspector, Foreign Service Inspection Corps), 12 May 1954. 
6 UVaL; Special Collections Department; Cumming Papers, Box 2; The John Foster Dulles Oral 
History Project - Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr. 1966 - 67; Transcript of a 
Recorded Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr., 3 Dec. 1966, pp. 16 - 18. 
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government. In addition to drawing up the country's first budget and complete 
financial statement it had, on 1 April, secured passage of an election law and had 
scheduled elections for early 1954, measures which the Departments of State and 
Defense believed brought a greater sense of reality to Indonesia's economic and 
political affairs. 7 However, the reality of Indonesia's economic circumstances 
did not make happy reading. Due mainly to the slump in rubber prices, its terms 
of trade had fallen by about 20 per cent between 1950 and early 1953, wiping out 
a trade surplus of $453 million in 1951. Together with debt repayments to The 
Netherlands, this had put pressure on Indonesia's foreign exchange holdings, 
which had almost halved to $271 million in the year to February 1953.8 In the 
context of this gathering crisis, Wilopo's Cabinet was unable to resist the 
growing political tension between the PNI and the Masjumi, the main coalition 
partners and was replaced, on 31 July, by a Government led by Ali 
Sastroamidjojo of the PNI. For the first time since independence, Masjumi was 
not represented in the Government, which the CIA considered to be `heavily 
infiltrated' by communists. 9 
The Ali Government presented the Eisenhower Administration with yet 
another challenge to its understanding of Indonesian politics. Within days of its 
coming to power, senior State Department officials concluded that it was `fragile' 
7 Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL); Records of the WHO Records (WHO Records), Office 
of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA), 1952 - 61; NSC Series, Policy 
Papers Subseries, Box 3; NSC 124/2 Southeast Asia [Indonesia; France and Indochina]; Progress 
Report by the Acting Secretary of State and the Acting Secretary of Defense on the 
Implementation of NSC 124/2 ("United States Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to 
Southeast Asia"), 5 Aug. 1953. 
8 NA; RG 59; Lot 55 D 388, Box 6; Southeast Asia; Bonsai to Walter Robertson, 1 May 1953. 
9 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4; 161st Meeting of the NSC, 9 Sept. 1953. 
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and, predating the CIA's similar assessment, included `a number of 
communists'. 10 The presumed communist involvement in the Government also 
led to calls for action to be taken. At the NSC, on 9 September, after hearing that 
a new policy paper on Indonesia was being prepared, Harold Stassen, the 
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, proposed that it should cover 
measures which might be adopted by Washington to bring down the Ali 
Government `since it was obviously a pretty bad one. "' However, this analysis 
of the Ali Government was not uniformly held within the Administration - the 
State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs certainly believed that the CIA 
and the Department of Defense overemphasised communism as a motivating 
factor in Indonesian political life. 12 Early in August, Eisenhower was told that 
communists appeared only to be influencing the Government and were not 
represented in it, while a report to Dulles concluded that the Cabinet's policies 
were moderate and that it was not acting under duress from the communists. '3 
As the PNI-PKI alliance continued, Washington increasingly came to regard 
the Masjumi Party and the PSI as its natural allies in Indonesia. The Masjumi 
Party, the main Moslem political organisation which also had a sizeable middle- 
class membership and enjoyed its greatest support in Sumatra and East Indonesia, 
10 UVaL; Special Collections Department; Cumming Papers, Box 2; HSC - Correspondence M- 
0 (1952 - 1958); Matthews (Deputy Under Secretary of State) to Cumming, 6 Aug. 1953. 
11 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4; 161st Meeting of the NSC, 9 Sept. 1953. 
12 NA; RG 59; Lot 55 D 388, Box 5; Indonesia; Everett Drumwright to the Secretary of State, 
16 Nov. 1953. 
13 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 31; Indonesia (4); Memorandum for the 
President, 5 Aug. 1953. NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; W. Park Armstrong 
(Special Assistant for Intelligence) to the Secretary of State, 9 Dec. 1953. 
206 
was considered to be the political grouping most likely to co-operate with the 
Administration -a view shared by the British, who believed that Masjumi's 
policies on a wide range of issues were `less in conflict with Western interests' 
than the PNI's. 14 Reflective of the growing divergence between the two parties, 
which had worked together during the independence struggle but which had been 
increasingly alienated from each other since, was Hatta's disenchantment with 
Sukarno's espousal of radical, and specifically PNI, policies and his desire to 
invite communists into the Government. Hatta, who favoured devolution of 
power to the regions, also found himself at odds with Sukarno's vision of 
centralised government in Indonesia. 
Masjumi's standing in Washington was not harmed at all by its decision to 
form a "loyal" opposition to the Ali Government and its resistance, along with 
the PSI, to PNUPKI-inspired agitation in economically rich Sumatra. 15 The CIA 
portrayed the Masjumi, the PSI and the "17 October" group of military leaders as 
the people who were prepared to stand up to the communists while the PNI, and 
by implication Sukarno, were not. 16 However, this analysis failed to reflect the 
full flavour of the political debate in Indonesia, a problem which would remain a 
feature of the CIA's analysis of Indonesian politics. The NSC recognised that 
there were two struggles going on, firstly between the PNI and the Masjumi and, 
secondly, between communists and non- and anti-communists. This assessment 
14 AA; CRS A 5461/3/101/3; Oscar Morland (British Ambassador in Jakarta) to Churchill, 
19 Jun. 1953. 
15 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3751; Robert Bone (Second Secretary, Jakarta) to 
the Secretary of State, 10 Aug. 1953. The New York Times, 2 Aug. and 14 Sept. 1953. 
16 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; Bonsai to Drumwright, 24 Dec. 1953. 
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reflected Cumming's advice that the PNI and Sukarno viewed the Masjumi and 
the PSI in a completely different light from Washington. The Masjumi, they 
reportedly believed, was so concerned to bring down the Government that it was 
willing to involve itself in communist plotting to achieve its objective. They also 
considered that the right-wing of the Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a 
radical Moslem party which had split from the Masjumi in 1952, represented a 
greater danger to the democratic system in Indonesia than the PKI, 17 while the 
PSI's reputation had already suffered from its association with the "coup" of 17 
October 1952. Despite the differences of opinion within the Administration, it 
was the more hawkish assessment of communist advances which tended to be 
seen by the Indonesians, who believed that the Americans were drawing them 
into the Cold War. Fiercely resistant to any outside influence, they rejected 
Washington's argument that Indonesia would follow the same pattern as 
Czechoslovakia where, in 1948, communists had subverted the government from 
within. Indonesians viewed the PKI as a nationalist communist party which 
would be dealt with if it stepped out of line, as had happened in 1948. The 
Americans, who were not pleased at this challenge to their analysis of communist 
intentions, thought the Indonesian approach showed `dangerous naivete' but 
realised that Jakarta would not accept `instruction' on the matter. 18 
17 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA, 1952 - 61; NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 3; 
NSC 171/1 Policy on Indonesia (Tin); "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with 
Respect to Indonesia", NSC 171/1,20 Nov. 1953. NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 
3752; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 24 Nov. 1953. Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As 
Foreign Policy, p. 41. 
18 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 40 - 41. NA: RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954, 
756D. 00, Box 3752; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 24 Nov. 1953. Cumming was reporting 
a conversation with the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Sunario. NA; RG 59; Lot 55 D 388, Box 6; 
Mr Nixon's Visit (3); Briefing Papers for Vice President Nixon On His Trip to the Far East 
- 15 Sept. 1953. 
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While the Americans struggled to understand Indonesian politics, both sides' 
failure to construct a positive economic relationship also thwarted the 
Administration's hopes for an improvement in relations. Washington's main 
objective, since 1945, had been to reintegrate Indonesia's natural wealth into the 
world capitalist economy and, at independence, the State Department had 
envisaged that this would be achieved by private investment in raw material 
production. 19 The destructive war with The Netherlands had both postponed and 
made more urgent the need for funds to repair existing plant and to create new 
capacity. However, independence did not bring the hoped for surge in inward 
investment. In Washington, Indonesia's inability to strengthen its economy was 
seen almost entirely as a failure to attract the foreign investment needed both to 
modernise and to diversify its economic base. The NSC concluded that it was 
conditions in Indonesia which were deterring potential investors and that 
governmental indecision, the internal security situation and the government's 
failure to agree an investment code had all contributed to the economy's 
stagnation. 
The NSC recognised, however, that the Indonesians did not regard inward 
investment as the most crucial issue affecting their attitude towards the US. In 
the economic arena, Jakarta was much more interested in the `lack of effective 
US response' to its concerns about the collapse in rubber and tin prices, which 
Indonesian leaders blamed on the US. The Administration, in turn, felt that it 
19 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 8; NSC 
171/1 Policy on Indonesia (Tin); "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to 
Indonesia", NSC 171/1,20 Nov. 1953. 
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had shown sympathy to the Indonesians' difficulties but had been limited `by 
domestic considerations' in what it could do. This attitude was, of course, in 
marked contrast to Washington's unwillingness to accept domestic pressures as a 
reason why Jakarta could not meet its concerns about, for example, West Irian. 
As Indonesia's biggest customer for its natural rubber, the US was especially 
vulnerable to charges that it was unwilling to support the price Indonesia received 
for its exports. The advent of the Ali Government saw rubber prices fall to a new 
post-Korean War low and followed the failure, in May, of the Rubber Study 
Group to agree positive measures to stabilise the price -a decision with which the 
US privately agreed but was unwilling to acknowledge publicly. Although the 
Administration did cut production of synthetic rubber, its position of not 
supporting Indonesia's calls for tough action was taken in the knowledge that it 
left hundreds of thousands of peasant rubber producers more susceptible to 
communist propaganda. Similarly, Jakarta found reason to complain about 
Washington's disinterest in protecting its earnings from tin exports, which 
accounted for 10 per cent of its foreign exchange receipts. In March 1952, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) had signed a three-year contract to 
purchase between 18,000 and 20,000 tons of tin annually, with the price fixed for 
the first two years and negotiable for the third. The deal was designed to 
complete US stockpiling arrangements and to assist in Indonesian efforts to 
stabilise the price of tin. However, the RFC caused consternation both in Jakarta 
and in the State Department when it announced that it wished to terminate the 
agreement at the end of the second year and was unwilling to buy more tin at any 
price as the US stockpiling programme was finished. Only after an unseemly 
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row, in which the Indonesians charged Washington with reneging on a contract, 
did the Administration decide to honour the deal because it `could not afford to 
let Indonesia go down the drain. '20 
Despite the negative effects of the disputes over rubber and tin on US- 
Indonesian relations, it was the West Irian question which vexed Washington 
most. Inside the State Department, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs argued that 
the way the US handled the issue might be the `most decisive factor in the 
success of US foreign policy towards Indonesia. 12l While Dulles agreed with 
this, he found the wrangling between the Dutch and Indonesians unacceptable 
and blamed them for the predicament in which the Administration found itself. 
With both sides taking entrenched positions, there was, he judged, no possibility 
of a solution being found which would allow Indonesia to make progress and 
which avoided unpalatable consequences for the US. As he saw it, support for 
the Indonesian case, while it would strengthen the hand of anti-communists, 
could only be achieved at a `severe cost' to relations with The Netherlands and 
Australia. For the Administration, this price was too high and so it opted for 
`neutrality' on the sovereignty issue but, at least nominally, pledged to `explore 
within the US Government possible solutions to the problem. 22 In reality, the 
20 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA, 1952 - 61; NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 8; 
NSC 171/1 Policy on Indonesia (Tin); "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with 
Respect to Indonesia", NSC 171/1,20 Nov. 1953 and Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4; 
181st Meeting of the NSC, 21 Jan. 1954. The Administration was unwilling to raise the 
government-controlled price of synthetic, opposed increased regulation of the world rubber 
market while it was selling off synthetic rubber factories and rejected a rubber buffer stockpile. 
21 NA; RG 59; Lot 55 D 388, Box 5; Far Eastern - General; "Current Problems In US Foreign 
Policy Towards Indonesia", 26 Mar. 1953. 
22 UVaL; Special Collections Department; Cumming Papers, Box 2; The John Foster Dulles Oral 
History Project - Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr. 1966 - 67; Transcript of a 
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Administration had taken a line which it knew would weaken the Indonesian 
Government's ability to counter the PKI's advance but which would also protect 
Washington from involvement in a situation in which it felt it could only lose. 
The policy of neutrality was advantageous for the new Administration, 
which was settling in to power, and for a State Department wishing to paper over 
the cracks in its policymaking apparatus on the West Irian question. The 
Australians were particularly conscious that the new regime was not necessarily 
conversant with the problem. During a visit to Washington, Alan Watt, the 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, found the Administration 
concerned solely with the broad thrust of policy. He reported that, for Walter 
Bedell Smith, the Undersecretary of State, West Irian was `an entirely new 
problem about which he had not thought' and he doubted whether either Dulles 
or Eisenhower had `any special knowledge' of the issue. 23 While the new 
political appointees were busy with other matters, Departmental officials 
remained split on what to do about West Irian. John Allison, the outgoing 
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, supported the Indonesian case 
because he believed that Indonesia would prevail eventually and that, in the 
meantime, the dispute would cause friction between the West and Indonesia. 
However, the "Europeanists", like Freeman Matthews, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of State and soon to be US Ambassador to The Hague, resolutely 
Recorded Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr., 3 Dec. 1966, pp. 19 - 20. DDEL; 
WHO Records, OSANSA, 1952 - 61; NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 8; NSC 171/1 
Policy on Indonesia (Tin); "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to 
Indonesia", NSC 171/1,20 Nov. 1953 
23 AA; CRS A 5461/3/2/14; Watt to Casey, 10 Mar. 1953. 
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backed the Dutch. Cumming noted that the pro-Dutch lobby did not appreciate 
the importance of Asian nationalism but he also decried their opponents as 
`emotional experts', preferring himself to join neither camp. 24 In the 
circumstances, the policy of neutrality over West Irian reflected not just the 
difficulties which the Administration faced in choosing between The Netherlands 
and Indonesia but also in reconciling the views of its own officials in the State 
Department. 
Although the Administration marked time in its relations with Indonesia 
during its first nine months in office, it did begin to pay more attention to 
Indonesia. In fulfilling its election promise, the Administration was not 
motivated simply by a belief that Indonesia deserved to be paid more attention in 
its own right. Washington's confidence in the ability of non-communist leaders 
to retain political and military power in the face of communist infiltration had 
been shaken by the installation of the Ali Government and, as a result, Indonesia 
assumed a higher priority for the Administration. 25 For the first time, a US 
Administration began to develop policy on Indonesia separately from the rest of 
Southeast Asia. 
24 AA; CRS A5461/3/2/14; Memorandum for the Minister, attached to Gilchrist to Spender, 
30 Jun. 1953. UVaL; Special Collections Department; Cumming Papers, Box 2; The John Foster 
Dulles Oral History Project - Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr. 1966 - 67; 
Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr., 3 Dec. 1966, 
pp. 19 - 20. National Library of Australia (NLA); Casey Family Papers (MS 6150); Lord Casey's 
Diary, 8 Sept. 1953. 
25 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA, 1952 - 61; NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 3; 
NSC 124/2 Southeast Asia [Indonesia; France and Indochina]; Progress Report by the Acting 
Secretary of State and the Acting Secretary of Defense on the Implementation of NSC 124/2 
("United States Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to Southeast Asia"), 27 Aug. 1953. 
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The new policy document, which was approved by Eisenhower on 20 
November 1953, identified Indonesia's importance to the US as well as the 
parameters within which policy would be conducted. Like the Truman 
Administration's policy, the new statement emphasised Washington's intention 
to prevent Indonesia from passing into the `communist orbit' but NSC 171/1 
attempted to acknowledge a more positive slant to its relationship with Jakarta by 
asserting Indonesia's strategic importance to the US, and the West in general. In 
particular, Indonesia's significance was seen to derive from its size, strategic 
location and its actual and potential economic wealth. Nevertheless, the new 
policy continued to define Indonesia as a country to be saved from communism 
rather than a nation worthy of Washington's attentions in its own right. 
Acknowledging the importance of avoiding `the appearance' of interference in 
Indonesia's internal affairs, the Administration set as its first task the elimination 
of communist influence from the Government and, generally, to work with non- 
and anti-communist groups to isolate the PKI. Despite its attempt to portray 
Indonesia in positive terms, NSC 171/1 exposed just how limited were the 
Administration's options for improving relations with Jakarta. While it accepted 
the need to resolve the tin problem by making a `reasonable' price offer for the 
third year of supplies, it only proposed that the aid programme should continue, 
as opposed, presumably, to being ended, and that `appropriate actions' should be 
taken to strengthen friendly relations between the two countries. 26 
26 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA, 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 8; 
NSC 171/1 Policy On Indonesia (tin); "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with 
respect to Indonesia", NSC 171/1,20 Nov. 1953. The Truman Administration's final policy 
statement on Indonesia was contained in NSC 124/2, approved on 25 June 1952. HSTL; Truman 
Papers, PSF, National Security Files, Box 217; 120th Meeting of the national Security Council, 
25 June 1952; "United States Objectives And Courses Of Action with respect to Southeast Asia", 
NSC 124/2,25 Jun. 1952. 
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In devising NSC 171/1, the Administration appeared to have both accepted 
and rejected Cochran's advice to underplay its hand. The limited nature and 
extent of the actions which Washington believed could be taken to improve 
relations with Indonesia combined with the vagueness of its strategy for 
strengthening friendship with Jakarta to give the impression that the 
Administration had neither the expectation nor the intention to do much to build 
a positive relationship. However, in stark contrast, Washington was fully 
prepared to meddle in Indonesian politics in order to achieve its aim of saving 
Indonesia for the West despite the evidence of the past and its own assessment 
that it could not afford to be caught. 
In fact, as NSC 171/1 was being drafted, Washington took a major step 
towards recognising Indonesia's higher priority when Vice-President Richard 
Nixon visited Jakarta, in late October. Nixon was the most senior elected 
American to have gone to Indonesia and his presence there demonstrated the 
seriousness which the Administration attached to improving its contacts with 
Jakarta. However, Nixon blundered into the same trouble as Cochran had before 
him, despite being warned beforehand about Indonesians resistance to being 
preached at or pressurised. According to Indonesian officials, he responded to 
requests for help in stabilising rubber prices by saying that the US would find it 
difficult to help Indonesia until it gave `open and active proof of its anti- 
communist alignment. ' Despite his hosts' protestations that this was politically 
impossible, he irritated them further by announcing that they would be soon 
coming under `strong pressure' to enter a military alliance to defend the Pacific 
215 
from communism. 27 To compound the problems caused by his visit, the year 
ended with the Indonesians indignant that a conference of Western powers in 
Bermuda was to discuss the threat posed by communism in the archipelago. 
Foreign Office officials discovered that the State Department had no idea why the 
issue had been raised and only later did it emerge that Dulles had asked for the 
matter to be put on the agenda after receiving disturbing reports from Nixon 
about the political situation in Indonesia. Although the furore eventually blew 
over, it did revive worries, in London at least, that Washington was, once more, 
looking for a solution to the West Irian question based on a transfer of 
sovereignty in exchange for Indonesian accession to a military pact with the 
West, but this time as a way of bolstering Indonesian anti-communists and not 
because it saw merit in resolving the problem. 28 
Despite Nixon's heavy-handed approach to the Indonesians, he did come 
away from Jakarta convinced of the Administration's need to take its relations 
with Indonesia more seriously. He believed that more could be done to win the 
country over and identified the weak non-communist labour movement as a 
priority for supportive action. He also told State Department officials that the US 
had to increase the number of Indonesian students being trained in America if it 
were to counter a programme run by the PRC. Most of all, however, Nixon 
emphasised the overarching importance of stabilising the price of rubber and 
27 NA; RG 59; Lot 55 D 388, Box 7; Mr Nixon's Visit (3); Briefing papers for Vice President 
Nixon on his Trip to the Far East, 15 Sept. 1953. PRO; FO 371/106824; Records of 
Conversations by Lord Reading and W. D. Allen, of meetings with the Indonesian Ambassador, 
Subandrio, 17 Nov. 1953 and 20 Nov. 1953. 
28 PRO; FO 371/106824, Sir Roger Makins (UK Ambassador in Washington) to the Foreign 
Office, 20 Nov. 1953 and a Memorandum by J. E. Cable, 25 Nov. 1953. 
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argued that, unless this happened, Indonesia risked complete economic collapse 
which no amount of aid would prevent. In his view, the situation in Indonesia 
was delicately poised and the country could `go either way' in the Cold War 
struggle. 29 In response to Nixon's warning, the Administration drew up a plan to 
make Indonesia's rubber industry more competitive in world markets, rather than 
take measures to boost price levels. By September, proposals had been agreed 
under which Washington would underwrite the $60 million cost of planting 
380,000 acres with high-yielding trees. Designed to restore the viability of 
smallholders, the plan also promoted modern production methods and sought to 
break the stranglehold of the middlemen who marketed the smallholders' 
produce by establishing co-operatives to sell the rubber. While Washington 
planned to cater for Indonesian sensibilities by presenting its plan only after 
having received a request for assistance from Jakarta, it did not envisage allowing 
any Indonesian proposals to alter markedly its own ideas. 30 The Administration's 
unwillingness to tolerate significant amendment of its proposals demonstrated its 
presumption that Indonesia would have to accept the American plan or nothing. 
The sense that Washington was intent on forcing Jakarta into a corner was 
reinforced by the knowledge of its earlier refusal to act to raise rubber prices. 
29 DDEL; WHO Records, National Security Council Papers 1948 - 61, OCB Central File Series, 
Box 69; OCB 091.4 Far East (File #1) (2) [November 1953 - April 1954]; Vice President Nixon's 
Report to Departmental Officers on his Trip to the Far East, 8 Jan. 1954 and OSANSA, 1952 - 
61, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8; Far East, US Policy toward, 1954 - 59; Minutes 
of a conference at the State Department, "Future Steps in Southeast Asia", 24 and 25 Jul. 1954. 
30 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA, 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 10; 
NSC 5417/3 - US Rubber Policy; "US Rubber Policy", NSC 5417/3,24 Sept. 1953. 
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Overall, the Administration believed that it had reversed the decline in 
relations with Jakarta which had occurred after the collapse of the Cochran- 
Subardjo pact and which had persisted through 1953. Nixon was careful to 
report that, based on his assessment of Sukarno as an, albeit naive, non- 
communist, he was `less pessimistic' than some in the State Department about 
Indonesia's prospects. The Vice-President believed that Sukarno's hold over the 
people, his pre-eminence amongst the Indonesian leadership cadre and his 
political outlook made him Washington's best asset in the country where he was, 
as Nixon put it, `... our main card, ... a good card, a strong card, because he is a 
strong man. '31 With Nixon's testimonial still fresh, the Administration began to 
explore with the Indonesian leader the possibility of him visiting the US. 32 
Despite this upbeat assessment of the state of US-Indonesian relations, the 
Administration still harboured significant reservations about the continuing 
political instability, the deterioration in the economy and the seemingly 
inexorable rise of the PKI. 
Principal amongst Washington's concerns was the perceived weakness of 
the Ali Government and the widening split between the PNI and the opposition. 
31 NA; RG 59; Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Record Set of National 
Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, 1950 - 
1954 (Lot 78 D 394), Box 4; NIE 65 - 54 "The Probable Outlook for Indonesia Through 1954"; 
"The Probable Outlook for Indonesia Through 1954", NIE 65 - 54,11 May 1954. DDEL; WHO 
Records, National Security Council Papers 1948 - 61, OCB Central File Series, Box 69; OCB 
091.4 Far East (File #1) (2) [November 1953 - April 1954]; Vice President Nixon's Report to 
Departmental Officers on his Trip to the Far East, 8 Jan. 1954. 
32 DDEL; WHO Records, National Security Council Staff : Papers 1948 - 61, OCB Central File 
Series, Box 41; OCB 091. Indonesia (File #2) (1) [June 1954 - January 1955]; "Progress Report 
on NSC 171/1, United States Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to Indonesia", 
1 Jul. 1954. 
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The Administration saw little evidence that the leadership in Jakarta was doing 
anything positive to improve stability or to check the PKI's growing influence. 
The Government itself was seemingly consumed in a tactical battle to reduce the 
influence of the Masjumi and the PSI at the expense of dealing with Indonesia's 
problems. Officials noted that, in the absence of the much-delayed elections, the 
Government lacked a popular mandate and that it had failed to establish law and 
order in the regions, where dissidence continued unabated. The economy, too, 
showed few signs of improvement as exports fell, the trade deficit reached 1 
billion rupiah and foreign exchange reserves went below the statutory limit. 
While the Government cut its expenditure to deal with the increased budget 
deficit, this hit capital investment plans at a time when the Government was 
planning to industrialise the economy. 33 
Washington's main criticism of the Ali Government, however, remained its 
co-operative relationship with the PKI. This emphasis on the importance of 
communism in US-Indonesian relations reflected American assessments of 
communist strategy in Asia. These had concluded that, under the direction of the 
USSR and, especially, the PRC, `indigenous Communist parties' were building 
their strength and would use `subversive and indirect aggression' to try to weaken 
Western influence in the Far East. 34 In Washington, it seemed that events in 
;; NA; RG 59; Lot 78 D 394, Box 4; NIE 65 - 54 "The Probable Outlook for Indonesia Through 
1954"; "The Probable Outlook for Indonesia Through 1954", NIE 65 - 54,11 May 1954. AA; 
CRS A5954/1/2279/2; Ministerial Despatch 4/1954 from Jakarta, 27 Feb. 1954. The New York 
Times, 12 Oct. 1954. 
;' NA; RG 59; Lot 78 D 394, Box 1; NIE 10 -2- 54 Communist Courses Of Action In Asia 
Through Mid-1955; "Communist Courses Of Action In Asia Through Mid-1955", NIE 10 -2- 
54,15 Mar. 1954. DDEL; Ann Whitman File : Miscellaneous Series, Box 2; Foreign Policy - 
Miscellaneous Memoranda; Secretary of State to the President, 28 May 1954. 
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Indonesia were conforming to this pattern as Cumming reported the views of 
senior PNI officials that there were no basic conflicts between Marhaenism, 
Sukarno's political philosophy, and communism. Increasingly perturbed about 
the PNI's reliance on PKI support in its struggle with the Masjumi and the PSI, 
the Administration believed that it was witnessing a classic example of a 
"national front" strategy in action. Although a communist take-over was thought 
to be highly unlikely in the short-term, the PKI was considered to have benefited 
from a weakening of the Masjumi and the PSI in the bureaucracy and the armed 
forces and was also enhancing its prestige and popular support. 35 The 
Administration believed that the PKI would continue to support the Ali 
Government, or another like it, while it built up its strength and that, if allowed to 
do so, the possibility of a communist assumption of power by 1957 would 
`greatly increase'. Opinions were, however, divided about the extent of the threat 
posed by the PKI. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
did not agree with the CIA that the PKI had begun to make significant inroads 
into the army. Cumming took an even more sanguine view of the situation when 
he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff Planning and Intelligence Group that the 
communists were `not a decisive factor in the government' and that, as a Moslem 
people, Indonesians had a basic antipathy to communist ideology which, along 
with the strength of the Masjumi Party and the military, gave `room for hope' 
about developments. 36 
35 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 
20 Jan. 1954 and Lot 78 D 394, Box 4; NIE 65 - 54 "The Probable Outlook for Indonesia 
Through 1954"; "The Probable Outlook for Indonesia Through 1954", NIE 65 - 54, 
19 May 1954. 
36 NA; RG 263; National Intelligence Estimates Concerning the Soviet Union, 1950 - 1961, 
Intelligence Publication File, Box 2; NIE 10-7-54; "Communist Courses of Action in Asia 
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On the issue which had the greatest influence over US policy towards 
Indonesia, the Administration agreed that a communist threat existed but could 
not reach a consensus about the extent of that threat. There was unanimity in 
Washington that, unless the PNI was removed from its dominant position in 
government, it would be difficult to halt the PKI and this factor emphasised the 
importance of the forthcoming elections. Washington's ability to act in support 
of its objectives was, however, limited by the mutual suspicion which 
characterised relations with Jakarta. Although he thought Indonesians were 
learning that relations with the US did not involve `colonialism and domination 
of local interest', Cumming believed that Americans still suffered from the 
legacy of `deep-seated resentment' which Indonesians felt towards the Dutch and 
with which other `white European foreigners', including Americans, had been 
tarred. 37 While the Ambassador was optimistic that, after a difficult start, the US 
was beginning to made headway in winning over Indonesians, others worried 
about the effect Sukarno's morals might have on his position in Indonesia and his 
consequent standing as Washington's "main card" in the country. During 1954, 
Jakarta was swept by gossip that the President would take a second wife, a 
decision which Embassy staff believed would leave him open to attack by his 
political enemies. John Steeves, the Charge, also regaled Washington with 
details of the `sensational and sordid rumours' about Sukarno's personal life, 
which included relationships with an agricultural student and the wife of a former 
Through 1957", NIE 10-7-54,7 Nov. 1954 and RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; 
Memorandum of Conversation by Philip Haring, of a meeting between Cumming and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Planning and Intelligence Group, 6 Oct. 1954. 
37 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; Memorandum of Conversation by Philip 
Haring, of a meeting between Cumming and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Planning and Intelligence 
Group, 6 Oct. 1954. 
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Mayor of Jakarta. 38 While Steeves' report about the `scandal' surrounding 
Sukarno implied that Jakarta society thought his behaviour reprehensible, the 
news was not calculated to improve Sukarno's popularity with the Eisenhower 
Administration. 
Not only did Washington become increasingly disturbed by the internal 
situation in Indonesia but it was also uncomfortable about Indonesia's foreign 
policy, believing that the Ali Government was more militant in its conduct of 
foreign affairs and had shifted away from the `apparent disposition of his 
predecessors towards the United States. '39 Indonesians, however, viewed Ali's 
approach quite differently. They saw a more activist policy but also one which 
explored the possibility of co-operation with communist countries while staying 
within Jakarta's established foreign policy principles. Ide Anak Agung Gde 
Agung, by no means a radical in Indonesian politics, found the new policy to be 
perfectly reasonable given the opportunities offered by the post-Stalinist USSR's 
attitude towards Indonesia, which was now much more friendly. Indeed, he 
attributes Washington's perception that Indonesia had become anti-American to 
Dulles' `rigid views and narrow outlook' which led him to misunderstand a 
policy which `at that juncture ... was certainly not anti-American'. 
40 While the 
Administration was unhappy that Indonesia had established diplomatic relations 
38 NA; RG 84; Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1953 - 55: 350, Box 41; 350 
IndonesiaJSukarno (Pres) 1953 - 55; John Steeves to Galbraith (Officer in Charge FE : PSA), 
7 Sept. 1954. Sukarno's first marriage to Inggit, in 1923, ended in divorce in 1952. He and his 
"first" wife, Fatmawati, were married in 1943 and he married Madame Hartini in 1954. He would 
take two further wives, Dewi, who he married secretly in 1959, and Hariati. 
39 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp. 37 - 38. 
40 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, (The Hague, Paris, 
1973), pp. 184 - 87. 
with the USSR and was promoting the PRC's membership of the UN, it was the 
influence of the communist sympathisers in Ali's Cabinet which really disturbed 
Washington. Symptomatic of this concern was the matter of the replacement of 
the Dutch military mission whose work in Indonesia had been brought to an end 
by the Wilopo Government. Ali, then Ambassador to Washington, had asked the 
State Department if the US would be willing to provide a replacement mission, a 
request towards which Dulles was favourably disposed. However, Washington's 
hopes of extending its military links with Indonesia were dashed by the Defence 
Minister, Iwa Kusumasumantri, a minister `subject to communist influence', who 
decided not to replace the Dutch. 41 To Washington, this episode was clear 
evidence of the impact of "communist influence" on the way the Ali Government 
conducted its relations with the US and which, when taken with Jakarta's 
rapprochement with the USSR and its links with the PRC, indicated a leftward 
shift in Indonesia's world outlook. 
The Ali Government's newly activist approach to foreign relations also 
extended to its prosecution of Indonesia's campaign to secure West Irian, much 
to Washington's chagrin. Frustrated by the unwillingness of the Dutch to give up 
West Irian and their own inability to prosecute their claim, the Indonesians 
decided to refer the issue to the UN in an effort to pressurise The Netherlands to 
negotiate. In recognition of Washington's pivotal role, Sukarno and Ali both 
made further attempts to secure US support for the `mild' resolution they 
41 NA; RG 59; Lots 58 D 614 and 60 D 60, Australia and New Zealand Desk Files, Subject Files 
1949 - 58, Box 9; I. S. Indonesia 1951 - 54; Bedell Smith to Charles Wilson (Secretary of 
Defense), 23 Jun. 1953 and 15 Mar. 1954. 
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intended putting before the General Assembly and urged the Administration, if it 
could not assist them, not to influence other delegations against it. 42 The State 
Department was horrified at Indonesia's threatened internationalisation of the 
dispute, a move which it believed could not be constructive. Bedell Smith told 
Cumming that the Administration wanted to avoid the communists reaping a 
propaganda advantage from the Indonesians' initiative and instructed him to 
make strenuous efforts to persuade them not to raise the matter. 43 The 
Administration's efforts failed and, once more, it was faced with having to decide 
how to deal with what it saw as an intractable problem made worse by the 
submission of a resolution calling for the Dutch to agree to talks under UN 
auspices. Galbraith, now the Indonesia Desk Officer, favoured supporting the 
Indonesian resolution while Bedell Smith was isolated in wishing to side with the 
Dutch and the Australians but, crucially, Dulles remained convinced that strict 
neutrality was the only viable option. 44 
By now, however, the State Department was admitting that its stance was 
motivated by more than just a desire not to offend either the Dutch, the 
Indonesians or the Australians. In a detailed exposition of its case, Walter 
Robertson, Allison's successor as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 
emphasised the strategic importance of `not New Guinea (Irian) alone but the 
42 NA; RG 59; Miscellaneous Lot Files, Subject Files Relating to Indonesia 1947 - 1958 (Lots 62 
D 68 and 62 D 409), Box 20; 1954.322 Netherlands; Galbraith to Bonsai, 16 Aug. 1954. 
43 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; Smith to Cumming, 29 Apr. 1954. 
44 NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 20; 1954.322 Netherlands; Galbraith to Bonsai, 
16 Aug. 1954. AA; CRS A5462/1/2/14A; External Affairs Office, London to the DEA, 
13 Sept. 1954. 
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whole Indonesian archipelago' to the security of the offshore island chain and the 
sea lanes between Asia and Australia. Noting that the Administration also had to 
take account the fact that the Dutch in West Irian were not going to be displaced 
by the Indonesians, he concluded that US neutrality on the West Irian issue was 
`essential' to the cause of keeping Indonesia non-communist. 45 The State 
Department had evidently decided that nothing it could do would persuade the 
Dutch to leave West Irian and that support for the Indonesians would, therefore, 
be both an empty gesture and a hostage to fortune in the event that US pressure 
on the Dutch failed. Dulles himself was especially concerned lest any US action 
in support of the Dutch during the UN debate should `affect adversely' pro-US 
elements in the forthcoming Indonesian elections46 and, so, the best option 
remained strict neutrality. The wisdom of this position seemed to be confirmed, 
in December, when the matter was raised and the debate in the UN General 
Assembly developed into an argument between the Indonesians, the Dutch and 
the Australians. While the US Delegate, Henry Cabot Lodge, was able to assure 
Dulles that America had not been caught in the crossfire, 47 Dulles' determination 
to avoid controversy was compromised by the unofficial actions of members of 
the US Delegation, who gave `probably decisive assistance' to the anti-Indonesia 
lobby. 48 
as NA; RG 59; Lot 58 D 614, Australia and New Zealand Desk Files, Subject Files 1949 - 1958, 
Box 5; 16 Netherlands New Guinea; Robertson to Murphy, 3 Dec. 1954. 
46 AA; CRS A 5462/1/2/14; Spender to the DEA, 31 Oct. 1954. 
47 DDEL; Papers of John Foster Dulles, Telephone Calls Series, Box 3; Telephone Conv. - 
General Nov. 1954 -- Dec. 31,1954 (2); Telecon with Ambassador Lodge, 11 Dec. 1954. 
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Delegation to the DEA, 14 Dec. 1955. 
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Despite Nixon's injunction to the State Department that it should make a 
greater effort to win over Indonesia, the essential dynamics of the bilateral 
relationship changed very little. While Indonesians remained unhappy about 
Washington's emphasis on anti-communism and the State Department's dislike 
of their foreign policy, the US Administration continued to give the impression 
that it believed it knew best how to resolve Indonesia's problems. Whether in 
relation to the rubber industry or Indonesia's broader economic problems, 
Washington's policies remained limited in scope or unfocussed on Jakarta's 
priorities, or both, and allowed the Soviets to gain a toehold in Indonesia. As 
Cumming admitted, the aid programme remained small in relation to the 
`monumental' task faced in Indonesia but the level of provision was rationalised 
by the Administration's assessment that Indonesia could not absorb more. 49 
Washington also limited its ongoing aid programme to the provision of technical 
assistance, a policy which was formalised by the two governments in 1954,50 just 
as the more nationalist Ali Government was placing a high priority on 
industrialisation as a way of breaking away from the colonial economy which 
still persisted. The Soviets quickly exploited the gap between Indonesia's needs 
and Washington's willingness, or ability, to meet them by offering what The New 
York Times described as a `Soviet Point IV' plan amounting to $100 million, 
which Indonesia would share with India. 51 With Washington looking ever more 
49 NA; RG 84; Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1953 - 55 : 350, Box 39; 350 
Indonesia/Political Situation July - Dec. 1954; Cumming to Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, 19 
Nov. 1954. 
50 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 42. 
51 The New York Times, 7 Nov. 1954. 
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expectantly towards the elections in the hope that a more congenial government 
would emerge in Indonesia, it now found itself involved in both an ideological 
and an economic struggle with communism there. 
The sense that Indonesia was becoming a Cold War battleground appealed to 
a growing body of opinion within the State Department which theorised that it 
would be the next major area of conflict in Asia, following the settlement of the 
Indochina war at Geneva. Supporters of the "domino" theory, including 
Eisenhower, had long-supposed that communist success in Indochina would lead 
to the progressive collapse of the rest of Southeast Asia, with Indonesia being the 
last of the dominoes to fall. According to the "domino" theory then, Indonesia's 
fate was entirely bound up in the outcome of the Indochinese imbroglio. 52 The 
apparent conclusion of the war led some analysts in Washington to revise their 
estimates of communist intentions and to argue that the next target would not be 
one of the mainland countries, but Indonesia itself. Known as the "leap-frog" 
theory, this new analysis brought Indonesia centre-stage in the Cold War. Its 
proponents argued that the loss of Indonesia would trap Southeast Asia in a 
pincer movement between it and the PRC and would inevitably lead to the 
capitulation of the rest of the region. 53 The development of the "leap-frog" 
theory, although it did not supplant its predecessor, had the effect of heightening 
Indonesia's profile in the State Department's thinking about Cold War policy in 
52 Robert Divine, Eisenhower And The Cold War (New York and Oxford, 1981), p. 41. 
53 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 38. 
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Asia and reflected what many at Foggy Bottom considered to be the reality of the 
situation. 
As the perceived threat from communism increased and as opinions about 
the Ali Government hardened, Washington looked to the elections, due in 1955, 
as a potential solution to its problems with Indonesia. Already backing the 
Masjumi and, to a lesser extent, the PSI as alternatives to the PNI, the 
Administration began to implement NSC 171/1's recommendation to build links 
with anti- and non-communist groups and leaders whilst not appearing to 
interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs. As concerns mounted about the direction 
being taken by the Ali Government, so the Masjumi's and the PSI's 
attractiveness to Washington grew. Despite the unanimity in Indonesia about the 
West Irian question, both parties strongly criticised the decision to refer the 
matter to the UN and they also condemned the idea, floated by the Government, 
of a non-aggression pact with the PRC. 54 The Masjumi also demonstrated its 
potential as a bulwark against communist subversion by forming an anti- 
communist front in response to the arrival of the first Soviet Ambassador, on 14 
September. Cumming had already responded to the injunction to forge closer 
links with the opposition parties and, within days of his decision, Steeves, now 
Counselor at the Embassy, met Dr. Abu Hanifah, a senior Foreign Ministry 
official and Masjumi supporter. During a wide-ranging discussion, Hanifah told 
Steeves that the Masjumi feared that the Government would rig the ballot and he 
made a none too subtle request for covert American assistance to the Masjumi, 
54 AA, CRS A5462/1/101/6; Political Intelligence Report (29 September -5 October 1954), 
6 Oct. 1954. 
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citing the example of De Gasperi, in Italy. 55 In spite of Hanifah's warning, the 
State Department's Head of Intelligence, W. Park Armstrong, remained 
convinced that the Masjumi would win the election if it was fairly conducted. He 
told Dulles that the Masjumi was likely to far outstrip the PNI and the PKI and 
would, if it fell short of an overall majority, form a coalition with the PSI or the 
NU. Armstrong's optimistic prognostication did admit of the possibility that a 
PNU/PKI alliance might take power if the Masjumi's plurality was small but his 
analysis reinforced the Administration's evident belief that success for the 
Masjumi would limit further communist advances. 56 
Washington's concentration on the Indonesian elections as its best hope for 
an improvement in relations with Jakarta reflected the extent to which Nixon's 
appeal to treat Indonesia more seriously had done little to dispel the mutual 
suspicions which existed between the two countries. Nor had his entreaty 
resulted in the Administration being able to make significantly greater progress in 
establishing, through its actions, a better relationship with Indonesia and taking 
concrete steps to help improve the political and economic situation there. It fell 
to Cumming to make policymakers in Washington aware that prospects in 
Indonesia were not `uniformly gloomy'. He argued that apparent signs of 
political disintegration were only to be expected in a country as diverse as 
Indonesia and suggested that this very diversity imparted a certain resilience to 
ss NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; Cumming to the Secretary of 
State, 7 Jan. 
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shocks which might completely disrupt a more tightly organised state. Cumming 
also pointed to the basic `respect and emotional attachment' of the educated elite 
to Western democratic liberalism and emphasised that Sukarno, despite 
uncertainties about his future actions, had demonstrated his commitment to 
keeping Indonesia firmly on a democratic and constitutional path. Cumming did 
not try to minimise the threat posed by the PKI but reported that, even within the 
PNI, there were signs that the communists' claim to be a nationalist party were 
being treated more sceptically. The Ambassador also reassured Washington that 
the national police and the army could be relied upon to support the state and this 
analysis formed the basis of his briefing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in October. 57 
There was, however, concern within the Administration about the 
deterioration of Indonesia's financial situation which, if it continued unchecked, 
was expected to weaken further Indonesia's non-communist leaders. The NSC 
was told that the situation seemed intractable and that any action which the 
Government might take to deal with it promised only to give the communists a 
further advantage. Furthermore, it had been possible for the Administration to 
take only limited steps to implement the policy contained in NSC 171/1 and it 
seemed unlikely, therefore, that Washington would be able to influence the 
situation materially. The air of impending crisis led the NSC to elevate to 
previously unseen heights the strategic importance Washington attached to 
Indonesia. At the its meeting on 1 December, Eisenhower, Dulles and the 
57 NA; RG 59; DF 1950 - 1954,756D. 00, Box 3752; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 
14 Apr. 1954 and Memorandum of Conversation by Philip Haring, of a meeting between 
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Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, used a debate on policy in the Far East to 
commit the US, subject to the `constitutional processes', to `employ all feasible 
covert and all feasible overt means, including ... the use of armed force if 
necessary and appropriate (to prevent Indonesia, ) or vital parts thereof, from 
falling to communism. In proposing this unprecedented course of action, Dulles 
insisted that Indonesia was `an essential element' in the offshore island chain 
despite the advice of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert 
Cutler, that Indonesia had never before been considered a link in the defensive 
perimeter. The Secretary of State also observed that, if the Indonesian 
Government was to become communist dominated, Washington would not be 
able to rely on receiving a request for assistance to prevent a communist take- 
over. The new policy, therefore, allowed the US to intervene without a `local' 
plea for help. While Wilson noted that Indonesia was crucial to the success of 
US policy in the Far East, the President pointed out that the US had no treaty 
arrangements with Indonesia, which consequently meant that it had to be dealt 
with differently from the other nations in the island chain. Despite Cumming's 
reports that the situation was manageable, the NSC opted, in effect, to categorise 
the Indonesian Government as unfriendly and decided to authorise the use of 
extreme measures to prevent Indonesia from going communist. In a sign that the 
situation was getting to him, Eisenhower asked the NSC, possibly not just 
rhetorically, `why the hell did we ever urge the Dutch to get out of Indonesia? ' 
58 
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Washington's official view held that Indonesia was set on a course of 
decline which would result in a communist take-over. This `drift' was, however, 
matched by American policy, which had seemingly accepted that there was little 
that could be done to affect the situation unless a new, and more acceptable, 
government was installed in Jakarta. The plans to invite Sukarno to the US had 
been dropped because he had become over-identified with the PNUPKI alliance 
and the rubber industry assistance programme had been delayed for six months 
with the result that there was nothing positive about US-Indonesian relations at 
the time the NSC met in December. Indeed, the issues which dominated high- 
level consideration of Indonesia were the continued indecisiveness of the Ali 
Government and the reported growth of the PKI. 59 In this context, the NSC's 
decision to authorise the use of drastic measures to prevent a communist take- 
over represented as much a failure of American policy as it did concern at the 
situation in Indonesia. It also provided more evidence of the gap between the 
thinking of the senior politicians and the officials most closely involved in 
carrying out that policy. 
The State Department continued to believe that NSC 171/1 gave the US 
`ample opportunity' for securing its objectives in Indonesia and argued that 
military intervention would be feared, and opposed, by Indonesians as a 
reimposition of foreign domination. It recommended that military action should 
only be taken as a last resort and that, in this event, it should not involve the 
59 DDEL; WHO Records, National Security Council Staff : Papers 1948 - 61, OCB Central File 
Series, Box 41; OCB 091. Indonesia (File #3) (1) [January 1955 - January 1956]; "Progress 
Report on NSC 171/1 (Indonesia), 12 Jan. 1955. 
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ANZUS powers. 60 This issue was symptomatic of a wider misunderstanding of 
Indonesia in the Administration which contributed to the lack of success of its 
policies. Francis Underhill, the Vice-Consul in Jakarta and soon to be Indonesia 
Desk Officer at the State Department, ascribed much of the opposition to the 
Manila Pact to Indonesians' resentment at being told what the dangers were that 
they faced and what should be done about them. After three hundred years of 
Dutch governance, Underhill reported that Indonesians just wanted to be dealt 
with as equals and not be preached to, patronised or treated with condescension. 
He highlighted the tact with which the Soviets conducted relations with Jakarta, 
citing Soviets references to `mutually beneficial economic relations' rather than 
`aid' or `assistance'. In Indonesian culture, he explained, the receipt of a gift 
induced a feeling of dependence until a gift could be returned. Underhill's 
comments accurately identified some of the cultural and psychological factors 
behind the impotence of American policy in Indonesia and which, as the NSC 
prescribed yet another remedy for Indonesia's ills, still went unrecognised within 
the US foreign policymaking elite. 61 
The announcement, in December 1954, that an Afro-Asian Conference 
would be held in Indonesia presented Washington with another foreign policy 
problem. Although the conference had been the brainchild of the Prime 
60 NA; Records of the Policy Planning Staff Relating to State Department Participation in the 
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Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, it was Sukarno who 
was credited with being the inspiration behind it and State Department analysts 
noted that the domestic and international prestige of the Indonesian leadership 
would be affected by its outcome. The challenge presented to Washington by the 
conference, to be held at Bandung, was not just confined to Indonesia's standing 
in the world. In resurrecting the possibility of the emergence of a third bloc of 
countries, the conference revived Washington's fear that its anti-communist 
alliances, especially in Asia, might be destabilised. The State Department was 
keen to prevent the African and Asian countries from dealing with the outside 
powers as a bloc and Dulles, in particular, was worried that such a development 
could lead to an `anti-Western and anti-white course in Asia'. 62 Washington's 
principal concern, however, was that the conference would end the quarantine of 
the PRC and provide it with a propaganda platform. The Bandung Conference 
was seen, by the Administration, as a response to the Manila Pact, which 
Indonesia had not joined, and represented, for the CIA, yet another example of 
Sukarno's fraternisation with the communist Chinese - he was, as the CIA agent 
responsible for Indonesia put it, `in the process of selling his charisma, if not his 
soul, to the communists .... 
963 
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Dulles' initial reaction, also shared by many at the State Department, was 
that the Conference should be prevented from taking place and initial planning 
was directed at either aborting the meeting altogether or dissuading enough 
`significant' countries from attending as to make it meaningless. 64 However, this 
negative attitude came under attack from a number of quarters. Cumming 
thought that a more sophisticated approach would pay dividends. He proposed 
that Washington should welcome the Conference but keep a careful watch on it 
and take the opportunity to do some discreet lobbying of participants. The 
British and the French took a similar line, arguing that it would be best not to 
show any sign of anxiety about the Conference and suggesting that friendly 
countries should be briefed to put the West's case at the Conference. In the face 
of this pressure, and after it became clear that the important Arab countries would 
be attending, Dulles reluctantly changed his mind and Washington embarked on a 
campaign with other Western powers to influence the outcome of the 
Conference. 65 By the time it took place, in the last week of April, the State 
Department had co-ordinated activity with the UK, France and Australia to 
ensure that the West's cause was fully promoted at Bandung. The Western 
powers used a Manila Treaty Powers meeting to prime Pakistan, the Philippines 
and Thailand to resist any effort to condemn the Manila Pact and they divided 
between themselves the work of lobbying attendees. 66 Dulles himself played a 
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significant part in the effort to secure a favourable outcome. He used the conflict 
in the Formosa Straits to argue with the Lebanese delegate, Charles Malik, and 
the Philippines' Foreign Minister, Carlos Romulo, that the Bandung Conference 
could lead to war if the PRC was given either the private or public support of 
participants. Romulo left Washington with a draft resolution, supplied by Dulles, 
which called for a non-violent solution to be found to the dispute, together with 
the promise of a nuclear reactor for research as a demonstration of the US 
commitment to the peaceful use of atomic energy. 67 
The Eisenhower Administration viewed the Bandung Conference as another 
battlefield in the Cold War and its analyses of the Conference reflected this 
viewpoint. Cumming proclaimed that the Conference had been `more than an 85 
per cent victory' for the West while an assessment drawn up by the Embassy 
attributed the `considerable substantive success' won by the free world to the 
work of the `partisans of the western world' who had blunted the expected 
communist diplomatic offensive. 68 The State Department concurred with this 
view and even found evidence that the Conference might lead to an improvement 
in relations with Indonesia. The Ali Government had not only organised the 
Conference efficiently but, officials noted, had not followed `the Communist 
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party line' and had, as a consequence, strengthened its domestic position. 69 
Furthermore, a State Department analysis of the Conference concluded that the 
emergence of a third world `consensus' might lead to a reduction in anti-western 
sentiment. Noting that greater self-confidence had been generated among 
participants at Bandung, officials argued that the `lingering sense of inferiority' 
which caused much anti-western feeling would erode over time and that it could 
even result in a relaxation of cold war tension. Washington's assessment of the 
struggle with the PRC for the hearts and minds of the participants was, however, 
more mixed. To Washington's delight, the Conference endorsed the right of 
nations to defend themselves collectively so long as these arrangements did not 
serve big powers' interests. Delegates also condemned colonialism of all kinds, 
thus fulfilling Washington's hope that communist expansion would be opposed, 
supported UN Charter commitments to human rights and gave a higher priority to 
disarmament over calls to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus 
satisfying the Administration's objectives. American diplomacy failed, however, 
to prevent Chou En Lai, the PRC's Foreign Minister, achieving a great personal 
success at Bandung. By adopting a moderate and flexible approach, Chou was 
able, according to the State Department's analysts, to convince attendees of his 
own integrity and of the PRC's pacific intentions. Revealing the failings of 
Washington's approach which emphasised US concerns over Asian ones, 
American observers noted the PRC's identification with Asian interests might 
`blind' participants to the real danger it posed. Apart from implying that the 
Chinese were not themselves Asian, this analysis once more revealed 
69 AA; CRS A5462/1/2/1/lA; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA 28 Apr. and 
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Washington's unwillingness to allow other peoples to make their own 
judgements about communism. 
The Administration's concentration on the struggle with communism 
resulted, however, in a failure to understand the Conference properly. By 
emphasising the need to win support for its own policies, Washington had not 
appreciated the real importance of the Conference for the participants. Norman 
Cousins, writing in the Saturday Review, pointed to the Conference's historic 
significance and saw it more as a ceremony than a conference. For Cousins, the 
graduation of the African and Asian nations out of colonialism and into `the 
family of free nations' outweighed the proceedings at Bandung. 7° Other 
unofficial American assessments of the Conference also challenged the 
Administration's view that it had triumphed in the debates. Journalist Ethel 
Payne reported that denunciations of the US and USSR had been much more 
even-handed than Washington's analyses had implied. She agreed that the 
`trump card' of the Conference had been the `damnation of communism as a new 
form of colonialism' but informed readers that `... included, if not written into the 
resolutions, was a strong indictment against the arrogant patronage of the US. ' 
Rather than seeing Bandung as a victory, Payne argued that it presented 
Washington with an opportunity to prove its sincerity to the `vast uncommitted 
blocs' but insisted that this would require a re-assessment of US foreign policy. 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, for one, was not convinced of the 
Administration's ability to meet the challenge when he denounced it for not 
70 LoC; Mintz Papers, Box 16; Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, 1955; "Report 
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sending a message to the Conference, unlike the Soviets. 7' Despite these views, 
there was a much more positive, if not relieved, attitude in Washington after 
Bandung. It seemed that the Administration's efforts had paid off with the newly 
emergent nations in general, and Indonesia in particular, showing that they could 
be persuaded into the Western camp. 
The Bandung Conference coincided with the final stages of the review of US 
policy towards Indonesia which had flowed from the NSC's 1 December, 1954, 
meeting. On 12 May, the NSC considered, and agreed, NSC 5518 which updated 
policy and brought together the previous policy, the NSC's authorisation to use 
military and covert measures to prevent Indonesia going communist and the 
deferred rubber industry revitalisation programme. The new policy 
acknowledged the reduced risk of a communist take-over in Indonesia but still 
was chiefly concerned with fighting the `long-run danger' of internal subversion. 
Nevertheless, NSC 5518 reflected the more positive outlook which prevailed in 
Washington and provided evidence of greater confidence in the conduct of 
policy. 
The Administration remained committed to preventing the loss of Indonesia 
to communism, to persuade it to affiliate with the West and to assist in the 
development of a `stable, free government' capable of resisting communist 
threats. The State Department had successfully argued that, in carrying out this 
policy, the NSC's decision to take overt, including military, action in concert 
71 LoC; Papers of Ethel L. Payne, Box 18; Folder 10: Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 
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with ANZUS should be struck down. However, the new policy gave the 
Administration far wider scope to take action by authorising it to take both overt 
and covert action in concert with `other nations as appropriate', thus potentially 
allowing the involvement with the UK and the Manila Pact signatories in 
addition to Australia and New Zealand. Given that the NSC accepted that the 
risk of an external threat was `now remote', the new policy opened up the 
possibility of a co-ordinated covert campaign being mounted by the West and its 
allies against perceived internal subversion in Indonesia. Despite the injunction 
to avoid the appearance of interference in Indonesia's internal affairs, US policy 
now formally sought the election of a government not dependent upon the PKI 
and the promotion of `free labor' and other organisations, as Nixon had 
demanded. Further enhancing the Administration's concentration on the 
conquest of internal communist opposition, the NSC decided that it would seek 
to forge closer links with the Indonesian military and police forces by providing 
them with equipment and training and by ensuring that the West was `the 
principal source' of materiel to both. 
In an attempt to balance the essentially defensive, anti-communist elements 
of the policy, NSC 5518 sought to accommodate the views of those, including 
many Indonesian friends of the US, that the projection of a positive image of 
itself would reap benefits. Convinced that contact with the US would give 
Indonesians a better understanding of America, the NSC agreed a wide ranging 
programme of travel, study and training for Indonesians and sought to inject an 
ideological element into policy by re-emphasising the American tradition of anti- 
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colonialism. Although the NSC sought to develop a more positive policy, it 
found this difficult to achieve. With the Soviets willing to offer economic 
assistance, the Administration felt the need to be more expansive than it had been 
previously. The new policy document, therefore, promised a lengthy, but vague, 
wish-list of measures designed to help Indonesia modernise its economy by 
attracting private capital, diversifying production and developing trading links 
with other countries. However, the Administration's ability to help was limited 
by internal divisions over policy. The NSC itself was split over the plan to 
modernise the Indonesian rubber industry with the Commerce Department 
arguing that the scheme was attracting much opposition within Indonesia. The 
State Department accepted that many Indonesians were upset at the prospect of 
inferior quality trees being uprooted, but persuaded the NSC to allow Dulles the 
discretion to decide when to implement the plan. 72 The debate over the rubber 
industry plan demonstrated the difficulties faced by Washington in generating a 
positive image for itself in Indonesia. Not only was it hard to reach agreement on 
attractive policies but there was no certainty that, when developed, they would 
appeal to the intended beneficiaries. 
Despite these problems, events seemed to be favouring Washington when, 
on 25 July, the Ali Government was forced to resign after becoming involved in a 
dispute with the army over the appointment of a new Chief of Staff. The crisis 
erupted when intra-army tension was aroused by the Government proposal, which 
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had Sukarno's backing, for a new army Chief of Staff to replace Nasution's 
successor. The army's success in bringing down the Government not only 
established its political power but also, from Washington's point of view, got rid 
of a much-disliked government. 73 Its successor, led by Burhanuddin Harahap, 
was a coalition of the Masjumi and the PSI and was much more to Washington's 
liking. It promised to attack inflation, stamp out corruption, settle the grievances 
of the regions and oversee the forthcoming elections. All of this was well- 
received in the State Department, where Kenneth Young, the Director of the 
Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, noted that the new Prime 
Minister had also signalled his Government's desire for closer relations with the 
US. Although Young expected little change in Indonesia's independent foreign 
policy, he thought Harahap would take a more moderate line over West Irian. 74 
The extent of the shift in the political landscape was emphasised further when the 
new Government restored Nasution to his former position as army Chief of Staff 
thus marking the rehabilitation of the anti-Sukarno "17 October" plotters. 
With the long awaited Parliamentary elections due in September, a friendly 
government in power and evidence pointing toward a Masjumi victory in the 
ballot, the political situation was now more favourable to US interests than at any 
time since 1950. In spite of this, reports from Cumming that elements in the PNI 
might be seeking a rapprochement with the Masjumi had raised doubts in 
Young's mind that his view of Indonesian politics as a `polarity' between the PNI 
73 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, p. 49. 
74 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3438; 756D. 00/7-1555; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 
12 Aug. 1955 and 756D. 00/9-155; Young to Robertson, 2 Sept. 1955. 
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and the Masjumi might be 'oversimplified'. 75 Despite these doubts, 
Washington's relationship with the Masjumi remained close. The Embassy 
relied on the party for much of its political intelligence, including its predictions 
of the election's outcome, and the CIA, which had an American Moslem working 
undercover in the party, had given the Masjumi $1 million to support its 
campaign. 76 There was, therefore, great consternation in Washington when 
initial results from the election indicated that the PNI and the PKI had done far 
better than expected and might even form the next government. After all the 
ballots had been counted, it became clear that the new Parliament would be 
dominated by four parties which had taken 198 out of the 257 seats - the PNI 
(22.3 per cent of the vote) and the Masjumi (20.9 per cent) with fifty-seven seats 
each, the NU (18.4 per cent) with forty-five and the PKI (16.4 per cent) with 
thirty-nine. Even though the final result did not confirm Washington's worst 
fears, it did expose the poverty of US intelligence in Indonesia and its 
understanding of the political situation. 
The outcome of the election demonstrated how Washington's identification 
with the Masjumi and the PSI had led it to make serious policy misjudgements. 
Only after the election did it become clear that its reliance on these two parties to 
form an anti-communist bulwark in Indonesia had been misplaced. The PSI had 
been destroyed as a political force, probably because of its association with the 
plot of 17 October 1952, while both the CIA and the Embassy had accepted at 
75 NA; RG 84; Djakarta Embassy and Consulate, Confidential File, 1953 - 55: 312 - 322, Box 37; 
320: Indonesia-US Relations 1953 - 55; Young to Cumming, 8 Feb. 1955. 
76 AA; CRS A5954/1/2279/2; Australian Embassy, Jakarta, to the DEA, 9 Jul. 1955. Smith, 
Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 202 - 08. 
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face value assurances from the Masjumi that the NU would have no impact on 
Indonesian politics, and its vote. 77 The Embassy had failed to develop any links 
with the NU and Cumming reported that it was unable exert any influence over it 
or keep track of it since it had no reliable or a contact within its leadership. 78 All 
of this, together with the PNI's surprisingly strong showing and the PKI's vote, 
led Young to conclude that Embassy staffing needed to be increased and more 
Indonesian language officers provided. 79 Washington's concentration on the 
Masjumi and the PSI had also weakened its standing with the PNI and Sukarno, 
which caused two principal problems for the State Department. The first was 
that Washington had no way of influencing the PNI towards joining a PNI- 
Masjumi-NU coalition government, which the Administration favoured. The 
second, and most important, problem involved Sukarno who not only, in 
Cumming's view, dominated the PNI but was becoming a crucial player in his 
own right once more. The Ambassador warned Washington that the election had 
broken the elite's monopoly on Indonesian political life and that `the masses 
(would) have a more important, if not determining, role' in future. He warned 
that Sukarno had spotted this and had began to restore his power by appealing to 
popular sentiment. 80 Washington's decision to throw in its lot with the Masjumi 
had effectively closed off its lines of communication to Sukarno and, as Dulles 
77 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, p. 208. 
78 NA; RG 59; Lot 60 D 60, Indonesia Desk Files 1950 - 56, Box 10; 123 Cumming, Hugh S. Jr. 
1955; Cumming to Young, 25 Nov. 1955. 
79 NA; RG 59; Lot 60 D 60, Indonesia Desk Files 1950 - 56, Box 10; 123 Cumming, Hugh 
S. Jr. 
1955; Young to Cumming, 7 Oct. and 22 Nov. 1955. 
80 NA; RG 59; Lot 60 D 60, Indonesia Desk Files 1950 - 56, Box 10; 123 Cumming, Hugh 
S. Jr. 
1955; Cumming to Young, 25 Nov. 1955. 
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admitted to the NSC, it was `in no position to exert pressure on him' in support 
of US policy. 8' 
The disparity between Washington's interest in Indonesia, evidenced by its 
willingness to use military force to prevent a communist take-over, and the way it 
conducted its policy became evident in the post-election period. Despite being 
committed, by NSC 5518, to encourage the emergence of a non-communist 
government, the Administration took few practical steps to ensure that it could 
respond to the election results. Moreover, it failed to give hope that any 
moderate government which might emerge would receive better treatment than 
the Ali Government had on the issue which dominated Indonesian national 
politics, that of West Irian. In the face of continued Dutch refusals to negotiate, 
Washington maintained its public neutrality when the Harahap Government 
referred the matter back to the UN General Assembly. Even `a conservative old 
ex-colonialist and NATO enthusiast' like Cumming doubted the wisdom of 
Washington's obduracy. In a demonstration of the pragmatism which seemed to 
elude officials in Washington, he told Young that he saw US support for the 
status quo as 6a major obstruction to the ... continuance 
in power of moderate 
non-Communist political forces in Indonesia. '82 Yet the prospect of a radically 
new approach being taken was remote. Dulles remained unconvinced of the 
utility of reviving the invitation to Sukarno to visit the US, despite Eisenhower's 
recognition that such a step might be necessary, while his brother, Allen, the 
81 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 7; 271st Meeting of the NSC, 22 Dec. 1955. 
82 NA; RG 59; Lot 60 D 60, Indonesia Desk Files 1950 - 56, Box 10; 123 Cumming, 
Hugh S. Jr. 
1955; Cumming to Young, 25 Nov. 1955. 
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Director of the CIA, took a more hawkish view of the situation in Indonesia than 
did the State Department and had, since 1953, been developing closer links with 
the Australians, who shared his opinions. 83 However, the Dulles brothers' 
antipathy towards Indonesia, and Sukarno in particular, reflected only one side of 
the generally fragile condition of US-Indonesian relations. Commenting on the 
generally improved state of relations between the two countries, the British 
Ambassador in Jakarta, Oscar Morland, noted that Indonesians still found 
Americans `instinctively uncongenial' and would quickly renew hostilities with 
Washington following any `major mistake' by the Administration in its conduct 
of policy. 84 Although the election had marked a significant stage in Indonesia's 
development as an independent nation, the Administration was uncertain what its 
response, if any, should be. While Cumming pressed for a signal to be given to 
Sukarno, the Dulles' brothers remained unwilling to make a concession of such 
magnitude to a leader who had failed to show unambiguously his commitment to 
the "free world". 
83 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 7; 271st Meeting of the NSC, 22 Dec. 1955. 
NLA; Casey Family Papers, Lord Casey's Diary, Box 27; Entry for 12 Sept. 1953. AA; CRS 
A1838/2/TS383/6/1; Spender to Casey, 5 Jan. 1955. 
84 PRO; FO 371/23539; "Indonesia : Annual Review for 1955", 26 Jan. 1956. 
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7. From Diplomacy To Armed Intervention (January 1956 - May 1958) 
Despite the Dulles brothers' concerns, the Administration's realisation of 
just how little influence it had in Jakarta forced it to reconsider what had been an 
essentially negative policy towards Indonesia. Also, State Department officials 
dealing with policy towards Indonesia had concluded that a more positive 
approach was necessary. In particular, they were worried that Washington's 
policy of `strict neutrality or strict inactivity' on all aspects of Dutch-Indonesian 
relations could end in an `explosive anti-Dutch reaction' which would set back 
US interests in Indonesia. I The Administration also found itself under pressure 
in the media for its lack of friendliness towards the Ali Government. For 
example, The New York Times supported nationalist criticism of Washington's 
portrayal of the entire PNI as fellow-travellers and its failure, thereby, to mobilise 
nationalism in the struggle against the PKI. 2 It was in this context that Cumming 
was recalled, to Washington, in December 1955, to discuss how the 
Administration might respond to the new situation. 
The State Department's main problem was whether to invite Sukarno to visit 
the US. Although there was a need for the Administration to build a relationship 
with the Indonesian President, the decision was by no means clear-cut. Those 
who favoured extending an invitation, like Cumming, knew that Sukarno badly 
wanted to make an official visit to America, a country whose political traditions 
1 NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 20; 1956: 322 New Guinea; Young to Robertson, 
6 Jan. 1956. 
2 The New York Times, 19 Jan. 1956. 
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he claimed had greatly influenced him. They were also aware that the State 
Department had received intelligence that the USSR and the PRC might be about 
to issue invitations of their own and wanted to forestall adverse comment by 
inviting Sukarno first. Others in the Administration thought Sukarno's professed 
admiration for Jefferson and Lincoln only masked a greater liking for Marx. 
Cumming later remarked that this group, which included `some very high 
government officials', also found Sukarno's `personal morals ... highly 
objectionable'. They thought he was only seeking self-aggrandisement and was 
willing to accept help from any country, including the USSR and the PRC, to 
expand his personal power. The decision to invite Sukarno was eventually taken 
on the pragmatic grounds that there was nobody else Washington could deal with 
if it wanted to foster good relations with Indonesia and despite uncertainty about 
how the visit would turn out. In order to maximise the invitation's impact, it was 
agreed that Dulles himself would visit Jakarta to ask Sukarno to make the visit. 3 
-- The Secretary of State's visit to Indonesia, although it only 
lasted a day, fed 
the perception that US-Indonesian relations were improving and even Dulles 
managed, albeit grudgingly, a positive assessment of the situation. At his 
meeting with Sukarno, on 12 March, Dulles congratulated the Indonesian 
President on the conduct of the elections. He also assured Sukarno that 
Washington had no intention of pushing Indonesia into international 
involvements which would prevent it from `concentrating on (the) internal 
UVaL; Special Collections Department; Hugh S. Cumming Jr. Papers (#6922), Box 2; The John 
Foster Dulles Oral History Project - Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr. 1966 - 67; 
Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr., 3 Dec. 1966 and Box 
12; Correspondence :I-K 1957 & 1961 - 1977; Cumming to Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 
28 Jul. 1976. 
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development which is essential for national persistence. ' For his part, Sukarno 
stressed Indonesians' unity of purpose concerning West Irian and told Dulles that 
the communist countries had a clearer policy on Asian nationalism than the 
American one, which he described as `dumb'. He also countered Dulles' request 
for an explanation of Indonesia' neutrality in the Cold War by asking the 
Secretary why the US was neutral between Indonesia and The Netherlands. 4 
Despite initial doubts about the worth of Dulles' visit, the Embassy thought it had 
been `quite successful' and had allowed a useful exchange of views to take place. 
Even Dulles believed that his meeting with Sukarno had been valuable in helping 
to ensure the exclusion of the PKI from the new Government, which was sworn 
in on 21 March. 5 The Indonesian President, while pleased to accept the 
invitation to visit the US, was less sure about the meeting's worth and he passed 
a message to Eisenhower that there had been issues which he had felt unable to 
raise with Dulles. He had wanted, it was reported, to discuss Indonesia's attitude 
towards US aid, which he likened to that of a woman in love for whom `jewels 
are not enough -- she wants the heart as well', a view which he no doubt believed 
would not appeal to the Secretary of State. 6 
4 NA; RG 59; Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Miscellaneous Subject Files, Far East General, Oct. - 
Dec., to Japan, Jan. - July 1956, Box 1; Indonesia 1956; Cumming to Robertson, 
4 Apr. 1956. 
DDEL; Ann Whitman File; Dulles - Herter Series; Dulles, John Foster Mar `56; 
Dulles to 
Eisenhower, 13 Mar. 1956 and DDE Diary Series; May `56 Goodpaster; Memorandum of 
Conference with the President, 15 May 1956. Present were Eric Johnson and Colonel A. J. 
Goodpaster. 
5 AA; CRS A 1838/272/250/10/7/6; J. M. McMillan (Counselor, Australian Embassy, Jakarta, to 
Watt, 15 Mar. 1956. DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 7; 280th Meeting of the NSC, 
22 Mar. 1956. 
6 DDEL; Ann Whitman File; DDE Diary Series; May `56 Goodpaster; Memorandum of 
Conference with the President, 15 May 1956. Present were Eric Johnson and Colonel A. J. 
Goodpaster. 
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The possibility that the Indonesian leadership might have a more sanguine 
view of relations with Washington did not seem to penetrate the State 
Department, where optimism about the future dominated thinking. The 
Administration regarded the new PNI-Masjumi-NU coalition as a step in the right 
direction, despite being led by Ali, and as evidence that the fractious Indonesian 
political parties might, at last, be willing to subordinate their rivalries to the task 
of halting the PKI's rise. This drew a cautious welcome from Dulles, who 
thought the new Government to be `better than anticipated. '7 Meanwhile, 
Kenneth Young, the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, had taken the opportunity afforded by the thaw in relations to press for a 
more positive approach to policy. He told Walter Robertson, the Assistant 
Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, that Indonesia deserved a `more important role' 
in the making of US policy in Asia than it had been given previously. He argued 
that a `free, stable and developing' Indonesia could become one of the most 
influential countries in Asia and might, along with Japan and India, be `a long- 
range counterweight to Red China. ' Young advised Robertson that this objective 
could take five to ten years to realise and said that, as a first stage, Indonesia 
should be allowed to strengthen itself `within its understandable policy of non- 
alignment' .8 
Indeed, in the early months of 1956, it seemed possible that 
Indonesia's neutralism might be more acceptable to Washington. This was 
certainly the opinion of the Australian Ambassador, Percy Spender, who pointed 
to statements by Eisenhower that the US should `respect the right of each nation 
7 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 7; 280th Meeting of the NSC, 22 Mar. 1956. 
8 NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 20; 1956 320 United States; Young to Robertson, 
21 Mar. 1956. 
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to choose its own path' to back his claim that the Administration had adopted a 
more relaxed approach towards the neutralist nations. In this new atmosphere, 
Spender reported, Washington would not insist that neutral nations join alliances 
with the West but, merely, that they stayed out of the Soviet orbit. 9 
Sukarno's tour of the US, in May and June, was intended by both sides as a 
fresh start in US-Indonesian relations. 10 While the public side of the visit more 
than lived up to expectations, the Indonesian leader's dealings with senior 
Administration officials both reflected and reconfirmed the mutual distrust and 
dislike which had characterised the relationship up to that point and this resulted 
in the impetus towards a closer rapport between the two governments being lost. 
Sukarno's open and approachable style made a great impression on American 
public opinion and he was feted in the newspapers. Howard Jones, later to 
become Ambassador to Indonesia, recalled how Americans had never seen a 
politician with his manner before - according to one newspaper reporter, 
Sukarno, unlike American politicians, shook babies' hands and kissed their 
mothers - and that they reacted warmly to him. However, the highpoint of the 
visit was his address to a joint session of Congress, on 17 May. With 
Eisenhower present, Sukarno told his audience that they had nothing to fear from 
Asian nationalism and praised Congressional support for anti-colonialism, 
reminding the assembled dignitaries that Indonesians would not consider their 
revolution complete until West Irian was recovered. Noting that freedom of 
9 AA; CRS A5462/1/2/4; Despatch No. 4, Spender to Casey, 19 Jun. 1956. 
10 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, p. 181. 
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expression and freedom from want were, for Indonesians, indivisible from each 
other, the President said that Asians wanted economic and political stability and 
criticised US military aid as a destabilising factor in the region. He argued that 
only through economic development would Asians come to cherish their hard- 
won freedom and implicitly told his hosts that Indonesia's `unsatisfied heart' 
needed injections of development aid if it was to consolidate itself. The speech 
was given an ecstatic response by the politicians present. One Congressman 
called it `a sensation' and said it had been the best ever made by a visiting 
statesman, with the possible exception of Churchill. " 
Despite the acclaim Sukarno received, he was unable to replicate this public 
triumph in his dealings with Eisenhower and Dulles. When he met Eisenhower, 
there was `an immediate nonmeeting of minds' and, despite Sukarno's efforts to 
engage the President about Asian nationalism, all they managed to discuss, 
according to Sukarno, was their mutual love of films. To make matters worse, 
Eisenhower declined his guest's invitation to visit Indonesia. Dulles, too, gave 
no indication to the Indonesian President that he believed US-Indonesian 
relations had fundamentally changed for the better. In discussions with Sukarno, 
the Secretary of State reverted to his hard line on neutralism, denouncing it as 
`immoral', and told Sukarno he had to choose sides in the Cold War. 12 Publicly, 
at least, Sukarno proclaimed the visit a success, but he failed to persuade the 
" Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 233. Sukarno's speech can be found in DSB, 
Vol. XXXIV, Number 884,4 Jun. 1956. 
12 Cindy Adams, Sukarno . An Autobiography. As Told To Cindy Adams, (Indianapolis, New 
York, 1965), p. 277. The New York Times, 22 Apr. 1957. Harsono, Recollections Of An 
Indonesian Diplomat In The Sukarno Era, p. 127. 
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Administration to support the Indonesian claim to West Irian and was, despite the 
impression gained by US officials at the time, overwhelmed by the hopelessness 
of ever raising his people's standard of living to that enjoyed by Americans. In 
his assessment of the visit, the British Ambassador in Jakarta agreed that very 
little had been achieved during Sukarno's visit, noting tartly that `the most 
tangible trophy' Sukarno took back with him was an American air-hostess. 13 
That US-Indonesian relations did not benefit from Sukarno's trip to 
America had much to do with the irreconcilability of the respective leaderships' 
views of the communist threat. This dysfunction, which was both political and 
cultural, led Washington to regard Sukarno as unacceptably tolerant of the PKI, 
while Sukarno, and most Indonesians, resented Washington's fixation with the 
struggle against communism as interference in their internal affairs. The 
Administration's doubts about the Indonesian leader persisted despite the 
formation of the second All Government. For, although it conformed with 
American plans, it had been installed only after Sukarno's pressure for 
communist participation had been rejected by the three main coalition partners. 14 
In Washington's eyes, therefore, Sukarno was a danger because he continued to 
be both the focus of Indonesian political life and a friend of communism. 
However, the Javanese, and Sukarno in particular, viewed things differently. In 
13 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, p. 81. AA; CRS A1838/272/250/10/7/6; 
Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 18 Jun. 1956. UVaL; Special Collections 
Department; Hugh S. Cumming Jr. Papers (#6922), Box 2; The John Foster Dulles Oral History 
Project - Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr. 1966 - 67; Transcript of a 
Recorded 
Interview with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Jr., 3 Dec. 1966. PRO; FO 371/129509; 
"Indonesia : Annual Review for 1956", Dermot McDermot to Selwyn Lloyd, 30 Apr. 1957. 
14 The New York Times, 21 Mar. 1956. 
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contrast to the secular notion of power common in the West, Javanese culture 
saw power as a divine gift which gave its possessor the ability to dominate events 
and people. This `mystical, quasi-religious and intensely personal' concept of 
power pre-disposed Sukarno to resist attempts to deflect him from pursuing 
courses of action which he thought best for Indonesia. One of these was gotong 
rojong, a traditional Indonesian method of achieving objectives by co-operation, 
which formed the basis of the President's desire to see communist involvement 
in the Indonesian government. 15 Sukarno's wish to adopt traditional methods to 
solve the manifold problems facing Indonesia thus conflicted absolutely with 
Washington's policies on the complete exclusion of communists from positions 
of influence. That neither side understood the other's point of view is clear and 
the consequence was that a closer relationship between the US and Indonesia was 
made more difficult. 
Sukarno's visits to the USSR, in August, and to the PRC, in October, 
confirmed his growing disenchantment with the US world view and punctured 
even the public bubble of optimism which Americans held about Indonesia. 
Although Washington had remained calm about the deterioration in Indonesian- 
Dutch relations, which had followed the collapse of Harahap's efforts to 
negotiate over West Irian, there was concern over Sukarno's leftward shift after 
leaving America. In the USSR, he assured his hosts that Indonesia looked 
forward to a world free of capitalism and imperialism and, in return, was offered 
15 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, pp. 62 - 63. Jones draws on Anderson, The Idea 
Of 
Poirer In Javanese Culture, (Cornell, 1970) for this analysis of Sukarno's motivations. 
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$100 million of credits to finance industrialisation of the Indonesian economy. 16 
The Chinese, however, not only impressed Sukarno with the progress they had 
made since the revolution but also showed that they knew how to deal with him. 
The Indonesian President left China believing that Mao Tse-tung's rebuilding of 
the country and its economic achievements were more relevant to Indonesia's 
needs than were the West's nostrums. 17 Perhaps just as importantly, the Chinese 
showed that they knew exactly how to create the right impression with Sukarno 
by making a two-hour film record of his visit. Comparing this unfavourably to 
the thirty-minute documentary made while he was in America, Sukarno believed 
it showed that only the Chinese appreciated his importance properly and that 
Europeans could never understand the Asian mind. '8 A more substantial 
reminder of Washington's lack of empathy and its unwillingness to take steps to 
persuade Indonesia not to succumb to Soviet blandishments came with its 
effective denial of requests for development aid before, during and after 
Sukarno's visit. Even with Cumming's support for a rise in the aid budget to $35 
million, the Administration limited appropriations to $15 million because of 
Indonesia's turn to the communists. ' 9 
Washington's concern that Indonesia was slipping into the communist camp 
heightened as Sukarno made proposals for the reorganisation of Indonesian 
16 The New York Times, 4 and 12 Sept. 1956. 
17 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, p. 81. 
18 Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, pp. 293 - 94. 
19 NA; RG 59; Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1956, Far East 
General, Oct - Dec, to Japan, Jan - July 1956 (Lot 58 D 3) Box 3; Sukarno 
Visit 1956; William 
Sebald to the Secretary of State, 12 May 1956. The New York Times, 11 Dec. 1956. 
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political life which provoked turmoil and the first signs of revolt against central 
government. In two speeches at the end of October, Sukarno argued that only by 
changing the organisation of society could Indonesia hope to make progress. He 
warned that the existing situation could become revolutionary if nothing were 
done and urged that the Western model of democracy, which had operated since 
independence, be replaced by a system of "Guided Democracy". Proclaiming his 
own commitment to democracy, he proposed that political parties should be 
dissolved and replaced by arrangements which reflected Indonesian traditions and 
minimised conflict by eliminating oppositional politics. Cumming reported that 
the initiative stemmed as much from Sukarno's desire to respond to disaffection 
amongst the army and youth as from the lessons he had drawn from his trips to 
the USSR and the PRC. 20 However, the President's ideas caused even more 
disruption to the already strained system as first Hatta resigned and then army 
rebellions broke out in Sumatra. While the Vice-President's resignation had been 
expected since July and divisions in the army made the revolts unsurprising, 
these events pushed Cumming into predicting that, unless a change of 
government occurred, it was difficult to see how `military and political chaos, 
economic disaster, and ... 
bloodshed, if not ... civil war' could 
be avoided. He 
argued, however, that the key to solving the crisis lay in convincing the non- 
Javanese areas that they were represented in the government. 2 1 An analysis of 
the situation prepared by the UN, came to a largely similar conclusion. It 
stressed that, while the influence of `leftist parties' had grown since the elections, 
20 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3439; 756D. 00/10-356; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 
30 Oct. and 2 Nov. 1956. 
21 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3439; 756D. 00/10-356; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 
27 Dec. 1956. 
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the main factors behind the unrest were the government's inability to bring the 
army under control and growing regional disaffection, particularly in Sumatra 
and the Celebes, with the centralisation of government. 22 Noticeably, neither 
Cumming nor the UN portrayed the situation as communist-inspired, which was 
the view increasingly accepted by the State Department, although the 
Ambassador did warn that the PKI would benefit if a solution was not found 
rapidly. 23 
The reactions to Sukarno's call for "Guided Democracy" highlighted how 
US-Indonesia relations were viewed differently by the Embassy in Jakarta and 
policymakers in Washington. While Cumming's reports gave a more complete 
picture of political life in Indonesia, Dulles and other leading Administration 
officials saw events only in terms of whether they made it more or less likely that 
Indonesia would join the communist camp. That Indonesia was a Cold War 
battleground had been formalised as far back as December 1954, in NSC 5429/5, 
and this approach had dominated Washington's analysis of relations with Jakarta 
ever since. The perception that things had not improved during the Harahap and 
second Ali ministries, which were relatively well-liked in Washington, 
increasingly focused the Administration's attention on Sukarno as the witting, or 
unwitting, agent of communism in Indonesia. It was in this context that no 
gesture had been made by the Administration during Sukarno's visit which might 
22 UNA; Office of the Secretary-General, The Executive Office : Office of the Executive Assistant 
(1946 - 61), Files of the Executive Assistant - Political Matters, DAG-1/1.1.1.3, Box 15; Note on 
the Situation In Indonesia; "Note on the Situation in Indonesia", 28 Dec. 1956. 
23 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3439; 756D. 00/10-356; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 
27 Dec. 1956. 
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have put relations on a new footing, while Indonesia's perceived slide towards 
communism after Sukarno's trips to the USSR and the PRC had been, in the 
Administration's view, inevitable. In fact, by the time Sukarno arrived in 
Washington, the Administration already had a considerable investment in its 
aggressive policy of preventing the spread of communism to Indonesia. As had 
been envisaged in the original NSC determination, contingency planning for 
overt intervention in Indonesia had taken place within ANZUS. By March 1956, 
planners had concluded that, to be successful, any military intervention before a 
communist take-over `would require substantial and successful conditioning by 
psychological, political and economic means', a finding which ruled out a short- 
term military solution to Washington's problem. In the absence of a major effort 
to prepare Indonesia for Western-led intervention, the planners advised that 
military involvement could only be contemplated after a communist take-over, 
when they thought that anti-communist elements might invite Western support. 
24 
This conclusion left Washington without two of its main options for achieving its 
objectives in Indonesia, since a diplomatic rapprochement had clearly been 
rejected. 
Throughout 1956, the Administration made very little progress towards its 
goal of securing a stable, pro-Western government in Indonesia. By early 
October, it had concluded that the Ali Government was not able to resist either 
external or internal communist attack and that US policies, while they had 
24 AA; CRS A5954/1/1423/6; "A Study Of The Military Measures Which Should Be Undertaken 
For The Defence Of South East Asia Under Conditions Short Of Overt Communist Aggression", 
Report of Australia's ANZUS Military Representatives attached to a Memorandum to the 
Acting 
Minister of Defence, 2 Mar. 1956. 
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prevented Indonesia from passing into the communist orbit, had not detached it 
from its `neutral position'. 25 With the diplomatic option discarded and having 
had use of military force ruled out, senior Administration officials now sought 
alternative ways of dealing with a situation which had been made markedly more 
urgent by Sukarno's speeches in favour of a new political system. By the end of 
1956, the CIA had become actively involved in the implementation of what had 
become the Administration's very personalised opposition to Sukarno. In 
November, Frank Wisner, the CIA's Deputy Director Plans, signalled the 
beginning of eighteen months of undercover operations against Sukarno when he 
told Al Ulmer, the chief of the CIA's Far Eastern office, that `it's time we held 
Sukarno's feet to the fire'. Joseph Smith, the CIA agent responsible for 
Indonesia, attributed Wisner's remark to a secret decision taken by the Dulles 
brothers to pressurise Sukarno into changing his policies. 26 
Sukarno's plans for the Indonesian political system, the break with Hatta and 
the Sumatran revolts all served to provide Washington with the building blocks 
with which to construct a new policy towards Indonesia, or, more precisely, 
against Sukarno. These developments coincided with the decision to use the 
CIA, a step which itself marked the beginning of a new phase in the conduct of 
US policy. By early 1957, policymaking was no longer aimed at encouraging 
Indonesia into a friendlier posture towards the West but was defensive, intended 
`s DDEL; WHO Records, National Security Council Staff : Papers 1948 - 61, OCB Central File 
Series, Box 42; OCB : 091. Indonesia (File #4) (7) [February - November 1956]; "Progress 
Report On "US Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Indonesia" (NSC 5518)", 
10 Oct. 1956. 
26 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 197 - 99 and 236. Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As 
Foreign Policy, pp. 84 - 85. 
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to stop Indonesia falling into the communist camp and was entirely reactive to 
events in Indonesia. Furthermore, conduct of policy was concentrated in the 
hands of a small cadre of officials in Washington, a group dominated by the 
Dulles brothers, which relied on the CIA for advice. This reliance on an 
unorthodox foreign policymaking infrastructure ensured that the Dulles' group 
were not troubled by outside influences and received only the information which 
fitted in with their plans. It also precipitated a breakdown in the usual diplomatic 
channels which led to the sacking of John Allison, Cumming's successor, and the 
establishment of a closely co-operative relationship with the UK and Australian 
governments and their secret services. 
If the decision to use the CIA to induce a change of policy in Jakarta had 
been provoked by Sukarno's rejection of the western liberal democratic model, 
Washington was still left with the difficulty that it had few reliable friends inside 
Indonesia. The CIA's links with the Masjumi had withered away, it had no 
`assets' in the press and was forced to rely for its intelligence on copies of 
Cabinet minutes, which were not particularly helpful because important decisions 
were taken outside the Cabinet by Sukarno and his advisers. Some contacts had 
been made through the US aid programmes, including the training courses run for 
the Indonesian military and police, but these had not significantly improved the 
situation. 27 Only when the "colonels' revolts" began in Sumatra, and later in the 
Celebes, did a tailor-made alternative powerbase appear which had the potential 
to be incorporated into Washington's plans. The position brightened further 
27 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, p. 213. NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3439: 
756D. 00/1-157; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 5 Feb. 1957. 
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when, on 9 January, the Masjumi resigned from the Ali Cabinet and Hatta, in 
Cumming's estimation, placed the full weight of his prestige behind the colonels' 
calls for autonomy. 28 Hatta's support for the Sumatran revolts provided 
Washington with the political alternative, with military and popular backing, to 
Sukarno's seemingly inevitable accommodation with communism. This 
development's importance became clear to the Administration when the 
Indonesian President officially proposed the creation of a gotong rojong Cabinet 
and a National Council, to be made up of the representatives of functional groups 
in society, to advise it. When the Ali Government resigned, on 14 March, the 
Masjumi and the NU led the way in rejecting communist participation in these 
bodies and Hatta became the focus of opposition to the inclusion of the PKI in 
the Government. 29 
While Washington was rediscovering its liking for Hatta and the religious 
parties, it was also building links with the dissidents, who had a number of 
grievances with Jakarta. Since independence, concern had been growing in the 
regions about the central government's failure to decentralise power and its 
unwillingness to distribute development funds to places like Sumatra, which 
earned the majority of Indonesia's foreign exchange. There was also conflict 
between the local military commanders, who had become increasingly powerful, 
and the central military authorities which had sought to restore their primacy 
since Nasution had returned as army Chief of Staff. Forced to set up illicit export 
28 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3439; 756D. 00/1-157; Cumming to the Secretary of State, 
8 Feb. 1957. 
2) NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3440; 756D. 00/2-1557; Galbraith to the Secretary of State, 
21 Mar. 1957. 
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deals to finance their operations, these commanders had achieved local popularity 
and established very profitable businesses which were threatened by Nasution's 
efforts to restore his own position. The rebels had been careful not to challenge 
Sukarno directly and, instead, demanded the removal of the Ali Government and 
Hatta's return. By early 1957, a stalemate had developed with Jakarta unable to 
dislodge the dissidents but with the dissidents equally incapable of removing the 
Ali Government. The spread of the revolts, in March, to South Sumatra and the 
Celebes (Sulawesi), in East Indonesia, did not alter the situation appreciably but 
the fall of the Ali Government did satisfy one of the opposition's demands. 30 
The rebellions appeared to fit in extremely well with the Administration's 
ideas about how any switch to communism might be contained. Dulles was 
especially pleased that the colonels had acted. He told Casey that it would have 
been necessary to have promoted the regional autonomy movement, presumably 
from Washington, to oppose a communist-dominated government in Jakarta if it 
had not arisen of its own accord. The Secretary of State also made clear his 
dislike of a strong central government in Indonesia, advising his Australian 
counterpart that he believed the country might only be managed effectively as `a 
rather loose federation of autonomous units. '31 Dulles' less than total 
commitment to the integrity of the Indonesian state resurfaced when he saw 
Allison before his departure for Jakarta. In a briefing similar to that he had given 
Cumming, Dulles enjoined Allison to keep Sukarno away from the communists, 
30 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 54 - 66. 
31 AA; CRS A5462/l/101/9; DEA to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 14 Mar. 1957. 
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to stop him using force against the Dutch and, `above all ... make sure that 
Sumatra doesn't fall to the Communists. '32 With Dulles' endorsement of the 
rebels, the CIA now established direct contact with their representatives, finding 
them extremely well-organised. However, it was evident that Dulles' favourable 
attitude towards the dissidents was based on nothing more than a general 
awareness of the situation. The CIA, on whom he relied for his information, did 
not know what the rebels' demands were and `didn't have a file on a single one 
of them. ' 31 
The establishment of links with the rebels split Washington into two 
competing camps. Supporters of the official policy towards Indonesia, which 
sought to influence Sukarno and the Government of Indonesia, had the advantage 
of legitimacy but were faced with the determination of the Dulles brothers and 
the CIA to manipulate policymakers into authorising a covert US intervention. 
The conflict in Washington presented policymakers with the additional problem 
of reconciling the different approaches into a coherent policy towards the new 
government in Jakarta, led by the technocrat Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Analyses of 
the new Cabinet, which was installed on 9 April, gave impetus to the supporters 
of the covert policy. Although free of PKI members, State Department analysts 
identified that the new Cabinet contained `four' leftists, suggesting the 
`possibility of crypto-communist participation' in the new Government. 34 The 
12 Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, p. 301. 
33 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 216 - 19. 
34 BUL; OSS/State IR Reports Part VIII : Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Far East 
Generally : 1950 - 61 Supplement; Department of State OIR Report 7489, "Indonesia's New 
"Business Cabinet" ", 22 Apr. 1957. 
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impression of communist influence on Sukarno and Djuanda was enhanced by 
the omission of the Masjumi from the Cabinet as the price extracted by the PKI 
for its own exclusion. Meanwhile, the CIA drew the more positive conclusion 
that it was pressure from `the Sumatrans' which had prevented the PKI from 
joining the Cabinet and which had limited the leftist incursion to `three 
sympathisers'. 35 The dilemma faced by Washington was neatly summed up by 
John Gordon Mein, the Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific 
Affairs, who wondered how Washington's support for the Masjumi could be 
compatible with its relations with a government `which in other circumstances 
we would welcome. ' Noting that the senior Cabinet posts were held by `able 
men ... 
friendly to the US' and that the leftists held only minor posts, Mein asked 
Robertson and Howard Jones, Robertson's Deputy, whether the Administration 
would support Djuanda's efforts to hold Indonesia together or `encourage 
separatist elements ... perhaps to the point of a 
breakup of (Indonesia)'. 36 
In fact, it was Mein who was asked to provide the answer to his own 
question. By May, the lobbying of those in Washington who argued that `the US 
should regard with satisfaction, if not discreetly encourage, the separation of ... 
the major outlying islands' had to be addressed and it fell to Mein to assess this 
option. In concluding that the break up of Indonesia would `not serve US policy 
objectives', Mein dismissed the arguments in favour of supporting secession, 
which, he noted, `at first glance ... provide(d) an easy and convenient solution to 
35 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 222 - 23. 
36 NA; RG 59. Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 1957, Country File - 1957, Name 
File - 1957 (Lot 59 D 19), Box 1; Indonesia - West Irian 1957; Mein to Jones and Robertson, 
22 Apr. 1957. 
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basic US policy problems in the area. ' He told Robertson that, although `anti- 
communist governments' would provide `a useful counter-balance' to a leftist- 
influenced Java, reduce Sukarno's political influence, bring the natural wealth of 
the outer islands under `more reliable political control' and secure the 
strategically important island of Sumatra, other factors outweighed even these 
considerations. In a devastating critique of what he evidently thought was a 
simplistic analysis of the situation, Mein challenged Sumatra's political and 
economic viability and undermined the assumption that the dissidents, let alone 
mainstream politicians, would support the destruction of the Republic of 
Indonesia. He argued that its `mutually hostile' ethnic and cultural groups made 
`dubious' the idea that Sumatra formed a discrete political unit and he warned 
that, once the principle of national unity was broken, disintegration was `almost 
certain to continue below major island level'. Worse still, Mein noted that even 
Sumatra's much vaunted economy was dependent on Javanese food supplies and 
suffered from chronic labour and skills shortages, thus reducing its ability to 
stand apart from the centre, at least in the short-term. Most uncomfortable of all, 
however, was Mein's conclusion that neither the dissident colonels nor senior 
Sumatran politicians like Hatta, Sjahrir and Natsir supported an independence 
movement. 
Mein's assessment of the position in Indonesia exposed the inadequacy of 
the case put forward by the Dulles' camp. It showed that the interventionists had 
seriously misjudged the rebels and had given little thought to the implications of 
US support for secession. In recommending that the US should discourage the 
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`quixotic regional rebellions', Mein argued that Washington should instead 
encourage the dissidents to support anti-communist elements in Java and to press 
for their `legitimate regional demands' within the framework of a single nation 
state. He also pointed out that the mere fact of US interference in Indonesia's 
internal affairs would weaken the dissidents' support amongst moderate 
politicians and the populace generally, while the scale of the assistance required 
to ensure success would be impossible to hide. Mein warned that such activity 
would be seen as an attempt to re-impose Western colonialism, would incur 
`counter-action' by Indonesia's friends in the Asia-African movement and would 
tend to help communists win control of Indonesia rather than stop them. 37 
Despite Mein's report, the interventionists suffered only a temporary setback and 
it soon became clear that they would take whatever action was necessary to prove 
their own case. 
On the face of it, developments over the next few months justified the 
aggressive intent of the Dulles' camp as more evidence of Sukarno's 
fraternisation with communism appeared. However, opinion within the 
Administration was being influenced by more than just the events themselves. 
The CIA, which supported the secessionists, knew that it could not act until it had 
the approval of the `higher authorities in Washington' and was seeking to create 
the `right atmosphere' in those quarters. 38 The Secretary of State also exerted his 
influence in whatever way he could to undermine Sukarno and to push him ever 
;' NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3440; 756D. 00/4-157; Mein to Robertson and Jones, 
17 May 1957. 
38 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 216 and 220 - 21. 
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closer to the Soviets while, at the same time, ensuring that Allison was excluded 
from the small circle of advisors making policy on Indonesia. By September, the 
battle between the two factions had been decisively won by the Dulles brothers 
and their allies. 
To those seeking to "prove" Sukarno to be a communist sympathiser, the 
visit of the Soviet President, Kliment Voroshilov, to Indonesia, in May, was the 
first of several significant events in the Spring and Summer of 1957. Travelling 
widely with the Indonesian President, Voroshilov's trip not only raised the PKI's 
profile but helped consolidate, in those who were looking for it, the impression 
that Sukarno was working with the communists. That Eisenhower had declined 
an invitation similar to that which Voroshilov had accepted and had thus turned 
down the opportunity to influence Indonesians did not affect the hard-liners' 
interpretation of the situation. However, the decision, in May, to reject a third 
invitation - one made to help overcome the impact of the Soviet President's visit 
- delivered a huge snub to Sukarno. 
39 Further support for the anti-Sukarno 
camp's outlook came shortly after Voroshilov's departure when the National 
Advisory Council, containing forty-five communist or leftist members, was 
formed. Despite these elements accounting for only 25 per cent of the Council's 
total membership, the coincidence of Voroshilov's visit and the Council's 
establishment reinforced suspicions in Washington that "Guided Democracy" 
was, at least, partly communist inspired. 40 The final straw for Dulles and his 
39 Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, pp. 311 - 12. 
40 The New York Times, 16 Jun. 1957. Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, p. 305. 
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supporters came when the PKI won nearly 30 per cent of the vote in local 
elections in Java during the Summer. At the NSC meeting, on 1 August, with 
Allen Dulles arguing that Java was now considerably closer to being lost to 
communism, Eisenhower concluded that the Administration should study the 
implications of the situation and `consider what we can do about it. ' 
Accordingly, the meeting agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental 
Committee to review the situation and to make recommendations on what action 
might be taken . 
41 Having been delayed by the Mein report, the proponents of 
intervention were now back in the driving seat. 
While the "activist" supporters of Dulles were using events in Indonesia to 
bolster their case, the CIA was busy strengthening its own position by 
discrediting its opponents. Of particular concern to the Agency was the attitude 
of the new Ambassador, John Allison, who had arrived on 3 March. 
Unsurprisingly, Allison believed that the US should conduct its relations with 
Indonesia through the legitimate government rather than by promoting an 
alternative. Thinking that compromise between Government and opposition was 
possible, particularly after Djuanda's appointment, he argued that the 
Administration should ensure that the rebels were not defeated, thus preserving 
the opposition's negotiating position, but that Washington should also encourage 
the Djuanda Government's search for a solution by `do(ing) what we can to help 
41 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series; 333rd Meeting of the NSC, 1 Aug. 1957. Dulles' 
comments are still sanitised in the official record of the meeting. However, they are alluded to in 
the following extract : `Mr. Cutler asked whether, in the light of the briefing by the Director of 
Central Intelligence on Indonesia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be asked to study the military 
consequences of Java falling under Communist control. The President said he would like to have 




42 The CIA, however, did not view the situation with the same equanimity and 
despatched Ulmer to investigate. Ulmer, who Allison thought had been 
`brainwashed ... as to the 
imminent Communist danger in Asia', played his part 
in the CIA's plan to massage opinion in Washington by reporting that Allison 
`was inclined to be soft on communism' and supported this assertion with his 
conclusion that Sukarno, with whom Allison wanted to deal, was `beyond 
redemption'. Increasingly, Allison came to recognise that his position was being 
undermined and that Dulles was accepting CIA reports `uncritically' while his 
predecessor, now Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State 
Department and the official link between the State Department and the CIA, 
regarded him as `second rate'. 43 
While the CIA was seeking to eliminate Allison's influence in Washington, 
it was Sukarno who was singled out for special attention by the Administration. 
With its optimism of the previous year now dashed, Washington sought to 
weaken Sukarno and to demonstrate its disapproval of his policies. During the 
Summer, the CIA, playing on Sukarno's reputation as a womaniser, planted 
stories in Time magazine that he had fallen under the influence of a blonde Soviet 
spy. So encouraging were the results, that a `blue movie', purporting to show a 
liaison between the two and supposedly produced by the Russians to blackmail 
Sukarno, was made but, ultimately, never used. 44 More conventionally, Dulles 
42 NA; RG 59; DF, Box 3440; 756D. 00/4-157; Allison to Robertson, 8 Apr. 1957. Allison to the 
Secretary of State, 31 May 1957, FRUS 1955 - 1957, Vol. XXII, pp. 388 - 91. 
43 Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, pp. 307 and 341. 
44 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 231 - 32. The New ' York Times, 6 Sept. 1957. 
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signalled his displeasure at Sukarno's leadership by blocking Indonesian requests 
for military supplies even though the CIA and the State and Defense Departments 
had approved token arms shipments. Dulles refused the Indonesian request, first 
made in 1956, despite fears that the Indonesian military, which was well- 
disposed towards the US, would turn to the Soviets instead. 45 His unwillingness 
to contemplate any gesture which might indicate US tolerance of Sukarno also 
found expression in his reaction to the return of the West Irian issue to the UN 
General Assembly. Now, more than ever, the Secretary of State was convinced 
that Indonesian control of West Irian would be against US interests and was 
considering siding with the Dutch at the UN. He was, however, successfully 
opposed both by his brother and Robertson, who argued that supporting the 
Dutch would alienate the `moderate anti-Communist' opposition, which 
supported Sukarno in this matter. 46 
As Dulles became more outspoken in his hostility towards Sukarno, Allison 
remained virtually the only senior official willing to contradict him. However, 
his ability to make his voice heard was progressively reducing as policymaking 
on Indonesia became the preserve of the small group around Dulles. Cumming's 
return to Washington, which coincided with him adopting a more hard-line 
attitude towards Indonesia, provided Dulles with an alternative source of "local" 
45 NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 20; 1955 - 1956 - 1957 430.5 Agreement to 
Purchase US Military Equipment; Mein to Robertson, 12 Nov. 1957. Kahm and Kahin, 
Subversion As Foreign Police, p. 82. The New York Times, 27 Dec. 1957 and 1 Jan. 1958. 
46 NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 20; 1957 322 New Guinea Problem; 
Memorandum of a meeting in the Secretary's Office, 3 Oct. 1957. DDEL; Dulles Papers, 
Telephone Calls Series, Box 7; Memoranda Tel. Conv. - Gen. September 2,1957 to Oct. 31, 
1957 (3); Telephone Call to Robertson, 12 Sept. 1957. NLA; Papers of Lord Casey (MS 6150), 
Lord Casey's Diaries, meeting with Allen Dulles, 3 Oct. 1957. AA; CRS A5462/1/1/4/2/2; 
Report of the ANZUS Council, 4 Oct. 1957. 
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knowledge and consequently diminished Allison's importance to Dulles. 
Although Cumming was responsible for the State Department's entire 
intelligence and research operation, he continued to devote much of his time to 
Indonesia, earning the unofficial title of `the Assistant Secretary in Charge of 
Indonesian Affairs'. 47 He was also involved in setting up a direct channel of 
communication between Washington and the Jakarta Embassy which Allison 
knew nothing about. 48 However, the clearest evidence that Allison no longer 
figured in Dulles' plans came with the establishment of the NSC's Ad Hoc 
Interdepartmental Committee. Chaired by Cumming and with Howard Jones 
representing the State Department, the Committee was so secret that Francis 
Underhill, the Indonesia Desk Officer, was not even aware of its existence, while 
Allison was only told about its formation after the event and his request to join it 
was refused. 49 By the time the Committee began its work, the balance of forces 
within the Administration favoured those who wished to build up the Sumatran 
dissidents as an anti-Sukarno movement. 
A significant problem for the hard-liners in Washington was the uncertainty 
about the dissidents' intentions, especially since they had not irrevocably broken 
with Jakarta. The Djuanda Government's continuing efforts to find a solution to 
the crisis held the threat for the Administration that a compromise would leave 
Sukarno in power, the PKI unchecked and its Sumatran allies neutralised. 
47 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, p. 83. 
48 Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, pp. 340 - 41. The CIA station also communicated with 
Washington without Allison's knowledge - see Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Police, 
p. 105. 
49 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 91 - 92. 
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Djuanda's calling of a National Conference, for 10 September, raised just such a 
possibility and provoked Dulles to instruct Allison not to give it any 
encouragement. He argued that the `anti-communist' rebels needed more time to 
`develop further strength' before negotiating with Sukarno because he did not 
want to risk them being intimidated or entrapped into a `face-saving 
arrangement' with Jakarta. 50 Dulles' cable exposed the widening gap between 
Washington's reading of the situation and Allison's. The Ambassador responded 
furiously to what had, in effect, been an instruction to sabotage the Conference. 
He accused Dulles of the `grossest self-deception' in believing that even a 
government led by Hatta would be anti-communist and reminded the Secretary of 
State that, while the dissidents certainly were anti-communist, the original causes 
of their revolt had more to do with economic grievances and fears of Javanese 
domination. Turning to Dulles' fears about the power of the forces seeking 
change, he recorded his belief that it was `defeatist' to think that Hatta, Djuanda 
and the dissidents were not capable of influencing Sukarno but that, to do so, 
they would have to be in contact with him. The breach between Washington and 
Jakarta was confirmed by Dulles' rejoinder that Allison's views were a `gross 
misinterpretation of the Department's thinking. '51 
Dulles' fears that the National Conference might defuse the dispute between 
Jakarta and the regions reflected more than just a simple desire on his part to 
protect the dissidents. It was, instead, indicative of the hard-liners' wish to 
50 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1957, Box 3440; 756D. 00/9-357; Dulles to Allison, 24 Aug. 1957. 
s1 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1957, Box 3440; 756D. 00/9-357; Allison to Dulles, 26 Aug. 1957 and 
Dulles to Allison, 31 Aug. 1957. 
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polarise the situation further to ensure that no compromise was possible. The 
CIA had sought to limit the colonels' willingness to conciliate at the Conference 
and, after those dissidents who attended it had returned to Sumatra, they were 
persuaded by their more extreme colleagues to repudiate the agreements reached 
there and to adopt a line similar to that espoused by Dulles in his argument with 
Allison. The rebels' radicalism also opened up a split with Hatta when they 
denounced his agreement to try to work with Sukarno, while the former Vice- 
President was dismissive of the changing positions of the rebels. Since the State 
Department was also worried about Hatta's apparent willingness to compromise, 
this breach did not concern Washington. 52 Dulles' efforts received an 
unexpected boost in the aftermath of an assassination attempt on Sukarno, on 30 
November. Despite CIA-inspired propaganda that the PKI had been behind the 
incident, 53 the culprits were soon identified as radicals from East Indonesia and 
their actions led to a campaign against prominent Masjumi figures supposedly 
implicated in the affair. As the atmosphere worsened, Natsir, Harahap and 
Sjafraddin Prawiranegara, the governor of the Bank of Indonesia, all fled to 
Sumatra to join the dissidents. 
Dulles' desire to simplify the debate also extended to eliminating dissent in 
his own camp and this meant getting rid of Allison. Having already 
demonstrated how far removed he was from Dulles' thinking on Indonesia, in 
November, Allison tried to forestall the growing crisis over West Irian. With 
52 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 73 and 99 - 102. 
53 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 235 - 36. 
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Indonesian patience running out over persistent Dutch refusals to discuss 
sovereignty and in the light of the UN's repeated failure to endorse calls for talks 
to begin, it became clear to Allison that another rejection would induce Sukarno 
to take drastic action. He, therefore, drew up a plan which he hoped would not 
only meet Indonesian demands but also Dutch financial and Australian security 
interests and would satisfy Washington's insistence that action be taken against 
communists. Coming at a time when Dulles was moving towards supporting the 
Dutch, the idea of an American-sponsored deal over the colony was anathema in 
Washington and Allison never received a reply to his proposal. 54 His attempt to 
remove the cause of so much discontent between Jakarta and Washington was 
Allison's last significant act as Ambassador and he was sacked in early January 
1958 because he stood in the way of Dulles' plan to provoke a confrontation with 
Sukarno. 55 
The aggressive stance adopted by Dulles and his allies in Washington 
reflected their increased commitment to the rebel cause and their determination to 
take action against Sukarno and communist influence in Indonesia. Even so, the 
timing and scale of the operation remained in doubt until December, when the 
expropriation of Dutch holdings in Indonesia began and the Government 
extended its territorial waters. 
54 Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, pp. 321 and 328 - 31. 
55 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, p. 221. 
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Cumming's Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee reported to the NSC, on 3 
September, that communist control of the Indonesian Government or Java would 
seriously affect US security interests by weakening non-communists in Asia 
generally and that, in the longer term, `bloc forces (using) bases on Java' would 
pose a `grave' military threat to Southeast Asia and Australia. It recommended 
that, while continuing `the present pattern of ... 
formal relationships with 
Indonesia', the Administration should `give greater emphasis to support of the 
anti-Communist forces in the outer islands ... and (continue) attempts to produce 
effective action (by) the non- and anti-Communist forces in Java. ' The 
Committee confirmed that, in its view, the `most promising approach' for 
pursuing this policy would be to exploit `the not inconsiderable potential political 
resources and economic leverage available in the outer islands (Sumatra and 
Sulawesi)' and that this `asset' should be developed `in accordance with ... NSC 
5518'. In practice, the Committee was proposing that the Administration use `all 
covert ... and overt means ... (in concert with) other nations as appropriate' to 
strengthen the dissidents in order that they would affect the situation in Java and 
provide a rallying point if Java was taken over by communism. Cumming's 
Committee also proposed that, if the situation in Java deteriorated, `more 
forthright means' should be undertaken to deal with the situation. 56 
The Committee's report thus brought together the disparate strands of US 
policy, official and unofficial, by marrying the commitments to use covert and 
56 "Special Report on Indonesia", 3 Sept. 1957, FRUS 1955 - 1957, Vol. XXII, pp. 436 - 40. The 
reference to `more forthright means' is censored in the FRUS reproduction but allusions to it can 
be found in Robertson to Dulles, 19 Sept. 1957, in ibid., pp. 445 - 48 and Allison, Ambassador 
From The Prairie, pp. 313 - 14. Sulawesi is another name for the Celebes. 
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overt actions to stop communism in Indonesia with Dulles' willingness, which 
Cumming no doubt remembered well, to countenance the break up of Indonesia, 
if circumstances demanded it. However, the report was the end result of the 
campaign to create the conditions in which the hard-liners' interventionist plans 
would be accepted. Even Allison, who had only seen a `milder condensed 
version' of the report, was able to pick holes in it. He told Washington that it 
contained no real analysis of the reasons for the communist gains or Sukarno's 
reliance on the PKI and that `no valid recommendations could be made for a cure 
without considering the causes of the disease. '57 Nevertheless, at its meeting on 
23 September the NSC agreed the report's recommendations with the result that 
weapons and funding began to find their way to the rebels. 58 
The immediate steps which were taken to support the rebels fulfilled the 
agreement to strengthen their military and negotiating positions only. Further aid 
depended on the deterioration of the situation in Java and Washington had to wait 
until December before the right climate existed which allowed an increased level 
of support. With the failure of the Indonesian resolution in the General 
Assembly, on 29 November, Sukarno authorised the expropriation of Dutch 
assets in Indonesia and the expulsion of Dutch citizens. The seizure of the 
investments and property gave Dulles just the excuse he needed to offer further 
evidence that the Government was unable to hold the communists in check. 59 
57 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, p. 95. Allison, Ambassador From The 
Prairie, p. 314. 
58 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series; 337th Meeting of the NSC, 23 Sept. 1957. Kahin and 
Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 120 - 22. 
59 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series; 347th Meeting of the NSC, 5 Dec. 1957. 
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The Administration now decided that it had `reached the point of no return with 
Sukarno' and, as Robertson told Allison, it became an objective of US policy that 
he be `at (the) very least relegated to (a) less dominant position in (the) political 
scene. '60 Dulles, however, was in favour of overthrowing Sukarno and 
transferring recognition to the `dissident elements', using '(US) land forces' to 
back this up. 61 With Eisenhower's agreement, steps were now taken to move 
naval units and detachments of the Third Marine Division from the Philippines 
into `the area of Indonesia' under the cover of protecting American lives and 
property but also to be ready to respond to any contingency. 62 
The spasm of radicalism in Indonesia also convinced the British 
Government of the need to join the American effort. Since the Autumn, the CIA 
had been keeping the British Secret Service appraised of developments not least 
because the Americans had to manage their contacts with the dissidents from 
Singapore. 63 With the city-state in the grip of an independence campaign, 
London had, initially, refused to allow the American naval units to dock at the 
port and this had thrown Washington's plans into chaos, provoking a flurry of 
activity as the Dulles brothers tried to use Dutch and Australian pressure to get 
60 Robertson to Allison, 7 Dec. 1957, FRUS 1955 - 1957, Vol. XXII, pp. 534 - 35. 
61 DDEL; Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7; Memoranda Tel. Conv. - Gen November 
1,1957 to Dec. 27,1957 (1); Telephone Call to Herter, 8 Dec. 1957. 
02 Admiral Burke to Admiral Stump, 7 Dec. 1957, FRUS 1955 - 1957, Vol. XXII, p. 533. NA; 
RG 59; Lot 64 D 199, Box 7; Secy M of Con, June 1957 - December 1957; Memorandum of 
Conversation by Dulles, of a meeting with van Roijen, 8 Dec. 1957. See also NA; RG 59; DF 
1955 - 1959, Box 3441; 756D. 00/12-1657; Herter to the Consul Naha, Okinawa, 18 Dec. 1957 
and DDEL; Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7; Memoranda Tel. Conv. - Gen. 
November 1,1957 to Dec. 27,1957 (1); Telephone Call with a "Military Man", 7 Dec. 1957. 
63 AA; CRS A5462/1/l/4/2/2; Report of the ANZUS Council Meeting, Washington, 4 Oct. 1957. 
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them to co-operate. 64 However, the anti-Dutch campaign, which made London 
worried about the safety of British assets, and, perhaps more importantly, the 
extension of Indonesian territorial waters, which threatened Singapore and 
communications within the Commonwealth, gave the Macmillan Government an 
incentive to support the Americans. No doubt under intense pressure from the 
CIA and the State Department, M16 and the Ambassador in Washington, Sir 
Harold Caccia, both lobbied London to support the operation and in the week 
before Christmas, British objections to the use of Singapore as a base for 
operations in Sumatra were overcome. 65 The agreement to allow the use of 
Singapore led to a much closer association between the British and the 
Americans with the formation of a top secret `ad hoc group ... to consider policy 
and other matters connected with Indonesia'. With its membership extended to 
include Australian diplomats, the select group of State Department officials and 
British Embassy staff first met on, 30 December, to co-ordinate their approach to 
the Indonesian problem. 66 As the year closed, Washington's hard-line faction 
had swung Administration policy behind their plan to curtail Sukarno's power, or 
even to depose him, and had also secured the support of the two Western allies 
most closely interested in Indonesia. The way was now open for the 
64 DDEL; Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7; Memoranda Tel. Conv. - Gen November 
1,1957 to Dec. 27,1957 (1); Telephone Call to Allen Dulles, 8 Dec. 1957. 
65 DDEL; Dulles Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 7; Memoranda Tel. Conv. - Gen November 
1,1957 to Dec. 27,1957 (1); Telephone Call to Cumming, 12 Dec. 1957. Kahin and Kahin, 
Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 126 - 27. 
66 AA; CRS A 1209/80/58/5039; UK High Commissioner to Menzies, 25 Dec. 1957 and 
A 1838/269/TS383/6/3; Spender to Menzies and Casey, 24 Dec. 1957. The existence of this `ad 
hoc group', which existed until April 1958, was kept not just from the Dutch but also from State 
Department Desk Officers. 
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Administration to promote through its proxies what it had failed to accomplish by 
diplomacy. 
The militant stance adopted by the central figures in Washington's foreign 
policymaking elite did not result solely from the Administration's failure to 
recruit Jakarta to the Western cause. It can also be seen both as a response to, 
and a defence against, the strongly anti-communist atmosphere in Washington. 
This pressure built up towards the end of 1957, when the House Committee On 
Un-American Activities began investigating the former OSS agent Jane Foster, 
who had been indicted for espionage. The charges against Foster related to 
accusations that she had passed her post-war reports on Indonesia to the Soviets 
and had, since 1942, been a member of the communist party. 67 The supposition 
that all the policy difficulties with Indonesia derived from communist subversion 
of the US government received further support from Major-General Charles 
Willoughby, who had been MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence. In evidence to the 
Committee, he charged that `the current crisis ... (could) 
be traced directly' to 
communist subversives who had `induced the United States Government to 
champion Sukarno', who he described as a Japanese collaborator and communist 
sympathiser. 68 
67 LoC; Record of Hearings Before the Committee On Un-American Activities, House of 
Representatives, 85th Congress, 7-9 Oct. and 20 Nov. 1957. R. Harris Smith, OSS : The Secret 
History of America's First Intelligence Agency, (University of California Press, 1972), 
pp. 290 - 91. Smith draws on Elizabeth MacDonald, Undercover Girl, (New York, 1947). Foster 
had married a Soviet intelligence officer after she left Indonesia. 
68 MA; Record Group 23, Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, Box 5; Folder #2, 
"Indonesia"; "International Communism (Communist Designs on Indonesia and the Pacific 
Frontier), Staff Consultation with Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, 16 Dec. 1957. 
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With the public and private political impetus behind action, Washington's 
military assistance for the rebels continued and supporters of intervention had 
their optimism about the likely success of the operation reinforced by the CIA. In 
an "eyes only" memorandum to Eisenhower and his brother, Allen Dulles 
emphasised the dissidents' reluctance to make a final break with Jakarta and laid 
the blame for any future break firmly at the central government's door. 
Displaying a remarkable knowledge of the rebels' plans, he advised that an 
ultimatum designed to initiate talks would be delivered to Sukarno on or about 5 
February and that the rebels seemed `fully united' in their determination to secure 
a change in government. Dulles was also confident about the level of support the 
dissidents could expect in the event of a breach with Jakarta. Predicting general 
support in Sumatra and the Celebes, the CIA chief estimated that, `at a 
minimum', they could `probably launch fairly widespread guerrilla warfare' in 
Java. 69 Allen Dulles' report amounted to a convincing justification for 
supporting a rebellion which, if it did not achieve its aims by negotiation, would 
certainly deliver an anti-communist government in Sumatra and the Celebes. 
However, there were voices within the inner circle of policymakers who did 
not accept that the Jakarta government was entirely to blame for the situation and 
pushed for less drastic action. Mein, although familiar with the covert operations 
through his membership of the US-UK-Australian working party, argued that 
Washington was partly responsible for the situation. He told Robertson that 
many in Indonesia felt that the West was abandoning the country and he warned 
69 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, 
Box 11; US Policy Toward Indonesia; "Probable Developments in Indonesia", 31 Jan. 1958. 
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that US policies might be just as much a cause of Indonesia going communist as 
were the activities of the PKI. Pointing out that Washington's stance was 
pushing Indonesia towards communism and encouraged separatism, he urged that 
a conciliatory gesture be made in an effort to restore American prestige. He also 
proposed that the US should facilitate the creation of a moderate government and 
be prepared to assist it by persuading the Dutch to open talks with Indonesia on 
`the whole gamut' of their relations, including West ]Irian. 70 Mein's rejection of 
the "military" route was helped by the efforts of Djuanda, Nasution and Hatta to 
seek a compromise between Jakarta and the dissidents. With the Prime Minister 
indicating his willingness to step down in Hatta's favour and as the situation in 
Indonesia deteriorated, Washington decided to embrace Mein's proposal. 
The Dulles brothers' secret policy of supporting the rebels depended for its 
success on many assumptions about developments. In his memorandum to the 
President, Allen Dulles had expected that the rebels would be prepared to 
negotiate beyond any deadline in their ultimatum and that the government would 
not have the military capacity to forestall such talks. Meanwhile, by accepting 
Mein's plan, the State Department hoped to capitalise on the pressure from the 
rebels to secure a moderate government in Jakarta. These plans relied, however, 
on the main Indonesian actors playing their parts as Washington hoped they 
would. With Sukarno out of the country, the Acting President, Sartono, and 
Djuanda had undertaken to maintain the status quo and much depended on 
whether they could be influenced either to present the President with a fait 
70 NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 20; 1958 320 - USA; Mein to Robertson, 2 Jan. 1958. 
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accompli or even break their promise. The rebels had to stay united and not act 
precipitately, especially by forming a rival government, thus closing off room for 
a deal. As it happened, the Dulles' plan foundered on its misunderstanding of the 
Jakarta Government's reaction to the rebel threat. On 10 February, the rebels 
issued their ultimatum denouncing Sukarno's rule as unconstitutional and calling 
for the installation of a new government headed by Hatta and the Sultan of 
Yogjakarta and gave Sukarno five days to comply. Djuanda, backed by 
Nasution, immediately rejected the ultimatum and took steps to isolate the rebels. 
On 15 February, the dissidents proclaimed the formation of the alternative 
government, the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI). 
It was in the middle of this confrontation that Washington sought to 
implement Mein's plan. On 12 February, Mein himself approached the 
Australian Charge and asked if his Government would allow its Ambassador in 
Jakarta, L. R. McIntyre, to discuss Washington's plan with Hatta and Djuanda. 
With Allison gone, Mein had to admit that there was no American `in relations of 
confidence' with moderate Indonesian leaders. State Department officials also 
made informal enquiries of the Dutch and Australian Embassies about whether 
their governments might be prepared to modify their policies on West Irian in the 
event that an acceptable regime came to power in Jakarta. 7' However, it was not 
until 19 February that McIntyre was able to meet Hatta by which time the Jakarta 
Government had taken its decision to oppose the rebels. Mein's plan, which had 
originally been intended to avoid military confrontation now became victim to 
71 AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/11/9/2; Booker to the DEA, 12 Feb. 1958 and 
A1838/321/3034/11/161; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 18 Feb. 1958. 
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the entrenched positions of Washington and Jakarta. The rapidly developing 
situation also contributed to its failure. Sukarno's return, on 16 February, and the 
attitude of his Government left Hatta in an untenable position despite his own 
repudiation of the rebels separatism and his influence quickly waned. More 
destructive, though, were Dulles' comments made at a press conference the day 
after the rebel ultimatum was issued. Denouncing "Guided Democracy", he 
observed that Washington would like to see a `constitutional' government in 
Jakarta, and provoked a storm of protest about US interference in Indonesia's 
internal affairs. 72 Dulles' association of the Administration with the rebel cause 
scotched any possibility of an American-brokered political settlement, even if the 
Dutch and Australians had been willing to support it, and left Washington relying 
on the rebels for the success of its policy. 
Allison's removal had left Washington bereft of influence in Jakarta at a 
crucial time but his replacement, by Howard Jones, promised at least to restore 
harmony between the Secretary of State and the Embassy. Jones, who presented 
his credentials on 10 March, was intimately involved in the formulation of the 
secret policy towards Indonesia having been a member of both the Cumming 
Committee and the US-UK-Australian working party and his appointment was 
especially welcomed by the CIA officers involved in the covert operation. 73 
However, he had barely arrived at his post before Washington's Sumatran allies 
collapsed. In a move which confounded all US estimates, the Indonesian army 
72 NA; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3441; 756D. 00/2-358, Mein to Robertson, 14 Feb. 1958. 
73 Smith, Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, p. 239. 
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launched a series of daring assaults on rebel positions in the oil-rich areas of 
Southern Sumatra and at other strategic locations. The central government forces 
made sweeping gains and their surprise attack prevented Washington from using, 
as a pretext for direct military intervention, the threat to American lives and 
property of fighting around US-owned oil installations. 74 To all intents, the 
Sumatran revolt was over by the middle of April, when Padang fell, but it was 
not until 4 May that the PRRI's last stronghold at Bukitinggi was taken. 
The swift defeat of the Sumatran revolt revealed the extent of Washington's 
failure to analyse correctly virtually every aspect of the situation. In the first 
place, policymakers did not treat seriously the possibility that Jakarta would take 
a tough line with the rebels. In his January report, Allen Dulles had predicted 
that the chances were `better than even' that Sukarno would accede to the 
appointment of a new government when faced with the rebels' ultimatum. He 
had, however, underestimated the impact of the rebels' challenge on moderate 
nationalists, like Djuanda, who objected to their separatism and rallied to 
Sukarno in the crisis. Nasution, too, was more intent to assert his authority over 
the army than he was to support renegade military elements who accepted US 
support. The Sumatran revolt was also linked with the struggle to recover West 
Irian for, unless Jakarta could assert its sovereignty over its own rebellious 
provinces, Sukarno could hardly exert a serious military threat against the 
Dutch. 75 The Government's strategy, therefore, was to achieve a victory over the 
74 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 148 - 55. 
75 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp. 61 - 62. 
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rebels before negotiating a settlement of their demands. 76 Dulles failed even to 
understand the effect of the rebellion on the PKI, justifying his support for the 
dissidents on the basis that their defeat would benefit the communists. '? In fact, 
once the rebellion had begun the PKI was able to cloak itself in nationalist garb 
and gain prestige by allying with Sukarno, Nasution and others opposed to the 
rebels. Compounding its political miscalculations, Washington both understated 
the central government's capacity to act and overstated the rebels' morale and 
ability to resist. 78 
Jakarta's military success forced previously committed supporters of the 
rebels in Washington into re-thinking strategy. In a franker assessment of the 
situation than those produced by the CIA, Robertson told Dulles that the rebels' 
military position now required a re-appraisal of US policy. He argued that the 
rebels had been unable to show widespread support for their cause in Indonesia, 
that there appeared to be no co-ordination between the Sumatrans and the 
PERMESTA rebellion in the Celebes and added that Washington had `very little 
information' about the political plans of the dissidents. Concluding that the 
Administration should seek a compromise with Jakarta as the best way to limit 
communist influence and to promote the rebels' demands, he pointed out to the 
Secretary that Djuanda remained willing to step aside and that a Hatta-Sukarno 
76 NA; RG 59; DF, Box 3442; 756D. 00/4-358; Jones to the Secretary of State, 10 Apr. 1958. 
77 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 9; 358th Meeting of the NSC, 13 Mar. 1958. 
78 Smith, Portrait OfA Cold Warrior, pp. 239 - 41. AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/11/9; Australian 
Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 27 Mar. 1958 and A 1838/272/250/10/7/6; Australian 
Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 31 Mar. 1958. 
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reconciliation still seemed possible. 79 Assistant Secretary Robertson was not the 
only official experiencing a pauline conversion as he discovered that there was 
another side to what had previously been thought of as a simple fight against 
communism. In Jakarta, Jones had been told by Hatta that rebellion was actually 
a split between Indonesian anti-communists and that communism was `not the 
major issue' at stake. Jones could find no reason to doubt Hatta and had 
concluded that, if Washington really wanted to fight communism in Indonesia, 
`American policy ought to be directed toward settling the rebellion as fast as 
possible. ' The newly-arrived Ambassador now realised that Administration 
policy had been made without either full access to `all the facts' or a complete 
appreciation of the `inwardness of the situation' and, instead, had proceeded on 
the assumption that communism was the main problem. 80 
Robertson's and Jones' case that the time had come to return to the position 
pursued by Mein before the rebellion was boosted by the Indonesian 
Government's desire, with the rebels facing defeat, to engineer a settlement of the 
dispute. However, Dulles remained unmoved by either the evidence or his 
advisers' arguments and precipitated a serious escalation of the civil war which 
proved disastrous for US policy in Indonesia. In early April, the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister, Subandrio, met Jones to discuss US-Indonesian relations and 
appealed for a gesture of reconciliation from Washington, perhaps involving 
supplies of rice or a token shipment of arms. Subandrio provided Jones with `the 
79 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/3-1458; Robertson to Dulles, 31 Mar. 1958. 
The Piagam Perdjuangam Semesta Alam (PERMESTA) revolt, based in the Celebes, had begun 
in March 1957 and had links to the Sumatran rebellion. 
80 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, pp. 118 - 19 and 121. 
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most forthright statement' yet of change in the Indonesians' attitudes when he 
told him that plans were being laid for the police and military to take steps 
against communists and the eventual banning of the PKI. In discussions which 
must have delighted Jones, the minister also said that he would be recommending 
a `cooling-off period' on the West Irian issue and that he could envisage a time 
when Indonesia would participate in regional `mutual defense ... pacts. 781 Jones 
also reported that the army's importance in Indonesian politics had increased and 
that Nasution was displaying a more pronounced anti-communist line. However, 
he warned that the position of its largely pro-American officer corps was being 
undermined by Washington's arming of the rebels and that `some positive 
gesture' should be made to preserve their loyalty. He recommended that Dulles 
offer military aid but only after hostilities had ceased. 82 Jones' argument was 
quickly accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who agreed that Nasution should be 
helped as he was `the strongest anti-communist force' in Indonesia. 83 
Back in Washington, however, Dulles was not at all keen to accept the 
advice he was being given. Throughout March he had campaigned actively for 
recognition of the rebels, notably with Casey and Selwyn Lloyd, the British 
Foreign Minister, and was still considering `some form of recognition' as late as 
mid-April. With both Robertson and Jones now counselling a change in policy 
81 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 2517; 611.56D/1-858; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
8 Apr. 1958. 
82 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/4-358; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
12 Apr. 1958 and Jones to Robertson, 12 and 15 Apr. 1958. 
83 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/4-1758; General Maxwell D. Taylor 
(Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff) to the Secretary of Defense, 18 Apr. 1958. 
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he refused to accept the need to send a signal to Jakarta. 84 On 7 May, Dulles was 
still looking for an excuse for military action against Indonesia telling the Dutch 
Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, that he hoped for an Indonesian attack on West 
Irian so that they could be given `a bloody nose'. 85 A more tangible indication 
that senior figures in the Administration remained committed to the dissidents 
came with the arrival, in mid-April, of CIA planes and aircrew in the Celebes. 86 
The decision to send the Mustang fighters and B-26 bombers indicated the extent 
to which the Dulles brothers had become detached from the rest of the 
policymaking establishment in Washington. Indeed, the provision of the planes 
amounted to a rejection of Jones' advice that the `tactic' of aiding the rebels had 
already succeeded in persuading Jakarta to seek a compromise. 87 
With its newly acquired airforce, PERMESTA was able to go onto the 
offensive making some territorial gains and harassing Indonesian and foreign 
shipping. Its campaign lasted until Jakarta was able, in mid-May, to attack rebel 
strongholds in East Indonesia, destroying a number of planes and capturing 
islands under its control. 88 While the rebel offensive was in full swing, 
84 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/3-1458; Dulles to the State Department, 
14 Mar. 1958. Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 162 - 63. AA; CRS 
A3092/2/TS221/11/9; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 6 May 1958. 
85 DDEL; Dulles Papers, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box 1; Memos of 
Conversation - General -L Through M (1); Memorandum of Conversation by Dulles of a 
discussion with Luns, 7 May 1958 attached to Memorandum of Conversation by Dulles of a 
discussion with Luns, 17 Sept. 1958. The Australian understanding of this conversation held that 
Dulles remarked that `there was ... something to 
be said for letting Indonesia stick their necks out 
so that they could be given a blow that would finish them off. ' (AA; CRS A1838/272/250/10/7/6; 
Australian Embassy, The Hague to the DEA, 8 May 1958. ) 
86 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, p. 172. 
87 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/4-358; Jones to Robertson, 15 Apr. 1958. 
88 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, pp. 172 - 74. 
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Washington suddenly relented, authorising Jones to offer aid to Indonesia. The 
Administration's change of heart followed a meeting, on 5 May, between Jones 
and Djuanda in which the Indonesian Prime Minister made the first direct 
accusation that Washington was involved with the rebels. He told Jones he had 
evidence that Clark Field, a major US airbase in the Philippines, was being used 
by the rebels and that the bombing campaign had made compromise impossible. 
Djuanda indicated that US friendship was so important to Indonesia that he was 
prepared to overlook past American involvement with the rebels so long as it 
stopped meddling in his country's internal affairs in future and he appealed for a 
positive response from Washington. 89 The next day, Herter, standing in for 
Dulles, instructed Jones to deny the accusations about US involvement in the 
rebellion but to accept the Indonesian offer of talks. He also told Jones that 
Washington was prepared to sell Indonesia 35,000 tons of rice and would be 
willing to supply weapons to Jakarta if it settled with the rebels and took action 
against the PKI. To encourage `close working relations' with the military, Herter 
extended invitations to Indonesian military observers to attend a Manila Pact 
naval exercise and a weapons demonstration. 90 Jones conveyed Herter's 
response to a much relieved Djuanda, on 7 May, and to Nasution the next day. 
89 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/5-658; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
5 May 1958. 
90 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/5-658; Herter to Jones, 6 May 1958. The 
offer to supply weapons is not specifically mentioned in Herter's cable but is mentioned in Jones 
account of his subsequent meetings with Djuanda and Nasution (NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, 
Box 3442; 756D. 00/5-758; Jones to the Secretary of State, 7 May 1958 and 756D. 00/5-858; 
Jones to the Secretary of State, 8 May 1958) and a detailed account of these events by McIntyre 
(AA CRS A 1838/321/3034/11/161; McIntyre to the DEA, 8 May 1958. ) The SEATO exercise 
was codenamed "Clambake" and the weapons demonstration "Oceanlink". 
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While Dulles had been consulted about the offer to Djuanda, he had made it 
clear that he harboured `considerable doubt whether the present approaches ... 
would work. '91 Buoyed by the rebels' successes, in early May, Dulles had no 
desire to abandon them and sought to capitalise on their apparent strength by 
proposing a cease-fire during which he expected the Indonesian Government 
would take action against the PKI. He was also unhappy about the vagueness of 
Nasution's plans to counter the PKI and wanted Jones to obtain firm evidence of 
the Government's intentions before US economic and military aid was delivered. 
As an inducement to the Indonesians, Dulles made it clear that a token shipment 
of arms worth $7 million could be arranged in `short order'. 92 Once again an 
initiative from Washington collapsed as a result of its failure to understand either 
the Indonesians' motivations or capacity to act. On 15 May, Jones passed the 
cease-fire proposal to Djuanda, who turned it down, rejecting any compromise 
with the rebels. 93 The same day the Government counter-offensive began with 
the destruction of five rebel planes at Menado and the end of the US intervention 
was in sight. 
As if to emphasise the spectacular miscalculation made by Washington in its 
assessment of the Indonesian Government's capacity to resist pressure from the 
rebel movement, Jakarta had compromised the operation and had a dossier 
detailing foreign involvement with the rebels, which it intended to present to the 
91 AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/11/9; Australian Embassy, Washington to the DEA, 9 May 1958. 
92 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/5-1258; Dulles to Jones (No. 3300), 
13 May 1958 and 756D. 00/5-1358; Dulles to Jones (No. 3301), 13 May 1958. 
93 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/5-1558; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
15 May 1958. 
290 
UN. Not only had the Government been aware of the links between the US Navy 
and the rebels in Sumatra but, by late April, Jakarta knew that American, Chinese 
and Filipino pilots were working for the rebels. 94 Although both Dulles and 
Eisenhower ascribed American involvement with the rebels to the presence of 
`soldiers of fortune' or `adventurers', Jakarta had compelling evidence of official 
US intervention by the time Djuanda rejected Dulles' cease-fire. Before finally 
deciding against talking to the PERMESTA, the Indonesian Government had sent 
an intermediary, Lieutenant Colonel Andi Jusuf, to Menado to explore the 
possibility of a negotiated settlement. Later, he told the US Army Attache that he 
had found `very young' Americans and Chinese pilots there who did not seem to 
him to be `adventurers' but looked like people out of `West Point'. The airfield, 
he said, was protected by anti-aircraft guns and `Chinese colonels' were training 
Indonesians in their use. Jusuf also reported that he had been told that Dutch 
marines had participated in rebel actions. Most worryingly for the Americans, he 
bragged that two Jakarta agents had penetrated the rebels' communications 
system and were giving all incoming and outgoing messages to the Government. 
Jakarta, he said, was receiving daily information about all missions to be carried 
out and had the fingerprints and photographs of all the Chinese and American 
pilots. 95 An indication of the potential dangers of the operation came when, on 
17 May, a rebel B-26 strafed a British submarine, HMS Aurochs, off the Celebes' 
coast, much to the embarrassment of the British Government, which had 
94 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/5-158; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
3 May 1958. 
95 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 756D. 00/5-1258; USARMA, Jakarta, to the Secretary 
of State, 12 May 1958. 
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originally thought an Indonesian plane was responsible. 96 However, the 
following day the shooting down of a B-26 over Ambon and the capture of its 
American pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, finally ended the Dulles' brothers military 
adventure in Indonesia. 97 
At the time, the operation in Indonesia was the largest covert action 
undertaken by the CIA and cost $10 million. It involved the US Navy, planes 
and aircrew supplied by the CIA's proprietary airline, Civil Air Transport, and 
overflights by U-2 spyplanes. Clandestine support had been given to the rebels 
by the US, the UK, Taiwan and the Philippines with Australian and, possibly, 
Dutch assistance and yet the effort was `a complete failure. '98 Despite its grand 
scale, the intervention was poorly managed by the Administration, which became 
entangled with insurgents who it did not know and whose capabilities it 
96 Crew members from HMS Aurochs, interviewed on condition of anonymity, said that the vessel 
was in transit from the "Oceanlink" exercise to Sydney when it was attacked by an unmarked 
Mitchell bomber. After the submarine docked at Townsville, the crew were told that the plane's 
pilot had been American and they were required to re-sign the Official Secrets Act. The British 
Government complained to Jakarta about the incident before realising that it had been a rebel 
plane which had machine-gunned HMS Aurochs. (PRO; FO 371/135907). 
97 It appears possible that an American pilot had been captured as early as 5 May. On 11 May, 
Jusuf talked to the US Army Attache about `the B-26 which was shot down near Ambon a short 
time ago' and which had an American pilot. The Attache's report of the conversation implied 
previous knowledge of this in the State Department. (NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3442; 
756D. 00/5-1258; USARMA, Jakarta, to the Secretary of State, 12 May 1958. ) It is possible that 
Pope was actually captured much earlier than has been realised or that another plane was downed. 
In either event, such an occurrence would place in a different light Djuanda's insistence, on 5 
May, that he had proof of the use of Clark Field (Pope was carrying such evidence with him when 
he was captured), Herter's decision to authorise the rice and arms supplies, on 6 May, and the 
visit to Jakarta of Admiral Lawrence Frost, the Chief of US Naval Intelligence, on 8 May. If two 
American pilots were captured, it makes even more incredible the continuation of the bombing 
campaign in the period between the two incidents. 
98 This assessment was made later by Richard Bissell (DDEL; Oral History Interview with 
Richard M. Bissell Jr., 9 Nov. 1976. ) For accounts of the CIA's involvement in the rebellion, see 
Leonard Mosley, Dulles :A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, And John Foster Dulles And Their 
Fainil', Network, (New York, 1978) and L. Fletcher Prouty, The Secret Team : The CIA And Its 
Allies In Control Of The United States And The World, (Englewood Cliffs, 1973). 
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overestimated. 99 The CIA's performance certainly did not impress Admiral 
Arleigh Burke, the US Chief of Naval Operations, who later told Casey that it 
failed to provide `positive and reliable' intelligence and tended to report 
information which supported its theories, dismissing unhelpful material. 'oo 
Pope's capture also left Washington in a particularly difficult position which, 
since it could hardly admit that he worked for the CIA, forced it to rely on Jakarta 
to minimise publicity about his employers. In this respect, at least, Washington 
was in luck because the pro-American leadership in Indonesia was already 
negotiating with Jones and had nothing to gain from publicly exploiting the 
incident. Indeed, an open admission that the US Government had been behind 
the bombing would have risked not only the talks but a further boost for the PKI. 
Accordingly, Djuanda, Subandrio and Nasution all took steps to damp down the 
matter. 1°1 Nevertheless, the fiasco critically undermined the Administration's 
leverage over the Djuanda Government and the detention of its agent gave 
Jakarta a valuable negotiating advantage over Washington. The exposure of the 
US role in the rebellion set the final seal on the shift in Administration policy 
away from the dissidents and towards its new friends in Jakarta. 
99 Smith, Portrait OfA Cold Warrior, p. 241. AA; CRS A1838/272/250/10/7/6; Australian 
Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 10 Jul. 1958. 
IM NLA; Casey Papers, MS 6150, Lord Casey's Diaries; Entry for 12 Sept. 1958. 
'"' AA; CRS A 1945/39/248/7/18; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 28 May 1958. 
For example, Jakarta did not announce Pope's capture until 27 May 1958. Washington 
steadfastly refused to reveal Pope's association with the CIA, even within the Administration, but 
Mein did admit to an Australian Embassy official that Pope had been working for the CIA. (AA; 
CRS A 1838/269/TS383/6/3; Australian Embassy, Washington, to Casey, 23 Dec. 1959. ) 
Although sentenced to death, in 1959, Pope was reprieved and released, in 1962. He returned to 
work for the CIA. (Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA And The Cult Of Intelligence, 
P. 29. ) 
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8. Picking Up The Pieces (June 1958 - January 1961) 
The collapse of the Dulles brothers' secret campaign against Sukarno left the 
Administration in an extremely weak position as it tried to try to repair the 
damage done by its failed intervention in the rebellion. However, Washington's 
chances of building a better relationship with Jakarta were hindered by its 
unwillingness to adopt policies which showed a renewed commitment to 
Indonesia. Instead, it continued to give preference to the views of its Anglo- 
Saxon allies, which limited its ability to project a positive impression to the 
Indonesian Government and hamstrung its attempts to prevent further intrusion 
by the Soviets. Secretary of State Dulles was reluctant to accept the need for a 
rapprochement with the Indonesian Government. Nonetheless, on 20 May, he 
expressed publicly the Administration's new-found belief that the differences 
between the Government and the rebels were an internal matter which `should be 
dealt with ... without 
intrusion from without. ' Dulles' statement was part of the 
price demanded by Djuanda to demonstrate American goodwill before he and 
Nasution began to fulfil their part of the deal, which included a Cabinet reshuffle 
and action against the PKI. On 22 May, Washington delivered more confidence- 
building measures, which included the rice sale, $1.2 million of aircraft spares for 
the national airline, the police and the airforce and some small arms for the 
police. ' Dulles also held out the prospect that Washington would be prepared to 
' NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3443; 756D. 00/5-2358; Robertson to Admiral Stump, 
23 May 1958. 
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extend `substantial economic aid and ... military aid' after the Indonesians had 
shown their determination to eliminate `the communist threat'. 2 
Despite Jones' optimism that the rebels had forced a change in the central 
government's outlook, the reality was that "moderates" who had supported the 
dissidents had been disgraced by the rebellion's failure. Power and influence 
now was shared between the army, the PKI and Sukarno, and all of them 
regarded the US with varying degrees of suspicion. The first indication that the 
realities of political life in Indonesia would not be especially pleasing for 
Washington came with the long-awaited Cabinet reshuffle, on 25 June, in which 
the Americans had hoped to see Hatta and the Sultan of Yogjakarta figure. 
However, neither were included and the "leftists" from the outgoing Cabinet 
remained in place. Reflecting the sense of deflation in American circles, Jones 
reported that the new Cabinet was `somewhat disappointing but ... probably the 
best that can be hoped for', his disappointment assuaged only by the inclusion in 
the Cabinet of an army officer. 3 If the reshuffle produced, in Washington, a sense 
of unease about its future relationship with Jakarta, then the Indonesians were 
having identical thoughts as the rebels kept up their bombing raids and 
Washington seemed unable to halt them. 4 
2 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3443; 756D. 00/6-758; Circular 1160 signed by Dulles, 
7 Jun. 1958. 
NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3443; 756D. 00/6-1658; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
27 Jun. 1958. The New York Times, 29 Jun. 1958. 
4 The raids were being mounted by B-26's from Taiwan, with the planes refuelling in the 
Philippines, indicating continued CIA involvement. Administration efforts to stop the raids may 
have been hindered by the CIA being unwilling to jeopardise its sources' by allowing Mein to 
give the government in Taiwan evidence at Washington's disposal. (AA; CRS 
A3092/2/TS221/11/161; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 16 Jul. 1958. ) The 
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In early April, Jones had identified the army as Washington's main anti- 
communist ally in Indonesia. 5 Impressed by its unexpectedly good performance 
against the rebels and by Nasution's apparent determination to take on the PKI, 
the Administration had, nevertheless, been disturbed at the lack of detail in 
Nasution's plans to combat communism. In an effort to cement relations with the 
army, and to help repair the damage done to America's reputation in the armed 
forces by the arming of the rebels, Washington now reconsidered Jakarta's long- 
outstanding request for weapons. With Eisenhower's approval, the negotiations 
were concluded on 13 August and the first delivery arrived in Jakarta on 15 
August, to be followed by a further fourteen `huge shipments' by the end of the 
month. In total, $7 million worth of small arms, enough to equip twenty-one 
battalions, were delivered. 6 
According to Jones, the effect on Indonesian opinion was palpable as it 
seemed to the people that `America was with them instead of against them. ' 
Even Sukarno, worried that Washington might be building up the army to move 
against him, took a ride in one of the Globemaster transport planes - an event 
which associated him with the arms supplies and helped dispel his fears about US 
motives. 7 Despite Jones' euphoria, the supplies did not represent an 
unconditional commitment by Washington to the Djuanda Government. Careful 
Taiwanese had stopped aiding the "rebels" by mid-August 1958. (NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, 
Box 3443; 756D. 00/7-258; US Embassy Taipei to the Secretary of State, 19 Aug. 1958. ) 
5 Jones to the Secretary of State, 6 Apr. 1958, FRUS 1958 - 1960 XVII, pp. 92 - 94. 
6 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 2518; 611.56D/7-258; James O'Sullivan to Robertson, 
19 Aug. 1958. Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 154. 
7 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 2518; 611.56D/9-258; Jones to Robertson, 2 Sept. 1958. 
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to minimise opposition from the Dutch and Australians to the weapons transfers, 
Dulles had made it clear that Washington would not wish to give Indonesia the 
means with which to attack West Irian. To obviate this possibility, Subandrio 
had given assurances that the arms would not be used for offensive purposes and 
Dulles informed Casey that no `major weapons' would be provided. 8 Of more 
concern, though, was the extent to which Indonesia had turned to the Soviet Bloc 
for assistance since 1957. Compared with a total of $276.9 million of economic 
assistance from the US since independence, Indonesia had accepted an estimated 
$194 million in non-military aid and $178 million in military assistance from the 
Soviets. 9 In an effort to offset the increasing encroachment of Soviet influence, 
Dulles approved a further tranche of military aid, in November. The new 
package, which included aircraft for the first time and was worth $7.8 million, 
was part of a concerted effort by Washington to wean Jakarta away from a 
dependence on Soviet weaponry. '° 
Signs that the Djuanda Government was interested in developing a new 
relationship with Washington soon became evident. Nasution's campaign to rein 
in the PKI continued in a largely unspectacular way but was sufficiently effective 
8 AA; CRS A4311/5/98/2; "Indonesia and The Netherlands", submission to the Cabinet by Casey, 
8 Jul. 1958. Indonesia's shopping list had totalled $120 million, and included a request for 
helicopters and it seems that the Administration was originally thinking in terms of sales totalling 
$75 million. (AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/11/161; DEA to the Australian Embassy, Washington. ) 
9 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 
26; NSC 5901 - US Policy On Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", NSC 5901,16 Jan. 1959. 
10 NA; RG 59; Bureau of European Affairs (BEA), Office of Western European Affairs (OWEA), 
Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk, 1951 - 1963, Box 7; 17 Indonesia - 1959; 
Robertson to the Secretary of State, 11 Jan. 1959. American military supplies formed only part of 
the West's efforts to end Indonesian purchases of Soviet weaponry. 
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for John Gordon Mein, the Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific 
Affairs, to report that PKI leaders were, for the first time, complaining of 
`military repression'. He also noted that, with Djuanda's co-operation, `leftist 
influence' on Sukarno had been reduced. " It was, however, Djuanda's 
cancellation of the elections scheduled for 1959 which struck the most important 
blow against the PKI's aspirations. The decision, taken in September, appeared 
to the State Department to give clear evidence that its policies were working. 12 
Taken together with a new economic settlement for the regions, approved in July, 
and the adoption of a law governing foreign investment, also in September, there 
were enough indications that a positive relationship would be possible. The new 
atmosphere even allowed Washington to discount the outlawing of the Masjumi 
and the PSI throughout the rebellious areas, which emphasised the extent to 
which the Administration was now committed to working with the central 
government. 
However, the new situation hid a continuing mutual distrust on both sides' 
part. The evidence of American involvement with the rebels had affected many 
of its erstwhile friends, and Sukarno, deeply. Washington's sudden reversal of its 
policy, while welcome, did not inspire confidence that it was `really ready and 
willing ... to support Indonesia. 
"3 Meanwhile, Dulles had found it hard to 
reconcile the new approach to Indonesia with his support for the rebellion and 
" NA; RG 59; DF 1955 -1959, Box 3444; 756D. 00/12-258; Mein to Robertson, 8 Dec. 1958. 
12 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 -1959, Box 3443; 756D. 00/9-258; Memorandum of Conversation 
by 
Robertson of a meeting with van Roijen, 26 Sept. 1958. 
13 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 2517; 611.56D/1-858; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
11 Jun. 1958. Jones is quoting Ruslan Abdulgani, Vice Chairman of the National Council. 
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harboured doubts about Jakarta's willingness to confront communism. Late in 
June he had indicated to Jones that he still considered that the dissidents, whom 
he likened to `embers which could flare up', offered an alternative to 
rapprochement. 14 When the rebels were no longer a viable force, he continued to 
make clear his misgivings about the direction of US policy but could not bring 
himself - and this went for Eisenhower, too - to take Jones advice and `cultivate' 
Sukarno. ' 5 
Evidence persisted that Dulles had still not come to terms with the collapse 
of his own strategy for exerting influence on Sukarno while the "Asianists" in 
Washington had revised their views in the light of reality. While Dulles 
maintained the official line that relations with Indonesia had taken a positive 
turn, he still found it hard to hide his scepticism. He told a NATO meeting, in 
December, that Jakarta was acting in ways which were `contrary to the interests 
and desires of the Communists' and that Washington was using its `modest 
supplies of (military) equipment' to encourage it. Dulles argued that US policy, 
while it `might be wrong', was an honest attempt to win influence with the 
Indonesian Government, an aim which it seemed, to him, was being achieved. 16 
More enthusiastic in his support for the new approach was Robertson who, by 
14 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3443; 756D. 00/6-1658; Dulles to Jones, 28 Jun. 1958. 
15 NLA; Casey Papers (MS 6150), Lord Casey's Diaries; Entry for 17 Sept. 1958. 
16 AA; CRS A 1838/272/250/10/7/6; External Affairs Office, London, to the DEA, 19 Jan. 1959. 
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June 1959, had concluded that Washington's policy was `correct', had secured 
`heartening' progress and promised more. '7 
The extent to which Dulles, and the other interventionists, had lost influence 
was confirmed by the review of US policy which followed the rebels' defeat and 
the Administration's transfer of support to the central government, and 
particularly, the army. Consideration of the dissidents in relation to US policy, 
confined to one paragraph buried deep in NSC 5901, acknowledged that they had 
become merely an `effective guerrilla fighters' with the capacity to harass and 
disrupt the central government. No longer seen as a way of pressurising Sukarno, 
the rebels had become an irritant for an Administration which now sought tamely 
to `encourage reconciliation' between them and Jakarta. The new policy 
document, approved on 29 January 1959, was a much more sensitive analysis of 
the causes of the friction between Washington and Jakarta than had been 
acceptable for some time. Washington not only accepted that its attitude towards 
nationalism had affected relations with Indonesia but even conceded Jakarta's 
right to regard military pacts as sharpening Cold War tensions. In contrast to 
previous policies, NSC 5901 committed Washington to seeking Indonesia's 
friendship whilst Jakarta maintained an active association with the USSR and the 
PRC. Also for the first time, the Administration now accepted Dutch culpability 
for many of the chronic problems which Indonesia had faced since independence. 
Identifying Holland's failure to prepare Indonesia for political and economic 
1' NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk 1953 - 61, Box 7; 
Indonesia 1959; Robertson to W. Randolph Burgess (US Representative on the North Atlantic 
Council), 11 Jun. 1959. 
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freedom, Washington now re-dedicated itself to overcoming the legacy of 
colonialism. 
The most far-reaching changes in the Administration's attitude came in its 
acceptance of Sukarno as the `paramount' Indonesian leader and in the tactics it 
proposed to employ to counter communism in Indonesia. While the military's 
`key importance as a stabilizing force' was clearly stated, NSC 5901 contained a 
tribute to Sukarno's symbolic importance as `the mystic incarnation' of the state. 
Accepting the Indonesian President as `a political fact of life which must be lived 
with', the document noted his apparent concern at the PKI's strength and his 
reluctance to use force, or to undermine his position above party politics, to 
curtail it. Implicitly recognising Sukarno's dilemma, and that the task of rolling 
back communist influence in Indonesia was not a simple one, Washington 
adopted a political strategy aimed at undermining the PKI's untainted reputation 
as a champion of popular causes with the aim of leaving it open to `politically 
justifiable' repression. '8 However, the dissidents' activities threatened this new 
anti-communist strategy by allowing the PKI to retain its nationalist credentials 
as fighting continued in Sumatra. The insurgency also induced Indonesia to turn 
to the PRC for support as the Taiwanese continued to assist the rebels. 19 
18 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, 
Box 26; NSC 5901 - US Policy on Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", NSC 5901, 
16 Jan. 1959. The policy was approved by the NSC on 29 January 1959. 
19 AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/11/9; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 6 Jan. 1959. 
NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 2517; 611.56D/1-859; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
18 Mar. 1959. 
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Despite the dissidents, both Sukarno and the Djuanda Government kept the 
political pressure on the PKI and, in doing so, persuaded Washington to alter its 
opinion of "Guided Democracy". Washington had placed itself in an awkward 
spot by supporting the postponement of the 1959 elections, from which it 
expected the PKI would emerge as the largest party. 20 In abandoning its 
democratic principles because it feared that the "wrong" party would win, 
Washington had invested a great deal of trust in the Indonesian leadership to 
ensure that an acceptable alternative was found. Nevertheless, there was a 
significant body of opinion within the Administration which was ready to accept 
that Western democracy might not be suited to Indonesia. Noting that little 
measurable progress had been made towards a stable political system since 
independence, officials argued that, in "Guided Democracy", Indonesian leaders 
who rejected totalitarianism and military dictatorship were seeking a middle way 
forward 
. 
21 For instance, Jones saw benefits in Djuanda's proposal for a return to 
the 1945 Constitution, which, he argued, would maintain democratic safeguards 
whilst allowing the introduction of "Guided Democracy". He also observed that 
Sukarno's plan provided for regional representation in any elected Consultative 
Assembly and that the programme might, therefore, prove attractive to Hatta. 22 
20 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, 
Box 26; NSC 5901 - US Policy on Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", NSC 5901, 
16 Jan. 1959. 
21 NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 21; 1959 Briefing Papers; MSP Briefing Book 
for Mr Robertson, 15 Jan. 1959. 
22 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3444; 756D. 00; Jones to the Secretary of State, 7 
Jan. 1959. 
Since independence, Indonesia had had a provisional Constitution which was never ratified. The 
1945 Constitution was that used by the Republic Of Indonesia. 
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These optimistic assessments seemed to be well-founded when, in February, 
the Government announced a plan for the implementation of "Guided 
Democracy" by the following August. The New York Times welcomed the 
proposal to include thirty-five members of the armed forces in parliament as well 
as the significant differences between it and Sukarno's original concept. 23 The 
Indonesian Government took great care to ensure that Washington was well- 
informed about its aims. In an advance briefing, Djuanda told Jones that the 
main aim of the plan was to reduce PKI strength and influence by breaking its 
links with the labour unions. 24 After a difficult birth, during which the 
Indonesian Parliament three times rejected Sukarno's request to return to the 
1945 Constitution and the President was forced to introduce it by decree, the first 
element of "Guided Democracy" was introduced when a new Cabinet, headed by 
Sukarno, was appointed, on 8 July. With Djuanda as First Minister, Nasution as 
Minister of Security and Defence and no PKI or "fellow-traveller" members, the 
new Government was well-received in Washington, where Mein thought it 
reflective of a rightward trend. 25 Jones, however, saw the new Cabinet as 
nothing more than another example of Sukarno's desire to protect his position by 
playing off his rivals for power - Nasution and the PKI - against each other and 
he reminded Washington that this strategy had allowed the PKI to make its 
23 The New York Times, 22 Feb. 1959. 
24 AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/11/9; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 
29 Jan. 1959. 
25 AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/1 1/161; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 
9 Jul. 1959. 
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comeback in the early 1950's. 26 Jones' concerns about the extent to which 
Sukarno planned to suppress the PKI were increased later in the month when 
communists were appointed to two new state bodies, the Supreme Advisory 
Council and the National Planning Council in what the Ambassador described as 
6a real breakthrough for the PKI ... (as) they had penetrated officialdom. ' 
27 
If the State Department was relatively content with Jakarta's new anti- 
communist stance, it also had to confront the other factors which had been 
identified in NSC 5901 as contributing to a possible communist take-over in 
Indonesia. In addition to countering the growing strength of the PKI, policy now 
committed Washington to `vigorous' action to wean Jakarta away from Soviet 
bloc economic and military aid. Noting that the Indonesian fiscal and financial 
situation was `at about the lowest level since independence', NSC 5901 linked 
popular disaffection to the Indonesian Government's inability to deliver 
economic development and basic services. In much the same way as previous 
policy statements had identified the need to encourage economic reform as a 
priority for US policy, NSC 5901 listed a battery of remedies for Indonesia's 
ailing economy but specifically counselled against actions which might give the 
impression that Washington was attempting to control, or take responsibility for, 
Indonesian economic development. This fresh sensitivity on the 
Administration's part also encompassed the acceptance that Indonesia would, at 
26 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3445; 756D. 00; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
27 Jul. 1959. 
27 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 242. 
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least in the short-term, continue to receive assistance from the Soviets. 28 Since 
1951, US technical, developmental and other economic assistance had totalled 
$61.4 million and had been concentrated on educational and health projects with 
developmental funding coming largely from the 1950 Export-Import Bank loan 
of $100 million. With its renewed interest in competing with the Soviets, the 
level of US assistance for economic development now increased with the 
authorisation of loans totalling $76.8 million. 29 Although the Indonesian 
Government showed no immediate willingness to break its links with the USSR - 
in January, it had taken up the $100 million loan first offered by the Soviets in 
September 1956 and, in July, received another $17.5 million in aid from Moscow 
- Jones remained convinced that Washington should respond positively to any 
future requests for assistance from Jakarta. 30 
Of even greater importance to Washington was the question of military aid. 
Convinced that the armed forces represented the `principal obstacles' to the PKI, 
Washington undertook to `increase (the army's) capability to maintain internal 
security and combat Communist activity ... 
by providing appropriate arms, 
equipment and training .... 
' Despite this, the Administration's commitment was 
not wholehearted as it balanced its wish to bolster Nasution with the fears of 
28 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, 
Box 26; NSC 5901 - US Policy on Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", NSC 5901, 
16 Jan. 1959. 
29 The New York Times, 13 Feb. and 19 Mar. 1959. AA; CRS A1838/2/827/3/19; News Bulletin, 
2 Jul. 1959 and A1838/321/3034/11/161; News Bulletin, 27 Jun. 1959. The loans comprised $6 
million from the Development Loan Fund for harbour rehabilitation and $70.8 million from PL 
480 surpluses. 
30 The New York Times, 4 Jan. and 26 Jul. 1959. NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3445; 
756D. 00/7-1559; Jones to the Secretary of State, 27 Jul. 1959. 
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Australia and The Netherlands that Indonesia might acquire the means to conquer 
West Irian. Perhaps with this and the Administration's recent transfer of loyalty 
from the dissidents to the army in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned 
lest, having committed itself to Nasution, the US should again prove to be fickle. 
During the NSC discussion of the new policy, Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, warned that any failure to `keep the ball rolling' would `destroy ... or 
weaken' Nasution, who, he noted, had been the chief agent of Indonesia's recent 
escape from `the clutches of the Communists'. To meet these concerns, the 
Administration sought to design an arms supply programme, described in NSC 
5901 as `limited but continuing', which avoided increasing the Indonesian army's 
offensive capacity while satisfying the recipients that the US was responsive to 
its needs. 3 
This was, however, easier said than done. Although NSC 5901 contained an 
`illustrative military assistance program' totalling $46.9 million up to Fiscal 
1962, the Department of Defense admitted that it would not meet Indonesian 
requirements for `major naval vessels, aircraft ... or the major reequipping of the 
Indonesian armed forces'. The organisers of the programme were worried that it 
represented `an illogical, perhaps dangerously dilatory, piecemeal approach' to 
providing military aid. 32 In fact, Washington's plans to counter Soviet military 
31 NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk 1953 - 61, Box 7; 
Indonesia 1959; Robert Moore to Mein, 23 Mar. 1959 and Robertson to Burgess, 11 Jun. 1959. 
DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 
26; NSC 5901 - US Policy on Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", NSC 5901,16 Jan. 1959 and 
Ann Whitman File, NSC Series; 395th Meeting of the NSC, 29 Jan. 1959. AA; CRS 
A5818/2NOLUME 1/AGENDUM 12; Cabinet Submission No. 12, by Casey, 5 Jan. 1959. 
32 NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk 1953 - 61, Box 7; 
Indonesia 1959; Moore to Mein, 23 Mar. 1959. 
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aid to Indonesia were designed only to give Indonesia the means to combat 
internal disorder and conceded to others, the USSR included, the market for 
prestige heavy weaponry. The evidence from the military planners that the 
programme had not been thought through properly only added to the impression 
that American policy remained reactive and in thrall to Dutch and Australian 
policy. These deficiencies did not seem important, however, when a further $15 
million package of arms was approved, in early February. This assistance, most 
of which was to equip twenty army battalions `on an austere basis', was seen as 
an expression of the Administration's confidence in the Indonesian leadership 
and was received by a `delighted' Indonesian military. 33 
The issue of sovereignty over West Irian continued, however, to bedevil 
relations with Indonesia. In the decade since Indonesian independence, 
Washington had singularly failed to use its influence with Indonesia, Holland or 
Australia seriously to push for a solution. Now, in a frank assessment of the 
situation, the Administration admitted that its apparent inability to support the 
Indonesians had left this `key gambit' to the Soviets. It also recognised that the 
benefits of its assistance programmes were significantly undermined by this 
failure to satisfy Indonesian nationalism and Sukarno's personal commitment to 
the West Irian issue. However, Washington's friendships with the Dutch and the 
Australians still left it unable to accept Indonesia's case for sovereignty. 
Although the nature of the diplomatic problem posed by the sovereignty question 
33 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, 
Box 26; NSC 5901 - US Policy on Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", NSC 5901,16 Jan. 
1959. The New York Times, 10 Feb. 1959. 
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had not changed - and neither had the US policy of neutrality - circumstances had 
altered enough to cause the Western allies to think that Indonesia might launch an 
attack on West Irian. The West had been shocked by the proficiency of Jakarta's 
forces in putting down the dissidents and feared that Soviet weapons supplies 
would enhance their capabilities. Washington also had doubts about Jakarta's 
intentions towards Timor, Papua and British Borneo and worried that a military 
success in West Irian might encourage Indonesia to pursue claims in these 
areas. 
34 
Given the belief, in Washington, that a negotiated settlement of the dispute 
was impossible, its main diplomatic effort now centred on preventing the use of 
force by Jakarta to resolve the matter. As early as November 1958, Dulles had 
warned Subandrio that the US would oppose any forcible alteration to the status 
quo 35 and this attitude persisted throughout 1959. In defending US, and other 
Western countries', arms sales to Indonesia, Robertson claimed that they had 
given the `free world ... a considerable deterrent' to any Indonesian aggression 
against West Irian. 36 While using its new-found influence in Jakarta to prevent 
an attack, Washington also gave the Dutch promises of support should one be 
launched. In October 1958, Dulles had undertaken to support the Dutch `to the 
limit of (the Administration's) legal authority', a contrivance which implicitly 
34 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, 
Box 26; NSC 5901 - US Policy on Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", NSC 5901, 
16 Jan. 1959. 
35 NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk 1953 - 61, Box 6; 
"US Assurances to the Dutch on Indonesia - 1958", by W. Cromwell, 11 Feb. 1959. 
36 NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk 1953 - 61, Box 7; 
Indonesia 1959; Robertson to Burgess, 11 Jun. 1959. 
308 
acknowledged that any assistance would be logistical rather than military. After 
his death, this formula was repeated by Christian Herter, his successor, and 
formed the basis of Washington's continued support for the Dutch. 37 Although 
the Administration officially remained neutral on the issue, the reality was that its 
policy remained the essentially conservative one of support for the Dutch. 
Despite the continuing irritation caused by the West Irian dispute, the 
Administration was, by the end of the year, more optimistic about its relations 
with Indonesia. Mein, now the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific 
Affairs, noted that US interests had been `perceptibly if unevenly advanced' over 
the preceding eighteen months. Pointing to undertakings by Sukarno that 
Indonesia would not use force against West Irian, the Government's `orientation 
(towards) the free world' and the growing opposition to the PKI, he told James 
Parsons, the new Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, that he saw no 
reason to alter the basic approach set out in NSC 5901. Mein's optimism was, 
however, qualified by the persisting political instability, caused by economic, 
administrative and internal security problems, which were stopping the new 
Government from making other than slow progress. 38 Even Allen Dulles thought 
that Indonesia `was more friendly to us at present than it had ever been', drawing 
comfort from the anti-PKI campaign and the frosty state of relations between 
Indonesia and the PRC caused by Jakarta's campaign against ethnic Chinese-39 
37 NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk 1953 - 61, Box 7; 
Indonesia 1959; "Precise Oral Statement to the Dutch", attached to Kohler to Parsons, 
10 Aug. 1959. 
38 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3446; 756D. 00/12-3159; Mein to Parsons, 31 Dec. 1959. 
39 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 12; 429th Meeting of the NSC, 16 Dec. 1959. 
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The Administration's more positive outlook, while based on concrete 
evidence of Jakarta's responsiveness to American concerns, nevertheless masked 
signs of the uneasiness which had characterised its relations with Indonesia since 
1945. In particular, Washington found it difficult to assess Sukarno's attitude 
towards communism. Despite the cooling of his friendship with Beijing and his 
Government's anti-PKI campaign, he remained close to the PKI. Compounding 
Jones' worries about the direction "Guided Democracy" might take, the President 
made clear that he saw the answer to Indonesia's economic ills as lying in a 
greater socialisation of the economy. 40 While this might have been expected, he 
also went out of his way, in September, to court the PKI by speaking to its 6th 
Congress having first overridden a decision by Nasution to ban it. Although 
Herter was prepared to accept Sukarno's appearance as a manoeuvre in his power 
struggle with the army and the PKI, he observed that it did nothing to dampen US 
concerns about Indonesia's future. 41 Sukarno was not, however, the only one to 
endanger the improvement in US-Indonesian relations as, for a fourth time, 
Eisenhower rejected his opposite number's invitation to visit Indonesia. While 
Sukarno reluctantly accepted Eisenhower's refusal, Mein thought that it was 
becoming increasingly difficult to find convincing reasons why the President 
should not agree to visit. Noting that Sukarno attached great importance to 
personal relationships and would take a further rejection as a personal affront, 
Mein argued that Eisenhower should build on the evident signs of friendliness 
40 The New York Times, 22 Apr. and 2 Sept. 1959. 
a1 NA; RG 59; DF 1955 - 1959, Box 3445; 756D. 00/8-1459; Herter to Jones, 30 Sept. 1959. 
310 
from the Indonesian Government and take advantage of the collapse in 
Indonesian-PRC relations by visiting Indonesia during 1960.42 
As Eisenhower entered his last year as President, US-Indonesian relations 
were relatively tranquil. With Sukarno preoccupied by the introduction of 
"Guided Democracy", Washington refrained from making any dramatic gestures 
which might be construed as interference in Indonesian affairs. Instead, it 
preferred to allow Indonesia to `work out its own destiny' while pursuing the 
longer-term goal of cultivating influential sectors of the elite through which it 
could work in the future. 43 In January, the Operations Coordinating Board 
concluded that the Administration had achieved `perceptible, if not precisely 
measurable' progress towards its policy objectives and that nothing had occurred 
which merited the reconsideration of policy. 44 Washington's recognition that it 
faced a lengthy period of difficult diplomacy if it was to win over the Indonesians 
had conditioned it to accept unfavourable developments as the price which it 
would have to pay for eventual success. 
In an effort to maintain the momentum of its policy of constructive 
involvement, Eisenhower approved a further $21.5 million in military aid for 
Fiscal 1960 and the Export-Import Bank authorised a credit of $47.5 million for 
42 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 181. NA; RG 59; Lots 62 D 68 and 62 D 409, Box 
21; 1959: 320 - USA; Mein to Parsons, 27 Nov. 1959. 
13 AA; CRS A 1838/321/3034/11/161; DEA to the Australian Embassy, Washington, 
11 Mar. 1960. 
°' DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3; 
Indonesia; "Report On Indonesia (NSC 5901)", 27 Jan. 1960. 
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the construction of a fertiliser plant and an electric power station. 45 Nevertheless, 
Washington found that the Soviets were more than willing to match them in the 
competition for Indonesia's affections. When Prime Minister Nikolai Khruschev 
spent two weeks in Indonesia during February and offered $250 million in aid, 
Allen Dulles conceded that his visit had been a `mild success'. However, the trip 
was viewed in an altogether more positive light by Indonesians. Even moderates, 
like Ide Agung, contrasted Washington's formulaic approach to Jakarta with the 
dynamism of Moscow's. 46 The difference in the attitudes of the two Cold War 
antagonists became clearer to Indonesians when, in April, Eisenhower turned 
down, for the fifth time, an invitation from Sukarno to visit Indonesia. Although 
the official reason for the refusal was medical advice that Eisenhower should not 
undertake a long tour of Asia, Ambassador Jones records that the President was 
not prepared `to go out of his way to please' a man he `disapproved (of), disliked 
and distrusted'. The rejection also conformed with Washington's long-held 
policy of doing nothing which might enhance Sukarno's prestige, a position 
which Jones thought needlessly alienated the only man who could have brought 
Indonesia into the West's camp. As Mein had predicted, the Indonesian 
President regarded the rejection as a personal humiliation. 47 
as DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3; 
Indonesia; "Report On Indonesia (NSC 5901)", 27 Jan. 1960. The New York Times, 
29 Jan. 1960. 
46 DDEL; Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 12; 436th Meeting of the NSC, 10 Mar. 1960. Ide 
Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, pp. 382 - 83. 
47 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, pp. 181 - 82. Adams, Sukarno : An Autobiography 
As 
Told To Cindy Adams, p. 296. 
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Once more, a gap had opened up between the analyses of Indonesian 
domestic politics made by the American Ambassador and Washington. While 
Jones accepted that "Guided Democracy", but especially Sukarno's devotion to 
gotong rojong politics, was allowing the PKI to wield greater power, he believed 
that it represented a genuine attempt to deal with the political chaos which had 
plagued the country since independence. 48 However, policymakers in the US saw 
only communism's remorseless advance under Sukarno's patronage and, as a 
result, sought an ever-closer alliance with Nasution. 
The PKI continued to benefit from the country's parlous economic situation 
as it took a leading part in channelling popular discontent into protests against 
government policies. 49 However, more worrying for the State Department was 
the Party's growing influence in the institutions of "Guided Democracy". The 
creation, in January, of the National Front, which Sukarno envisaged would 
eventually replace all political parties, led to the banning, in August, of the 
Masjumi and the PSI while the PKI managed to circumvent the new regulations 
governing the operation of political parties in the interim. Also contributing to 
the unease felt in Washington was Sukarno's appointment, in March, of a gotong 
rojong parliament in which the PKI and its supporters were estimated to have 20 
per cent of the seats. 50 By August, when the Peoples' Consultative Congress, 
whose composition reflected that of the parliament, was established, only the 
48 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 245. 
49 AA; CRS A3092/2/TS221/11/161; Australian Embassy, Washington, to the DEA, 
27 Jan. 1960. 
50 The New York, Times, 28 Mar. 1960. 
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Cabinet did not contain PKI members. Despite Jones' attempt to understand 
these developments as a response to the failure of Western democratic forms in 
Indonesia, the Embassy now began to report that the PKI seemed to be getting 
closer to power and might even find Indonesia delivered into its hands without a 
fights 1 
The PKI was, however, only one of three main players on the Indonesian 
political scene. It was engaged, with Sukarno and the army, in a complex 
competition for power in which Sukarno had alliances with each of the other two 
and, at the same time, dominated them. 52 Washington, while aware that the 
Indonesian President was the paramount figure in the equation, remained unable 
to come to terms with him, especially as his "Guided Democracy" reforms 
concentrated power in his hands. In the early months of 1960, the Administration 
was prepared to accept the new political system as an attempt to find solutions to 
Indonesia's chronic problems. 53 However, as Sukarno moved to the left and in 
the wake of the severing of relations with The Netherlands in August, "Guided 
Democracy" once more was seen as the infrastructure of a nascent communist 
state. The announcement of NASAKOM, Sukarno's concept which combined 
the nationalist, religious and communist elements of society in a representation of 
unity, was emblematic of this leftward drift and convinced Jones that the 
51 NA; RG 59; Central Decimal File (CDF) 1960 - 1963, Box 2204; 798.00/9-2660; Rolland 
Bushner (Counselor) to the Secretary of State, 25 Oct. 1960. 
52 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, pp. 54 - 55. 
5' This view was shared, for example, by Dr. Raymond Allen, the Director of the US Operations 
Mission to Indonesia (ICA), in his report "Observations and Reflections on Indonesia in 
Transition", 11 May 1960. (NA; RG 59; CDF 1960 - 1963, Box 2203; 798.00/7-160). 
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President was determined to construct `some form of national communism' in 
Indonesia. 54 Having already identified the army as the main focus of its efforts to 
stem communist advances in Indonesia and pleased with Nasution's actions 
against the PKI, the Administration now moved to strengthen its ties with the 
military. In October, with the agreement of the Departments of State and 
Defense, Parsons gave Nasution secret assurances that he would get support from 
the US in the event that there was a `final confrontation' between the army and 
Sukarno. Parsons believed that the assurances he gave would be a prerequisite to 
any army action designed to `eliminate Sukarno as an effective force' and to 
reduce communist influence. 55 In making this commitment to Nasution, the 
Administration signalled that, once more, it had decided it could not work with 
Sukarno and was prepared to subvert a government it officially recognised. 
The Administration's restrained relationship with Sukarno flowed not just 
from its doubts about the Indonesian leader but also because it had nothing 
substantial to offer which might induce him to throw in his lot with Washington, 
most notably in relation to West Irian. Having practised a policy of, what Dulles 
had once called, `concealment' in which its pro-Dutch sympathies were hidden 
behind a facade of neutrality, the State Department still adamantly refused to 
accept Indonesia's case for sovereignty. However, as the voting power of the 
Third World increased in the UN, it became obvious that such a posture would 
54 NA; RG 59; CDF 1960 - 1963, Box 2204; 798.00/9-2660; Jones to the Secretary of State, 
15 Nov. 1960. NASAKOM is an acronym of Nasional, Agama, Komunis. 
55 NA; RG 59; CDF 1960 - 1963, Box 2204; 798.00/9-2660; Parsons to Merchant, 26 Sept. 1960 
and BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk, 1951 - 1963, Box 7; Indo; 
Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of Defense of a meeting with Parsons, 
28 Sept. 1960. 
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not protect US interests much longer. Having previously contributed, by 
abstaining in votes, to the defeat of Indonesia's attempts to gain the UN General 
Assembly's support for negotiations, even the Bureau of European Affairs now 
accepted that Indonesia would probably win a vote should the issue return to that 
forum. 56 The matter came to a head, in August, when the Dutch announced that 
an aircraft carrier, the Karel Doorman, would visit West Irian as a reminder of 
Dutch sovereignty. Infuriated by what he saw as a direct challenge to Indonesia's 
claim to the territory, Sukarno broke off diplomatic relations with Holland and, 
the following month at the General Assembly, denounced Dutch sovereignty over 
West Irian as a threat to world peace. 57 In placing the West Irian issue back on 
the agenda, Sukarno made all the more compelling the need for a change in 
Washington's policy on West Irian. As part of a general review of US policy 
towards Indonesia, the outgoing Administration now acknowledged that the issue 
was `a major deterrent' to the successful pursuit of US objectives in Indonesia 
and sought to `isolat(e) the issue from cold war exploitation' by utilising the 
UN. 58 In what amounted to a compromise between the warring factions in the 
State Department as much as a proposal to defuse the West Irian crisis, Herter 
agreed that Washington would promote a plan under which West Irian would be 
placed in a UN trusteeship and, in doing so, recognised that Washington's past 
56 NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk, 1951 - 1963, Box 
7; Indonesia - Miscellaneous 1958 - 60; McBride to Kohler, 30 Jun. 1960 and 
Kohler to Parsons, 
6 Jul. 1960. 
57 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 189. 
58 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy pares Subseries, 
Box 
29; NSC 6023 - US Policy On Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", 19 Dec. 1960. 
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policy of `non-involvement' had influenced Indonesia's drift towards a closer 
alignment with the Soviets. 59 
If the Administration was willing to contemplate a shift in its policy on West 
Irian in order to increase its influence in Jakarta, there was no similar desire to 
rectify failings in other areas of its relations with Indonesia. Having cultivated 
Nasution as its best hope of eventually destroying the PKI and reining Sukarno 
in, Washington once more showed that it preferred to place more emphasis on its 
allies' needs than it did on consolidating its allies in Indonesia. During the same 
trip to Washington in which he had been assured of US backing in any 
confrontation with Sukarno -a visit undertaken while Sukarno was in New York 
at the UN - Nasution was told that the Administration would be unable to meet 
Indonesian requests for heavy weaponry. The supplies were denied because of 
Washington's sensitivity towards Holland and Australia, who both feared that 
Western arms would encourage Indonesia to mount an attack against West Irian. 
However, as supporters of the original decision to restart arms deliveries had 
predicted, Moscow agreed to provide the weapons three months later. 
60 
Neither was Eisenhower able to develop a personal rapport with Sukarno in 
order to advance US interests. After he had spoken at the UN General Assembly, 
Sukarno had remained in New York while Nasution had been feted in 
Washington. Only at the last moment was Eisenhower persuaded to invite 
59 NA; RG 59; BEA, OWEA, Alpha-Numeric Files of the Swiss-Benelux Desk, 1951 - 1963, Box 
7; Indo; Kohler to Dean Rusk (Secretary of State Designate), 10 Jan. 1961. 
60 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 189 - 90. Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign 
Policy, p. 63. 
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Sukarno to meet him in the capital and then it was to ensure that Sukarno did not 
`go hard with Nasution' when they returned to Jakarta. 61 Before the meeting, 
Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon warned Eisenhower that Sukarno was 
vain and sensitive but that he responded well to personal attention. 62 Despite 
Dillon's efforts, the meeting turned into a disaster when Sukarno was kept 
waiting in an ante-room while an aide warned Eisenhower that his party included 
the leader of the PKI. Yet again, the Indonesian President felt that he had been 
slighted by an Administration which was not prepared to accord to him the 
respect which he believed he deserved. 63 
As Eisenhower's Presidency drew to a close, the state of US-Indonesian 
relations resembled that of 1957, except that Washington had little prospect of 
influencing the situation as it had hoped it could through the dissidents. The 
Administration's attitude towards Sukarno and his Government was marked by a 
sense of powerlessness in the face of the PKI's advance. From where he stood, 
Jones believed that, while the communists successfully exerted leverage in 
Indonesia and held the initiative, the West had become `passive spectators' bereft 
of ideas about how to halt the communist juggernaut. 
64 The review of US policy 
carried out in the closing weeks of 1960 reflected Jones' pessimism. Designed to 
61 DDEL; WHO Records, Office of the Staff Secretary : Records 1952 - 61, Subject Series, State 
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update NSC 5901, which was by this time almost two years old, NSC 6023 
remained remarkably similar to its predecessor both in its analysis of the situation 
and its policy direction. Despite the paper's gloominess about the prospect that 
Sukarno's devotion to NASAKOM could lead to the PKI finally securing Cabinet 
seats, it contained no new policy initiatives to combat the threat save for the 
proposal to `possibly' use the UN to defuse the West Irian question. 65 
The CIA, while it thought that US policy was misconceived, was similarly 
unable to put forward alternative solutions to the problem. In an analysis of 
policy conducted for the Kennedy Administration, Richard Bissell, the Deputy 
Director Plans, argued that Washington's reliance on Nasution as an anti- 
communist bulwark flew in the face of the facts about his close relationship with 
Sukarno. Bissell also displayed the dislike of Sukarno which had characterised 
the Dulles brothers' attitudes. Noting that Sukarno's `dictatorship (was) the crux 
of the Indonesian problem', he suggested that the slide to communism in 
Indonesia would only be halted when Sukarno, who he saw as a latter-day Hitler, 
was no longer its leader. Bissell's argument revolved around his belief that 
Washington was appeasing Sukarno and his communist friends but he was 
unable to offer any panacea for the ills he described. Bemoaning the `extremely 
limited' influence the US had, Bissell told the new Administration that the `least 
unsatisfactory' policy which it might pursue involved the application of 
pressures, and the offering of favours, as an inducement to Sukarno and the 
65 DDEL; WHO Records, OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, 
Box 29; NSC 6023 - US Policy On Indonesia; "US Policy On Indonesia", 19 Dec. 1960. 
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Indonesian elites `to behave in a more constructive fashion. ' Despite the CIA's 
earlier disastrous effort, Bissell was prepared to consider subverting the Sukarno 
Government, an option excluded only by the lack of `countervailing elements 
which, of their own accord or in response to external stimuli, could effectively 
challenge or modify the policies of the Sukarno regime. '66 
When John F. Kennedy came to power, he inherited a failed policy from his 
predecessor. Having sought, as its main objective, to prevent Indonesia from 
going communist, the Eisenhower Administration bequeathed a situation in 
which there was every possibility that the PKI would soon be able to challenge 
for power. Most disturbingly, the Administration had adopted policies the effect 
of which had been to destroy American influence in Indonesia. As Jones had 
concluded, Washington had been reduced to the role of a spectator and had no 
idea how it might act to secure its interests. In its way, Bissell's analysis also 
underlined how limited were Kennedy's policy options. Most remarkable, 
however, was the transformation which had taken place in US-Indonesian 
relations since 1945. From a position in which it had enjoyed enormous goodwill 
and respect amongst Indonesians, and especially their leaders, America was now 
seen as an aggressive and insensitive power in much the same way as the Dutch 
and the Japanese had been before them. 
66 UVaL; Special Collections Department, Cumming Papers, Box 2; Indonesia Materials 1956 - 
61 and 1973 - 75; "Indonesian Perspectives" by Richard Bissell, 22 Mar. 1961, attached to 
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9. Conclusion 
In 1967, the former Vice-President, Richard Nixon described Indonesia as 
`the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area' because it contained `the region's 
richest hoard of natural resources'. ' His assessment came after the Indonesian 
military had, in 1965, suppressed a coup attempt by the PKI and carried out a 
massacre of suspected communists, which had left hundreds of thousands of 
people dead, and had removed President Sukarno from power. Nixon's 
comments reflected a new optimism in Washington that, with the PKI and 
Sukarno gone, Indonesia's immense untapped wealth could, at last, be won for 
the West. He also exposed the unpalatable fact that it had taken the tumultuous 
events of 1965 to return American thinking to the position it had been in at the 
end of the Second World War, when it had first sought to re-integrate Indonesia 
into the world capitalist economy. That American policy had failed to achieve 
this objective and that, by 1961, Indonesia seemed to be well on the way to 
becoming a communist-dominated state, had much to do with the manner in 
which successive Administrations had determined and executed that policy. For, 
despite the importance Washington accorded Jakarta, it was consistently unable 
to balance its own self-interest with a sympathetic understanding of Indonesian 
nationalism. In defiance of the presumption that US foreign policy was 
conducted on a rational basis, the often stereotypical and patronising attitudes 
held by senior State Department and Administration officials were allowed to 
influence policymaking. While this problem was not necessarily confined to 
1 Richard Nixon, `Asia After Viet Nam', Foreign Affairs 46 (1967 - 68), pp. 111 - 25. 
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relations with Indonesia, it formed the backdrop to the deep-seated personal 
dislike of Sukarno shared by the Dulles brothers and Eisenhower, the people 
most closely associated with the anti-Sukarno policies which culminated in the 
CIA-supported regional rebellions of 1957/58. 
Indonesia's rise to prominence in the long list of US post-war priorities was 
unexpected and, certainly, unwanted. When, in June 1945, the State Department 
opted for non-intervention in the Dutch colony it did so for the very good reason 
that it had many other more pressing problems to deal with. One happy 
consequence of this decision, which applied to all the European colonies in the 
region, was that it absolved Washington of any association with the restoration of 
imperialism in Asia. Yet, by 1947, the Truman Administration's resolve to 
remain aloof from the independence struggle in the NEI had been eroded by the 
internationalisation of the dispute and, crucially, the fact that US involvement 
was possible in a way that it was not in, for example, India or Vietnam. 
Washington's initial hope that the NEI would contribute to the economic 
rehabilitation of Holland, and indirectly to Europe, under Dutch tutelage 
persisted despite the controversies at the UN caused by the British occupation 
and the first Dutch "police action". However, pressure from the UK, India, 
Australia, the Indonesian nationalists and domestic opinion, together with the 
growing Soviet interest in the dispute, all pushed Washington towards closer 
involvement and a more critical assessment of the Dutch. Nevertheless, the 
Administration's role in the UN debate which followed the first "police action" 
and its subsequent decision to accept membership of the UN Committee of Good 
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Offices (GOC) were only made possible by The Netherlands' inability to prevent 
outside interference in its colonial affairs. Whereas the UK and France could use 
their vetoes at the UN to protect their interests from unwelcome attention, 
Holland had no such defence and Washington was able to take the line of least 
resistance by acceding to the demands being placed on it. So, initial American 
involvement in Indonesia was largely for negative reasons and was due partly to 
Dutch impotence. Nonetheless, Indonesia became a test-bed of American 
diplomacy and its ability to deal with Asian nationalism. 
Within a year, Washington had acquired its own interest in Indonesia, which 
it saw as crucial to the integrity of its intended perimeter defence of island bases 
off the Asian mainland. While Indonesia had been a vital supplier of natural 
rubber and tin to American industry before the war, it had not previously held any 
special military significance for Washington. Even its value in the reconstruction 
of The Netherlands and Europe had not been so great that the Truman 
Administration had been tempted to intervene to ensure Dutch control. Only as 
the likelihood increased that the communist Chinese would prevail and America 
was forced to revise its plan to confront communism on the Asian mainland, did 
Washington perceive Indonesia as vital to US national security. Although itself 
not part of the arc of island bases running from Japan through the Ryukyus, and 
the Philippines to Australia, Indonesia controlled sea lanes between the Indian 
and Pacific oceans and lay across the line of bases. Thus, it assumed an 
important place in Washington's plans for the defence of Asia and as a place of 
potential conflict with the USSR. The Chinese communists' final victory, in 
323 
1949, the outbreak of the Korean War and the continuing colonial war in 
Vietnam all served to keep America focused on the defence of its Asian front 
from communist encroachment. At the same time, the Indonesian revolution was 
coming to a head, the newly independent state was proclaiming its neutrality in 
the Cold War and the PKI was beginning its revival. Sukarno's emergence as a 
charismatic and vocal proponent of Asian nationalism caused further 
consternation in Washington, where unequivocal support for the West was seen 
as the only guarantee of US friendship. By the end of 1954, Washington's 
interest in Indonesia had become centred on its anti-communist credentials. The 
approval, in November, of NSC 5429/5 with its commitment to use `all feasible 
covert (and) overt means including ... the use of armed 
force' to prevent a 
communist take-over formalised the Eisenhower Administration's fixation with 
communism in Indonesia. 2 
Although US policymakers accorded a high priority to Indonesia, they did 
not view it as important in its own right. In economic terms, its value lay in the 
vital role it had been assigned in the restoration of The Netherlands and Europe, 
while its location athwart the American chain of offshore bases, which contained 
Communist China, conditioned Washington's assessment of Indonesia's strategic 
worth. Despite their oft-stated support for self-determination, post-war American 
administrations did not translate their rhetorical promotion of independence into 
2 DDEL; White House Office - OSANSA Records 1952 - 61, NSC Series, Policy 
Papers 
Subseries, Box 12; NSC 5429/5 - Policy Toward The Far East (2); "Current Policy 
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policies which favoured nationalists. Consistently, US interests were associated 
with those of The Netherlands, or America's other Anglo-Saxon allies. 
Immediately after the war ended, the Truman Administration had no 
difficulty in subscribing to continued Dutch sovereignty and persisted in this 
legalistic, as opposed to political, basis for its policies until March 1949, when 
Dean Acheson faced down the Europeans over the creation of NATO. During 
this period, Washington's main concern centred on the need for the Dutch to 
rehabilitate their assets in the colony, to restore the flow of profits to the 
metropole and to revive the NEI's export trade in raw materials. The question of 
progress towards Indonesian independence, it was assumed, could be left to the 
liberal Dutch, whose traditional links with the US and status as trusted wartime 
allies meant that they could be relied upon to protect US interests. By contrast, 
the nationalist movement was an unknown quantity in Washington, where the 
State Department found it hard to decide whether it was a creature of the wartime 
Japanese occupation, a communist conspiracy or, if the Dutch were to be 
believed, both. In view of the perceived wisdom at the time, which regarded 
Indonesians as politically apathetic, the violence faced by the British and the 
support claimed by Sukarno could not, it was felt, have been an expression of 
genuine nationalist sentiment but must have been generated by some external 
influence. Yet, wherever its true origins lay, the essential consideration, in 
Washington, was that Indonesian nationalism threatened the speedy re- 
integration of the NEI into the world economy, a decisive reason for the Truman 
Administration's ambivalent response to the first Dutch "police action". 
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Washington's preference for the Dutch and its reactionary approach to the 
rise of Indonesian nationalism reflected its overwhelming desire for stability 
without which, it believed, the reconstruction of world capitalism would be 
delayed, if not prevented. As far as Indonesia was concerned, The Netherlands 
was seen as the guarantor of peace and as a bulwark against the encroachment of 
communism, a view which came under increasing strain as the American 
members of the GOC challenged the State Department's assumptions, 
particularly about the nationalists, who they found to be friendly towards the 
West. During 1948, increased Dutch intransigence, the nationalists' suppression 
of the communist uprising at Madiun and the Dutch failure to destroy Republican 
resistance, all combined to persuade Washington that it could no longer rely on 
The Netherlands to deliver stability in Indonesia. With the Republic now 
regarded as a moderate alternative to both the Dutch and the communists, 
Washington moved to consolidate Sukarno's and Hatta's positions by more 
forcefully supporting independence. The Conference at The Hague was not, 
therefore, the culmination of a four-year campaign by the Truman Administration 
to win Indonesian freedom, but a means by which it could rescue its plans for 
Indonesia's incorporation into the capitalist economy whilst also reducing the 
risk of a communist take-over. The omission of West Irian from the transfer of 
sovereignty and the settlement of the debt issue in favour of the Dutch confirmed 
Washington's lack of a philosophical commitment to the nationalists and its 
empathy with the colonial power. Despite the Truman Administration's efforts 
to portray Indonesian independence as a victory for America's principled foreign 
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policy, it represented nothing more than a tactical device to advance its own self- 
interest. 
Despite its pragmatic approach to Indonesian independence, the 
Administration preferred to present itself as a friend of Asian nationalism. 
Speaking to the National Press Club shortly after the transfer of sovereignty in 
Indonesia, Acheson identified the US with Asian independence movements. He 
singled out what he called `the revulsion against foreign domination' as a 
characteristic of the nationalist mood sweeping Asia but also revealed 
Washington's myopia by asserting that the external threat to Asian nationalism 
was exclusively communist. 3 This analysis did not, however, reflect either the 
experience or priorities of Indonesians. While there had been a communist 
insurgency before independence, the nation's leadership did not regard the PKI as 
a threat. They pointed out that the Republic had crushed the Madiun uprising and 
insisted that they would be able to deal with any future insurgency. More 
important for Indonesians was the memory of over three hundred years of 
domination by white Europeans, something which they were reminded of by the 
continuing Dutch presence in West Irian. The struggle against the Dutch had also 
persuaded Indonesians that they could not rely on the superpowers and, therefore, 
regarded their `independent and active' foreign policy as an extension of national 
sovereignty. Whereas Acheson thought that communism posed a threat to Asian 
nationalism, the Indonesians viewed Cold War competition as the danger to their 
I 
independence. 
3 "Crisis In Asia - An Examination Of US Policy", speech by 
Acheson at the National Press Club, 
Washington DC, 12 January 1950, DSB Vol. XXII, Number 551,23 Jan. 1950. 
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Washington's inability to grasp the importance of West Irian to the 
Indonesian revolution formed the basis of the failure of American policy during 
the 1950's. Once again, the State Department decided that US interests would be 
better served by supporting its allies, principally the Dutch and the Australians, 
rather than the Indonesians. Following the initial concession to Dutch 
sensibilities, at The Hague Conference, officials at Foggy Bottom recognised that 
a solution to the dispute was essential but the State Department limited its 
intervention to ritual exhortations for both parties to negotiate. While the 
Indonesians put forward ideas about how sovereignty might be transferred, the 
American position re-inforced the Dutch refusal to talk. While the Truman 
Administration's detached policy could be described as neutral, the arrival of 
John Foster Dulles at the State Department signalled a shift to barely concealed 
support for the Dutch. Increasingly influenced by the hard-line Australian 
opposition to Indonesian sovereignty, Dulles only maintained America's official 
neutrality so as not to undercut Washington's allies in the Masjumi and the 
Indonesian military. Despite evident incredulity in Jakarta that Washington 
tolerated continued Dutch colonialism, and in spite of Sukarno's regularly-made 
promise that American support over West Irian would enable him to align 
Indonesia with the West, Dulles frustrated efforts at the UN to encourage 
negotiations and rejected advice from American ambassadors in Jakarta that 
relations with Indonesia would not improve until the Dutch gave up the territory. 
Even when, in 1960, the Eisenhower Administration began to take more positive 
approach to finding a solution, it could only bring itself to consider a UN 
trusteeship arrangement and not a full transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. 
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The late change of heart did nothing to repair the enormous damage done to 
relations with Jakarta. In supporting the Dutch, Washington failed to appreciate 
the depth of the Indonesian desire to "recover" West Irian and, thus, contributed 
to the eradication of The Netherlands' influence in the country, which was a 
major blow to American policy. The Dutch refusal to negotiate led directly to the 
abrogation of The Hague Agreement, in 1956, and the seizure of Dutch assets a 
year later. Both followed rejections by the UN General Assembly of calls for 
talks, decisions which the Indonesians considered had been engineered by 
Washington. As had been the case after 1945, American assertions of sympathy 
with nationalist causes were exposed as insubstantial. Preferring to defend the 
status quo, which favoured their Anglo-Saxon allies, Truman and Eisenhower 
both defined US interests as being identical to those of The Netherlands and 
Australia. As a consequence, the Soviet Union was able to rehabilitate its 
reputation in Indonesia by supporting Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian. 
Washington's failure to break with its allies on this crucial issue undermined 
Indonesian moderates, alienated Sukarno and allowed the PKI to associate itself 
with the nationalist movement, a vital advantage in its quest for acceptance and 
power. By August 1962, when the Kennedy Administration mediated the 
agreement under which sovereignty was transferred, Washington's standing with 
Indonesians was so low that its diplomatic support for Jakarta reaped no benefits 
simply because it had come too late. 4 
a McMahon, Colonialism And Cold War, pp. 325 - 26. 
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American policymakers also found it difficult to accept Indonesia's 
neutralism as a genuine assertion of independence and a `considered attempt to 
define the appropriate role for Indonesia in a bipolar world. '5 To officials 
worried about the consequences of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, 
Jakarta's assertion of an `independent and active' foreign policy seemed like a 
dangerous flirtation with the forces ranged against America and its allies. 
Washington did not understand Indonesians' public commitment to a policy of 
equidistance between the two superpowers. Indeed, throughout the 1950's, the 
State Department refused to accept evidence of the Indonesian leadership's 
privately stated pro-Western orientation when this was not reflected in complete 
adherence to Washington's line. Indonesia's refusal to sign the Manila Pact, in 
1954, and its subsequent organisation of the Bandung Conference appeared, to 
Dulles especially, to undermine America's security policy in Southeast Asia. The 
Secretary of State's militant anti-communism, which dictated that countries 
either sided with the US or the USSR, left no room for a middle way. 
Accordingly, Indonesia's promotion of an African-Asian bloc was viewed with 
hostility and was seen as a vehicle for communist subversion. Dulles' narrow 
analysis of the world situation resulted in potential allies, such as Indonesia, 
being propelled towards the USSR because their nationalist philosophy prevented 
them from making the kind of commitment to the West which Washington 
wanted. For this reason, Washington refused to meet Indonesia's requests for 
economic and military aid and, as a last resort, Jakarta instead turned to Moscow. 
By contrast, the Indonesians found that the Soviets were more than willing to fill 
5 Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, p. xvii. 
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the void left by Washington by providing Jakarta with the aid it wanted and by 
acknowledging its nationalist history. 6 
The problems caused by Washington's failure to understand, or respond to, 
Jakarta's main concerns were compounded by its determination to dictate the 
terms on which relations were conducted. What Dermot McDermot, the British 
Ambassador in Jakarta in the mid-1950s, called its `governess-like handling of 
Asiatics'? both confirmed, in Washington's eyes, Indonesian delinquency and 
consolidated the mutual suspicion which existed in the two capitals. For the 
Americans, the main test of Indonesian fielty was its willingness to join the US in 
a military pact as part of the effort to contain communism in Asia. In 1945, 
Washington had partly based its support for the Dutch on their presumed desire 
to maintain regional security and, after independence, had expected to form an 
alliance with an Indonesia governed by moderate leaders. Indonesia's persistent 
refusal to reach a bilateral treaty with Washington and its equally strong antipathy 
towards the Manila Pact contributed to the Eisenhower Administration's view 
that Jakarta was latently pro-communist. Meanwhile, the Administration's 
unsubtle attempts to browbeat Jakarta, like Nixon's in 1953, only served to 
heighten Indonesian misgivings that Washington would impair its independence 
of action if given the chance. Similarly, Washington's comparison of Sukarno's 
6 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 122. Adams, Sukarno : An Autobiography. As Told 
To Cindy Adams, pp. 297 - 98. Sukarno told Adams that he had no trouble getting a 
$100 million 
aid package from Moscow after Washington had turned him down. He also cited the gift of a 
monument by the `Communist Bloc' commemorating Indonesia's struggles as the sort of symbol 
much loved by Indonesians but not forthcoming from the `free world' - `we are still waiting for 
any Western country to show some gesture of out-and-out kindness', he said. 
7 PRO; FO 371/129509; "General Situation - 1956", McDermot to Lloyd, 30 Apr. 1957. 
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toleration of the PKI, and his espousal of gotong rojong politics, with the 1948 
communist coup in Czechoslovakia offended Indonesian sensibilities. By 
comparing Indonesia with a central European state, the Administration revealed 
its monolithic world view, in which cultural differences between countries 
mattered less than whether they subscribed to Washington's analysis of world 
communism. Furthermore, the Administration's assertion that Sukarno could not 
manage the PKI suggested that Washington's anti-communist strategies were the 
only viable option in all cases, an implicit criticism of a man who took pride in 
his mastery of his country's politics. 
While successive US Administrations blamed nationalists, and especially 
Sukarno, for the rise of communism in Indonesia and the drift towards the USSR, 
they avoided any acknowledgement of the effect of their own policies on the 
internal domestic situation. Washington's culpability derived, in the first place, 
from its failure to establish itself as a friend of Indonesia's and, then, its pursuit 
of policies which the communists were able to exploit to their own advantage. 
With its much-vaunted commitment to self-determination, the US was well- 
placed, in 1945, to benefit from the goodwill, and expectations, of Indonesian 
nationalists. However, the Truman Administration's pro-Dutch policies meant 
that, by the time of independence, the Indonesian leadership cadre had become 
suspicious of American sincerity. Nevertheless, after Madiun and the subsequent 
Soviet denunciations of Sukarno and Hatta, Soviet-Indonesian relations were 
effectively non-existent and the way was clear for Washington to establish itself 
as Jakarta's ally. The Administration's failure to capitalise on this advantage 
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owed much to its own perception that its role in securing the transfer of 
sovereignty would be enough to consolidate its position in Indonesian affections 
and to the advent of the Korean War, which diverted Washington's attention 
from less pressing matters. 
Having lost the initiative, the Truman Administration and, later and more 
especially, the Eisenhower Administration then pursued policies that not only 
reduced US prestige in Indonesia but which also played into the communists' 
hands. In particular, Washington's attitude towards Jakarta's claim to West Irian 
had a galvanising effect on communist fortunes. Sukarno certainly believed that 
the communists' rapid growth was attributable to the consistent support 
Indonesia received from the USSR and the PRC in contrast to American 
"neutrality". His view was endorsed by Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, the Foreign 
Minister in the Harahap Government, who believed that the Americans had 
caused Sukarno to `veer towards' the communists. 8 Washington's persistent 
refusal even to lend its weight to calls for talks cut the ground from under the feet 
of its moderate allies in Indonesia, most notably the Harahap Government which 
was forced into abrogating The Hague Agreements after its failure to make 
progress on the issue. The Eisenhower Administration, despite its criticism of 
Truman's inattention to Asia, also went out of its way to deny Sukarno any sign 
of approval. Eisenhower's refusals to Indonesia visit were seen by Sukarno as a 
personal affront and became an embarrassment, notably to US envoys in Jakarta. 
8 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, pp. 80 - 81. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty 
Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945 - 1965, p. 375. The Kahins, too, ascribe the PKI's revival 
to its `skilful espousal of the West Irian issue'. (Kahin and Kahin, Subversion As Foreign Policy, 
p. 45. ) 
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More importantly, Eisenhower's inaction denied the US any chance of 
counteracting the favourable impressions created by the visits of Soviet leaders. 
So, in 1957, the PKI election campaign benefited from Voroshilov's tour, and, in 
1960, Khruschev's delivery of economic and military aid contrasted with 
Eisenhower's demonstrations of unfriendliness. 
If Washington's attitude towards Indonesia's claim to West Irian provided 
the stimulus to the communist resurgence and then sustained it through the 
1950's, bolstered by Eisenhower's snubbing of Sukarno, then the CIA-sponsored 
rebellion of 1957/58 confirmed communism as a force in Indonesian politics. 
Intended to bring pressure on Sukarno to moderate his policies by increasing the 
strength of anti-communist forces, the Eisenhower Administration's decision to 
encourage and support the rebels had the opposite effect. By supplying weapons 
to the insurgents, Washington exposed its friends in the army officer corps to 
criticism and made them question their continued allegiance. More 
catastrophically, the defeat of the dissidents destroyed the very political elements 
which Washington hoped would provide an alternative to the nationalists and 
communists. It also allowed the PKI, once again, to portray itself as a defender 
of the Indonesian state and propelled it centre-stage as it became one of the three 
main players in Indonesian politics along with the army and Sukarno. 
Washington's duplicity in supporting the rebels while maintaining relations with 
Jakarta, and its sudden reversal of policy after the shooting down of the CIA 
plane, not only alienated Sukarno further but also emphasised how untrustworthy 
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the Americans were. 9 Having for years insisted that it was the Soviets and their 
allies who were seeking to subvert Indonesia, it was Washington that had been 
caught red-handed. 
That American policy toward Indonesia was undermined by the lack of 
empathy policymakers had with Indonesian nationalism is beyond doubt. In part, 
this resulted from the domination of the State Department apparatus by officials 
whose training and experience conditioned them to view their work through a 
European perspective. Many, like Howard Jones, had been transferred away 
from the European desks at the State Department to work on Asia after 1949 and, 
as John Allison later wrote, many of these felt that their new assignments had 
taken them away from the mainstream of foreign policy work. Ambassador 
Allison argued that, as a consequence, they did not place Asians `on an equal 
footing with our Western allies' when considering issues like the Indonesian case 
for sovereignty over West Irian. 10 Thus, Dutch and Australian objections to 
Indonesian sovereignty carried more weight in Washington than did Jakarta's 
arguments. This bias also affected the consideration given by the State 
Department to the advice it received from the Embassy in Jakarta. Often 
hampered by a lack of Indonesian-speaking officers, the Embassy, nevertheless, 
identified the importance of the West Irian question while Allison's analysis of 
the nature of the regional revolts was found, by his successor Howard Jones, to 
9 Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945 - 1965, 
pp. 380 - 81. Adams, Sukarno : An Autobiography. As Told To Cindy Adams, p. 
299. 
10 Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, p. 37. "United States Diplomacy In Southeast Asia : 
The Limits Of Policy", by Allison (1963), cited in Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years 
Indonesian Foreign Policy 1945 - 1965, p. 374. 
335 
have been accurate. Jones, of course, had been one of the small group of officials 
who had originally rejected Allison's advice. 
The "Europeanist" background of many of those dealing with Indonesia was 
reflected in their attitudes, which were often patronising and stereotypical in 
relation to Indonesians. During the independence struggle, American 
policymakers were conditioned by reports from Walter Foote, the Consul- 
General until late 1947, who believed that Republican leaders were untrustworthy 
and that Indonesians generally were incapable of surviving without the Dutch. 
Officials also believed in their own superiority over Indonesians and couched this 
in ways redolent of the same colonialist attitudes which they professed to oppose. 
Frequently, the Indonesians' unwillingness to accept American advice, especially 
about communism, was portrayed as naivete by officials unable to accept that 
they might hold views which were different to Washington's. The idea that 
Indonesians generally, and their leaders particularly, were incapable of 
independent thought found expression in ways reminiscent of imperial 
paternalism. Thus, Charles Livengood, Foote's successor, could report to 
Washington that the Republican leaders were approaching the post-Renville 
negotiations in a `demanding and even childish' manner. " This demeaning 
image of Indonesians persisted after they had achieved statehood and so, in 1959, 
James Baird, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration's 
Operations Mission to Indonesia, could still see Indonesia's refusal to accept his 
advice about economic reform as a sign of its delinquency - for him, Indonesia 
'l NA; RG 59; DF 1945 - 1949,856E. 00, Box 6451; Livengood to the 
Secretary of State, 
20 Feb. 1948. 
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was nothing less than a `problem child'. 12 Sukarno certainly thought that 
American policymakers had a sense of their own superiority, bordering on the 
racist, when he observed that `the USA just can't discount leaders because 
they're Asian. ' 
13 
During the Truman Presidency, this antipathy towards Asians affected 
American attitudes to the Indonesian revolution and buttressed Washington's 
unwillingness to side openly with the independence movement. However, during 
the Eisenhower Presidency, this antagonism was lifted onto an altogether 
different level, one that introduced into policymaking a personal dislike of 
Sukarno, which Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers shared and which distorted 
the Administration's assessment of the national interest. From the outset, 
Eisenhower and his Secretary of State demonstrated their lack of commitment to 
Indonesia by contemplating the disintegration of the state as an objective of US 
policy in the event of a communist take-over, something which the State 
Department officially considered, at the time, to be only a long-range possibility. 
That this outlook became a self-fulfilling prophesy had much to do with the 
prevailing mood in Washington, which ascribed unwelcome developments in 
Indonesia to the influence of communism and, increasingly, linked them to 
Sukarno personally. 
12 UVaL; Special Collections Department; Hugh S. Cumming Jr. Papers (#6922), Box 11; 
Correspondence A-C 1959 - 60; Baird to Cumming, 26 Jan. 1959. 
13 Adams, Sukarno : An Autobiography. As Told To Cindy, Adams, p. 299. 
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Politically, the Eisenhower Administration found Sukarno frustrating in two 
main respects. Firstly, Washington viewed his devotion to the completion of the 
Indonesian revolution, through the West Irian issue, as evidence of his 
concentration on the less pressing problems of state. In Administration circles, 
the revival of the Indonesian economy was the most important matter for Jakarta 
to deal with and Sukarno was thought incapable of addressing this problem. 14 
Later, his promotion of gotong rojong politics became synonymous in 
Washington with the advance of communism in Indonesia. Dulles viewed the 
Indonesian President in particularly negative terms, considering him to be 
`dangerous and untrustworthy and by character susceptible to the Communist 
way of thinking. ' 15 
However, before he had tried to bring the PKI into government, Sukarno's 
moral character had become an issue in Washington. His decision to take a 
second wife, in 1954, aroused much interest in the Administration, where it was 
perceived as a mistake which would affect the President's popularity. Over the 
next few years, stories of his sexual habits, which involved Pan American 
Airways hostesses, Hollywood film stars, mistresses, twelve-year old dancing 
girls and two more wives contributed to his negative image within the 
Administration. 16 To Dulles, the son of a minister whose propensity to moralise 
14 Allen Dulles to the President, 17 Apr. 1958, FRUS 1958 - 1960, Vol. XVIII, pp. 114 - 16. 
15 NA; RG 59; Records of the Policy Planning Staff (Lot 67 D 548), Box 141; Record of a 
Meeting in the Secretary's Office, 2 Jan. 1958. 
16 When on foreign trips Sukarno usually chartered a Pan American Boeing 707. On one such trip 
the CIA acquired evidence of him `partying' in an hotel in Cairo with three air hostesses. (Smith, 
Portrait Of A Cold Warrior, pp. 237 - 38). His links with Joan Crawford and 
Gina Lollabrigida 
were known to policymakers (Stephen Ambrose, Ike's Spies : Eisenhower And The Espionage 
Establishment, (New York, 1981), p. 249), while Jakarta was awash with rumours of Sukarno's 
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and pontificate were well-known, '7 Sukarno's sexual mores were beyond the 
pale, while Eisenhower's dislike of the Indonesian leader may have stemmed 
from memories of a sexual indiscretion of his own. '8 That Sukarno's reputation 
as a womaniser influenced Administration policy is beyond doubt, Allen Dulles 
thinking him to be `vain and pleasure loving to a marked degree' 19 while the CIA 
was clearly aware that senior officials were sufficiently antagonised by the 
Indonesian President's activities that they commissioned a "blue movie". All 
three US Ambassadors to Jakarta, between 1953 and 1961, were also convinced 
that Sukarno's behaviour was a consideration in policymaking at the highest 
levels. Thus, in 1955, those arguing in favour of inviting Sukarno to the US, 
including Hugh Cumming, found that his morals were a factor for those who 
thought that he should not be asked. Similarly, John Allison and Howard Jones 
both believed that Eisenhower's persistent refusals to visit Indonesia were, at 
least partly, influenced by the perception that Sukarno was not `a nice man. ' This 
was an opinion with which none of them agreed. While Cumming was more 
neutral on the subject, Allison and Jones thought that Sukarno was unfairly 
depicted as a playboy. They argued that his reputation derived from 
misapprehensions in the West about Moslem laws on polygamy and about 
Oriental cultural assumptions that `divine despots ... 
be virile beyond the potency 
highly unconventional behaviour, which verged on `depravity'. (AA; CRS A5954/1/2279/2; 
Djakarta Despatch No. 7,28 Jul. 1955. ) 
17 AA; CRS A5462/1/2/14; Despatch No. 4, Spender to Casey, 19 Jun. 1956. 
18 Though the exact nature of Eisenhower's relationship with his driver Kay Summersby, which 
lasted from 1943 to 1945, is uncertain, it seems that Eisenhower fell in love with her but was 
unable to consummate the liaison. Summersby hinted that Eisenhower was impotent. (Piers 
Brendon, Ike : The Life And Times Of Dwight D. Eisenhower, (London, 1987)). 
19 Allen Dulles to the President, 17 Apr. 1958, FRUS 1958 - 1960, Vol. XVIII, pp. 114 - 16. 
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of ordinary men. ' Jones, in particular, railed against the prejudice which blinded 
`some of the most responsible officials to the realities of the power situation. '20 
Throughout the Truman and Eisenhower Presidencies, US policy towards 
Indonesia was characterised by its failure to assess accurately the forces with 
which it was dealing. Washington's persistence in supporting the restoration of 
the Dutch, in the face of mounting evidence of the strength of Indonesian 
nationalism, indicated how slow was the Truman Administration's re-appraisal of 
traditional friendships in the light of post-war realities. That the Dutch were 
able, with Australian assistance, to retain American support over the West Irian 
question showed the enduring quality of the Anglo-Saxon bias which pervaded 
Washington's policies at a time when Asia's importance was growing. 
Complementing this blinkered outlook was the determination of policymakers to 
identify communist subversion in every aspect of Indonesian political life. This 
prevented Washington from understanding the nature of Indonesian nationalism, 
with dire results. The entire rationale for the covert intervention in 1957 and 
1958 being based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the dispute between the 
regions and Jakarta. In part this occurred because Dulles was not prepared to 
accept advice which contradicted his preconceived notions about Sukarno and the 
rebels. However, the major cause was the inability of officials, mostly in 
Washington, to come to terms with the dynamics of Indonesian political life. 
Despite over a decade-long association with the Indonesian political elite, the 
State Department was only too willing to believe that that the rebellion in 
20 Allison, Ambassador From The Prairie, p. 313. Jones, Indonesia : The Possible Dream, 
pp. 63,78 and 181 - 82. 
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Sumatra and Sulawesi was a clash between the forces of good and evil, between 
anti-communists and fellow-travellers and the PKI in Java. Ambassador Jones' 
surprise, in March 1958, when Hatta advised him that the rebellion represented a 
split in the anti-communist camp was palpable and betrayed the ignorance, and 
prejudice, of senior American policymakers which had led Washington into its 
disastrous association with the rebels. 
In 1961, Washington's unsuccessful attempt to project its power and 
influence into Indonesia was viewed, by the people who had overseen the failure, 
as the result of a communist conspiracy to subvert the "free world". In spite of 
the Kennedy Administration's decision to resolve the West Irian issue in 
Indonesia's favour, Sukarno remained a thorn in America's side. Washington's 
support for the creation of the Federation of Malaysia, in 1963, antagonised the 
Indonesian President and relations deteriorated into a campaign of open hostility 
towards America, which included the ending of the US aid programme and 
Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN. The decline in relations was only halted 
when, in October 1965, an abortive coup was followed by an army-led massacre 
of communists and alleged sympathisers. Shorn of his support, Sukarno was 
eventually replaced by General Suharto, a development which, for Washington, 
ushered in a period of harmonious and stable friendship with Jakarta. 
Whatever 
the precise role played by Washington in the events which ended Sukarno's rule, 
there can be no doubt that US policy during the Truman and 
Eisenhower 
Presidencies contributed significantly to his demonisation and to 
Indonesia's 
descent into military dictatorship. For Indonesia, the intended benefits of 
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American policy - peace, prosperity and democracy - were not forthcoming, 
while both Truman and Eisenhower failed to secure Indonesia's vast wealth for 
capitalism. That this happened had more to do with Washington's policy failures 
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